

DIPLOMACY, PUBLIC OPINION AND THE “FRACTALIZATION” OF U.S.
ANTARCTIC POLICY, 1946–1959

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Declaration

This thesis contains no material which has been accepted for a degree of diploma by the University or any other institution, except by way of background information and duly acknowledged in the thesis. To the best of my knowledge and belief, this thesis contains no material previously published or written by another person except where due acknowledgement is made in the text. Some material published and researched by me has been included and duly acknowledged in the content of this thesis. These references include:

Moore, Jason Kendall. "A 'Sort' of Self-Denial: United States Policy toward the Antarctic, 1950–1959." *Polar Record* 37, no. 200 (2001): 14-27.

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Moore, Jason Kendall. "Alliance of Mistrust: The United States, Britain and Chile in the Quest for Antarctic Sovereignty, 1952–1959." *Estudios Norteamericanos* 3, no. 3 (2004): 187-205.

Moore, Jason Kendall. "Bungled Publicity: Little America, Big America and the Rationale for Non-Claimancy, 1946–1961." *Polar Record* 40, no. 212 (2004): 19-30.

Moore, Jason Kendall. "Tethered to an Iceberg: United States Policy toward the Antarctic, 1939–1949." *Polar Record* 35, no. 193 (1999): 125-34.



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


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Abstract

The many specialists who address the background of the Antarctic Treaty of 1959 concur that the United States and Soviet Union set aside their own disputes for the sake of an internationalization agreement which devoted the world's last continent to peaceful scientific cooperation. While this is true and must be regarded as a formidable achievement, the treaty gains further significance when evaluated in light of the Cold War tensions which bore upon it.

This thesis maintains that the controversy surrounding Antarctica reflected the patterns which at a global level threatened to embroil the superpowers in full-scale conflict. It contains previously published research which analyzes U.S. Antarctic policy in detail, and herein provides the groundwork for establishing links between U.S.–Soviet, U.S.–British and U.S.–Chilean relations at large and their relations in the far south, as well as between the U.S. internationalization proposals and U.S. national security policies.

The “fractalization” of U.S. Antarctic policy shifts emphasis from the policy itself to how Cold War diplomacy and public opinion bore upon it. Physical scientists regard objects as “fractal” when their structural complexity is maintained at all levels, as in snowflakes or electronic transmissions. This provides an ideal metaphor for the analytical framework adopted herein.

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This thesis would not have been possible except for Consuelo León Wöppke, who involved me with a series of research projects sponsored by the Antarctic Institute (INACH) of the Chilean Foreign Affairs Ministry and by the Chilean National Commission for Scientific and Technological Research (CONICYT).¹ This experience resulted in a series of publications which helped to distinguish my application to the Thomas Crawford Memorial Scholarship, University of Tasmania. I am grateful to Marcus Haward for helping to have secured my funding to attend conferences of the Chilean Association of North American Studies (ACHEN) and the Encounters of Ibero–American Antarctic Historians (EHIA), as well as for his supervision of this project; and to H. Robert Hall for sharing his Australian archival materials and doctoral thesis with my Chilean colleagues.

¹ The INACH projects were *Convergencia y Divergencias de las Conductas y Acciones de Chile y USA en Antartica entre 1939–1949* and *Chile y Estados Unidos: Continuidad y Convergencia en sus Politicas Antarticas, 1949–1957*. The CONICYT projects were *Politica Antartica entre 1939–1956: Influencias, Divergencias y Confluencias entre las Posiciones de Gran Bretana, Estados Unidos y Chile* and *Potencias Anglo-Sajones y Politica Antartica Chilena en 1956–1961*.

Preface

In the footnotes and text the Department of State, Foreign Office, and Foreign Affairs Ministry are understood to be U.S., British and Chilean, respectively. Citations such as “Department of State to Embassy in Santiago” are understood as to the U.S.

Embassy in Santiago; “Foreign Office to Embassy in Buenos Aires” as to the British Embassy in Buenos Aires; and “Embassy in Washington to Foreign Affairs Ministry” as from the Chilean Embassy in Washington. Exceptions are indicated, for example, “British Embassy in Washington to Department of State.”

References to the Secretary of State, Foreign Secretary, and Minister of Foreign Affairs—or Foreign Affairs Minister—are also understood to be U.S., British and Chilean, respectively. There are cases of overlapping titles, such as “Undersecretary of State,” usually referring to the U.S. Undersecretary of State, but in one or more cases to the British Undersecretary of State for Foreign Affairs, as clarified by the organizational and archival references. The term “Under Foreign Secretary” is not used as it would be misrepresentative.

Details are sometimes added for the sake of clarity. For example, “Mr. Leche to Mr. Bevin” becomes “Embassy in Santiago (Leche) to Foreign Secretary (Bevin).” As the latter terminology was originally used as frequently or more frequently than the former in the reviewed documents, it is deemed appropriate in all such cases. Last names are included in parentheses if originally used, and further identifying criteria if available. For example, “Embassy in London (Tibbetts) to Department of State, 16 July 1953, no. 324; Embassy in Santiago (Bowers) to Secretary of State, 31 March 1953, no. 410, control 10818, NARA, RG 59, 702.022.” Numbers and control references, often a combination of letters and numbers, are listed after the dates.

NARA, RG and all other acronyms are explained in the following section.

In the previous example, “Secretary of State (Dulles)” would be more accurate, but it was not originally qualified as such. While reference to “702.022/3-3153” would be more accurate, and was originally qualified as such, in relation to the second document, only “702.022” is used. It is the specific Department of State manuscript collection in which both documents were found; the suffix is only a numerical reference to the date. This style of reference is preferable as multiple documents are often included in the same footnote. When dates appear in parentheses, they have usually been derived from the filing protocol.

In many cases multiple documents from different manuscript collections are included in the same footnote. For example, “Department of State, Division of European Affairs, Memorandum on Trusteeship Agreement for Antarctica, 1 March 1948; Secretary of State (Marshall) to Secretary of Defense (Forrestal), 10 June 1948; Secretary of State (Marshall) to Secretary of Defense (Forrestal), 8 July 1948, NARA, RG 59, 800.014; Department of State, Report for National Security Council (NSC 21), 13 July 1948, NARA, RG 218, Records of Policy Planning Staff.”

The first three documents are from the same Department of State manuscript collection. The fourth document is from a Joint Chiefs of Staff manuscript collection, classified in reference to the Policy Planning Staff—as is another Department of State manuscript collection. The overlapping jurisdiction is explained in chapter six. If a fifth document were added from “NARA, RG 59, 702.022” or “PRO, FO 371,” for example, it would be listed as such. Record groups and manuscript collections are not listed independently of their archival repository, as indicated by NARA, PRO and other acronyms explained in the following section.

The repetition of “Secretary of State (Marshall) to Secretary of Defense (Forrestal)” is deemed appropriate as they refer to separate documents. They are not listed as “Secretary of State (Marshall) to Secretary of Defense (Forrestal), 1 March 1948 and 10 June 1948” to preserve continuity of reference: each document is fully listed as it originally appeared—given the previous qualifications. If the second document had not used the last names, neither would the reference. Numbers and control references are generally applicable only to documents from embassies.

Archival sources reveal inconsistencies which, aside from occasional misspellings, are left unmodified. While “Embassy in Santiago (Bowers)” appears to refer to “Ambassador in Santiago (Bowers),” it remains as originally used. Communications between offices or divisions of the same organization are prefaced accordingly, for example, “Department of State, Office of American Republic Affairs to Division of River Plate Affairs.” References such as “Department of State, Memorandum of Conversation, Office of American Republic Affairs et al.” are understood to be of a conversation involving the listed office and others—or if not with others, among its own members. Authors of the memoranda are rarely identified. The office or division or individual listed is the one which first appeared on the document.


Sources from the Byrd Polar Research Center are generally informal in nature. Byrd was close to leading figures throughout the government and armed services, such as President Franklin D. Roosevelt and Fleet Admiral William D. Leahy. He often addressed them without using their titles, and was addressed by them in the same manner. The official titles have not been included, except when originally used. They are deemed less significant than the need to clarify that “Mr. Bevin” happened to be “Foreign Secretary (Bevin).” When they are significant, the full names and

titles, if necessary, are identified in the text.

Chilean documents are referred to in English, as this is technically uncomplicated and facilitates comprehension. They retain the acronym MRECh in reference to the Chilean Foreign Affairs Ministry or Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores de Chile. Chilean secondary sources are listed by their given titles. Chicago-style documentation and American English have been adopted with some qualification. Periodicals and newspapers are cited only by name and date. Authors and article titles have been omitted. Terms such as “Cold War,” “Escudero Plan,” and “Antarctic Treaty” are treated as proper nouns. Terms such as “Berlin blockade,” “Suez crisis,” and “U-2 incident” are not. This thesis deals with many well-known events which if all treated as proper nouns would lead to incessant capitalization.

The term “free world” is placed in quotation marks to acknowledge its subjective nature. The term “American” is used in reference to citizens of the United States, though technically it applies Latin Americans as well. The term “North American” is alternately used when both types of Americans are under discussion. Gender-neutral terms, such as “chairperson,” “spokesperson,” and “humankind,” are also adopted—except in the citations if documents use other terms. The term “Royal Navy” is used in reference to the British navy, yet the prefix HMS is not used in reference to vessels thereof.

Map of Antarctica



Territorial claims of each of the seven claimant nations extend to 60°S, except for the Norwegian claim, which has an undefined limit. Reproduced from *Polar Record* 37, no. 200 (2001): 14.

Acronyms and Abbreviations

<i>BAS</i>	<i>Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists</i> , published by the Federation of American Scientists
BPRC	Byrd Polar Research Center, Papers of Admiral Richard E. Byrd, Columbus, Ohio
<i>DAFR</i>	<i>Documents on American Foreign Relations</i>
<i>DIA</i>	<i>Documents on International Affairs</i> , published on behalf of the Royal Institute of International Affairs
FO	Foreign Office [archival reference]
<i>FRUS</i>	<i>Foreign Relations of the United States</i> , published on behalf of the United States Department of State
MRECh	Archives of the Chilean Foreign Affairs Ministry, Diplomatic Department, Santiago, Chile.
NARA	National Archives and Records Administration, College Park, Maryland
PRO	Public Record Office, London, England
RG	Record group
<i>SLA</i>	<i>Survey of International Affairs</i> , published on behalf of Royal Institute of International Affairs
USGPO	United States Government Printing Office
<i>USWA</i>	<i>The United States in World Affairs</i> , published on behalf of the Council on Foreign Relations

Table of Contents

Introduction	1
Part One: Diplomacy	
1. Multilateral Diplomacy	19
2. U.S.–Soviet Relations.....	59
3. Trilateral Diplomacy	97
4. U.S.–British and U.S.–Chilean Relations.....	134
Part Two: Public Opinion	
5. U.S. Antarctic Opinion.....	177
6. U.S. National Security.....	213
7. The Anti-Nuclear Movement	255
Conclusion.....	297
Bibliography	312

Introduction

The Antarctic Treaty of 1959 is not regarded as one of the more important documents of the Cold War, but rather as a minor aberration from the strife which plagued U.S.–Soviet relations and fuelled a nuclear arms race which confronted humanity with the prospect of self-destruction. The specialists who address the background of the treaty have correctly observed that the United States and Soviet Union set aside their own disputes for the sake of an internationalization agreement which devoted the world's last continent to peaceful scientific cooperation.¹ While this achievement must be regarded as formidable, many authors have refrained from thoroughly scrutinizing the Cold War context in which it emerged. This is understandable as the treaty appeared to be a mere bagatelle in a world filled with animosity and weapons of mass destruction.²

This thesis maintains that the controversy surrounding Antarctica reflected the patterns which at a global level threatened to embroil the superpowers in full-scale conflict.³ To varying degrees, F.M. Auburn, Peter Beck, Jack Child, Klaus J. Dodds, Christopher C. Joyner, Richard S. Lewis, Phillip W. Quigg, Deborah Shapley, and others discuss how Cold War dynamics influenced the formation of the Antarctic

¹ For example, Richard S. Lewis, *A Continent for Science: The Antarctic Adventure* (New York: Viking Press, 1965); Peter Briggs, *Laboratory at the Bottom of the World* (New York: David McKay Company, Inc., 1970). For an insightful critique of the 1957–1958 International Geophysical Year, see Walter Sullivan, “The IGY—Scientific Alliance in a Divided World,” *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists* 14, no. 2 (1958): 68–72.

² For example, American schoolchildren grew accustomed to civil defense drills which sought to give them some “sense of security in an age of overwhelming anxiety.” Joanne Brown, “‘A is for Atom, B is for Bomb’: Civil Defense in American Public Education, 1948–1963,” *Journal of American History* 75, no. 1 (1988): 68–90.

³ The Department of State's Policy Planning Staff observed, “While it seems unlikely that war could break out over disputed claims in Antarctica, it cannot be denied that wars in the past have grown out of disputes of even more trivial nature.” Quoted in Secretary of State (Marshall) to Secretary of Defense (Forrestal), 10 June 1948, NARA, RG 59, 800.014.

Treaty.⁴ Some of their works were published before relevant archival materials had been declassified; others adopted a less chronologically focused tack or dwelled on non-archivally related issues. This thesis seeks to expand the scope of their contributions by linking the United States' policy toward the far south with its general role in world affairs from 1946 to 1959. It incorporates previously published research providing detailed analysis of how U.S. Antarctic policy evolved over this period.

Official documents reveal no explicit link between the first U.S. internationalization proposal in 1948 and, for example, the dispute over the future of Berlin which led to the Soviet blockade and Anglo-American airlift. They also reveal no such link between the second U.S. internationalization proposal a decade later and the ongoing dispute over Berlin which led to a Soviet ultimatum and the implicit threat of war. Those involved with the proposals were still likely to have been more preoccupied with the war scares over Berlin.⁵ Antarctica was but one facet of their expertise, and they received input from their colleagues throughout the Department of State in addition to the representatives of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the National Security Council.⁶ Though the proposals were innocuously worded and espoused

⁴ See F.M. Auburn, *Antarctic Law and Politics* (London: C. Hurst & Company, 1982); Peter Beck, *The International Politics of Antarctica* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1986); Jack Child, *Antarctica and South American Geopolitics: Frozen Lebensraum* (New York: Praeger, 1988); Klaus J. Dodds, *Pink Ice: Britain and the South Atlantic Empire* (London: I.B. Taurus, 2002); E.W. Hunter Christie, *The Antarctic Problem: An Historical and Political Study* (London: George Allen and Unwin, Ltd., 1951); Julius Goebel, *The Struggle for the Falkland Islands* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1982); Christopher C. Joyner and Ethel Theis, *Eagle over the Ice: The U.S. in the Antarctic* (Hanover, New Hampshire: University Press of New England, 1997); Richard S. Lewis and Philip M. Smith, eds., *Frozen Future: A Prophetic Report from Antarctica* (New York: Quadrangle Books, 1973); Phillip W. Quigg, *A Pole Apart. The Emerging Issue of Antarctica* (New York: McGraw Hill Book Company, 1983); Deborah Shapley, *The Seventh Continent: Antarctica in a Resource Age* (Washington: Resources for the Future, 1985).

⁵ See Stephen E. Ambrose, *Eisenhower: The President*, vol. 2, 1952–1969 (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1984), 57; Elizabeth Barker, *The British between the Superpowers, 1945–50* (London: The Macmillan Press Ltd, 1983), 121; *USWA 1948–1949* (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1949), 139, 148.

⁶ For clarification of how the latter bodies overlapped, see chapter six. See also Jason Kendall Moore, "Tethered to an Iceberg: United States Policy toward the Antarctic, 1939–1949," *Polar Record* 35, no. 193 (1999): 125–34.

international cooperation,⁷ they were advised, drafted and circulated by individuals whose careers required them to think in terms of conflict, which in this case happened to lie at the bottom of the world.⁸

Antarctica's untapped mineral resources provided a strong incentive for exploration after the Second World War. The United States promptly dispatched the most colossal expedition to date, and the press accurately reported that the government was contemplating a territorial claim. After the expedition returned, it refrained from doing so and instead proposed a condominium arrangement based on the renunciation of sovereignty. Given negative feedback from the seven nations which had announced claims—Argentina, Australia, Britain, Chile, France, New Zealand and Norway—it opted to pursue a form of internationalization which sustained the indecisive political status quo.⁹ The early Cold War period was equally indecisive, given Washington's inability to reassure allies of its motivations or to dissuade adversaries from testing its resolve.¹⁰ This trend was evident in relation to U.S. Antarctic policy, the unreliability of which exasperated many officials nearly as much as by the risk posed by Soviet involvement.¹¹

Like many controversies, the Antarctic involved questions of national prestige, economic resources and strategic advantage. What it lacked was the catalyst of an indigenous population. However seriously the claimant nations viewed the region, they proved unable or unwilling to devote any more resources to it. Further

⁷ This is in contrast to many proposals of the era which were not innocuously worded but did espouse international cooperation, such as the U.S. arms control proposals—discussed in chapter seven—which included provisions the Soviet Union rejected as they appeared to be a guise for espionage.

⁸ The reviewed archives do not indicate that officials believed the region's unique geographical characteristics offered any panacea for the sovereignty dispute, which was fuelled largely by nationalistic sentiments, as discussed most thoroughly in chapter five.

⁹ See chapter one.

¹⁰ See *USWA* 1957 (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1958), 26.

¹¹ See Moore, "Tethered to an Iceberg"; Moore, "A 'Sort' of Self-Denial: United States Policy toward the Antarctic, 1950–59," *Polar Record* 37, no. 200 (2001): 13–26. Chapter one includes material from these articles.

expeditions and military bases could not be funded by the expectation of mineral wealth or any future concessions to be gained from control of the Magellan Strait.¹² It bode well that Argentina, Britain and Chile—whose territorial claims overlapped in the peninsular region beneath South America—were in no position to mount expeditions on the U.S. scale. Otherwise they might have acted upon their threats of war, and the United States would have found itself in an even more precarious than it already was for tacitly condoning British actions which Latin Americans throughout the Western Hemisphere found objectionable.¹³

As the Anglo–Latin American dispute was beginning to recede, the United States chose to include the Soviet Union in the negotiations which culminated in the Antarctic Treaty. This decision related to the 1957–1958 International Geophysical Year, an eighteen-month event devoted to increasing humankind’s scientific knowledge.¹⁴ The superpowers joined the seven claimants and three other nations—Belgium, Japan and South Africa—in the Antarctic component of this event. The USSR re-established its presence on the frozen continent for the first time in over a century while its troops remained poised to overrun Western Europe, and the U.S. Strategic Air Command awaited orders to eradicate communist population centers.¹⁵ The Antarctic Treaty nominally prohibited those kinds of plans from extending to the bottom of the world. This was all the more noteworthy as U.S. officials had expected the Soviet Union to “torpedo” the negotiations, and prepared for that possibility by

¹² Chile and Argentina were falsely alleged to harbor this objective. Jason Kendall Moore, “Seven Penguins and an Olive Branch: Antarctic Politics in *The New York Times*,” *Estudios Norteamericanos* 2, no. 4: 125-136.

¹³ The threats of war were most explicitly stated by Chilean Foreign Minister Arturo Olavarria Bravo. See chapter three.

¹⁴ See John A. Simpson, “The International Geophysical Year: A Study of Our Planet,” *BAS* 13, 10 (1957): 351-56; Walter Sullivan, “Antarctica in a Two-Power World,” *Foreign Affairs* 36 (1957): 154-66.

¹⁵ See Charles C. Alexander, *Holding the Line: The Eisenhower Era, 1952–1961* (Bloomington, Indiana: Indiana University Press, 1975), 203; John Lewis Gaddis, *The Long Peace: Inquiries into the History of the Cold War* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1987), 110.

holding a series of clandestine discussions which, if discovered, might have had the same effect.¹⁶

In this way the Antarctic controversy invites analysis as fractal history. Physical scientists regard objects as fractal when their structural complexity is maintained at all levels, as in snowflakes or electronic transmissions. This discovery gave rise to chaos theory which has been applied a variety of innovative ways, though H.W. Brands questions if “fractals” contribute anything other than a metaphor to the field of history since its practitioners have long agreed that the every level of the past is riddled with complexity.¹⁷ This thesis nonetheless adopts the metaphor in reference to the “fractalization” of U.S. Antarctic policy, that is, the identification of superpower rivalries which shaped the future of the southern continent in keeping with the spirit of Geneva to resolve disputes through negotiations rather than armed conflict.¹⁸ Though the Antarctic Treaty failed to produce a widespread thaw in the Cold War,¹⁹ its fruition demonstrated that great ideals could be achieved under the least promising circumstances.²⁰

The title refers to “fractalization” rather than fractionalization since the latter might suggest that U.S. Antarctic policy was merely one component, and possibly a divergent component, of the Cold War. As previously mentioned, Antarctic literature makes this impression while Cold War literature either ignores the Antarctic or refers

¹⁶ See Department of State, Bureau of European Affairs (Kohler) to Office of Deputy Undersecretary of State (Daniels), 21 April 1959, NARA, RG 59, 399.829.

¹⁷ H.W. Brands, “Fractal History, or Clio and the Chaotics,” *Diplomatic History* 16, no. 4 (1992), 495-510.

¹⁸ The legitimacy of this spirit was widely questioned as the superpowers were not only stockpiling weapons of mass destruction but threatening to use them. In relation to the Antarctic, it alternately became known as the spirit of the International Geophysical Year, which British officials privately mocked. See Foreign Office (Hankey) to Colonial Office (Rogers), 16 June 1958, AS 15214/135; Colonial Office (Rogers) to Foreign Office (Hankey), 18 June 1958, A 15214/135A, PRO, FO 371.

¹⁹ North American periodicals ran stories which adopted the “thaw” theme. See *Newsweek*, 26 October 1959; *Time*, 26 October 1959; *The New Republic*, 14 December 1959.

²⁰ Jason Kendall Moore, “The Constructive Limits of Antarctic History, Yankee Imperialism and Chilean–Australian Relations through 1959,” *Revista de Historia* 13–14 (2003–4): 173–78.

to it only briefly. In *The Cold War: The United States and the Soviet Union, 1917–1991*, Ronald E. Powaski writes of the 1959 treaty as “the only bright spot” in a dismal year of superpower relations.²¹ Observers at the time reached the same conclusion in keeping with President Dwight D. Eisenhower’s public statements and the undeniably altruistic provisions of the treaty itself.²² The fact that Powaski devotes more than a single sentence to the treaty distinguishes his book from countless others. Chalmers M. Roberts goes somewhat further to observe that its cooperative spirit was questionable in light of the events which surrounded it, most notably the following year when the Soviet Union downed a U.S. spy plane over its territory.²³

The U-2 incident has been described as the reality of the spirit of Geneva and signs of cooperation, such as the meeting of Eisenhower and Soviet Premier Nikita S. Khrushchev at Camp David, as the illusion.²⁴ This thesis applies a similar perspective to U.S. Antarctic policy, which fluctuated in many ways except for its promulgation of science and international cooperation, objectives which failed to guise its concern with strategic issues, but which nonetheless did reach fruition. Eisenhower hailed the treaty as an outstanding example of America’s devotion to peace and justice,²⁵ yet it had opposed the two articles of greatest political significance, pertaining to the suspension rather than the renunciation of sovereignty and the inclusion of a nuclear test ban.²⁶ Moreover it had chosen to involve the Soviet Union only due to a lack of

²¹ Ronald E. Powaski, *The Cold War: The United States and the Soviet Union, 1917–1991* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1998), 125.

²² *The New York Times*, 16 June 1960; James R. Killian, Jr., “Science and Public Policy,” *BAS* 15, no. 4 (1959): 168–72. For further analysis of the U.S. press, see chapter five.

²³ Chalmers M. Roberts, *The Nuclear Years: The Arms Race and Arms Control, 1945–70* (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1970), 50–51.

²⁴ *SIA* 1959–60 (London: Oxford University Press, 1964), 10.

²⁵ *The New York Times*, 8 January 1960.

²⁶ According to U.S. documents, another divisive issue pertained to the treaty’s accession clause. From a technical standpoint, this issue was of little consequence until it had been decided what nations would

viable alternatives. The peace and justice to which Eisenhower referred had been neither premeditated nor enthusiastically welcomed by government officials.²⁷

This thesis highlights two major components of U.S. Antarctic policy, diplomacy and public opinion. The Eisenhower administration engaged in forms of psychological warfare with the Soviet Union and, to a lesser extent, with the American people.²⁸ Central to its military strategy was the doctrine of massive nuclear retaliation which effectively prevented the Soviet Union from using its superior conventional forces to overtake Western Europe.²⁹ While it seemed unlikely that the doctrine would be applied to limited conflicts, officials including former President Harry S. Truman alluded to that possibility on numerous occasions.³⁰ Their hope was to preserve a “delicate balance of terror” which intimidated the Soviet Union without absolutely horrifying the American public.³¹ U.S. Antarctic policy reflected a benign variation of the strategy to “keep the communists [and everyone else] guessing.”³² Until the treaty was signed in December 1959, the other nations dreaded the possibility that Washington might reverse its non-claimant policy and further complicate prospects for a harmonious settlement.³³

Of the many reasons why the government did not advance a territorial claim,

be acceding to. See Department of State, Office Memorandum, 24 November 1959, NARA, RG 59, 399.829.

²⁷ Chapter five deals with this issue most poignantly by incorporating the opinions of Admiral Richard Evelyn Byrd.

²⁸ See Kenneth Osgood, “Form before Substance: Eisenhower’s Commitment to Psychological Warfare and Negotiations with the Enemy,” *Diplomatic History* 24, no. 3 (2000): 405-33; Kenneth A. Osgood, “Hearts and Minds: The Unconventional Cold War,” *Journal of Cold War Studies* 4, no. 2 (2002): 85-107.

²⁹ See Martin J. Medhurst, “Atoms for Peace and Nuclear Hegemony: The Rhetorical Structure of a Cold War Campaign,” *Armed Forces and Society* 23, no. 4 (1997): 571-93; A.J.C. Edwards, *Nuclear Weapons: The Balance of Terror, the Quest for Peace* (Houndmills: Macmillan Press Ltd, 1986), 23.

³⁰ Truman’s containment doctrine, announced while the United States held an atomic monopoly, foreshadowed the doctrine of massive retaliation. His statements during the Korean War indicated that serious consideration was being given to using the atomic bomb. See chapters two and six.

³¹ See Albert Wohlstetter, “The Delicate Balance of Terror,” *Foreign Affairs* 37, no. 2 (1959): 211-34.

³² See Dwight D. Eisenhower, *The White House Years: Waging Peace 1956-1961* (London: Heinemann, 1965), 295.

³³ See chapters one and three.

few Americans contemplated that their security might someday depend on the control of the Antarctic, as naval officers periodically suggested.³⁴ The frozen continent seemed peripheral to the future of either democracy or communism, and proposals for its internationalization failed to generate widespread public interest.³⁵ If the treaty had not required congressional ratification, the vast majority of Americans might have been unaware of its existence. Those who followed the debate perhaps empathized with the minority of senators who denounced it for unnecessarily legitimating the Soviet Union's presence in the far south. As one senator bemoaned, the affirmative vote reflected an unjustified faith in the Eisenhower administration's foreign policy.³⁶ The other signatory nations generally did not possess that faith,³⁷ yet they also ratified the treaty. They, like the United States, saw merit in permanently demilitarizing the one continent which lacked either swords or ploughshares.³⁸

The limited strategic significance of Antarctica only partially explains the Eisenhower administration's willingness to involve the Soviet Union and leave U.S. rights un-stated. To do otherwise would have further damaged the credibility of its public diplomacy, one aspect of what Kenneth Osgood defines as psychological warfare.³⁹ After the Second World War, U.S. rhetoric grew increasingly anticommunist and urged Eastern Europeans to defy Soviet rule. After the 1956 Hungarian uprising was brutally suppressed without so much as a threat of U.S. intervention, the nation's public diplomacy suffered a major setback. It then turned to less confrontational realms and began to emulate the Soviet Union's "peace

³⁴ *The New York Times*, 15–16 April 1947, as further discussed in chapter five.

³⁵ That is, the proposals failed to generate widespread public interest among U.S. citizens. They were more closely followed by Argentines, Britons and Chileans, for example, due to the sovereignty dispute presented most thoroughly in chapter three.

³⁶ *The New York Times*, 11 August 1960, as further discussed in chapter six.

³⁷ See chapters one and three.

³⁸ See Moore, "The Constructive Limits of Antarctic History."

³⁹ See footnote 27.

offensive.”⁴⁰ The eventual discovery of the Central Intelligence Agency’s infiltration of various cultural organizations, unbeknownst to their members, dealt another blow to American prestige.⁴¹ The success of the Antarctic Conference can only be viewed as a minor victory for U.S. propaganda—as it was shared by the other participants—whereas its failure due to a reversal of the non-claimant policy would have constituted an embarrassing defeat.⁴²

This thesis adopts a contextually oriented framework encompassing three chapters based on previously published research, focusing on the Antarctic, and four others which explore better-known aspects of the Cold War. The first context is the most general, U.S. Antarctic policy coupled with an overview of U.S.–Soviet relations—chapters one and two, respectively. Until the International Geophysical Year, U.S. Antarctic policy was motivated by the desire to exclude the Soviet Union. This was predictable in the early Cold War as the superpowers demonized each other. However, the assumption that Cold War motivations extended to the Antarctic can be interpreted in many ways, requiring clarification based on a review on how the superpowers vied for hegemony on the world stage. Though the Antarctic was a much lower-profile issue than the crises over Berlin and the Formosa Strait, for example, the events surrounding it coincided with overall trends.⁴³ In the 1950s the

⁴⁰ For example, “The West as Portrayed by Communist Propaganda,” *The World Today* 10, 12 (1954): 532-41; Phyllis A. Greenlaw, “‘Peace’ in Soviet Strategy,” *Russian Review* 13, no. 2 (1954): 99-119; Nikita S. Khrushchev, “On Peaceful Co-Existence,” *Foreign Affairs* 38, no. 1 (1959): 1-18; William Henry Chamberlain, “Communist Basic Tactics: Rule or Ruin,” *Russian Review* 20, no. 1 (1961): 3-10. The “peace offensive” included calls to relax international tensions. The Council on Foreign Relations warned that Soviet rhetoric to this effect was highly disingenuous since communist “leaders have shown that they can turn tensions on and off as it suits their own strategy.” Council on Foreign Relations, “Basic Aims of United States Foreign Policy,” in the U.S. Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, *United States Foreign Policy: Compilation of Studies* (Washington: USGPO, 1961), 641-61.

⁴¹ James Critchlow, “Public Diplomacy during the Cold War: The Record and Its Implications,” *Journal of Cold War Studies* 6, no. 1 (2004): 75-89; Ambrose, *Eisenhower* 2: 94-96.

⁴² This thesis deals with the success of the conference at which the Antarctic Treaty was signed, as well as the success of the signatory nations’ ratification thereof. It does not deal with the success of the Antarctic Treaty itself, as this would not be substantiated for decades.

⁴³ Both crises involved U.S. perceptions of communism. Chapter two discusses how these perceptions often failed to distinguish among the Soviet, Chinese and North Korean varieties which were, in many

Soviet Union began to equal or surpass U.S. technology,⁴⁴ providing a strong incentive for U.S. officials to re-evaluate the need for its involvement in the far south.

The second context deals with U.S.–British–Chilean relations, both pertaining to the Antarctic and in general—chapters three and four, respectively. The Chilean Escudero Plan, tabled in response to the first U.S. internationalization proposal, called for temporarily setting aside the question of sovereignty for five to ten years during which the seven claimant nations and the United States were to negotiate the less divisive issues of an agreement. The United States later incorporated the Escudero Plan into its second internationalization proposal, having discussed the plan with Britain and in so doing violated its pledge of confidentiality. It also followed British advice to involve the USSR, carrying its “apostasy” to a higher level.⁴⁵ Chapters three and four address this issue in depth. It is mentioned here to explain why these two nations receive special consideration. Argentina and Australia, for example, played roles which were significant but failed to alter the course of U.S. policy.⁴⁶

ways, very similar. U.S. officials viewed the Sino–Soviet split in the late 1950s as a positive development, but it had negligible bearing on the Antarctic Treaty. The treaty was signed while both U.S.–Soviet and U.S.–Chinese tensions remained extremely high despite indications that they might not lead to military conflict.

⁴⁴ See James R. Killian Jr., *Sputniks, Scientists and Eisenhower: A Memoir of the First Special Assistant to the President for Science and Technology* (Cambridge, Massachusetts: The MIT Press, 1977).

⁴⁵ This term has been used to describe U.S. Antarctic policy from a Chilean perspective since the Escudero Plan was concocted during the administration of President Gabriel Gonzalez Videla, one of the most fervent anti-communists on the planet, at a time when Washington also sought to exclude the USSR from the far south. The Department of State significantly modified the plan by applying its suspension of sovereignty indefinitely and using it to include the Soviet Union. See Jason Kendall Moore, “Maritime Rivalry, Political Intervention, and the Race to Antarctica: U.S.–Chilean Relations, 1939–1949,” *Journal of Latin American Studies* 33, no. 4 (2001): 713–38; Moore, “Thirty-Seven Degrees Frigid: U.S.–Chilean Relations and the Spectre of Polar Arrivistes, 1950–1959,” *Diplomacy & Statecraft* 14, no. 4 (2003): 69–93.

⁴⁶ For details of the **Australian** role, see Hall, *Origins of the Antarctic Treaty*. The Argentine role was less “constructive,” as Hall defines the Australian role. During the later 1940s through the mid-1950s, the regime of President Juan Domingo Perón nurtured its anti-U.S. reputation. Thereafter the government adopted a more conciliatory attitude but failed to table any Antarctic proposals as significant as the Chilean Escudero Plan, like the other nations which participated in the International Geophysical Year. See Moore, “The Constructive Limits of Antarctic History”; Department of State, Division of North and West Coast Affairs (Brundage) to Assistant Secretary of State (Braden) et al., 10 February 1947, NARA, RG 59; British Ambassador in Chile (Leche) to Foreign Secretary (Bevin), 29 January 1948, AS 970/305/2, PRO, FO 497/2.

U.S.–British–Chilean relations were largely but not exclusively influenced by U.S.–Soviet relations as well as concerns about U.S. national security policies. Britain and Chile both sought and required U.S. military and financial assistance at a time when anti-U.S. sentiment was prevalent among their citizens. The U.S. style of anticommunism failed to generate widespread enthusiasm in these nations, resulting in a backlash even among moderate citizens, and their officials sought to eschew the appearance of being subservient. For most of the period under consideration, they were mildly disappointed with the United States and highly suspicious of each other. By the time of the twelve-power negotiations over Antarctica, however, they considered the alternative of forging their own arrangement in cooperation with Argentina, in case the general negotiations were to fail, as often seemed likely.

The third context presents the domestic variables of U.S. Antarctic policy, coupled with an overview of U.S. national security policy—chapters five and six, respectively. North American journalists, politicians and a handful of citizens expressed disappointment that their government never formalized a sovereignty claim based on exploration, most notably, that of Admiral Richard Evelyn Byrd. The admiral was one of the best-publicized explorers of all time, and his recommendations in favor of a claim were repeatedly neglected. After his death in 1957, journalists began to adopt his view that the United States should announce a claim, as would have been in keeping with U.S. policies designed to halt Soviet expansion and eliminate the influence of domestic communists. Their perspective, like that of Byrd, was subordinated to national security concerns which grew so extreme as to silence meaningful criticism of the government's position in the Cold War. In this case that included not provoking a Soviet counter-claim by forwarding U.S. rights on the basis of exploration and discovery.

Each of these contexts relies on an initial chapter to provide a detailed survey of U.S. Antarctic policy, and a subsequent chapter to provide an overview of related aspects of the Cold War, followed by an interpretive synthesis. This format seeks to enhance the clarity of analysis, whereas the integration of all components might distort the connection between events aside from hindering the narrative flow. The chapters based on previously published material could still be read as independent contributions to historiography. Those dealing with the Cold War could not be, as they turn to issues which are not self-evidently germane to the Antarctic. They are bracketed with variations of the preceding themes for the sake of “re-enacting” the context in which U.S. Antarctic policy unfolded. While this thesis addresses history rather than the philosophy of history,⁴⁷ it does so in keeping with R.G. Collingwood’s thesis that since all history is the history of thought, it must be critically “re-enacted.”⁴⁸

The last context is only a single chapter in length—chapter seven—and expands on the topic which overshadowed all others: the arms race. Specifically it deals with the global anti-nuclear movement foreshadowed by the scientists involved with the U.S. atomic program who recommended establishing international control mechanisms before using the bomb against Japan. By the time the United States circulated the second internationalization proposal for Antarctica, it had joined a voluntary test suspension with the Soviet Union and Britain. The possibility of a test

⁴⁷ More technically this thesis address the past rather than history, a term often used in reference to books or articles written about the past opposed to what actually might have transpired. While this thesis cites many books and articles, it is based on original research.

⁴⁸ See Doug Mann, “Reconstructing the Past: A Structural Idealist Approach,” *Clio* 27 (1998): 221-49; Louis O. Mink, “Collingwood’s Historicism: A Dialectic of Process,” in Michael Krausz, ed., *Critical Essays on the Philosophy of R.G. Collingwood* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1972), 154-78. Collingwood espoused a philosophy of history which shifted attention from the “facts” to their broadest possible significance. This thesis applies his philosophy to specifically defined contexts rather than to “human experience as a whole.” See R.G. Collingwood, “The Nature and Aims of a Philosophy of History,” in R.G. Collingwood, *Essays in the Philosophy of History*, William Debbins, ed. (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1965), 34-56.

ban for the frozen continent was not discussed until the closing days of Antarctic Conference. The U.S. delegation initially opposed it but relented for the sake of permitting the other nations “to sell” the treaty at home, as *The New York Times* simplified.⁴⁹ More accurately it relented since otherwise the thirteen years of policymaking under consideration might have been for naught.

The four contexts move from the most general to the most specific.⁵⁰ The latter two explore factors bearing on U.S. foreign policy but which lie outside the sphere of inter-governmental relations, and thereby assume a higher degree of interpretive latitude.⁵¹ The significance of the anti-nuclear movement, one response to U.S. national security policies, is underscored by its presentation as the final context. While each of the others alludes to the arms race, it goes further to link the Antarctic Treaty to the partial nuclear test ban signed four years later by the United States, the Soviet Union and Britain. In the interim the treaty signatories had begun to forge an effective system of peaceful scientific cooperation while the superpowers’ dispute outside the Antarctic escalated to the verge of nuclear war. The test ban incorporated into the 1959 treaty established the only precedent for the one signed in 1963, and both manifested to the growing influence of world opinion.⁵²

The last context might be regarded as the most important since the arms race became synonymous with the Cold War long before the Antarctic Treaty was signed. If a nuclear exchange had transpired, the future of the southernmost continent would have been of little concern except to the scientists and explorers stationed there at the

⁴⁹ *The New York Times*, 1 December 1959.

⁵⁰ However, the individual chapters within the first three contexts move from the specific to the general. That is, from the multilateral diplomacy pertaining to Antarctica to the nature of U.S.–Soviet relations; from the trilateral diplomacy pertaining to Antarctica to the nature of U.S.–British and U.S.–Chilean relation; and from the limited extent of U.S. Antarctic opinion to the ideological nature of U.S. national security programs during the Cold War.

⁵¹ That is, the U.S.–Soviet context is more general and the U.S.–British–Chilean context more specific. The domestic context of U.S. Antarctic policy, involving questions of ideology and national security, is more general and the anti-nuclear context more specific.

⁵² See chapter seven.

time, whom most others suddenly would have envied. The first three contexts all refer to the arms race pertaining to U.S.–Soviet and U.S.–British relations, as well as U.S. national security policies. The fourth permits the arms race to be analyzed on its own terms, that is, relative to the anti-nuclear movement which transcended national boundaries and political dogma, in spite of its association with communists, communist sympathizers and Soviet propaganda.

Many types of sources are utilized herein. They include archival material drawn from U.S., British and Chilean repositories; official documents published at the time or when later declassified; press dispatches, international surveys and journal articles from the decades under consideration; and more contemporary scholarship. In keeping with the traditional historical method, they are synthesized to reach determinations which have been either neglected or underemphasized.⁵³ The originality of this thesis lies not in its reinterpretation of major Cold War events or of the previously published research included herein. Its originality lies in depicting U.S. Antarctic policy relative to the events which shaped the latter half of the twentieth century. The structure provides multiple interpretations of political developments germane to Antarctica as well as of their broader significance. None of the interpretations is held to be any more legitimate than any other, and neither does the order of their presentation seek to imply overall coherence. U.S. Antarctic policy unfolded in a manner which can be, and has been, described as both incoherent and self-defeating,⁵⁴ as often asserted of the U.S. role in the Cold War.

The reviewed manuscript collections, with the exception of those from the

⁵³ Like major Antarctic events, such as Operation High Jump, major Cold War events are discussed in multiple contexts. The crises over Berlin in the late 1940s and the late 1950s are germane to U.S.–Soviet and U.S.–British relations as well as to U.S. national security policies. While the significance of these events varies accordingly, their factual nature requires some degree of repetition. The two internationalization proposals are most repeatedly analyzed. Each chapter returns to them as they were indispensable in establishing the basis for the Antarctic Treaty.

⁵⁴ See footnote 10.

Byrd Polar Research Center, are diplomatic in nature. The operational details of various expeditions might or might not contain references to the political scenario. In the best case they might help to illuminate the challenges faced by U.S. policymakers, yet those difficulties can be reliably established using Department of State papers, augmented by papers from the Foreign Office and Chilean Foreign Affairs Ministry. The papers of Byrd indicate that, as previously mentioned, his recommendations were consistently neglected. Herein that is significant only as related to his indirect role in building public support for a territorial claim. The possibility of a U.S. claim generated unease among the seven nations with claims already in place, thus becoming an issue of both domestic and international significance.

Sources from the other signatories of the Antarctic Treaty might enhance certain aspects of this project. The same might also be true of influential non-signatory nations such as India. H. Robert Hall and Sanjay Chaturvedi, for example, have effectively used such materials to reach conclusions directly or indirectly related to the considered era of U.S. Antarctic policy,⁵⁵ and they are cited where deemed most appropriate. The possibility exists that, as with some primary sources, some relevant secondary sources have not been reviewed or have been reviewed but not cited. Non-U.S. perspectives are limited to those of Britain and Chile, the nations which often appeared to be the United States' closet allies in the world or in Latin America, respectively. The previously published research included herein thoroughly documents these three nations' relationship pertaining to the Antarctic, providing the groundwork for more general analysis of U.S.–British and U.S.–Chilean relations. While this thesis prioritizes the use of multi-archival sources, it makes no effort to be

⁵⁵ See H. Robert Hall, *Origins of the Antarctic Treaty*, PhD thesis, University of Tasmania, 1994; Sanjay Chaturvedi, *Dawning of Antarctica: A Geopolitical Analysis* (New Delhi: Segment Books, 1990).

multicultural,⁵⁶ an objective which would necessarily diminish the U.S. perspective.

The omission of Soviet documents, potentially the most intriguing of those not reviewed, is mostly due to their non-translation or non-availability outside Russia or both. Though U.S.–Soviet relations overshadowed the internationalization of Antarctic, both superpowers acted with considerable restraint in withholding their territorial claims. The reviewed diplomatic papers contain no evidence of extensive U.S.–Soviet or British–Soviet discussions about the Antarctic prior to the 1957–1958 International Geophysical Year (IGY), by which time Soviet participation in the informal, twelve-power discussions had become virtually unavoidable. As one the Department of State’s Antarctic specialists observed, the USSR had as legitimate, exploration-based rights as the United States did, and enjoyed a much longer-standing reputation for its expertise in the polar regions. U.S. and British archives indicate that it was these two factors, rather than any evidence of malicious intent, which stoked U.S. concerns of Soviet encroachment.⁵⁷

The following chapters tend to reinforce John Lewis Gaddis’ determination in *We Now Know: Rethinking the Cold War* that the United States lacked a grand strategy and that its reputation for leadership often exceeded its influence.⁵⁸ Melvyn P. Leffler, another widely respected historian, praises Gaddis for also defending the

⁵⁶ A survey conducted in the mid-1990s found that many U.S. historians viewed multiculturalism as exacerbating what Hayden White once referred to as the “conceptual anarchy” of their discipline. Since then the New Historicism movement has gone further, insisting that history is an interdisciplinary phenomenon and therefore devoid of a specific method. See Kenneth Cmiel, “History against Itself,” *The Journal of American History* 81 (1994): 1169–74; Hayden White, *Metahistory: The Historical Imagination in Nineteenth-Century Europe* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1973), 12–13; Catherine Gallagher and Stephen Greenblatt, *Practicing New Historicism* (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 2000), 19.

⁵⁷ For example, Department of State, Office of Intelligence Research (Boggs) to Bureau of British Commonwealth and Northern European Affairs (Ronhovde), 12 June 1953; Embassy in London (Rutter) to Department of State, Bureau of British Commonwealth and Northern European Affairs (Crowley), 28 February 1956, NARA, RG 59, 702.022; Department of State, Office of Inter-American Regional Political Affairs (Wilson) to Ambassador Paul C. Daniels, 20 November 1957, National Archives, RG 59, 399.829; Embassy in Washington (Hood) to Foreign Office (O’Neill), 13 March 1958, A 15214/81, PRO, FO 371.

⁵⁸ John Lewis Gaddis, *We Now Know: Rethinking Cold War History* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997), 27.

once-traditional U.S. view which blames the Soviet Union for having instigated the conflict.⁵⁹ Though others make persuasive arguments to the contrary,⁶⁰ the United States' policy toward the Antarctic underscored both the limits of its power and its willingness to accommodate the USSR—if only grudgingly and when comparatively little was at stake.

Gaddis' post-revisionist interpretation of the Cold War acknowledges some U.S. responsibility while placing most of it on the Soviet Union. A similar interpretation of this thesis is certainly possible, even likely if one is seeking further evidence to support a traditional interpretation. Since the originality of this thesis lies in portraying the Antarctic's relationship to the Cold War, and not the larger dispute itself,⁶¹ questions of ideology are not paramount. It still must be conceded that the adopted perspectives are increasing leftist,⁶² shifting from pure diplomacy to the non-governmental factors which influenced the nuclear-related aspect of U.S. Antarctic policy. Unlike Jean-Jacques Salomon, the present author finds no cause to smile at the communist-sympathetic ideals promulgated in *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists*.⁶³

⁵⁹ Melvyn P. Leffler, "The Cold War: What Do 'We Know Now'?" *American Historical Review* 104, no. 2 (1999): 501-24.

⁶⁰ For example, see; John Patrick Diggins, *The Proud Decades: America in War and in Peace 1941-1960* (New York: W.W. Norton & Company 1988), 68-69; S.R. Ashton, *In Search of Detente: The Politics of East-West Relations since 1945* (London: Macmillan Education Ltd, 1989), 8; Michael Cox and Caroline Kennedy-Pipe, "The Tragedy of American Diplomacy? Rethinking the Marshall Plan," *Journal of Cold War Studies* 7, no. 1 (2005): 97-134.

⁶¹ Many years ago one author prudently observed, "The Cold War has been discussed in a literature so massive, much of it so excellent, that it takes what may be a foolish intrepidity. . . to venture into the scholarly debate over the great conflict." Edward Pessen, "Appraising American Cold War Policy by its Means of Implementation," *Reviews in American History* 18, no. 4 (1990): 453-65.

⁶² The perspectives are increasingly leftist without emulating the moralistic tone of "New Left" revisionists who have underestimated the extent to which the Soviet Union actively sought to impose its will through domestic communist parties. Recently opened Eastern-bloc documents provide evidence of an ideologically driven conspiracy at times equal to the worst predictions of U.S. Cold Warriors. See Michael Leigh, "Is There a Revisionist Thesis on the Origins of the Cold War?" *Political Science Quarterly* 89, no. 1 (1974): 101-16; Douglas J. Macdonald, "Communist Bloc Expansion in the Early Cold War: Challenging Realism, Refuting Revisionism," *International Studies* 20, no. 3 (1995-96): 152-88; Odd Arne Westad, "A 'New', 'International' History of the Cold War," *Journal of Peace Research* 32, no. 4 (1995): 483-87; David A. Hounshell, "Epilogue: Rethinking the Cold War; Rethinking Science and Technology in the Cold War; Rethinking the Social Study of Science and Technology," *Social Studies of Science* 31, no. 2 (2001): 289-97.

⁶³ Jean-Jacques Salomon, "The *Internationale* of Science," *Science Studies* 1, no. 1 (1971): 23-43.

The integrity of its contributors was not only admirable; it helped to produce both the 1963 partial nuclear test and the ban included with the Antarctic Treaty. Whatever the ideological ramifications of this circumstance, it benefited all humanity.⁶⁴

The first chapter turns to the Department of State's effort to reach an internationalization agreement for the Antarctic which other nations found acceptable and which also preserved its own interests. Heightening the complexity of this objective was that it refused to announce its rights. While that position appeared to be conspiratorial in nature, it was equally the product of uncertainty. By no means is Gaddis the only author to have reached the same overall conclusion about the U.S. role in the Cold War.⁶⁵ He is mentioned by name to iterate that this thesis is a work of scholarship, not of polemics.⁶⁶

⁶⁴ F.M. Auburn dissents, repeating the Department of State's belief, discussed in chapter seven, that in some cases nuclear explosions could be deemed constructive, "The White Desert," *The International and Comparative Law Quarterly* 19, no. 2 (1970): 229-56.

⁶⁵ For example, Jan Nijman, "The Limits of Superpower: The United States and the Soviet Union since World War II," *Annals of the Association of American Geographers* 82, no. 4 (1992): 681-95. See also footnote 61.

⁶⁶ It remains arguable that U.S. policies encouraged the USSR to assume great-power status, such as by developing the atomic bomb and an impressive space program. For one compelling "New Left" perspective to this effect, see D.F. Fleming, "The Costs and Consequences of the Cold War," *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science* 366 (1966): 127-38.

1. Multilateral Diplomacy

After the Second World War the United States enjoyed an unprecedented opportunity to export its democratic ideals around the world. Antarctica could not be its first priority since ideological disputes on the other continents brought entire populations into conflict. As Eastern Europe succumbed to communism, the United States proved unwilling to mount an effective military deterrent. It did, however, seek to exempt the Antarctic from a similar fate by proposing a limited internationalization agreement with the seven nations which had announced territorial claims to the region—Argentina, Australia, Britain, Chile, France, New Zealand and Norway. This initiative failed to produce the desired consensus due to the other nations' unwillingness to renounce their sovereignty. The Department of State, though disappointed by this outcome, maintained its resolve to reach a satisfactory compromise. Eleven years later it secured that objective, though now in cooperation with the Soviet Union.

Christopher Joyner and Ethel Theis credit the United States with having assured that the Antarctic Treaty of 1959 upheld the principles of demilitarization, international scientific cooperation and the suspension of sovereignty disputes.¹ Frank G. Klotz suggests that the United States might have upheld the first two objectives by forwarding a claim and persuading the other claimant nations to join an arrangement excluding the USSR. Though the government did consider many drafts of a U.S. claim, it withheld them in favor of pursuing what seemed to be a more

¹ Christopher C. Joyner and Ethel R. Theis, *Eagle over the Ice: The U.S. in the Antarctic* (Hanover, New Hampshire: University Press of New England, 1997). This chapter includes material from Jason Kendall Moore, "Tethered to an Iceberg: United States Policy toward the Antarctic, 1939–1949," *Polar Record* 35, no. 193 (1999): 125–34; Moore, "A 'Sort' of Self-Denial: United States Policy toward the Antarctic, 1950–59," *Polar Record* 37, no. 200 (2001), 13–26.

reliable means of achieving international cooperation. This decision frustrated some officials within the Department of State, in addition to Admiral Richard Evelyn Byrd, one of the best-known Antarctic explorers of the twentieth century who failed to convince the government would ratify the extensive claims which he had made on its behalf.² While Klotz attributes this to the government's lack of "wherewithal,"³ the decision prudently sought to balance the nation's ideals with its strategic considerations.

This chapter examines the conclusion of John D. Negroponte, Barbara Mitchell and Lee Kimball that the United States' Antarctic policy demonstrated its concept of enlightened self-interest.⁴ It seemed to have this effect as the United States abandoned non-essential interests to promote goodwill, yet officials considered many other possibilities. As much of the world suspected, these included a unilateral effort to gain access to the continent's untapped mineral resources. Officials publicly recognized that the hope of discovering such resources motivated U.S. exploration after the Second World War. However, they soon began to consider more altruistic means of regulating the frozen continent. The shift reflected their desire to prevent the conflict between Britain and the Southern Cone nations, Chile and Argentina, whose claims overlapped in the peninsular region, from escalating to the point that it might have thwarted any form of international agreement.

U.S. Antarctic policy underwent several phases of revision over the two decades which preceded the Antarctic Treaty of 1959. The first phase corresponded

² See Jason Kendall Moore, "Bungled Publicity: Little America, Big America and the Rationale for Non-Claimancy, 1946–1961," *Polar Record* 40, no. 212 (2004): 19-30.

³ Frank G. Klotz, *America on Ice: Antarctic Policy Issues* (Washington: National Defense University, 1990). Other authors recognize that U.S. policy was highly indecisive. For example, Phillip W. Quigg, *A Pole Apart: The Emerging Issue of Antarctica* (New York: McGraw Hill Book Company, 1983), 141.

⁴ John D. Negroponte, "The Success of the Antarctic Treaty," *Department of State Bulletin* 87 (1987): 2123; Barbara Mitchell and Lee Kimball, "Conflict over the Cold Continent," *Foreign Policy* 35 (1979): 124-41.

to the 1939–1945 era when the threat posed by German exploration prompted the creation of the U.S. Antarctic Service, which permitted Byrd to coordinate his third expedition with cabinet-level officials. This phase reflected Washington’s desire to extend the Monroe Doctrine to the South Pole, as well as the need to set this objective aside due to its involvement with the global conflict. The second corresponded to the 1946–1947 era during which Byrd commanded the largest Antarctic expedition to date, Operation High Jump, and the government appeared ready to forward an official claim. The third phase unfolded in the 1948–1953 era when the first U.S. internationalization proposal was rejected, and the conflict between Britain and the Southern Cone nations grew increasingly volatile. The last phase spanned the 1954–1959 era during which the trilateral dispute began to recede and the International Geophysical Year involved twelve nations in the Antarctic which would become the original signatories of the treaty.

Throughout each of these phases, U.S. officials responded moderately to developments which jeopardized prospects for reaching an international agreement. They failed to achieve a unanimous consensus pertaining to Antarctica’s strategic value, and therefore chose to uphold the 1924 Hughes Doctrine, which required sovereignty claims to be based on permanent exploration rather than discovery or exploration. In some ways this position amounted to following the course of least resistance,⁵ though it proved effective in discouraging the outbreak of large-scale hostilities between Britain and the Southern Cone nations.⁶ U.S. policy also subordinated ideological concerns to the practicality of involving the Soviet Union. Otherwise, it was feared, the USSR might have taken the opportunity to portray itself

⁵ See Moore, “Bungled Publicity.”

⁶ See Secretary of State (Marshall) to Secretary of Defense (Forrestal), 10 June 1948, NARA, RG 59, 800.014; Embassy in Santiago (Belton) to Department of State, 18 February 1958, no. 829, NARA, RG 59, 702.022.

as a victim and to increase the effectiveness of its anti-U.S. rhetoric.⁷ While the Cold War could not be ignored, it was not permitted to defeat one unique example of international cooperation guided toward the scientific advancement of humankind.

Encouraging this result was that the continent's economic and strategic potential could not be substantiated, and the White House therefore refrained from making a sovereignty claim. In the late 1930s, the Department of Interior had observed that the continent might yield mineral resources which were valuable though not essential.⁸ The North American continent had not been fully exploited, and its depletion did not appear imminent, in spite of the high rate of U.S. consumption. Neither had the Antarctica's value been substantiated. Military officials compared making a declaration of U.S. rights to "buying a pig in the poke" which even if found to be worthless might oblige them to defend it.⁹ Antarctic specialists within the Department of State favored making a claim for two reasons. They doubted there that any need to defend the continent would arise, given its distance from major powers, none of which appeared likely to risk antagonizing the United States for an undetermined benefit.¹⁰ Even in that case diplomatic officials would remain comfortably seated in their offices.

In March 1939 Lincoln Ellsworth informally claimed a large Antarctic sector for the United States. He explained this as consistent with President Franklin D. Roosevelt's personal support for Admiral Byrd's earlier claims, based on the administration's

⁷ Department of State, Memorandum of Conversation with Representatives of Argentina, Australia, Chile, New Zealand and United Kingdom, 15 August 1958, NARA, RG 59, 399.829.

⁸ Department of State, Office of Historical Adviser (Boggs) to Division of Communications and Records (Hickerson), 14 October 1937, NARG 59, 800.014.

⁹ Department of State, Office of South American Affairs (Watrous), Memorandum for the Files, 23 April 1957, NARG 59, 702.022. See also Department of State, Bureau of Inter-American Affairs, Office Memorandum, 21 May 1955; Department of State, Bureau of British Commonwealth and Northern European Affairs (Raynor), Memorandum for the Files, 25 May 1955, National Archives, RG 59, 702.022.

¹⁰ See chapter five.

stance that the Monroe Doctrine should encompass the South Pole.¹¹ While neither explorer's claims would gain official ratification, the senate passed a resolution endorsing any decision by the president to use his executive authority to make a territorial claim.¹² As Byrd prepared to depart in late 1939, Roosevelt ordered the expedition members to deposit and record their unofficial claims to support a possible reversal of the 1924 Hughes Doctrine, which held that neither discovery nor exploration provided a legitimate basis for sovereignty claims. The Department of State seriously contemplated this and announced the United States' reservation of all rights.¹³

The reservation of rights was technically not a claim, yet the distinction aroused concern from the seven nations which had formalized their rights. France observed that U.S. officials appeared unable or unwilling to accept that its claim to *Terre Adelie* was "unquestionable," however the Roosevelt administration might attempt to rationalize U.S. rights. Norway expressed similar concerns though, like the United States, it was not eager to debate the most legitimate means of sustaining its rights or those of any other nation.¹⁴ Antarctica did not appear at risk of becoming the next U.S. state, yet the world properly surmised that the Roosevelt administration had territorial ambitions. It established the U.S. Antarctic Service to facilitate planning the expedition's technical and political aspects at the cabinet level.¹⁵ The president was a long-time friend and supporter of Byrd who had little difficulty persuading congress to fund the expedition.¹⁶ As a result, unlike any other twentieth-

¹¹ President Franklin D. Roosevelt, Memorandum for R. Walton Moore, 15 June 1939, NARA, RG 59, 800.014.

¹² Department of State, Memorandum by Special Adviser for Geography (Boggs), 11 August 1930, NARA, RG 59, 800.014.

¹³ *FRUS*, 1939, vol. 2, *General* (Washington: USGPO, 1956), 1, 11-14.

¹⁴ *FRUS* 1939, 2: 2-5.

¹⁵ *FRUS* 1939, 2: 7.

¹⁶ *The New York Times*, 3 June 1939, 7 July 1939. Byrd referred to Roosevelt as "one of my oldest friends." R.E. Byrd to R.B. Fosdick, 23 March 1931, BPRC, folder 1648.

century U.S. expedition,¹⁷ it was official in nature and sought to augment the government's interests in the region by establishing three bases.¹⁸

The importance of this objective related to Germany's stated desire to exploit the Antarctic in its quest for raw materials. In the previous 1938–1939 season the National Socialists had dispatched a large expedition whose airplanes dropped swastika flags as they covered over 100,000 square miles of uncharted territory.¹⁹ This development accompanied signs that Japan also sought to exploit the continent.²⁰ Though the United States still hesitated to accept its role as the forebear of democracy in the rapidly approaching global struggle, it insisted on maintaining its standing in the far south. Byrd and Roosevelt publicized their conviction that the Monroe Doctrine justified efforts to protect the region from the threat of external aggression.²¹ The Argentine government immediately declared that the other American republics had never recognized or been asked to recognize the legitimacy of that doctrine,²² the unilateral character reinforced perceptions that the United States was engaged in a strategically oriented race for the Antarctic.²³ *The New York Times* observed that the “whole nature” of exploration had assumed a more nationalistic tenor than ever before.²⁴

The Southern Cone nations responded to this by coordinating efforts to protect

¹⁷ U.S. Naval Reserve (Black) to Department of State, Division of Latin American Affairs, 10 February 1945, NARA, RG 59, 800.014.

¹⁸ *FRUS* 1939, 2: 7-14.

¹⁹ Embassy in Berlin (Geist) to Secretary of State, 20 March 1939, no. 638, NARA, RG 59, 800.014; *The New York Times*, 11 March 1939, 12 April 1939; Thomas R. Henry, *The White Continent: The Story of Antarctica* (New York: William Sloane Associates, 1950), 255.

²⁰ Department of State, Memorandum on Japanese Claims in the Antarctic, 28 January 1946, NARA, RG 59, 800.014; *The New York Times*, 24 December 1939.

²¹ President Roosevelt, Memorandum for R. Walton Moore, 15 June 1939, NARA, RG 59, 800.014; *The New York Times*, 12 January 1939, 8 July 1939, 15 July 1939.

²² *The New York Times*, 25 July 1939.

²³ R.E. Byrd to Department of State, Division of European Affairs (Cumming), 15 July 1939; Department of Interior, U.S. Antarctic Service, Memorandum for R.E. Byrd, 22 August 1939, NARA, RG 59, 800.014.

²⁴ *The New York Times*, 6 August 1939.

their rights.²⁵ Their most significant difference of opinion with the United States pertained to the Monroe Doctrine. From their perspective, shared by most Latin Americans, that doctrine was not only unilateral and therefore illegal; it flagrantly contradicted U.S. unwillingness to protest Britain's presence in the Falkland Islands and the Falkland Island Dependencies, located in the Antarctic archipelago.²⁶ Chile also expressed displeasure over the U.S. refusal to acknowledge any other nation's Antarctic rights, and promptly asserted its own over the sector from 53° to 90° West, located beneath South America in the region where British and Argentine claims overlapped. U.S. officials predictably denied the legitimacy of the claim,²⁷ but heeded the recommendation of Ambassador Claude G. Bowers to do so as mildly as possible to avoid inflaming anti-U.S. sentiment throughout the region.²⁸ These sentiments were known to be most poignant in the Southern Cone nations due to the influence of Axis sympathizers.²⁹

Bowers reported that Chilean officials appreciated the U.S. stance but felt compelled to protect their rights.³⁰ He believed that, despite the rhetorical passion of their claim, they would be willing to participate in any future negotiations which the United States might choose to instigate.³¹ Since there were also indications that the Argentines might take a flexible approach,³² and neither Southern Cone nation was

²⁵ Embassy in Buenos Aires to Secretary of State, 29 February 1940, no. 506, NARA, RG 59, 800.014.

²⁶ The Falklands are alternately known the Malvinas.

²⁷ *The New York Times*, 8 November 1940.

²⁸ Ambassador in Santiago (Bowers) to Secretary of State, 8 November 1940, NARA, RG 59, 800.014; "Recent Argentine and Chilean Decrees Related to the Antarctic," *Polar Record* 5, nos. 35-36 (1948): 223-27; "Argentine and Chilean Decrees Related to the Antarctic, 1942-49," *Polar Record* 5, no. 39 (1950): 478-82.

²⁹ See Claude G. Bowers, *Chile through Embassy Windows, 1939-1953* (Westport, Connecticut: Greenwood Press, 1958), 99-103, 120-24.

³⁰ Ambassador in Santiago (Bowers) to Secretary of State, 9 November 1940, no. 957; Department of State, Memorandum by Undersecretary of State (Welles), 8 November 1940, NARA, RG 59, 800.014.

³¹ Ambassador in Santiago (Bowers) to Secretary of State, 15 November 1940; Department of State, Memorandum by Special Adviser for Geography (Boggs) et al., 13 August 1946, NARA, RG 59, 800.014.

³² Embassy in Buenos Aires (Armour) to Secretary of State, 12 March 1940, NARA, RG 59, 800.014.

able to challenge the U.S. Antarctic program,³³ the Department of State refrained from investigating the geographical and historical bases of the Chilean claim, or that of any other nation.³⁴ It instructed Bowers to repeat U.S. allegiance to the non-claimant, non-recognition stance based on the Hughes Doctrine. Meanwhile its specialists continued assessing the viability of reversing that stance.³⁵ The “race” to Antarctica had not gathered sufficient intensity to convince U.S. officials of the need to take a more assertive position.³⁶

The Second World War diverted U.S. attention from the Antarctic, leading to the demise of the Antarctic Service while Admiral Byrd focused on other tasks to promote an Allied victory.³⁷ The global conflict had no such effect on the Southern Cone nations which hesitated to align themselves with the U.S.-led war effort and continued to dwell on the advantages which might accrue from their sovereignty claims. The U.S. Ambassador in Buenos Aires, Norman Armour, expressed concern that pro-Axis newspapers praised their joint expeditions to the peninsular region. He believed that the two nations would make a prolonged effort to invoke the Monroe Doctrine, not because they respected U.S. authority in the Western Hemisphere, but rather as a means of prompting a British withdrawal. Equally to his displeasure, most Latin Americans viewed the United States as an apologist for British colonialism.³⁸

The Department of State correctly predicted that further U.S. exploration

³³ Ambassador in Santiago (Bowers) to Secretary of State, 9 November 1940, no. 957, NARA, RG 59, 800.014.

³⁴ See Department of State, Division of River Plate Affairs (Hussey) to Division of North and West Coast Affairs (Brundage) et al., 13 August 1946; *The New York Times*, 8 November 1940.

³⁵ Department of State, Office of Geographer (Saucerman) to Office of American Republic Affairs (Woodward) and Division of European Affairs (Cumming), [28 July 1942]; Department of State, Division of American Republics, Analysis and Liaison Branch, Study of Antarctica, 25 July 1944, NARA, RG 59, 800.014.

³⁶ See H. Robert Hall, “The ‘Open Door’ in Antarctica: An Explanation of the Hughes Doctrine,” *Polar Record* 25, no. 153 (1989): 137-40.

³⁷ For example, Byrd was involved with establishing bases in the South Pacific. R.E. Byrd to Chief of U.S. Naval Personnel, 10 May 1943, BPRC, folder 306.

³⁸ Embassy in Buenos Aires (Armour) to Secretary of State, 22 March 1943, NARA, RG 59, 800.014.

would serve to reinforce perceptions of an Anglo–American conspiracy against the Southern Cone nations.³⁹ While Chile and Argentina were unable to maintain a substantial Antarctic presence during the war, Britain dispatched Operation Tabarin to indicate that it, even in the face of German aggression, it was unwilling to retreat from the disputed peninsula.⁴⁰ After defeating the Axis powers, U.S. specialists determined that it was imprudent to hold the nation’s Antarctic policy hostage to the Monroe Doctrine.⁴¹ They still hesitated to forward a sovereignty claim on the basis of discovery and exploration,⁴² but they abandoned the possibility of forging a condominium arrangement with the Southern Cone nations—as had once been contemplated for the sake of undermining the validity of other nations’ claims.⁴³ This shift corresponded to the two nations’ reluctance to join the Allied cause and their ongoing hesitancy to prosecute Axis sympathizers.⁴⁴

In November 1946, as the U.S. Navy’s Operation High Jump was preparing to depart, the Department of State entertained a UN trusteeship for the Antarctic.⁴⁵ The navy objected that this might curtail its possibilities for cold-weather training and the acquisition of atomic materials. It preferred engaging in aggressive exploration for the purpose of making a large claim.⁴⁶ Acting Secretary of State Dean Acheson attempted to bridge the divergence of perspectives by repeating Roosevelt’s instructions for explorers to deposit claims which might be invoked if a trusteeship

³⁹ Department of State, Division of Northern European Affairs (Cumming) to Division of American Republics, 2 December 1944, NARA, RG 59, 800.014.

⁴⁰ See *The New York Times*, 24 April 1944; Klaus Dodds, *Pink Ice: Britain and the South Atlantic Empire* (London: I.B. Tauris Publishers, 2002), 15.

⁴¹ *FRUS* 1947, vol. 1, *General* (Washington: USGPO, 1973), 1043-50.

⁴² Department of State, Office of the Geographer (Saucerman), Memorandum on Sovereignty of Deception Island, [28 July 1942], NARA, RG 59, 800.014.

⁴³ See Department of State, Division of American Republics to Office of American Republic Affairs (Briggs), 18 August 1939, NARA, RG 59, 800.014.

⁴⁴ See *FRUS* 1948, vol. 1, part 2, *General* (Washington: USGPO, 1976), 963-65; Bowers, *Chile through Embassy Windows*, 99-101.

⁴⁵ *FRUS* 1946, vol. 1, *General* (Washington: USGPO, 1972), 1492-93.

⁴⁶ U.S. Navy, Office of Judge Advocate, Top Secret Brief on Ulterior Mission and Objectives of Naval Expedition to Antarctic, 21 November 1946, in U.S. Navy (Dennison) to Department of State, Division of Northern European Affairs (Cumming), 22 November 1946, NARA, RG 59, 800.014.

were to prove infeasible or undesirable.⁴⁷ Specialists nonetheless grew frustrated that U.S. policy was somehow to promote the nation's undetermined rights while simultaneously fostering international cooperation.⁴⁸ They questioned Byrd's conviction that preserving the indecisive status quo would benefit the United States since Operation High Jump, which had been placed under his command, would leave it in an unrivalled position to assert rights based on exploration and discovery.⁴⁹

The New York Times attributed the massive scale of High Jump—thirteen vessels, including an aircraft carrier, with a crew of over four thousand—to Antarctica having become a strategically essential part of the world. It noted that the mission's technicians, sailors and scientists had been individually chosen to gather evidence of uranium and test weapons in the polar environment. Naval spokesmen confirmed that the expedition was militarily oriented and designed to bolster U.S. claims. Byrd's denial that it reflected hegemonic designs failed to reduce anxiety among the claimant nations.⁵⁰ As the Latin American press decried the appearance of "Yankee imperialism,"⁵¹ otherwise friendly European journalists ventured that Washington was pulling Antarctica into a grand design for warfare with the Soviet Union.⁵² High Jump was not only the "most ambitious" expedition to date, as Thomas R. Henry describes it. It was a "luxury cruise" compared to all that had come before, as evidenced by its surplus of amenities and transport of the very latest

⁴⁷ *FRUS* 1946, 1: 1497-98.

⁴⁸ *FRUS* 1947, 1: 1043-50.

⁴⁹ Department of State, Polar Regions: Secret Policy and Information Statement, 1 July 1946; Department of State, Office of American Republic Affairs (Briggs) to Assistant Secretary of State (Braden), 25 April 1947, 25 April 1947, NARA, RG 59, 800.014.

⁵⁰ See *The New York Times*, 9 November 1946, 13 November 1946. For further reference to the navy's agenda, see Department of State, Memorandum by Division of North and West Coast Affairs and Office of American Republic Affairs, 25 September 1946, NARA, RG 59, Office of American Republic Affairs, Memoranda on Chile.

⁵¹ Embassy in Lima to Department of State, 21 November 1946, no. 722, NARA, RG 59, 800.014.

⁵² Embassy in Paris (Caffery) to Secretary of State, 12 February 1947, no. 7582, NARA, RG 59, 800.014.

weapons, some of which had never been used in battle.⁵³

Operation High Jump returned in early 1947 without having gained evidence that uranium was among the minerals lying beneath the ice cap. Even if it had been, there were presently no means of gaining access to it. The Department of State began to reconsider the merit of a trusteeship arrangement as the seven claimants had not agreed on uniform criteria for recognizing each other's rights.⁵⁴ Since an additional claim would have complicated progress to this end, U.S. officials refrained from asserting one. Instead they concentrated on devising a more limited, eight-power arrangement to quell the sovereignty dispute, exclude the Soviet Union and promote the scientific betterment of humankind.⁵⁵ They accordingly urged Britain to refrain from involving the United Nations in its attempt to find some resolution with the Southern Cone nations.⁵⁶

In February 1948 the Department of State's geographical adviser, Sheldon W. Boggs, transformed these considerations into a draft condominium arrangement, alternately referred to as a "special regime." The draft called for consulting with the United Nation on all related issues, though limiting its jurisdiction to territory where uranium was found. The UN Atomic Commission would assume control of such regions to ensure that the continent would remain demilitarized.⁵⁷ The Department of the Interior lent support to this plan which it considered likely to grant the United States access to other potentially valuable resources.⁵⁸ While not yet dismissing the possibility of a U.S. claim, the Joint Chiefs of Staff also favored the special regime as

⁵³ Henry, *The White Continent*, ix.

⁵⁴ Department of State, Office of European Affairs to Division of Northern European Affairs, 27 January 1948, NARA, RG 59, 800.014.

⁵⁵ Department of State, Division of European and Northern European Affairs to Division of North and West Coast Affairs, 8 September 1947; Department of State, Secret Memorandum, 6 November 1947, NARA, RG 59, 800.014.

⁵⁶ *FRUS* 1947, 1: 1055-58.

⁵⁷ Department of State, Special Adviser for Geography (Boggs), Draft Agreement on the Antarctic, 22 March 1948, NARA, RG 59, 800.014.

⁵⁸ *FRUS* 1948, 1/2: 962.

it seemed more likely than a trusteeship to exclude the USSR.⁵⁹ This was one objective upon which civilian and military officials concurred.⁶⁰

Before the Department of State shared the plan with the claimants, dramatic tensions mounted which did not involve the USSR. Chilean President Gabriel Gonzalez Videla accompanied a voyage to establish his country's second military base in Tierra O'Higgins, which the British referred to as Graham Land,⁶¹ and Argentina reinforced its own presence by sending a number of vessels for operations in Tierra del Fuego. Perturbed by this challenge to its sovereignty, Britain responded by dispatching the *Nigeria*, one of its heaviest cruisers. Secretary of State George C. Marshall gravely disappointed Latin Americans by stating that the United States refused to become involved, and his denial that the British maneuver violated the 1947 Rio Treaty appeared to constitute a passive form of involvement. The 200-mile defensive perimeter which the treaty drew around the Western Hemisphere theoretically extended to the South Pole. However, the United States denied its applicability to the Antarctic sovereignty dispute.⁶²

This potentially volatile situation led the Department of State to withhold the internationalization proposal until June 1948. By that time the onset of winter in the Southern Hemisphere prevented any further naval displays. However, much to the Washington's disappointment, five of the seven claimant nations immediately rejected the proposal. The remaining two, Britain and New Zealand, only expressed

⁵⁹ Joint Chiefs of Staff, JCS 1830/1, United States Antarctic Policy, 30 January 1948; Joint Chiefs of Staff, JCS 1830/4, United States Antarctic Policy, 8 March 1948; Joint Chiefs of Staff (Leahy), Memorandum for Secretary of Defense, 26 March 1948, NARA, RG 218, Geographical File.

⁶⁰ Department of State, Division of European Affairs, Memorandum on Trusteeship Agreement for Antarctica, 1 March 1948; Secretary of State (Marshall) to Secretary of Defense (Forrestal), 10 June 1948; Secretary of State (Marshall) to Secretary of Defense (Forrestal), 8 July 1948, NARA, RG 59, 800.014; Department of State, Report for National Security Council (NSC 21), 13 July 1948, NARA, RG 218, Records of Policy Planning Staff.

⁶¹ *The New York Times*, 10 February 1948.

⁶² *The New York Times*, 16 February 1948, 19 February 1948; *FRUS* 1947, vol. 8, *The American Republics* (USGPO, 1972), 90-93. This issue is discussed at greater length in chapter three.

willingness to discuss some form of internationalization which bypassed the proposal's call for the renunciation of sovereignty.⁶³ The Department of State attempted to revive the proposal by announcing that serious consideration was being given to formalizing its own sovereignty claim. This course would have placed it in the same category as the other nations, thus permitting it to lead by example, eventually renouncing its own rights.⁶⁴ At the same time there was no means of reversing the non-claimant, non-recognition policy without calling into question the philanthropic objectives of U.S. exploration.

In July 1948 the Department of State sent Caspar Green to urge the Southern Cone nations to reconsider the U.S. proposal. As Ambassador Claude G. Bowers had predicted, Chilean officials refused to cede their Antarctic territory to either a UN trusteeship or an eight-power arrangement.⁶⁵ The Chilean Foreign Affairs Ministry presented Green with an alternative known as the Escudero Plan, which called for suspending sovereignty disputes for a five- to ten-year period during which the nations would be able to better appraise their interests, thus far based purely on speculation, and determine a mutually satisfactory resolution.⁶⁶ While appreciating the moderate nature of this course, Green grasped that there was nothing moderate about the government's devotion to the Chilean Antarctic. As Julio Escudero Guzman, author of the Escudero Plan, had made clear, "While other nations have claims to Antarctica, Chile has rights."⁶⁷ Green then proceeded to Argentina whose

⁶³ *FRUS* 1949, vol. 1, *National Security Affairs* (Washington: USGPO, 1976), 800-3.

⁶⁴ Department of State, Division of European Affairs (Hickerman) to Legal Division (Gross), 17 June 1948; Undersecretary of State (Lovett) to Secretary of Defense (Forrestal), [14 July 1948], NARA, RG 59, 800.014; *FRUS* 1948, 1/2: 989.

⁶⁵ Embassy in Santiago to Division of European Affairs and Office of American Republic Affairs, 19 July 1948, no. 475, NARA, RG 59, 800.014.

⁶⁶ *FRUS* 1948, 1/2: 795-96.

⁶⁷ Embassy in Santiago to Division of European Affairs et al, 19 July 1948, no. 475, NARA, RG 59, 800.014.

officials were equally passionate but less constructive,⁶⁸ refusing to accept the U.S. proposal even as a basis for discussions.⁶⁹

His journey was not entirely a failure since Chile and Argentina were the most difficult of the claimant nations from the U.S. perspective, and officials had long feared that they might forge an Antarctic alliance hostile to Anglo-American interests.⁷⁰ Though the neighbors both sought to curtail North American influence in the Western Hemisphere, Argentina regarded the Escudero Plan as detrimental to its Antarctic collaboration with Chile.⁷¹ The U.S. proposal for internationalization, though unsuccessful on its own terms, contributed to eroding the neighbors' effort to stand firm in defending their joint sector from 25° to 90° West.⁷² Chilean officials publicly retreated from earlier declarations that they were only willing to cooperate with Argentina, and privately they indicated receptiveness to negotiating directly with the United States.⁷³ Ambassador Bowers reported that the commander of the Chilean armed forces, Raul Cañas Montalva, was a "sincere and even militant friend of the United States" who opposed any form of alliance with Argentina beyond opposing the British presence in Antarctica.⁷⁴

The Department of State recommended postponing a U.S. claim since the latest, exploration-based draft overlapped with the Southern Cone nations' sector. Its

⁶⁸ Ambassador in Santiago (Bowers) to Secretary of State, 21 July 1948, no. 504; Embassy in Buenos Aires (Ray) to Secretary of State, 21 July 1948, no. 730, NARA, RG 59, 800.014.

⁶⁹ *FRUS* 1948, 1/2: 1011.

⁷⁰ Department of State, Division of North and West Coast Affairs (Brundage) to Assistant Secretary of State (Braden) et al., 10 February 1947, NARA, RG 59, 800.014.

⁷¹ Embassy in Santiago (Bowers) to Secretary of State, 8 March 1948, no. 165, NARA, RG 59, 800.014.

⁷² See "Argentine and Chilean Decrees."

⁷³ Ambassador in Santiago (Bowers) to Secretary of State, 6 August 1948, no. 537, NARA, RG 59, 800.014.

⁷⁴ Ambassador in Santiago (Bowers) to Secretary of State, 2 August 1948, no. 508; Department of State, Memorandum by Division of North and West Coast Affairs (Davis), 9 September 1948, NARA, RG 59, 800.014. See Mauricio Jara Fernandez, "Richard E. Byrd y Ramón Cañas Montalva: Contrapunto de Dos Visiones Antárticas," in Consuelo León Wöppke, Mauricio Jara Fernandez et al., *¿Convergencia Antártica? Los Contextos de la Historia Antártica Chilena, 1939–1949* (Valparaíso, Chile: Editorial Puntangeles, 2005), 151–58.

announcement, officials feared, would unleash a new tide of anti-Yankee opinion and perhaps renew an exclusive form of collaboration between the neighbors.⁷⁵ In August 1948 Secretary Marshall lamented that Washington's effort to resolve the dispute had seemed to complicate prospects for negotiation.⁷⁶ Many of the claimant nations, like most of the world, questioned its Antarctic policy in light of the military orientation of Operation High Jump and numerous official statements which acknowledged strategic motivations. The Department of State hoped to mitigate this impression by exerting no direct or indirect pressure for the claimant nations to accept the proposal,⁷⁷ and considered revising it to incorporate the tenets of the Chilean Escudero Plan.⁷⁸

The following year Britain and the Southern Cone nations signed an agreement to end their hostile naval displays.⁷⁹ Encouraged by this development, Dean Acheson, the new secretary of state, endorsed the Escudero Plan which in his view offered the best hope for preserving U.S. interests while also encouraging some form of international resolution.⁸⁰ Britain was not convinced of the wisdom of ignoring the question of sovereignty,⁸¹ but since the Southern Cone nations refused to accept outside arbitration,⁸² it consented to the U.S. shift of policy.⁸³ Its reluctance to do so had also been overcome by assurances that it would be involved with revising

⁷⁵ Ambassador in Santiago (Bowers) to Secretary of State, 3 August 1948, no. 530; Department of State, Division of Northern European Affairs (Hulley) to Office of European Affairs (Thompson), 24 August 1948, NARA, RG 59, 800.014.

⁷⁶ *FRUS* 1948, 1/2: 1000-03.

⁷⁷ Department of State, Division of River Plate Affairs (Dearborn) to Division of Northern European Affairs (Bream) et al., 25 March 1949, NARA, RG 59, 800.014.

⁷⁸ Department of State, Memorandum of Conversation by Division of Northern European Affairs (Hulley), 23 March 1949, NARA, RG 59, 800.014.

⁷⁹ *The New York Times*, 19 January 1949.

⁸⁰ *FRUS* 1949, 1: 795-96, 804-9.

⁸¹ Department of State, Memorandum of Conversation by Division of Northern European Affairs (Hulley), 20 July 1948, NARA, RG 59, 800.014.

⁸² *The New York Times*, 8 February 1948.

⁸³ *FRUS* 1948, 1/2: 1013-15.

the Escudero Plan before it was presented to the other claimant nations.⁸⁴ Whereas the United States had once sought international cooperation on a grand scale, it began to view direct negotiations as preferable to a conference, for the time being, and the only means by which one might be agreed upon in the future.⁸⁵

In July 1950 the Soviet Union announced that it would deny the legitimacy of any agreement from which it was excluded. It held that the Russian explorer Thaddius von Bellingshausen had been the first to discover the Antarctic continent during his 1819–1821 voyage. Aware that negotiations were taking place between the claimant nations and the United States, it requested information about the nature of plans under consideration.⁸⁶ The Department of State did not meet this request since it hoped to exclude the USSR with the eight-power agreement it was discussing with Chile and Britain.⁸⁷ It contemplated making a territorial claim to deter the Soviets from doing likewise, though Chile cautioned that this action would likely derail the negotiations currently under way.⁸⁸ Mario Rodriguez, counsel to the Chilean Embassy in Washington, expressed hope that the threat of Soviet encroachment might hasten all the claimant nations and the United States in reaching an agreement,⁸⁹ yet the Antarctic controversy defied traditional Cold War parameters. The only immediate danger pertained to the inability of the “free world” to resolve the sovereignty dispute.

⁸⁴ See Department of State, Memorandum by Office of South American Affairs (Barall), 5 March 1951, NARA, RG 59, 702.022.

⁸⁵ Department of State, Division of Northern European Affairs (Hulley) to Office of European Affairs (Thompson) and Office of American Republic Affairs (Woodward), 26 August 1948; British Embassy in Washington to Department of State, 18 October 1949, NARA, RG 59, 800.014.

⁸⁶ Soviet Embassy in Washington to Department of State, 8 June 1950, no. 145108, NARA, RG 59, 702.022. See Boleslaw A. Boczek, “The Soviet Union and the Antarctic Regime,” *The American Journal of International Law* 78, no. 4 (1984): 834–58.

⁸⁷ Department of State, Memorandum by Office of British Commonwealth and Northern European Affairs (Green), 16 August 1950, NARA, RG 59, 702.022.

⁸⁸ Department of State, Memorandum of Conversation, Office of North and West Coast Affairs (Owen) et al., 7 August 1950, NARA, RG 59, 702.022.

⁸⁹ Department of State, Memorandum of Conversation, Office of North and West Coast Affairs (Owen) et al., 13 June 1950, NARA, RG 59, 702.022.

This issue aside, the Department of State doubted that Antarctica held great military or economic significance. It still remained committed to excluding the Soviet Union and viewed the Escudero Plan as a “limited advance” toward that objective.⁹⁰ However, its leading Antarctic expert, Sheldon W. Boggs, urged that a claim be made as quickly as possible. In his perspective Antarctica’s untapped mineral resources warranted protection.⁹¹ His colleagues in the Bureau of European Affairs presented a new draft claim, extending from 130° East to 105° West, north from the South Pole; 130° to 15° East, north of 75° South; and 105° to 35° West, north of 81° South. Unfortunately they had no advice for how to reverse the non-claimant policy without creating an international uproar. Of equal concern was how to interpret the National Security Council’s resolution that a U.S. claim should be made prior to the signing of an international agreement—a distant prospect—or protected in lieu of such an agreement.⁹²

The Department of State presented Chile with a map depicting a Byrd–Ellsworth sector as a less ambitious, tentative U.S. claim.⁹³ The map omitted any reference to the Chilean claim, first declared in November 1940 and restated on numerous occasions thereafter, each time with the Chilean public’s impassioned support. In a formal letter of protest, Santiago referred to the map as unacceptable for this reason and because it suggested that the United States accepted the “sector principle,” which defined claims in terms of latitude extending to the South Pole, for itself but not for other nations.⁹⁴ The Department of State apologized for the

⁹⁰ Department of State, Secret Policy Statement: Polar Regions, 1 July 1951, NARA, RG 59, 702.022.

⁹¹ Department of State, Office of Intelligence Research (Boggs) to Bureau of Inter-American Affairs (Whitman) et al., 10 January 1952, NARA, RG 59, 702.02.

⁹² Department of State, Bureau of European Affairs (Bonbright) to Deputy Undersecretary of State (Matthews), 15 July 1952, NARA, RG 59, 702.022.

⁹³ Department of State, Office of Intelligence Research (Boggs) to Office of South American Affairs (Barall), 8 January 1952, 8 January 1952, NARA, RG 59, 702.022.

⁹⁴ Chilean Embassy in Washington to Department of State, 16 January 1952, NARA, RG 59, 702.022.

oversight and misunderstanding, respectively,⁹⁵ and pledged to take no action before the two nations had finished incorporating the Escudero Plan into a new internationalization proposal.⁹⁶

This slow trend toward international cooperation met a formidable setback in February 1953. The Royal Navy dismantled an Argentine outpost on Deception Island which had been constructed despite warnings. Sailors from *Snipe* encountered no vigilance from the non-commissioned officers posted there to defend the South Orkney Islands from “the bad habits of antiquated [British] imperialism,” as Chilean President Gabriel Gonzalez Videla had once described it.⁹⁷ The British “imperialists” then proceeded to dismantle a nearby Chilean outpost which was unoccupied at the time. Though diplomats informally agreed to avoid exaggerating the significance of the episode,⁹⁸ accusations of bad faith immediately arose when reports leaked to the press. The same pattern had accompanied earlier incidents, such as the previous season when Argentine soldiers had fired over the heads of a British geological team attempting to disembark from *John Biscoe*.⁹⁹

U.S. officials feared that the Southern Cone governments might issue a joint statement so belligerent that Britain would recall its ambassadors.¹⁰⁰ From the Southern Cone’s perspective, Britain had been allowed to make a mockery of the

⁹⁵ Department of State to Chilean Embassy in Washington, 16 January 1952, NARA, RG 59, 702.022.

⁹⁶ Department of State, Memorandum of Conversation, Bureau of European Affairs et al., 11 March 1952, NARA, RG 59, 702.022; Stephen G. Rabe, *Eisenhower and Latin America: The Foreign Policy of Anticommunism* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1988), 20.

⁹⁷ Ambassador in Santiago (Bowers) to Secretary of State, 18 February 1948, no. 96, NARA, RG 59, 800.014; *The New York Times*, 20 February 1953. For similar allusions to British “imperialism,” see Ambassador in Santiago (Bowers) to Secretary of State, 3 March 1948, nos. 121-23; Embassy in Santiago to Department of State, Office of European Affairs and Office of American Republic Affairs, no. 477, 19 July 1948, NARA, RG 59, 800.014.

⁹⁸ Embassy in Buenos Aires (Nufer) to Department of State, 23 February 1953, no. 1067, NARA, RG 59, 702.022.

⁹⁹ Embassy in Buenos Aires (Nufer) to Secretary of State, 22 February 1953, no. 628, control 9115, NARA, RG 59, 702.022; *The New York Times*, 3 February 1952.

¹⁰⁰ Embassy in Santiago (Bowers) to Secretary of State, 20 February 1953, no. 341, NARA, RG 59, 702.022.

security zone drawn around the Western Hemisphere by the Rio Treaty of 1947.¹⁰¹ Argentine President Juan Domingo Perón warned that the Southern Cone nations might be forced to divide the Antarctic between them like “good brothers,” unless outside interference were to cease.¹⁰² His counterpart, Carlos Ibañez del Campo, refrained from making logistically infeasible predictions, but journalists speculated that he might sever diplomatic relations with Britain.¹⁰³ The U.S. Embassy in Santiago doubted this in spite of the president’s anti-British reputation.¹⁰⁴ It predicted that he would prefer a negotiated settlement to armed conflict.¹⁰⁵

The United States favored the more moderate course but hoped to avoid having the issue taken before the Organization of American States (OAS), where its benign neglect of the Rio Treaty was bound to be harshly condemned. In that case U.S. officials foresaw a breakdown of relations with the Southern Cone nations, which might lead to the disintegration of the Pan-American system and have serious repercussions in the United Nations.¹⁰⁶ Secretary of State John Foster Dulles instructed the U.S. Embassy in Santiago to discourage the government from involving the OAS or making any “unwise” naval displays.¹⁰⁷ The Ibañez administration heeded this recommendation despite tremendous public pressure to the contrary.¹⁰⁸ It went further than requested and dismissed Foreign Affairs Minister Arturo Olavarria Bravo, whose public statements had appealed to those sectors of the military which

¹⁰¹ Embassy in Buenos Aires (Nufer) to Secretary of State, 23 February 1953, no. 629, control 9225, NARA, RG 59, 702.022.

¹⁰² Embassy in Santiago (Bowers) to Secretary of State, 24 February 1953, no. 348, control 9664, NARA, RG 59, 702.022.

¹⁰³ Embassy in Santiago (Bowers) to Secretary of State, 20 March 1953, no. 395, control 7496, NARA, RG 59, 702.022.

¹⁰⁴ See chapter four.

¹⁰⁵ Embassy in Santiago (Bowers) to Secretary of State, 23 March 1953, no. 400, control 8162, NARA, RG 59, 702.022.

¹⁰⁶ Acting Secretary of State (Smith) to Embassy in London, 10 April 1953, A-1362, NARA, RG 59, 702.022.

¹⁰⁷ Secretary of State (Dulles) to Embassy in Santiago, 3 April 1953, NARA, RG 59, 702.022.

¹⁰⁸ Embassy in Santiago (Bowers) to Secretary of State, 1 April 1953, no. 415, control 308, NARA, RG 59, 702.022.

sought to retaliate against the British, even at the risk of provoking a full-scale war.¹⁰⁹

The Chilean government took a further step to defuse the situation by withdrawing its demand for Britain to reconstruct its facility.¹¹⁰ While these developments were encouraging, Ambassador Bowers believed that the Deception Island incident had negated prospects for the revised internationalization proposal based on the Escudero Plan.¹¹¹ Chilean officials still wished to postpone its circulation as their relations with Argentina remained poor,¹¹² and their U.S. colleagues were in no rush, as they remained uncertain of how large a U.S. claim should be and when—or if—to announce it. Two years passed without any demonstrable progress on the issue. Pleased that Latin American and British naval officers had maintained a stiffly courteous attitude toward each other in the Antarctic, the Department of State lost any sense of urgency. It simply recommended further study to determine Antarctica's value and the appropriate scale of U.S. involvement.¹¹³

Within the Department of State, an ad hoc committee on the Antarctic had been holding general meetings on a biweekly basis for two years, with representatives of the air force and navy, while a technical group had been focusing on issue of a claim.¹¹⁴ These officials believed that the question of time had become most

¹⁰⁹ Embassy in Santiago (Bowers) to Secretary of State, 31 March 1953, no. 410, control 10818, NARA, RG 59, 702.022.

¹¹⁰ Embassy in London (Tibbetts) to Department of State, 16 July 1953, no. 324; Embassy in Santiago (Bowers) to Secretary of State, 31 March 1953, no. 410, control 10818, NARA, RG 59, 702.022.

¹¹¹ Embassy in Santiago (Bowers) to Secretary of State, 24 February 1953, no. 348, control 9664, NARA, RG 59, 702.022.

¹¹² Department of State, Office of South American Affairs (Barall) to Bureau of Inter-American Affairs (Woodward), 19 August 1953, NARA, RG 59, 702.022.

¹¹³ Department of State, Bureau of European Affairs (Bonbright) to Deputy Undersecretary of State (Matthews), 15 July 1952; Department of State, Memorandum of Conversation, Bureau of British Commonwealth and Northern European Affairs (Hilliker) et al., 11 September 1952; Assistant Secretary of State (Merchant) to Secretary of Interior (McKay), 10 April 1953; Department of State, Memorandum by Bureau of British Commonwealth and Northern European Affairs (Raynor), 25 May 1955, NARA, RG 59, 702.022.

¹¹⁴ Embassy in Santiago (Bowers) to Secretary of State, 24 February 1953, no. 348, control 9664, NARA, RG 59, 702.022.

significant, as other nations were consolidating their rights by opening new Antarctic stations in preparation for the 1957–1958 International Geophysical Year (IGY), an eighteen-month event sponsored by the United Nations.¹¹⁵ If the government upheld the Hughes Doctrine much longer, they warned, other nations' claims might saturate most or all of the continent. It was possible that the existing claims might be extended into the sector from 90° to 150° West, the only presently unclaimed sector which, as such, would be the least controversial over which to declare U.S. rights.¹¹⁶

The U.S. Navy's Operation Deep Freeze I departed for Antarctica in October 1955 with seven ships and a crew of eighteen hundred. In a goodwill gesture, Washington had invited each of the claimant nations to send observers,¹¹⁷ but this only partially reduced fears that it might choose to act unilaterally. Five Globemaster aircraft would be broadening the scale of discovery as never before possible, as well as reinforcing the basis for a U.S. claim. By name alone the planes seemed contrary to the promulgated spirit of international cooperation. Australia grew especially concerned when New Zealand informed it that the U.S. Air Force was planning to establish a base within its divided sphere, from 45° to 136° East and 142° to 160° East. The Department of State had failed to mention the base in its earlier discussions with Australia.¹¹⁸ Lest this had been an intentional oversight, Canberra demanded that the United States promptly consult with it regarding any future decisions which involved its sector.¹¹⁹

The Department of State assured the two Commonwealth nations that its first

¹¹⁵ Department of State, Bureau of Inter-American Affairs (Sparks) to Office of Undersecretary of State (Bishop), 19 May 1955, NARA, RG 59, 702.022.

¹¹⁶ Department of State, Memorandum by Bureau of British Commonwealth and Northern European Affairs (Raynor), 25 May 1955, NARA, RG 59, 702.022.

¹¹⁷ See *The New York Times*, 2 June 1955.

¹¹⁸ Department of State, Memorandum of Conversation, Bureau of European Affairs (Merchant) et al., 4 October 1955, NARA, RG 59, 702.022.

¹¹⁹ Department of State, Memorandum of Conversation, Deputy Undersecretary of State (Murphy) et al., NARA, RG 59, 702.022.

priority was to exclude the USSR.¹²⁰ Before the draft proposal could be circulated, due to incertitude over the size of a U.S. claim and decreasing cooperation with Chile,¹²¹ the USSR greatly complicated this objective. In February 1956 Moscow formally petitioned Australia for the right to establish bases in its Antarctic sector.¹²² Australia had little alternative but to accept since, as the Kremlin persuasively argued, no international organization had assumed jurisdiction over the Antarctic and those nations with conflicting claims had not sought arbitration.¹²³ The U.S. National Security Council feared that the USSR's presence eventually might compromise the Western Hemisphere's security, much as the Southern Cone nations interpreted the British presence. The council believed that open aggression by the Soviet Union was less likely than the gradual deterioration of U.S. rights, yet this was sufficient cause for alarm, given the upsurge of activities related to the IGY.¹²⁴

Operation Deep Freeze I led to the resurgence of suspicions that the United States planned to test nuclear weapons in the Antarctic. Eddie Rickenbacker, one of the most famous pilots in U.S. history, had given an unofficial speech a decade earlier, proposing that nuclear weapons should be used to gain access to the continent's untapped mineral reserves.¹²⁵ Although natural resources remained a motivating factor for Antarctic exploration, the Cold War had equated the use of nuclear weapons with Armageddon. For this reason India called for placing the Antarctic on the agenda of the UN General Assembly, and it also sought to ban any

¹²⁰ Department of State, Executive Secretariat (Burns) to Bureau of Far Eastern Affairs (Waddell), 14 February 1956, NARA, RG 59, 702.022.

¹²¹ Department of State, Memorandum by Office of Inter-American Regional Political Affairs (Wilson), 22 January 1957, NARA, RG 59, 702.022.

¹²² Australian Embassy in Washington to Department of State, 9 February 1956, NARA, RG 59, 702.022.

¹²³ Embassy in Canberra (Hoey) to Department of State, 24 June 1958, no. 539, NARA, RG 59, 702.022.

¹²⁴ National Security Council, NSC 5528: Antarctica, 12 December 1955, NARA, RG 59, Records of Policy Planning Staff.

¹²⁵ See *The New York Times*, 31 January 1946.

allegedly peaceful applications of nuclear technology. It was less concerned about the dispute over the peninsular region than over the fate of the rest of the continent where most of the hypothetically exploitable minerals were believed to lie. Although it might have empathized with Chile and Argentina, which were also developing nations, it opposed the notion that any nation had a right to exclude any other from the frozen continent.¹²⁶

The Department of State avoided taking an immediate position, instead requesting an elaboration on India's objectives to be discussed with the other American republics.¹²⁷ Officials appreciated that they would "badly" need the support within the Western Hemisphere if the subject were to be discussed and they were to follow their natural instinct to oppose UN involvement. While the Latin American delegations expressed opposition to the measure,¹²⁸ they did so out of their sense of solidarity with the Southern Cone rather than with Washington. Worse, the Department of State feared that if the General Assembly were to become involved, Chile and Argentina might "stimulate a substantive proposal" addressing the conflict over the peninsular region, as the Indian proposal did not.¹²⁹ Not only was this an unappealing prospect for U.S. diplomats; the Department of Defense held that since the continent's untapped resources might yet prove to be of major strategic value, they should be carefully guarded until evidence emerged to the contrary.¹³⁰

¹²⁶ Department of State, Memorandum by Office of United Nations Political and Security Affairs (DePalma), 5 March 1956, NARA, RG 59, 702.022.

¹²⁷ Acting Secretary of State (Hoover) to Delegation to United Nations and All Diplomatic Posts in American Republics, 8 March 1956, CA-6930, 8 March 1956, NARA, RG 59, 702.022.

¹²⁸ Delegation to United Nations (Lodge) to Secretary of State, 28 September 1956, no. 268, control 16372, NARA, RG 59, 702.022.

¹²⁹ Department of State, Memorandum of Conversation, Bureau of British Commonwealth and Northern European Affairs (Horsey) et al., 12 March 1956, NARA, RG 59, 702.022.

¹³⁰ Department of State, Antarctic Working Group, Memorandum, 15 March 1956, NARA, RG 59, 702.022

When hope passed that India might quickly withdraw its proposal,¹³¹ the Department of State decided that the best alternative was to support it in hope that the language could “be watered down to [an] innocuous statement.”¹³² This contingency would be manageable though still less than ideal since, officials believed, UN involvement would make any later reversal of the non-claimant policy appear to be motivated by narrow self-interest.¹³³ India, apparently of its own free will, later abandoned its threat to involve the General Assembly. The Department of State, though relieved, was cognizant that the issue would re-emerge if it were to announce a sovereignty claim.¹³⁴ This issue highlighted the need to determine the extent of U.S. rights and whether or not they should be formalized. The Department of State recommended doing so, if only over the unclaimed sector, but had failed to persuade the National Security Council.¹³⁵

Meanwhile Byrd had returned from commanding Operation Deep Freeze I and redoubled his efforts to promote a consensus within the government, first in relation to what he believed to be the general wisdom of a claim, and then in relation to its delineation. Like many within the Department of State, he believed that the United States was permitting its rights to erode,¹³⁶ whereas the USSR appeared to be on the verge of formalizing its rights. The Soviet expedition’s radio broadcasts to Moscow dwelled on the region’s great strategic value. The U.S. Embassy in Canberra was also

¹³¹ Acting Secretary of State (Hoover) to Delegation to United Nations et al., 3 September 1956, NARA, RG 59, 702.022.

¹³² Delegation to United Nations to Secretary of State, 14 September 1956, no. 216, control 8128, NARA, RG 59, 702.022.

¹³³ Department of State, Bureau of International Organization Affairs (DePalma) to Bureau of European Affairs et al., 9 August 1956, NARA, RG 59, 702.022.

¹³⁴ Department of State, Bureau of International Organization Affairs (Wilcox) to Bureau of Inter-American Affairs (Rubottom), 6 March 1957, NARA, RG 59, 702.022.

¹³⁵ Deputy Undersecretary of State (Murphy) to Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs (Sprague), 11 March 1957, NARA, RG 59, Records of Policy Planning Staff, 1957–1961. The National Security Council was composed of the Secretaries of State, Defense, and each of the three branches of the armed forces, and chaired by the president. For further elaboration, see chapter six.

¹³⁶ For example, Department of State, Bureau of British Commonwealth and Northern European Affairs (Raynor) to Bureau of European Affairs, 29 April 1955, NARA, RG 59, 702.022.

unsettled by this, but it cautioned that any declaration of sovereignty might appear to substantiate rumors of the alleged Anglo–American nuclear agenda, and thereby defeat any chance for an agreement.¹³⁷ The Australian government, however, did share this perspective. It joined Britain in encouraging that United States to make a territorial claim as a means of containing the Soviet Union.¹³⁸

Robert E. Wilson, one of the Department of State’s Latin American specialists most familiar with the Antarctic, appreciated that divergent pressures weighed upon the president and his most senior advisors. Nonetheless frustrated by their unwillingness to support a U.S. claim, he chose to simplify matters. The non-claimant policy could not secure its own objectives, which he deemed un-ambitious. The United States could not take its freedom of action for granted since it had allowed the Soviet threat to be transformed into a reality, and correspondingly set aside its initial objective to prevent this from happening. The non-claimant policy, intended to reduce tensions, was having the opposite effect of “increasing irritation and a sense of insecurity” among the other countries. He also chastised the policy for ignoring the Antarctic’s most troublesome conflict between the Southern Cone nations and Britain. For these reasons he believed it was essential to assert rights over the sector from 90° to 150° West, a move which congress supported, and to which no other nation was likely to object, as the region had not yet been claimed.¹³⁹

Wilson also appreciated the Eisenhower administration’s tendency to postpone decisions until every possible alternative had been considered, reconsidered

¹³⁷ Embassy in Canberra (Emmons) to Department of State, 19 March 1956, NARA, RG 59, 702.022.

¹³⁸ Department of State, Memorandum of Conversation, Acting Secretary of State et al., 9 November 1956, NARA, RG 59, 702.022.

¹³⁹ Department of State, Memorandum by Office of Inter-American Regional Political Affairs (Wilson), 22 January 1957, NARA, RG 59, 702.022.

and considered again.¹⁴⁰ At risk of contributing to the indecision which he detested, he outlined another possibility, arguably the most creative to date. In addition to the previous sector, he suggested claiming the interior sector from 45° East to 20° West, between Norway's claim and the South Pole; urging New Zealand to cede 150° to 165° West, transferring "Little America" to U.S. territory; and offering Chile and Argentina 90° to 110° West in exchange for relinquishing to Britain all territory east of 60° West. The Southern Cone nations would then be left with a sector spanning approximately from the latitude of Easter Island to the Falkland Islands, which Wilson envisioned them dividing at 74° West. One of his colleagues referred to this as "a very logical [and] reasonable formula," though it seemed unlikely to satisfy the Southern Cone nations "whose positions are more emotional."¹⁴¹

The Department of State opted to maintain its support for the more moderate first course and to proceed with attempts to convince the government of its feasibility.¹⁴² In June 1957 it modified the draft proposal for internationalization to permit cooperation with specialized agencies within the United Nations while barring the organization itself from assuming jurisdiction over the Antarctic.¹⁴³ This development, though significant, did not assuage Wilson's disappointment that the government had failed to determine its position on a claim.¹⁴⁴ He considered the

¹⁴⁰ See Stephen E. Ambrose, *Eisenhower: The President*, vol. 2, 1952–1969 (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1984), 77.

¹⁴¹ Department of State, Memorandum by Office of Inter-American Regional Political Affairs (Wilson), 31 January 1957, NARA, RG 59, 702.022. This comment was written on the memorandum by John C. Dreier, the U.S. Representative on the Council of the Organization of American States. Dreier believed that U.S. policy toward Latin American also tended to lack the creativity which Wilson advocated as regards the Antarctic. *FRUS* 1952–1954, vol. 5, *The American Republics* (Washington: USGPO, 1983), 264–65; John C. Dreier, *The Organization of American States and the Hemispheric Crisis* (New York: Harper & Row Publishers, 1962), 4–5, 9.

¹⁴² Department of State, Office of Inter-American Regional Political Affairs (Wilson) to Bureau of British Commonwealth and Northern European Affairs (Crowley), 21 February 1957, NARA, RG 59, 702.022.

¹⁴³ Department of State, Bureau of International Organization Affairs (Wilcox) to Bureau of Inter-American Affairs et al., 13 May 1957, NARA, RG 59, 702.022.

¹⁴⁴ See Department of State, Office of Inter-American Regional Political Affairs, Memorandum, 12 June 1957, NARA, RG 59, 702.022.

Department of Defense short-sighted for refusing to assume military or financial responsibility to enforce a claim, and he considered the rest of the National Security Council short-sighted for believing that a claim should be postponed until its logistical support could be guaranteed. He viewed his colleagues outside the Department of State as reasonably open-minded but poorly informed—for otherwise they would have shared his viewpoint.¹⁴⁵

Admiral George Dufek, commander of Operation Deep Freeze II in the 1956–57 season, recommended starting the process of international agreement by establishing tripartite condominium with Australia and New Zealand.¹⁴⁶ Though Washington enjoyed positive relations with the two Commonwealth nations, they insisted that an Anglo–American agreement be reached first—as soon as possible, in fact—at which time it would accept virtually any plan. Representatives of all four nations agreed to hold discussions to coordinate their positions. Aware that the other claimant nations, especially Chile and Argentina, would resent being excluded, they made every effort to conceal their discussions.¹⁴⁷ In September 1957 serious consideration turned to the United States and two Commonwealth nations signing a formal pact as a means of enticing the other claimants to join. Britain was to be initially excluded for the sake of conveying that it had not been party to the discussions.¹⁴⁸

Meanwhile the Chilean Foreign Affairs Ministry announced that it viewed developments in the Antarctic as holding direct national security consequences,

¹⁴⁵ Department of State, Office of Inter-American Regional Political Affairs (Wilson) to Bureau of Inter-American Affairs (Rubottom), Office Memorandum, 6 February 1957, NARA, RG 59, 702.022.

¹⁴⁶ U.S. Undersecretary of State to Office of Inter-American Regional Political Affairs, Memorandum, 14 June 1957.

¹⁴⁷ Department of State, Memorandum by Office of Inter-American Regional Political Affairs (Wilson), 23 August 1957; Embassy in Canberra (Ausland) to Department of State, 30 August 1957, no. 102, NARA, RG 59, 702.022.

¹⁴⁸ Department of State, Memorandum by Office of Inter-American Regional Political Affairs (Wilson), 19 September 1957, NARA, RG 59, 702.022.

including the risk of war.¹⁴⁹ The population at large feared that missiles could be launched against it from Soviet bases in the Antarctic. Nonetheless, the U.S. Embassy in Santiago attempted to persuade officials of the need to include the Soviet Union in an international agreement.¹⁵⁰ Adamantly rejecting the Soviet Union's presence as a rationale for its formal involvement, the Chilean government countered that the United States should announce a territorial claim to prevent further communist advances. The time had come, it insisted, to confront the political ramifications of Antarctica.¹⁵¹ In attempting to do the same, it faced a very different challenge; the Chilean public strongly opposed any form of agreement, with or without UN or Soviet involvement, which might be viewed as limiting its rights.¹⁵²

After the press reported that the United States, Britain, Australia and New Zealand were engaged in secret negotiations, the four nations anticipated that the Chilean government might issue denunciation harsh enough to negate any realistic hope for international cooperation. They decided to admit that negotiations were underway between Britain and the two Commonwealth nations, to portray this as only natural given their ties, and to avoid any reference to U.S. involvement,¹⁵³ while redoubling their efforts to prevent further leaks.¹⁵⁴ They believed that renewed conflict with the Southern Cone nations was inevitable after the IGY.¹⁵⁵ Since the United States and Soviet Union had announced plans to remain,¹⁵⁶ their ongoing

¹⁴⁹ Embassy in Santiago (Belton) to Department of State, 18 February 1958, no. 829, NARA, RG 59, 702.022.

¹⁵⁰ Embassy in Santiago (Zook) to Department of State, 17 September 1957, no. 293, NARA, RG 59, 702.022.

¹⁵¹ Department of State, Memorandum of Conversation, Ambassador Paul C. Daniels et al., 8 November 1957, NARA, RG 59, 702.022.

¹⁵² See *The New York Times*, 15 February 1958.

¹⁵³ Embassy in Santiago (Zook) to Department of State, 13 February 1958, no. 804, NARA, RG 59, 702.022.

¹⁵⁴ British Embassy in Washington to Department of State, 13 February 1958, NARA, RG 59, 702.022.

¹⁵⁵ Embassy in London (Whitney) to Secretary of State, 12 February 1958, no. 4781, control 7091, NARA, RG 59, 702.022.

¹⁵⁶ *The New York Times*, 14 June 1957, 15 June 1957, 30 June 1957.

presence would unavoidably prolong fears that they might advance territorial claims which overlapped those already in place, further complicating the Anglo–Latin American dispute. The four nations whose negotiations had been exposed thereby reasoned that it was best for the United States to maintain a semblance of neutrality.¹⁵⁷

The Department of State opposed any new initiative being presented before it had decided on its own course of action. It declined Santiago's offer to host a conference of all interested parties, excluding the Soviet Union, on the basis that this would be premature.¹⁵⁸ Secretary of State John Foster Dulles expected Chile to reinitiate debate over the Rio Treaty, perhaps more strenuously than before. He reminded U.S. embassies throughout Latin America of the government's stance to deny that the treaty extended to Antarctica. Diplomats were to avoid the issue if at all possible. Otherwise, they were to indicate that the United States could not extend the treaty as demanded since that would amount to recognizing the Southern Cone nations' claims.¹⁵⁹ While this form of neutrality held little promise of being perceived as such, the United States had few alternatives, short of denouncing British colonialism, and this was unfathomable.¹⁶⁰

In late March 1958, announcing no claim beforehand, the United States formally presented the seven claimant nations, Belgium, Japan, South Africa and the USSR, with a proposal for an international agreement based upon the freedom of scientific research and a prohibition of non-peaceful activities. These broad tenets,

¹⁵⁷ Embassy in Santiago (Zook) to Department of State, 13 February 1958, no. 804, NARA, RG 59, 702.022.

¹⁵⁸ Embassy in Santiago (Lyon) to Secretary of State, 19 February 1958, no. 554, control 11549, NARA, RG 59, 702.022.

¹⁵⁹ Secretary of State (Dulles) to Embassies in the American Republics et al., 27 February 1958, CA-7365, Confidential 2286, NARA, RG 59, 702.022.

¹⁶⁰ See *FRUS* 1949, vol. 2, *The United Nations, the Western Hemisphere* (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1976), 430–34.

borrowed from its unsuccessful initiative of the previous decade, now held greater appeal since they included a political status quo moratorium which forbade nations from citing their present expeditions to support new claims or to expand previous claims.¹⁶¹ This aspect was a vestige of the Chilean input which had virtually ceased after the United States had indicated receptiveness to Soviet participation. If the unilateral proposal surprised the Chileans, it had the same effect on the British who had enjoyed an unparalleled degree of confidence with U.S. officials—unparalleled by not full.¹⁶²

Since the proposal aroused little dissent, the Department of State soon followed it with another calling for an international conference,¹⁶³ which was accepted. Military officials believed that it was only wise, at this point, to discuss Antarctica with the North Atlantic Treaty Organization.¹⁶⁴ The government had no intention of reversing its formal agenda, but it had grown accustomed to devising, though not always acting upon, contingency arrangements. Few citizens of the United States or elsewhere were likely to have believed otherwise, or to have maintained that diplomacy should be ingenuous. President Dwight D. Eisenhower nonetheless announced that his administration had no political or military agenda as regards the Antarctic, and that its sincerity of purpose would rally support among “all other peoples of the world.”¹⁶⁵ This position was consistent with the Department of State’s view that the draft treaty fully upheld the principles of the UN Charter even

¹⁶¹ Department of State to Representatives of Argentina, Australia, Belgium, Chile, France, Japan, New Zealand, Norway, South Africa, USSR and the United Kingdom, 24 March 1958, NARA, RG 59, 702.022.

¹⁶² Secretary of State (Dulles) to Embassy in London, 31 March 1958, NARA, RG 59, 702.022.

¹⁶³ Foreign Office to Department of State, 22 May 1958, NARA, RG 59, 702.022.

¹⁶⁴ Secretary of State (Dulles) to Embassy in Paris, 25 April 1958, no. 3860, NARA, RG 59, 702.022.

¹⁶⁵ Department of State, Office of Deputy Undersecretary of State (Murphy) to Secretary of State, 28 May 1958, NARA, RG 59, 702.022.

though it sought to avoid the organization's jurisdiction.¹⁶⁶

Preliminary twelve-power negotiations commenced in Washington to forge agreement on a treaty. Ambassador Paul C. Daniels, the Department of State's special advisor on Antarctic affairs, joined U.S. representatives there, while his colleagues elsewhere pondered other alternatives, which as yet did not appear to warrant NATO intervention. U.S. officials merely hoped to be prepared if negotiations were to break down.¹⁶⁷ They had been conditioned to expect as much over the ten years since their first internationalization proposal—to which they themselves had grown “lukewarm,” as the British had observed.¹⁶⁸ Events soon appeared to justify their cautious approach, as India renewed its threat to involve the General Assembly and afford every member the opportunity to join the treaty. Chile countered with its own threat to withdraw from the negotiations and, perhaps, from the General Assembly, if the United States were again to remain mute.¹⁶⁹ This time the U.S. delegation at the United Nations unhesitatingly announced its opposition to the Indian initiative,¹⁷⁰ and New Delhi promptly desisted.¹⁷¹

At the negotiations in Washington, the United States held firm against a Soviet proposal to allow open admittance to the conference, the date and location of which had yet to be determined.¹⁷² Considering the laborious pace of the twelve-power negotiations, Secretary of State John Foster Dulles believed that broadening

¹⁶⁶ Secretary of State (Dulles) to All Diplomatic Posts, 20 June 1958, 20 June 1958, CA-11231, NARA, RG 59, 702.022.

¹⁶⁷ Department of State, Draft Position Paper on Antarctic Conference by Office of Deputy Undersecretary of State (Owen), 4 May 1959, 4 May 1959, NARA, RG 59, 702.022.

¹⁶⁸ *FRUS* 1948, 1/2: 1013-15.

¹⁶⁹ Secretary of State (Dulles) to Embassy in New Delhi, 11 June 1958, NARA, RG 59, 399.829.

¹⁷⁰ Secretary of State (Dulles) to Embassy in Wellington, 14 July 1958, no. 06786, NARA, RG 59, 702.022.

¹⁷¹ Department of State, Memorandum of Meeting of Representative of the Twelve IGY Nations, 2 October 1958, NARA, RG 59, 702.022.

¹⁷² Embassy in Canberra (Sebal) to Secretary of State, 6 June 1958, no. 651, control 4053, NARA, RG 59, 702.022.

the scope of involvement would render the treaty hopelessly unmanageable.¹⁷³ He concurred with British officials that the USSR might be able to force this issue before the United Nations and win support for championing the rights of the unrepresented members.¹⁷⁴ While this did not occur, Soviet objections to Article IV, the political status quo moratorium based on the Chilean Escudero Plan, emerged as an equally serious concern.¹⁷⁵ To plan for the worst dilemma—a Soviet withdrawal from negotiations, followed by an assertion of sovereignty—it convened a meeting of assistant secretaries from five germane regional bureaus and its experts in law, disarmament and science, plus Ambassador Daniels.¹⁷⁶ The working group arrived at no firm conclusions and, by good fortune, it was not required to as the Soviet Union continued its participation.

In October 1958, while numerous technicalities were being debated, Daniels met with representatives of Argentina, Britain and Chile. He inform them that his nation's decreased activity in the Antarctic was not due to any "legal disability." If the U.S. Navy were to go there in the future, it would do so without prior consultation, and it would disregard either notes of protest or post-facto invitations. The three nations, whose representatives he addressed like errant school children, were foolish to bicker over the question of ownership, as the region defied established legal precedents, and he charged that their tit-for-tat shenanigans had distracted attention from more constructive approaches—for example that of his own

¹⁷³ Secretary of State (Dulles) to All Diplomatic Posts, 20 June 1958, 20 June 1958, CA-11231, NARA, RG 59, 702.022.

¹⁷⁴ Department of State, Memorandum of Conversation with Representatives of Argentina, Australia, Chile, New Zealand and United Kingdom, 15 August 1958, NARA, RG 59, 399.829.

¹⁷⁵ Further negotiations were deemed futile if Article IV were discarded. Department of State, Bureau of Far Eastern Affairs (Robinson) to Office of Deputy Undersecretary of State (Murphy), 22 April 1959, NARA, RG 59, 702.022.

¹⁷⁶ Department of State, Bureau of European Affairs (Kohler) to Office of Deputy Undersecretary of State (Daniels), 21 April 1959; Department of State, Memorandum by Deputy Assistant Secretary for International Organization Affairs (Henderson), 24 April 1959, NARA, RG 59, 399.829.

government.¹⁷⁷

The twelve-power negotiations stagnated to such a degree by the following March that Argentina feared that the United States had lost its will to hold a conference. The most elementary question of all, when and where to hold it, had still not been finalized. The claimant nations remembered that Washington had lost enthusiasm for its first proposal, then started to advocate the Escudero Plan, and finally decided against circulating a new eight-power proposal which incorporated its avoidance of the sovereignty question. It was again evident that the U.S. government faced international divisions, as Department of State personnel broke protocol to inform Argentine officials. Ambassador Daniels' absence from the negotiations heightened anxiety over U.S. intentions, although it was only temporary due to illness.¹⁷⁸

The negotiations—which pertained to legal jurisdiction, the treaty's duration, administrative arrangements and inspection rights, among other issues—proceeded slowly but without any major disruption until the Antarctic Conference opened in October 1959, conveniently still in Washington. The Department of State, intent on avoiding last-minute debacles, assured Chile that it fully respected that nation's attitude toward maintaining sovereignty.¹⁷⁹ This change of tack owed in part to knowledge that the Chilean Foreign Affairs Ministry had been divided over whether to participate in the conference, since the resulting treaty might allow for circumvention of the one signed in Rio de Janeiro.¹⁸⁰ U.S. officials sought to assuage

¹⁷⁷ Department of State, Memorandum of Conversation, Ambassador Paul C. Daniels et al., 16 October 1958, NARA, RG 59, 399.829.

¹⁷⁸ Department of State, Memorandum of Conversation, Office of Inter-American Regional Political Affairs (Luboeansky) et al., 20 March 1959, NARA, RG 59, 399.829.

¹⁷⁹ Department of State, Memorandum of Conversation, Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs (Rubottom) et al., 2 November 1959, NARA, RG 59, 399.829.

¹⁸⁰ Department of State, Memorandum of Conversation, Ambassador Daniels et al., 11 July 1958, NARA, RG 59, 399.829.

this concern by volunteering to make a joint declaration with the Southern Cone nations that both treaties would be upheld fully and without amendment.¹⁸¹

The United States also chose to accept Article V, which banned nuclear explosions until a broader international agreement were to be reached governing the use of atomic energy. Until the final days of the conference, it had hoped that such explosions might be permitted under certain circumstances, given the unanimous consent of the signatories. As this scenario seemed extremely unlikely, given the power of modern weapons and the much-dreaded risk of fallout in the Southern Hemisphere, the U.S. delegation had consented to the test ban was, from a practical standpoint, no more than a formality.¹⁸² The Soviet Union's acceptance of Article VIII was somewhat more substantial. This article opened the treaty to UN members, as the U.S. delegation supported, and other nations unanimously approved by the signatories.¹⁸³ The Soviet Union had wished to grant membership to any nation which so desired, whereas now the all signatories gained the kind of veto power which, in some perspectives, had crippled the United Nations.

The Antarctic Treaty, signed on 1 December 1959, indiscriminately compromised the national interests of its twelve signatories. This served the cause of international cooperation and scientific advancement. While the Treaty avoided falling under UN jurisdiction, it established liaisons with the organization's specialized agencies. This also served the cause of international cooperation and scientific advancement. At the same time the cause being served required faith that its objectives were immutable, and this was what the treaty could not ensure. Its terms seemed designed to the contrary. They offered no effective criteria for

¹⁸¹ Department of State, Memorandum of Conversation, Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs (Rubottom) et al., 2 November 1959, NARA, RG 59, 399.829.

¹⁸² That is, without the test ban, the United States still would have faced tremendous, if not insurmountable difficulty gaining the unanimous consent of the other signatories.

¹⁸³ Department of State, Office Memorandum, 24 November 1959, NARA, RG 59, 399.829.

distinguishing between civilian and military activities. As most or all of the signatories must have recalled, Britain and Southern Cone nations had nominally upheld a prohibition of naval displays while their vessels had continued to prowl disputed waters and their governments had made jingoistic declarations. The conference had been a success, yet there was no guarantee that the same would be true of the treaty.

Admiral Richard Evelyn Byrd once wrote that the government's emphasis on international cooperation and scientific advancement was only a means of diverting attention from Operation High Jump's military objectives. At the time he was not engaged in a conspiracy of any sort, let alone one of atomic nature, as widely speculated. He was sharing his candid thoughts with the navy pertaining to how the Department of State had advised him to handle the press.¹⁸⁴ He had made every effort to comply by speaking in a highly equivocal manner, yet experienced little success as the non-claimant policy begged credulity, however dutifully he attempted to explain it.¹⁸⁵ Twelve years later, when the Antarctic Treaty was signed, many nations remained convinced that the United States would seek every opportunity to circumvent the demilitarization protocols.¹⁸⁶ What they failed to appreciate was that the idealistic rhetoric of U.S. policy—which had dwelled on science and international cooperation—had become a reality.

Throughout the period under consideration, U.S. officials often appeared disingenuous while they attempted to seek a resolution to the Antarctic controversy.

¹⁸⁴ For example, Department of State, Division of North and West Coast Affairs to Office of American Republic Affairs et al., 29 November 1946; Department of State, Division of North and West Coast Affairs (Brundage) to Assistant Secretary of State (Braden) et al., 10 February 1947, NARA, RG 59, 800.014.

¹⁸⁵ R.E. Byrd to C.W. Nimitz, 15 April 1947, BPRC, folder 7295.

¹⁸⁶ For example, Embassy in Buenos Aires to Department of State, 3 November 1959, no. 693, NARA, RG 59, 399.829.

For example, Assistant Secretary of State Spruille Braden once told Chilean officials who inquired about Operation High Jump that he knew as little about the massive operation as they did.¹⁸⁷ It was true that he knew only a few generalities provided by the Department of State's specialist,¹⁸⁸ yet his words seemed unconvincing in an era when journalists around the world depicted the Antarctic as a uranium mine for established and aspiring atomic powers.¹⁸⁹ Interestingly the Joint Chiefs of State and National Security Council failed to be convinced that the region was valuable enough to warrant a sovereignty claim, and they preferred to avoid any responsibilities which might emerge related to its defense. For this reason they supported the Department of State's first internationalization proposal, based on the renunciation of sovereignty,¹⁹⁰ as well as its later decision to accept the political status quo moratorium.¹⁹¹

As Caspar Green explained to the United Press in early 1948, U.S. Antarctic policy was highly flexible, seeking to accommodate new developments and to take heed of foreign opinions.¹⁹² This attribute frustrated other governments, as it permitted the United States to justify reversing its stance on the Monroe Doctrine, altering the terms by which to achieve an eight-power arrangement before yielding to the necessity of involving the Soviet Union in a twelve-power agreement. The Department of State recognized that the government's policy did appear to vacillate, though it regarded this as less significant than appearing to be exempt from the "selfish petty wrangling" which characterized the dispute between Britain and the

¹⁸⁷ Department of State, Memorandum of Conversation, Assistant Secretary of State (Braden) et al., 12 November 1946, NARA, RG 59, 800.014.

¹⁸⁸ Department of State, Division of American Republics, Top Secret Memorandum on Antarctic Expeditions, 15 August 1946, NARA, RG 59, 800.014.

¹⁸⁹ Ambassador in Santiago (Bowers) to Secretary of State, 8 August 1946, no. 14302, NARA, RG 59, 800.014; *The New York Times*, 6 November 1946, 16 November 1946.

¹⁹⁰ *FRUS* 1948, 1/2: 971-74, 989-92; *FRUS* 1949, 1: 800-3.

¹⁹¹ *FRUS* 1949, 1: 797-99.

¹⁹² Department of State, Memorandum by Division of Northern European Affairs (Green), 11 February 1948, NARA, RG 59, 800.014.

Southern Cone nations.¹⁹³

While the United States sought to preserve cordial relations with the Southern Cone nations, it refused to permit its hemispheric ideals from being directed against Britain.¹⁹⁴ The Southern Cone nations did have some basis for perceiving an Anglo–American conspiracy against their Antarctic rights,¹⁹⁵ yet the United States privately reprimanded the British for taking a heavy-handed tack in the sovereignty dispute.¹⁹⁶ Though it refrained from publicly criticizing the British on the basis of the Monroe Doctrine or the Rio Treaty,¹⁹⁷ it also declined to acknowledge their rights in the Antarctic while pursuing a solution which gravely undermined the concept of sovereignty.¹⁹⁸ The Southern Cone nations and Britain—like the other claimants—had cause to doubt the reliability of the United States in the far south. The Department of State nonetheless chose to take a “hands off” approach, as this helped to prevent the sovereignty dispute from escalating to the point that it might have thwarted any international agreement.¹⁹⁹

Much had changed since President Franklin D. Roosevelt and the Department of State had considered pursuing a tripartite arrangement with Southern Cone nations, justifying an Antarctic claim in terms of the defense of the Western Hemisphere. Over the following decade U.S. officials had begun to fear that a Latin American nationalism might surpass the danger of Germany’s quest for raw materials and the

¹⁹³ Department of State, Bureau of British Commonwealth and Northern European Affairs (Lister) to Bureau of European Affairs (Jones), 3 June 1957, NARA, RG 59, 702.022.

¹⁹⁴ Secretary of State (Marshall) to Embassy in London, 4 March 1948, control 906, NARA, RG 59, 800.014.

¹⁹⁵ See Peter J. Beck, “A Cold War: Britain, Argentina, and Antarctica,” *History Today* 37 (1987): 16–23.

¹⁹⁶ *FRUS* 1948, 1/2: 963–65.

¹⁹⁷ Embassy in London (Gallman) to Secretary of State, 18 February 1948, no. 604; Secretary of State (Marshall) to British Ambassador in Washington (Inverchapel), 27 February 1948, NARA, RG 59, 800.014.

¹⁹⁸ The Department of State repeatedly clarified that the U.S. non-recognition policy made no exception for British claims. For example, Department of State, Office of American Republic Affairs (Briggs) to Office of European Affairs (Hickerson), 13 November 1946, NARA, RG 59, 800.014.

¹⁹⁹ Secretary of State Marshall once referred to U.S. policy as reflecting a “hands-off” approach. *The New York Times*, 19 February 1948.

later spread of communism.²⁰⁰ They accordingly were cautious to bring their own policy in accord with the Escudero Plan since Chile, like Argentina, had been reluctant to join the Allied struggle against totalitarianism, and in the post-war era many of its citizens sympathized with anti-democratic ideals.²⁰¹ Aside from this, Peter J. Beck observes that the Southern Cone nations appeared to be “trigger happy” in their quest to prompt a British withdrawal from the Antarctic sector where their claims overlapped.²⁰² Many U.S. officials no doubt agreed with Frank Debenham’s conclusion that all three nations were behaving like spoiled children.²⁰³ Fortunately the Department of State succeeded in encouraging them to refrain from actions which might have divided the “free world” against itself.

Deborah Shapley writes that that U.S. Antarctic policy reflected officials’ contradictory desire to take advantage of the unique possibilities for strategic expansion while also being perceived as anti-imperialist.²⁰⁴ This conclusion encapsulates the factors bearing upon their decision to withhold a sovereignty claim despite their unrivalled ability to assert one on the basis of discovery. Like Byrd, many U.S. journalists and politicians regretted that the government was willing to pursue abstract ideals which diverged from the Cold War’s priorities. One congressman referred to the Antarctic Treaty as marking a “dismal end” to the legacy of U.S. Antarctic explorers dating back to Nathaniel Palmer. Indeed, after the Treaty was signed, there remained a distinct possibility that senators would fail to ratify it due to their failure to comprehend the benefits of internationalization.²⁰⁵ It served the

²⁰⁰ Moore, “Thirty-Seven Degrees Frigid,” 85.

²⁰¹ See Jason Kendall Moore, “Maritime Rivalry, Political Intervention, and the Race to Antarctica: U.S.–Chilean Relations, 1939–1949,” *Journal of Latin American Studies* 33 (2001): 713–38.

²⁰² Peter J. Beck, *The International Politics of Antarctica* (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1986), 35–36.

²⁰³ Frank Debenham, *Antarctica: The Story of a Continent* (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1961), 227–28.

²⁰⁴ Deborah Shapley, *The Seventh Continent: Antarctica in a Resource Age* (Washington: Resources for the Future, 1985), 21.

²⁰⁵ See Moore, “Bungled Publicity.”

world's best interests that a majority of U.S. senators appreciated that at time cooperation had to be viewed as an end in itself.

The consul general of the French Embassy in Quebec City found time in his schedule to mock the U.S. non-claimant policy. In one public speech, he referred to the Hughes Doctrine's tenet that sovereignty rights were to accrue by permanent settlement. "To support its thesis," he proclaimed, "[the United States] has even refused to recognize discoveries made by its own nationals."²⁰⁶ Indeed many U.S. citizens within and outside government also had difficulty explaining this phenomenon, although they derived no amusement from it. From a certain perspective U.S. Antarctic policy had forsaken tangible national interests, and unnecessarily as sovereignty did not preclude scientific cooperation. From a broader perspective, it had avoided an unnecessary conflict with its Cold War allies and an equally unnecessary point of conflict with the Soviet Union.

The Department of State correctly predicted that the government's decision to wait for an ideal moment to advance a sovereignty claim would amount to forfeiting the opportunity altogether. After Operation High Jump, that course would have appeared to confirm allegations that it was militarizing the planet's last frontier. After the *Nigeria* incident, it would have complicated a resolution of the dispute between Britain and the Southern Cone nations. After the Soviet Union's demand for involvement, it would have insulted the communist bloc, perhaps leading to a Soviet expedition before the International Geophysical Year (IGY) had been announced or a Soviet counter-claim or both. After the Deception Island incident, it would have reignited the previously existing sovereignty dispute. Once preparations were underway for the IGY, a U.S. claim would have violated the cooperative spirit to

²⁰⁶ Embassy in Quebec City (Mitchell) to Department of State, 24 January 1950, no. 11, NARA, RG 59, 702.022.

which the United Nations was devoted. Moreover, Washington had reason to be skeptical of those nations which encouraged a U.S. claim, for they had emphatically discouraged it prior to Soviet involvement at which time it would have been far more opportune.

Many years after the consul general in Quebec City had jested of these dilemmas, the French Embassy in Washington expressed concern that the Antarctic Treaty was deeply flawed since it refused to acknowledge sovereignty while at the time same implicitly guaranteeing it. The Department of State replied that it fully appreciated that perspective, but had to disagree. No nation, it explained, had spent more time than the United States analyzing the sovereignty issue. While many individuals had favored announcing a claim, the government had determined that the Hughes Doctrine provided a better means of securing international cooperation. Implicitly its self-denial was to continue serving as an example for the other signatories, promoting a degree of good will which would surmount technicalities.²⁰⁷ The French were unlikely to have accepted this, yet U.S. officials were not entirely unjustified to glorify the restraint of their nation's Antarctic policy.²⁰⁸

The following chapter turns attention to U.S.–Soviet relations, which heavily influenced how U.S. officials sought to build cooperation in the Antarctic. The two internationalization proposals which they tabled corresponded to their shifting perceptions of the Soviet threat. Between the proposals, the USSR developed the atomic bomb and then appeared to surpass U.S. technology. Antarctica could not be separated from the Cold War, yet there it remained one of the most benign arenas of superpower competition.

²⁰⁷ Department of State, Memorandum by Office of Western European Affairs (Jova), 8 July 1958, NARA, RG 59, 399.829.

²⁰⁸ See Negroponte, "The Success of the Antarctic Treaty"; Mitchell and Kimball, "Conflict over the Cold Continent."

2. U.S.–Soviet Relations

It is unsurprising that U.S. Cold War historiography minimizes or omits the importance of the superpowers' cooperation in the Antarctic. Officials at the time empathized with journalists' description of the sovereignty as a comic opera,¹ and their debate over the wisdom of making a claim was hardly vociferous. The failure of their first internationalization proposal, like the need to include the USSR's in their second proposal, was merely a "headache."² Historians have preferred to dwell on issues which suggest that either or both superpowers were to blame for overreacting to the threat posed by the other.³ In the Antarctic, that threat was purely hypothetical and little dwelled upon in the global battle to win hearts and minds. It is therefore poorly suited to the traditional, revisionist or post-revisionist categories and countless subcategories into which Cold War literature is divided.⁴

The early hope of U.S. officials to exclude the Soviet Union from Antarctica reflected their apprehension that the communist effort "to take over the world step-by-step" might extend to the southernmost reaches of the planet.⁵ Developments in the Mediterranean, Europe and Asia suggested that the USSR had no respect for the principle of self-determination and no intention of fulfilling its wartime pledge to

¹ For reference to the dispute as a "comic opera," see Frank Debenham, *Antarctica: The story of a continent* (New York: The MacMillan Company, 1961), 234-35. For similar U.S. press reports, see "Antarctica: The Very Cold War," *Newsweek*, 1 March 1948; Antarctica: Cold War," *Time*, 1 March 1948.

² The Department of State once acknowledged that an internationalization agreement might become a "headache" to manage, and that this description also applied to the indecisive nature of its Antarctic policy. Department of State, Office of European Affairs (Raynor), Memorandum on Trusteeship Agreement for Antarctica, 1 March 1948, NARG 59, 800.014; *FRUS* 1948, vol. 1, part 2, *General* (Washington: USGPO, 1976), 1003.

³ See Robert Stover, "Responsibility for the Cold War: A Case Study in Historical Responsibility," *History and Theory* 11, no. 2 (1972): 145-78; Douglas J. Macdonald, "Communist Bloc Expansion in the Early Cold War: Challenging Realism, Refuting Revisionism," *International Studies* 20, no. 3 (1995-96): 152-88.

⁴ See Michael Leigh, "Is There a Revisionist Thesis on the Origins of the Cold War?" *Political Science Quarterly* 89, no. 1 (1974): 101-16.

⁵ See World Peace Foundation, *DAFR* 1951 (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1953), 1-4.

hold free and fair elections in regions under its occupation.⁶ Americans, convinced that their own intentions in the world were genuinely idealistic, began to accept the responsibility of opposing the domination of any nation over another. Some officials feared that they might revert to an isolationist mentality,⁷ but that grew unlikely as the Soviet Union imposed its will over Eastern Europe with increasing brutality. U.S. satisfaction with having defeating the Axis powers was short-lived as many considered Marshal Joseph Stalin to be another Adolf Hitler.⁸

This chapter addresses the digression of U.S.–Soviet relations from the end of the Second World War through the early Cold War period. Events quickly revealed that the former collaboration between the two nations could not be sustained. U.S. officials attempted to counteract this pessimistic reality by declaring that their own system was eventually bound to triumph, and in the meantime that it would be able to halt the spread of totalitarianism.⁹ Rhetoric alone was unable to do so. The task called for long-term perseverance, as the Soviets refused to desist even after U.S. aid largely immunized Western Europe from communism.¹⁰ Though few Americans questioned the righteousness of their latest crusade for freedom, many of their allies did question its black-and-white assumptions about the world.¹¹ By the 1950s the superpowers' diplomacy amounted to little more than a forum for hostile propaganda which guised their mutual insecurity.¹² The Eisenhower administration's effort to

⁶ See World Peace Foundation, *DAFR* 1947 (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1949), 120-21.

⁷ John Lewis Gaddis, *Russia, the Soviet Union and the United States: An Interpretive History*, 2nd ed. (New York: McGraw-Hill Publishing Company, 1990), 181; *DIA*, 1947–1948 (London: Oxford University Press, 1952), 153-55.

⁸ Ronald E. Powaski, *Toward an Entangling Alliance: American Isolationism, Internationalism and Europe, 1901–1950* (New York: Greenwood Press, 1991), 201-2; Paul E. Zinner, “Marxism in Action: The Seizure of Power in Czechoslovakia,” *Foreign Affairs* 28, no. 4 (1950): 644-58.

⁹ *USWA* 1945–1947 (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1947), vii-viii.

¹⁰ See John W. Young, *Cold War and Detente 1941–91* (London: Longman, 1993), 2, 17.

¹¹ Henry L. Stimson, “The Challenge to Americans,” *Foreign Affairs* 26, no. 1 (1947): 5-14.

¹² Dean Acheson, *Power and Diplomacy* (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1959), 71; Lord Vanistart, “The Decline of Diplomacy,” *Foreign Affairs* 28, no. 2 (1950): 177-88; John

reverse this trend succeeded most notably in the Antarctic, one region, unlike many others, where the superpowers never contemplated war.

The Antarctic Treaty of 1959 indicated that the relaxation of superpower tensions could be selectively achieved. The first U.S. internationalization proposal in 1948 had unsuccessfully attempted to exclude the Soviet Union from Antarctica. While the seven claimant nations—Argentina, Australia, Britain, Chile, France, New Zealand and Norway—had supported this objective in principle, they had been unwilling to accept the proposal's call to renounce their sovereignty. Negotiations to form a modified eight-power agreement stalled after the Korean War broke out, and many years passed before the United States forwarded a second internationalization proposal which left the question of sovereignty unresolved. The success of this tack related to its inclusion of the Soviet Union and the claimant nations' acceptance that U.S. leadership could be effective without being bold, adapting itself to new circumstances rather than sustaining bygone hopes. Soviet involvement in the Antarctic might not have been ideal but, unlike the U.S. reluctance to assist Eastern European uprisings against Soviet rule, it did not compromise the destiny of freedom-loving populations.

Many factors contributed to the evolution of U.S.–Soviet relations over these years. Among them was President Harry S. Truman's lack of experience when he assumed the presidency after the death of Franklin D. Roosevelt. Unlike his predecessor, who was known for his grace and dignity, Truman was a forthright man

Spanier, *American Foreign Policy since World War II*, 6th ed. (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1968), 3-4. See Paul Y. Hammond, *The Cold War Years: American Foreign Policy since 1945* (New York: Harcourt, Brace & World, Inc., 1969), 28, 56-57; *DIA 1945–1946* (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1948), 21, 24.

with a reputation for being pugnacious.¹³ He relied heavily on his own advisors and British Prime Minister Winston Churchill, who concurred with the need to take a firm stance against the Soviet Union.¹⁴ This encouraged him to pursue a U.S. sphere of influence despite its inconsistency with the ideals for which the Second World War had been fought.¹⁵ Though the Soviet Union tacitly consented to U.S. dominance in Western Europe, Japan and throughout the Pacific, Truman rebuked its desire to maintain or impose friendly governments along its borders.¹⁶ Some historians have alleged that he was needlessly uncooperative than Stalin, but John Lewis Gaddis emphasizes the gravity of the Soviet threat as by 1947 communism had been imposed on eleven states with a combined population exceeding one hundred million.¹⁷

When Dwight D. Eisenhower assumed the presidency in 1953, he went beyond the containment doctrine to advocate communist rollback, though his policies demonstrated considerable restraint.¹⁸ Ending the Korean War had been an important campaign pledge which he fulfilled by negotiating an armistice rather than insisting on total victory, as had been possible during the Second World War. The theme of communist rollback was domestically popular but impractical as it entailed the risk of nuclear retaliation. The U.S. monopoly of atomic weapons had passed, and now the superpowers gravely menaced each other as well as the survival of the humanity. Eisenhower accordingly sought opportunities to minimize U.S.–Soviet tensions. He shared the anticommunist fervor of his secretary of state, John Foster Dulles, but did

¹³ John Patrick Diggins, *The Proud Decades: America in War and in Peace 1941–1960* (New York: W.W. Norton & Company 1988), 95, 98.

¹⁴ Ronald E. Powaski, *The Cold War: The United States and the Soviet Union, 1917–1991* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1998), 65; Powaski, *Toward an Entangling Alliance*, 165.

¹⁵ See Thomas G. Paterson, *The Making of the Cold War* (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 1979), 33.

¹⁶ Powaski, *Toward an Entangling Alliance*, 192; Diggins, *The Proud Decades*, 68–71.

¹⁷ John Lewis Gaddis, *The Long Peace: Inquiries into the History of the Cold War* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1987), 44; John W. Mason, *The Cold War 1945–1991* (London: Routledge, 1996), 6.

¹⁸ Stephen E. Ambrose, *Rise to Globalism: American Foreign Policy since 1938* (London: The Penguin Press, 1971), 22, 219; Divine, *Eisenhower and the Cold War*, 18–19.

not permit it to cloud his judgment.¹⁹ Throughout the period under consideration, the United States and the Soviet Union tended to view world as they imagined it, not as it was,²⁰ but they fully appreciated the need to avoid mutual destruction.²¹

In April 1945, shortly after taking office, Truman told the Soviet foreign minister that he expected the USSR to hold democratic elections in Poland and to abide by the outcome, whatever it might be.²² Stalin had agreed to this two months earlier at the Yalta Conference where the Big Three—the United States, Britain and the Soviet Union—had issued a joint declaration on the future of postwar Europe. Nonetheless each power sought to preserve or expand its influence in the region. Many authors, like many politicians of the time, have portrayed the Yalta Conference as a betrayal of Eastern Europe.²³ Roosevelt, Stalin and Churchill had spoken of great ideals while tacitly agreeing to partition the world as suited their national interests.²⁴ John Patrick Diggins observes that Yalta was not responsible for initiating the Cold War. Instead it revealed that the United States and the Soviet Union held fundamentally different historical perspectives.²⁵ Truman was less willing to accommodate this circumstance than Roosevelt appeared to have been.²⁶ When the Soviet foreign minister suggested

¹⁹ M.L. Dockrill, *The Cold War 1945–1963* (London: Macmillan Education Ltd., 1988), 61.

²⁰ Diggins, *The Proud Decades*, 73–75.

²¹ See John Scott, *Political Warfare: A Guide to Competitive Coexistence* (New York: The John Day Company, 1955).

²² Harry S. Truman, *Memoirs*, vol. 1, *Year of Decisions 1945* (Hodder and Stoughton Limited, 1955), 85. See Charles R. Morris, *Iron Destinies, Lost Opportunities: The Arms Race between the USA and the USSR, 1945–1987* (New York: Harper & Row, Publishers, 1988), 17–18.

²³ See Ronald Lora, “A View from the Right: Conservative Intellectuals, the Cold War and McCarthy,” in Robert Griffith and Athan Theoharis, eds., *The Specter: Original Essays on the Cold War and the Origins of McCarthyism* (New York: Franklin Watts, Inc., 1974); Norman A. Graebner, *Cold War Diplomacy: American Foreign Policy, 1945–1960* (Princeton, New Jersey: D. Van Nostrand Company, Inc., 1962), 21; Thomas J. McCormick, *America’s Half-Century: United States Foreign Policy in the Cold War* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1989), 45.

²⁴ See *USWA* 1945–47: 6.

²⁵ Diggins, *The Proud Decades*, 73–75.

²⁶ See Lloyd C. Gardner, *Architects of Illusion: Men and Ideas in American Foreign Policy 1941–1949* (Chicago: Quadrangle Books, 1970), 54.

that his tacit warning related to Poland was inappropriate, Truman retorted that the USSR had no excuse whatsoever for breaking its agreements.²⁷

Though discouraged by this exchange, Truman pondered the value of enlisting Soviet troops to defeat the Japanese in Manchuria and northern China. The German surrender appeared to be inevitable, but the Japanese army was recruiting volunteers for a last stand to be waged with the fanaticism which motivated Kamikaze pilots. Some military officials predicted that an invasion would cost up to a half million American lives. The involvement of Soviet troops had little bearing on this estimate, aside from risking that they might remain to impose their political will. The Yalta agreement had provided an incentive for the USSR to enter the war against Japan; in that case it was to be granted possession of the Kurile Islands.²⁸ In July 1945, two months after Germany had accepted an unconditional surrender, the Big Three met at Potsdam to discuss the last phase of the war effort. They restated their objection to the principle of spheres of influence but agreed to maintain separate zones of occupation in Germany.²⁹ While this arrangement laid the basis for future conflict, at the time there were more pressing concerns.

Truman had begun to forfeit hope that the Soviet Union understood anything other than force. There had been no indication that the Polish government-in-exile would be permitted an opportunity to re-establish itself, and numerous indications that the USSR opposed relinquishing its dominance throughout Eastern Europe and other regions where its troops were stationed. Bearing this in mind, Truman concluded that it was best to avoid involving the Soviet Union to defeat Japan.³⁰ That

²⁷ Truman, *Memoirs* 1: 85.

²⁸ Truman, *Memoirs* 1: 190, 238-39, 347-50.

²⁹ Mason, *The Cold War*, 4-5; Gardner, *Architects of Illusion*, 83.

³⁰ Gar Alperovitz, "The Use of the Atomic Bomb," in Thomas G. Paterson, ed., *The Origins of the Cold War* (Lexington, Massachusetts: D.C. Heath and Company, 1974), 51-60; Truman, *Memoirs* 1: 342.

appeared to be possible when he received news that the atomic test conducted by scientists of the highly classified Manhattan Project had succeeded beyond expectation, reportedly causing a blind woman to see light.³¹ This long-awaited development absolved the need for either a U.S. invasion or Soviet entry into the war. It was understandably regarded as a “godsend” which Truman and his advisers hoped would also curtail Soviet expansion.³² Since it remained premature to employ any overt form of coercion, Truman merely informed Stalin that a new weapon had been developed which might be decisive when employed against Japan.³³

The atomic bomb did bring the Second World War to an end, though not as immediately as had been anticipated. On 6 August the first weapon fell over Hiroshima, instantly killing 75,000 people, after which Truman referred to it as “the greatest thing in history.”³⁴ One senator went further in comparing it to the birth of Jesus Christ,³⁵ yet the Japanese government refused to accept an unconditional surrender, insisting that the emperor be retained. On 9 August the United States dropped a second weapon over Nagasaki, killing an additional 39,000 people. Even this failed to cause the Japanese to acquiesce, and they did not until five days later upon receiving informal assurances that the emperor would not be deposed.³⁶ Most Americans derived unqualified satisfaction from having avenged the bombing of

³¹ Martin J. Sherwin, *A World Destroyed: Hiroshima and its Legacies*, 3rd ed (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2003), 223.

³² Ambrose, *Rise to Globalism*, 127; Gardner, *Architects of Illusion*, 89; S.R. Ashton, *In Search of Detente: The Politics of East–West Relations since 1945* (London: Macmillan Education Ltd, 1989), 9.

³³ Joseph I. Lieberman, *The Scorpion and the Tarantula: The Struggle to Control Atomic Weapons, 1945–1949* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1970), 106–7; Pacific War Research Society, *The Day Man Lost Hiroshima, 6 August 1945* (Tokyo: Kodansha International Ltd., 1972), 197–98.

³⁴ James Chace, “Sharing the Atom Bomb,” *Foreign Affairs* 75, no. 1 (1996): 129–44; A.J.C. Edwards, *Nuclear Weapons: The Balance of Terror, the Quest for Peace* (Houndmills: Macmillan Press Ltd., 1986), 1–2.

³⁵ Ralph E. Lapp, *The New Priesthood: The Scientific Elite and the Uses of Power* (New York: Harper & Row, Publishers, 1965), 97.

³⁶ Brian Easlea, *Fathering the Unthinkable: Masculinity, Scientists and the Nuclear Arms Race* (London: Pluto Press Limited, 1983), 105. See Tom Huntington, “Dawn over Trinity,” *American History* 36, no. 1 (2001): 18–21.

Pearl Harbor on such a dramatic scale.³⁷ The others had to acknowledge that the conventional bombings of Tokyo and Dresden had killed as many or more civilians,³⁸ and that countless American lives had been saved. While the destruction of Hiroshima and Nagasaki might have been “distasteful,” officials regarded it as fully justifiable.³⁹

The atomic bomb did not prevent the Soviet Union from becoming involved. It declared war against Japan two days after Hiroshima was laid to ruins, and its troops were firmly established in Manchuria a week later when Japan finally accepted defeat.⁴⁰ The Red Army was large enough to maintain a simultaneous presence throughout Eastern Europe. U.S. officials appreciated that it was too large for being stopped by atomic weapons, if that need were to arise.⁴¹ The risk of an atomic bomb or bombs being used against civilian targets also failed to intimidate the Soviet Union since it had lost twenty million during the war, compared to which the death toll from Hiroshima and Nagasaki was miniscule.⁴² Truman, while not seriously considering a pre-emptive strike, did hope that the atomic bomb would persuade the Soviet Union to be more responsive to U.S. ideals. It had no such effect in part because of the

³⁷ Charles C. Alexander, *Nationalism in American Thought, 1930-45* (Chicago: Rand McNally & Company, 1969), 227-29; Barton J. Bernstein, “Truman and the A-Bomb: Targeting Non-Combatants, Using the Bomb, and His Defending the ‘Decision,’” *The Journal of Military History* 62, no. 3: 547-70; Lawrence S. Wittner, *Rebels against War: The American Peace Movement, 1941-1960* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1969), 128-29.

³⁸ See Edward Teller and Allen Brown, *The Legacy of Hiroshima* (London: Macmillan & Co. Ltd., 1962), 4; Bertrand Goldschmidt, *The Atomic Complex: A Worldwide Political History of Nuclear Energy* (La Grange Park, Illinois: American Nuclear Society, 1982), 16-18; John Newhouse, *The Nuclear Age: From Hiroshima to Star Wars* (London: Michael Joseph, 1989), 42.

³⁹ See Leslie R. Groves, *Now It Can Be Told: The Story of the Manhattan Project* (London: Andre Deutsch Publishers, 1962), 265, 413.

⁴⁰ Powaski, *The Cold War*, 67.

⁴¹ Ambrose, *Rise to Globalism*, 128-29.

⁴² See Albert Wohlstetter, “The Delicate Balance of Terror,” *Foreign Affairs* 37, no. 2 (1959): 211-34.

superiority of Soviet conventional forces,⁴³ and in part because of Soviet faith that the communist system was bound to triumph, with or without military confrontation.⁴⁴

The tenor of U.S.–Soviet relations grew increasingly negative as the year drew to a close. According to Averell Harriman, the U.S. Ambassador in Moscow, this was largely due the Soviet press making no effort to reciprocate the desire of the American people to reach a mutual understanding. Instead the state-controlled press dwelled on the racial injustice and economic disparities of the U.S. system, which it attributed to the inherent weakness of capitalism.⁴⁵ In public speeches Stalin berated the United States for harboring imperial ambitions in contrast to the social and humanitarian ideals which guided the Soviet Union’s behavior.⁴⁶ The two nations shared an ability to credit themselves with having the best intentions and an inability to fathom the same of each other. The United States’ secrecy about the atomic bomb had contributed to this, as had the Soviet Union’s clearly opportunist declaration of war against Japan, and the number of other factors was rapidly increasing.

In February 1946 George F. Kennan, the consul at the U.S. Embassy in Moscow, who shared Harriman’s despondent views, recommended a “patient but firm and vigilant containment” of Soviet designs on the world. His dispatch to this effect, known as the Long Telegram, implied that the government should respond to Soviet advances wherever they might take place. While that course of action was not without merit, it neglected fiscal constraints and the need to prioritize national interests.⁴⁷ The Long Telegram nonetheless earned regard as a foreign policy

⁴³ Walter LaFeber, *America, Russia and the Cold War, 1945–1992*, 7th ed. (New York: McGraw Hill Inc, 1993), 49–50; Ronald Steel, *Pax Americana* (New York: The Viking Press, 1967), 40.

⁴⁴ Norman Graebner, ed., *The National Security: Its Theory and Practice, 1945–1960* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1986), 21.

⁴⁵ *FRUS*, 1946, vol. 6, *Eastern Europe; The Soviet Union* (Washington: USGPO, 1969), 676, 684.

⁴⁶ See *FRUS* 1946, 6: 690–91, 695.

⁴⁷ Gaddis, *Russia, the Soviet Union and the United States*, 188–89.

blueprint.⁴⁸ In the process it extinguished any lingering hope that the ideals expressed at the Yalta Conference might yet be achieved. Martin McCauley writes that the Long Telegram exerted the single largest influence on how Truman approached the USSR.⁴⁹ Previously he and other officials had declared that the United States would neither intervene in the internal affairs of other states nor condone less scrupulous nations which might choose to do so. Now they acquired a rationale to intervene based on the assumption that other nations' freedom from Soviet influence warranted the extension of U.S. influence.⁵⁰

Two weeks later Churchill declared that the Soviet Union had drawn an "iron curtain" around Eastern Europe, attempting to quarantine it from the democratic impulse which prevailed in the West. The United States and Britain, he believed, shared a unique destiny to ensure that this effort would not succeed. He advocated "a fraternal association of the English-speaking peoples" which in many ways already existed, as those peoples shared a deep commitment to individual freedom and representative government. Though couched in defensive terms, the overtones of his message were not only provocative; they undermined faith that the United Nations might still function as planned and help to ameliorate U.S.–Soviet relations.⁵¹ There were few indications that anything would have that effect. The USSR was known to persecute its citizens for ideological non-conformity. It had, according to *The World Today*, become a more efficient police state than the Tsars had imagined possible.⁵²

⁴⁸ Ashton, *In Search of Detente*, 11-12; Gardner, *Architects of Illusion*, 277.

⁴⁹ Martin McCauley, *The Origins of the Cold War 1941–1949*, 2nd ed. (London: Longman, 1995), 73.

⁵⁰ See World Peace Foundation, *DAFR 1945–1946* (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1948), 763.

⁵¹ John W. Young, *Winston Churchill's Last Campaign: Britain and the Cold War 1951–1955* (Oxford: Carendon Press, 1996), 21-22; David Dimbleby and David Reynolds, *An Ocean Apart: The Relationship between Britain and America in the Twentieth Century* (London: Hodder & Stoughton, 1988), 171.

⁵² "Curiosities of Soviet Propaganda," *The World Today* 4, no. 9 (1948): 390-95.

Since Truman concurred with this assessment, he appreciated Churchill's willingness to publicize the harsh realities with which they both had to contend.⁵³

One of the many points of contention was the Soviet Union's reluctance to withdraw its troops from Iran. Its leaders claimed that the iron curtain speech and Truman's tacit endorsement of it were to blame for their inaction. From their standpoint the hostile attitude of the Anglo-Americans nations justified reneging on their earlier pledges.⁵⁴ From the standpoint of the Anglo-American nations, the Soviet consolidation of power over Eastern Europe justified their resolve to halt the spread of the "totalitarian virus."⁵⁵ Walter Bedell Smith, who had replaced Harriman as the U.S. Ambassador in Moscow, reported that the Soviet press regularly indicted Truman for betraying Roosevelt's legacy as a peacemaker.⁵⁶ Smith acknowledged that the U.S. press, like the U.S. public, had turned more anti-Soviet since the end of the war, yet he attributed this to the Soviet government's policies and declarations rather than to U.S. provocation.⁵⁷ Tensions also persisted at the official level as Soviet spokespersons charged that the United States failed to appreciate how much the USSR had suffered during the war.⁵⁸

While the Soviet Union did withdraw from Iran,⁵⁹ it did not become any more responsive to U.S. wishes at large. Instead it expanded its "subversive" activities in Greece and Turkey.⁶⁰ In March 1947 Truman appealed to congress for a \$400 million

⁵³ Gardner, *Architects of Illusion*, 104.

⁵⁴ Harry S. Truman, *Memoirs*, vol. 2, *Years of Trial and Hope 1946-1953* (Hodder and Soughton, Limited, 1955), 99-101.

⁵⁵ *FRUS* 1946, 6: 758.

⁵⁶ *FRUS* 1946, 6: 768, 783.

⁵⁷ *FRUS* 1947, vol. 4, *Eastern Europe; The Soviet Union* (Washington: USGPO, 1972), 520. See "The Return to Political Orthodoxy in Russia," *The World Today* 3, no. 2 (1947): 73-81.

⁵⁸ "Impressions of the Moscow Conference," *The World Today* 3, no. 6 (1947): 248-54.

⁵⁹ Truman, *Memoirs* 2: 99-101.

⁶⁰ The term "subversive" has been placed in quotation marks due to its impreciseness. Soviet "subversion" was often used, and continues to be used by some historians, to justify the U.S. role in the Cold War. The civil war in Greece can alternately be explained as a struggle against the nation's British-supported monarch. There was little evidence of Soviet involvement, and neither in Turkey, as

aid package to prevent these nations from being drawn into the Soviet sphere of influence. The requested funds were substantial but, he pointed out, only a tiny fraction of the amount which the United States had invested in defeating the Axis powers.⁶¹ After two months of deliberation, congress approved the president's appeal and, in his words, "served notice that the march of communism would not be allowed to succeed by default."⁶² This development formalized the U.S. commitment to contain communism—a commitment which became known as the Truman Doctrine, though it might well have been attributed to Kennan, Churchill or a number of other officials. Ronald Steel writes that the Truman Doctrine expanded the Monroe Doctrine beyond the Western Hemisphere to every corner of the world in hope of establishing an American empire.⁶³

In June 1947 Secretary of State George C. Marshall furthered this impression by proposing a \$13 billion European Recovery Program to be distributed over four years. While this generated unease among fiscally conservative members of congress, it appealed to the need for Americans to prove that their "tough talk" corresponded to policies. Citizens also responded enthusiastically to the notion that assisting Europe was in their own best interests.⁶⁴ Britain's inability to maintain its presence in Greece and Turkey had demonstrated that without economic assistance

Secretary of State Dean Acheson privately admitted to the Council on Foreign Relations. See Edward Pessen, "Appraising American Cold War Policy by its Means of Implementation," *Reviews in American History* 18, no. 4 (1990): 453-65; Les K. Adler and Thomas G. Paterson, "Red Fascism: The Merger of Nazi Germany and Soviet Russia in the American Image of Totalitarianism, 1930s-1950s," *American Historical Review* 75, no. 4 (1970): 1046-64; Melvyn Leffler, "Strategy, Diplomacy and the Cold War: The United States, Turkey and NATO, 1945-1952," *Journal of American History* 71, no. 4 (1985): 807-25.

⁶¹ *DIA 1947-1948* (London: Oxford University Press, 1952): 2-7

⁶² Truman, *Memoirs* 2: 114.

⁶³ Steel, *Pax Americana*, 23.

⁶⁴ Gaddis, *The Long Peace*, 59.

few nations would be able to purchase U.S. exports.⁶⁵ John Gimbel writes that the Truman Doctrine and Marshall Plan were pragmatic as well as ideological in nature. He notes that Kennan recommended simply telling the European nations that they must accept the Marshall Plan because the United States had determined that it was necessary. There was, in Kennan's view, no reason to engage in any form of negotiation which might question this basic assumption.⁶⁶

The government took a less arbitrary stance, giving Eastern European nations the opportunity to participate in the Marshall Plan if they agreed to disclose all economically related information. As this prerequisite would have exposed their heavy reliance on the Soviet Union,⁶⁷ it was viewed as an attempt to intervene in their domestic affairs.⁶⁸ Most Eastern European nations promptly embraced the Soviet alternative known as the Molotov Plan, which essentially reinforced their dependency.⁶⁹ Thomas G. Paterson writes that Stalin actually feared the Marshall Plan more than the atomic bomb since it threatened to expose the communist system's inability to rival the material benefits associated with capitalism.⁷⁰ Soviet officials naturally avoided this issue, instead charging that the United States was pursuing the "capitalist encirclement" of Eastern Europe.⁷¹ In September 1947 they established

⁶⁵ Joyce Kolko and Gabriel Kolko, *The Limits of Power: The World and United States Foreign Policy, 1945-1954* (New York: Harper & Row Publishers, 1972), 375; LaFeber, *America, Russia and the Cold War*, 58; Gaddis, *The Long Peace*, 41-42.

⁶⁶ John Gimbel, "The Origins of the Marshall Plan," in Charles S. Maier, ed., *The Origins of the Cold War and Contemporary Europe*, (New York: New Viewpoints, 1978), 143-77.

⁶⁷ Diggins, *The Proud Decades*, 79.

⁶⁸ Thomas G. Paterson, "The Marshall Plan Revisited," in Paterson, *The Origins of the Cold War*, 167-74.

⁶⁹ Powaski, *The Cold War*, 74.

⁷⁰ Paterson, "The Marshall Plan Revisited," 174.

⁷¹ Ashton, *In Search of Detente*, 6; *FRUS* 1949, vol. 5, *Eastern Europe; The Soviet Union* (Washington: USGPO, 1976), 1-2.

the Communist Information Bureau, or Cominform, to redouble propaganda that the Soviet system was not only preferable but ideal.⁷²

The democratically elected government of Czechoslovakia, while professing allegiance to socialist values, also expressed willingness to participate in the Marshall Plan. The Soviet Union viewed this as evidence that the local Communist Party preferred to compromise with non-communist elements rather than to heed the Kremlin's wishes. The party soon discarded its agreement to coordinate policies with the Social Democrats, but otherwise remained averse to following Soviet dictates. In February 1948 the USSR responded by overthrowing the government.⁷³ U.S. officials, like much of the world, expressed outrage at such violent disregard for representative institutions. At the same time they made no effort to intervene, lest they precipitate a direct conflict with the Soviet Union.⁷⁴ As that conflict seemed to have become unavoidable, whether immediately or at some point in the future, the U.S. Senate approved the Marshall Plan.⁷⁵ The Czech coup appeared to be in keeping with the Soviet Union's desire to expand its influence as widely as possible by any means necessary.⁷⁶

Shortly thereafter, the United States, Britain and France announced plans to introduce a new currency in their zones of occupation in Germany. The Soviet Union, which occupied the fourth zone, charged that this action violated the Potsdam agreement which had called for using a single currency to facilitate integration. The western nations disagreed, noting that the agreement had called for political as well as

⁷² Mason, *The Cold War*, 9-10. U.S. officials nonetheless believed that they had captured "the political warfare offensive." *FRUS* 1947, 4: 563.

⁷³ Zinner, "Marxism in Action."

⁷⁴ *FRUS* 1948, vol. 4, *Eastern Europe; The Soviet Union* (Washington: USGPO, 1974), 737, 757-58.

⁷⁵ Ambrose, *Rise to Globalism*, 165; Ashton, *In Search of Detente*, 7; Dimpleby and Reynolds, *An Ocean Apart*, 175.

⁷⁶ Norman Graebner, *The Age of Global Power: The United States since 1939* (New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1973), 91.

economic integration, the latter of which no longer served any purpose given the Soviet Union's obstruction of the former.⁷⁷ While the technicalities of the agreement could be debated, they guised a larger ideological and strategic dispute. If the western nations were to compromise, they feared not only imperiling the success of the Marshall Plan, but also encouraging the Soviet Union to stage further coups throughout Europe. If the Soviet Union were to compromise, it feared losing credibility among those Europeans—perhaps a minority—who genuinely sought its protection against “capitalist encirclement.”⁷⁸

When the western nations introduced the new currency in June 1948, the Soviet Union terminated their access to Berlin. The city lay deep within the Soviet zone but, given its importance, had been divided into four zones of occupation.⁷⁹ The western zones were now unable to be re-supplied using the overland routes upon which they had depended thus far. The Truman administration put aside its initial consideration of a military response in favor of staging an airlift with the British.⁸⁰ Despite public anxiety that the crisis might precipitate a world war,⁸¹ officials surmised that the Soviet Union wished to avoid that possibility.⁸² This proved correct as U.S. and British planes drew no enemy fire while flying to and from the besieged city. West Berliners were grateful for this but remained objective, viewing questions of ideology as subordinate to their preservation of a more comfortable lifestyle than possible in the Soviet-occupied zone.⁸³ Over the eleven months that it remained in

⁷⁷ *DIA* 1947–1948: 574–79, 582–85.

⁷⁸ See *USWA* 1948–1949 (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1949), 148.

⁷⁹ Mason, *The Cold War*, 11–12.

⁸⁰ Dimbleby and Reynolds, *An Ocean Apart*, 177.

⁸¹ *USWA* 1948–1949: 139.

⁸² Curtis Keeble, *Britain, the Soviet Union and Russia* (London: Macmillan Press Ltd., 2000), 223.

⁸³ “Life in Berlin Today,” *The World Today* 4, no. 12 (1948): 502–10.

place,⁸⁴ the blockade assumed greater significance for outsiders. For example, Truman referred to it as a tribute to America's "dedication to the cause of freedom."⁸⁵

Whether or not the United States had earned the right to be self-congratulatory, that impulse now diverged from its historical aversion to becoming embroiled in European affairs. The Berlin blockade crystallized the transformation of U.S.–Soviet relations, and by default U.S.–European relations, which the Truman Doctrine had set in motion. The USSR had some basis for claiming that it had been provoked, but the excessive nature of the blockade affronted the most lenient interpretation of a defensive maneuver. At the time Arthur Toynbee referred to the Soviet action as "folly."⁸⁶ Later historians have deemed it a humiliating blunder which permitted the United States to rationalize its longing to intervene.⁸⁷ Daniel Yergin adopts a broader perspective, writing that the blockade—whomever might be blamed for it—indicated that the recent triumph over the Axis powers had failed to establish a lasting peace. Instead it had foreshadowed the "armed truce" between the United States and the Soviet Union.⁸⁸

In April 1949, just prior to the Berlin blockade being lifted, the United States signed the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) with Canada and ten European nations. All parties had been forced to recognize the inadequacy of the U.S. atomic monopoly to deter communist aggression. While they had a total of

⁸⁴ The blockade was lifted in May 1949. For the official agreement, see *Selected Documents on Germany and the Question of Berlin 1944–1961* (London: Her Majesty's Stationery Office, 1961), 115.

⁸⁵ Truman, *Memoirs* 2: 137. Robert A. Divine writes that blockade largely accounted for Truman's victory in the president election that year. At least one opinion poll revealed that Americans were much more attentive to foreign policy than domestic issues. Robert A. Divine, "The Cold War and the Election of 1948," *Journal of American History* 59, no. 1 (1972): 90–110.

⁸⁶ Powaski, *The Cold War*, 75–76; Diggins, *The Proud Decades*, 81.

⁸⁷ Kolko and Kolko, *The Limits of Power*, 495–96; Ashton, *In Search of Detente*, 37, 45.

⁸⁸ Daniel Yergin, *Shattered Peace: The Origins of the Cold War and the National Security State* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company 1977), 392.

fourteen military divisions in Europe, the Soviet Union had well over a hundred.⁸⁹ An atomic bomb or bombs might inflict tremendous damage without preventing Western Europe from being overrun—a scenario which NATO sought to prevent. The United States was to cooperate in defending any member against an attack, as well as to join any war which might follow. Though a more entangling alliance could not be envisaged, congress ratified it by a wide margin.⁹⁰ Truman then proposed \$1.5 billion military aid package for Europe. The most effective argument in its favor came in August when the Soviet Union successfully tested an atomic bomb. The aid proposal soon gained approval,⁹¹ providing a further justification for Soviet to be un-conciliatory.⁹²

Events in China were equally discouraging. As the Soviet Union had been preparing its atomic bomb, the United States had terminated aid to Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek whose forces were being forced to surrender their positions on the mainland.⁹³ Further aid was deemed unable to reverse their pending defeat and to alienate the majority of Chinese who appeared to support the leadership of Mao Tse-tung. The Truman administration also nurtured hope that Mao, despite being a communist, might seek independence from Moscow.⁹⁴ That hope began to wane as Mao and his colleagues publicized their admiration for the Soviet Union, which reciprocated by signing a treaty of friendship and extending \$300 million in aid. Communist China seemed to become the junior partner of the Soviet Union rather

⁸⁹ Gaddis, *Russia, the Soviet Union and the United States*, 193.

⁹⁰ Ambrose, *Rise to Globalism*, 178-79; Powaski, *Toward an Entangling Alliance*, 222; Wilfrid Knapp, "The Partition of Europe," in Evan Luard, ed., *The Cold War: A Reappraisal* (London: Thames and Hudson, 1964), 45-61.

⁹¹ LaFeber, *America, Russia and the Cold War*, 84; Powaski, *The Cold War*, 76.

⁹² *FRUS* 1949, 5: 658-59.

⁹³ See Howard K. Smith, "An American Looks at Europe," *International Affairs* 26, no. 4 (1950): 470-76.

⁹⁴ Powaski, *The Cold War*, 81.

than one of its satellites,⁹⁵ and there was no solace in the distinction. Either way U.S. officials determined that the global balance of power was shifting in favor of communism.⁹⁶ Further undermining their position, several U.S. allies chose to recognize Mao's government.⁹⁷

If North Korea hoped for a similar response when it invaded the South in June 1950, it was mistaken. Its troops blatantly violated the 38th parallel in an effort to overthrow the Republic of Korea whose government, unlike that of North Korea, was recognized by the United Nations. The Security Council promptly condemned the invasion and called for providing military assistance to the Republic. Truman upheld the containment doctrine by ordering U.S. forces to South Korea and dispatching the Seventh Fleet to guard Formosa against a possible attack.⁹⁸ The Soviet Union denounced the Security Council resolution as providing a "cloak" for U.S. intervention, yet it did not veto either that resolution or the subsequent one which placed the UN military effort under U.S. leadership.⁹⁹ Instead it chose to abstain, as this course stopped short of exonerating North Korea while giving Soviet officials a high-profile opportunity to malign the United States. While the conflict was nominally Asian, U.S. officials viewed the Soviet Union as fully responsible for having inspired the North Korean invasion as part of a larger strategy to deplete U.S. strength in Europe.¹⁰⁰

⁹⁵ Max Beloff, "Soviet Policy on China," *International Affairs* 27, no. 3 (1951): 285-98; C.M. Chang, "Communism and Nationalism in China," *Foreign Affairs* 28, no. 4 (1950): 548-64.

⁹⁶ *FRUS* 1950, vol. 1, *National Security Affairs; Foreign Economic Policy* (Washington: USGPO, 1977): 314.

⁹⁷ *FRUS* 1949, 5: 672-74; *USWA* 1950 (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1951), 35-36.

⁹⁸ Department of State, *United States Policy in the Korean Crisis* (Washington: USGPO, 1950), 16-18, 24; *DIA* 1949-1950 (London: Oxford University Press, 1953), 631-33.

⁹⁹ Department of State, *United States Policy in the Korean Crisis*, 61-63, 66-68.

¹⁰⁰ *FRUS* 1950, vol. 4, *Central and Eastern Europe; The Soviet Union* (Washington: USGPO, 1980): 1168-69, 1242-44, 1276-78; World Peace Foundation, *DAFR* 1951 (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1953), 7.

The Korean War, though undeclared, provided the most glaring example of aggression since Pearl Harbor. The situation in Europe was far more convoluted as the superpowers remained there at the behest of their allies, and the region was held to be of unrivalled importance.¹⁰¹ The United had accordingly begun to refocus priorities by withdrawing its forces from South Korea in mid-1949. Consistent with military advice, Secretary of State Dean Acheson had announced that the nation no longer fell among the vital interests which the United States would automatically defend.¹⁰² It had not been contemplated that North Korea would invade without any form of provocation. As such the Truman administration had not hesitated to reverse its non-committal stance, yet it accepted that pursuing total victory might unleash a global conflict. General Douglas MacArthur, the commander of UN forces, was duly replaced after stating his willingness to take that risk.¹⁰³ After a year of fighting resulted in a stalemate, the Soviet Union proposed a truce which the U.S.-led forces rejected in favor of prolonging the stalemate.¹⁰⁴

Nonetheless, Americans supported the decision to intervene as it proved that they had overcome “the tragedy of timidity.”¹⁰⁵ That condition had been exemplified by the U.S. refusal to send troops to Greece and Turkey or to directly confront the Soviet Union over the Czech coup or Berlin blockade. Korea, though less than a final showdown, was unmistakably a war by proxy. U.S. officials ventured that the Soviet Union might instigate a major conflict elsewhere—and not necessarily by proxy—if North Korea were to triumph. Whatever their plans might have been, Soviet officials expressed grave concern at reports that the U.S. military was considering a pre-

¹⁰¹ Mason, *The Cold War*, 18-19.

¹⁰² Gaddis, *The Long Peace*, 96; Graebner, *Cold War Diplomacy*, 55; *USWA* 1950: 185.

¹⁰³ See William Reitzel et al., *United States Foreign Policy 1945–1955* (Washington: The Brookings Institution, 1956), 83; Robert Endicott Osgood, *Limited War: The Challenge to American Strategy* (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1957), 34-35.

¹⁰⁴ See Diggins, *The Proud Decades*, 93; McCormick, *America's Half-Century*, 105.

¹⁰⁵ Adlai E. Stevenson, “Korea in Perspective,” *Foreign Affairs* 30, no. 3 (1952): 349-60.

emptive strike against them.¹⁰⁶ Fortunately neither scenario came to pass by the time Dwight D. Eisenhower assumed the presidency and honored his pledge to end the hostilities.¹⁰⁷ The armistice signed in July 1953 established that the Korean Peninsula was to remain divided along the thirty-eighth parallel.¹⁰⁸

The death of Stalin earlier in the year had led to a power struggle within the Kremlin. While this had dampened the Soviet Union's revolutionary fervor and contributed to ending the Korean War,¹⁰⁹ the nation's political infrastructure remained firmly intact. The new style of collective leadership continued efforts to discredit the United States and undermine its alliances.¹¹⁰ Its more flexible diplomatic posture led many Americans to underestimate the communist threat,¹¹¹ which U.S. officials viewed as fundamentally unchanged.¹¹² Events suggested the contrary: that by appearing to repudiate Stalin's legacy, but actually following it, the Soviet Union had become more dangerous.¹¹³ That risk, the Department of State believed, could be seen either as an opportunity for strong leadership in the cause of peace or renewed efforts to confront and destroy Soviet communism.¹¹⁴ Eisenhower did not view these

¹⁰⁶ *FRUS* 1950, 4: 1230-32, 1254-58.

¹⁰⁷ Graebner, *The Age of Global Power*, 106-7.

¹⁰⁸ The U.S. military budget rose from \$14 billion in 1950 to \$50 billion in 1951 to \$62 billion in 1952. Mason, *The Cold War*, 23; Ashton, *In Search of Detente*, 57-60; Michael J. Hogan, *A Cross of Iron: Harry S. Truman and the Origins of the National Security State, 1945-1954* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), 324. Hours after the armistice was signed, the United States threatened that if North Korea were to renew hostilities, its response might extend beyond the Korean peninsula. Osgood, *Limited War*, 210. This was consistent with the increasing bitterness of U.S. and Soviet propaganda. See *FRUS* 1952-1954, vol. 8, *Eastern Europe; Soviet Union; Eastern Mediterranean* (Washington: USGPO, 1988), 1000-4.

¹⁰⁹ Godfrey Lias, "Satellite States in the Post-Stalin Era," *International Affairs* 30, no. 1 (1954): 40-49; Diggins, *The Proud Decades*, 138.

¹¹⁰ Bertram D. Wolfe, "The Struggle for the Soviet Succession," *Foreign Affairs* 31, no. 4 (1953): 548-65; Wolfe, "A New Look at the Soviet 'New Look,'" *Foreign Affairs* 33, no. 2 (1955): 184-98; *FRUS* 1952-1954, 8: 959.

¹¹¹ Gaddis, *Russia, the Soviet Union and the United States*, 221-22; *USWA* 1956 (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1957): 7.

¹¹² *FRUS* 1952-1954, 8: 1086-90, 1138.

¹¹³ Philip E. Mosely, "The Kremlin's Foreign Policy since Stalin," *Foreign Affairs* 32, no. 1 (1953): 20-33.

¹¹⁴ *FRUS* 1952-1954, 8: 1124; Powaski, *The Cold War*, 100.

as mutually exclusive alternatives. In this way his approach to world affairs would be “responsible.”¹¹⁵

Shortly before the Korean armistice was signed, the residents of East Berlin protested their occupation by the Soviet Union, the arbitrary nature of which had not improved despite Stalin’s death. What had appeared to change, however, was U.S. receptiveness to supporting anticommunist uprisings. The new secretary of state, John Foster Dulles, frequently urged resistance to Soviet-style totalitarianism. While Eisenhower exerted a more moderate influence over U.S. foreign policy, both men were closely associated with the theme of communist rollback. This more aggressive-sounding version of the containment doctrine failed to yield results when the Soviet Union violently suppressed the East German protestors.¹¹⁶ U.S. inaction revealed that officials, despite their rhetoric, hoped to stimulate anti-Soviet unrest without provoking an actual confrontation.¹¹⁷ This relieved most Western Europeans, for it indicated that the Eisenhower administration was less reactionary than its declarations suggested.¹¹⁸

The United States’ commitment to the “free world” persisted despite its hesitation to act at the every level. In January 1954 Eisenhower announced that the New Look, a military strategy based on reducing conventional forces and increasing

¹¹⁵ For one definition of “responsible power politics,” see Osgood, *Limited War*, 284.

¹¹⁶ During the 1952 election both parties called for liberating the “captive peoples” behind the iron curtain. Some Republicans denounced Truman’s containment policy as woefully inadequate to the point of being “immoral.” McGeorge Bundy, “November 1952: Imperatives of Foreign Policy,” *Foreign Affairs* 31, no. 1 (1952): 1-14. Eisenhower’s speeches often alluded to this issue. See *DIA 1953* (London: Oxford University Press, 1956), 230; Council on Foreign Relations, *DAFR 1954* (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1955), 1-2; Robert L. Branyan and Lawrence H. Larsen, *The Eisenhower Administration 1953–1961: A Documentary History* (New York: Random House, Inc., 1971), 33-36.

¹¹⁷ James G. Hershberg, “‘Explosion in the Offing’: German Rearmament and American Diplomacy, 1953–1955,” *Diplomatic History* 16, no. 4 (1992), 511-49; David G. Coleman, “Eisenhower and the Berlin Problem, 1953–1954,” *Journal of Cold War Studies* 2, no. 1 (2000): 3-34;

¹¹⁸ Townsend Hoopes, *The Devil and John Foster Dulles* (Boston: Little Brown and Company, 1973), 179; Charles C. Alexander, *Holding the Line: The Eisenhower Era, 1952–1961* (Bloomington, Indiana: Indiana University Press, 1975), 64. One author writes that the Berlin uprising exposed the profound “disparity of theory and reality” in U.S. foreign policy. Diggins, *The Proud Decades*, 147. For a similar conclusion, see Hans J. Morgenthau, “The Political and Military Strategy of the United States,” *BAS* 10, no. 8 (1954): 323-27.

the production of atomic weapons.¹¹⁹ Not only was this far more economical; it was to permit the United States to respond instantly and decisively to future episodes of communist aggression. Critics referred to it as the doctrine of massive retaliation,¹²⁰ and while this term lacked any positive connotation, it was in keeping Eisenhower's explanation to congress that it was designed "to blow hell out of [the communists] in a hurry if they start anything."¹²¹ He later assured the press that that there was no basis for portraying the New Look as jingoistic; it was simply "an attempt by intelligent people to keep abreast of the times."¹²² Officials throughout the administration began making an effort to counteract the anxiety which the New Look produced. They repeatedly asserted that their desire was not to antagonize the Soviet Union but merely to discourage it from engaging in provocative behavior.¹²³

However legitimate its motivation, the New Look failed to dissuade the Chinese from launching artillery strikes against the islands of Quemoy and Matsu in the Formosa Strait. This action, which commenced in September 1954, suggested that the communist government might go further and launch an invasion of Formosa.¹²⁴ The Eisenhower administration responded by signing a mutual defense treaty with the island,¹²⁵ yet China not only continued to shell Quemoy and Matsu; it overran Nationalist forces on the Tachen Islands.¹²⁶ The White House then began to

¹¹⁹ See "President Eisenhower Takes the Initiative," *The World Today* 10, no. 2 (1954): 51-58; Council on Foreign Relations, *DAFR* 1953 (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1954), 63-66.

¹²⁰ Gaddis, *Russia, the Soviet Union and the United States*, 215-16. Secretary of State John Foster Dulles wrote that the doctrine sought to achieve a "balance which holds military expenditures to a minimum consistent with safety, so that a maximum of liberty may operate as a dynamic force against despotism." John Foster Dulles, "Policy for Security and Peace," *Foreign Affairs* 32, no. 3 (1954): 353-64.

¹²¹ Powaski, *The Cold War*, 103.

¹²² Branyan and Larsen, *The Eisenhower Administration*, 40.

¹²³ *USWA* 1955 (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1957), 8, 20; W. Averell Harriman, "Leadership in World Affairs," *Foreign Affairs* 32, no. 4 (1954): 525-40.

¹²⁴ See "America's 'Entangling Alliance' with Formosa," *The World Today* 11, no. 2 (1955): 61-71; Richard W. Van Alstyne, "Myth versus Reality in the Far Eastern Policies of the United States," *International Affairs* 32, no. 3 (1956): 287-97.

¹²⁵ Powaski, *The Cold War*, 112; Diggins, *The Proud Decades*, 144.

¹²⁶ Gaddis, *The Long Peace*, 133-36.

consider a pre-emptive strike against China and perhaps even the Soviet Union if it were to intervene.¹²⁷ The situation recalled the Department of State's earlier warning that Formosa might involve the United States in "extensive and protracted hostilities."¹²⁸ Congress granted Eisenhower full discretion to embark on that course.¹²⁹ It was a testament to his restraint that he gave China the opportunity to voluntarily desist.¹³⁰

Britain and France would soon be given the same opportunity. Their expectation of U.S. support after Egypt nationalized the Suez Canal in July 1956 was understandable but misplaced. The previous month, as Britain was withdrawing the last of its occupation forces, Israel had mounted a series of attacks against its Arab neighbor which, like the entire region, demonstrated hostility toward the Jewish state. Egyptian President Abdel Gamal Nasser had turned to the Soviet bloc for weapons after the United States refused his appeal, and Czechoslovakia had obliged. Though acknowledging that Nasser was not a communist, U.S. officials had withdrawn funding for the Aswan Dam—a major infrastructure project designed to enhance Egypt's self-sufficiency. Nasser's willingness to deal with communists had been deemed unacceptable for any reason. Resentful of this decision, aside from America's perceived responsibility for the creation of a Jewish state, Nasser had chosen to nationalize the Suez Canal.¹³¹ His statements thereafter were as critical of

¹²⁷ See Ambrose, *Rise to Globalism*, 238-39; *FRUS* 1952-1954, 8: 1261-63.

¹²⁸ *FRUS* 1951, vol. 1, *National Security Affairs; Foreign Economic Policy* (Washington: USGPO, 1979), 19-20.

¹²⁹ Stephen E. Ambrose, *Eisenhower: The President*, vol. 2, 1952-1969 (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1984), 234-35.

¹³⁰ For a more critical perspective, see Gordon H. Chang and He Di, "The Absence of War in the U.S.-China Confrontation over Quemoy and Matsu in 1954-1955: Contingency, Luck, Deterrence?" *American Historical Review* 98, no. 5 (1993): 1500-24.

¹³¹ Dwight D. Eisenhower, *The White House Years: Waging Peace 1956-1961* (London: Heinemann, 1965), 21-24, 31-33; *FRUS* 1955-1957, vol. 16, *Suez Crisis July 26-December 31, 1956* (Washington: USGPO, 1990), 55-58, 62-68.

the United States as of Britain and France, which had previously held control and sought to re-establish it by sending in paratroopers.¹³²

The United States empathized with the need of Britain and France to guarantee that traffic through the Suez Canal would not be interrupted since nearly half of their petroleum supplies flowed through it.¹³³ At the same time it felt obliged to support UN resolutions condemning their invasion, for otherwise it would have been perceived as defending European imperialism and the equally unpopular specter of Zionism.¹³⁴ The Eisenhower administration endorsed the UN resolutions which censured its allies, yet in doing so it failed to win Nasser's confidence.¹³⁵ After Soviet Premier Nikita S. Khrushchev publicly supported him, Eisenhower warned that if the Soviet Union were to intervene, the United States would be forced to do so on the other side.¹³⁶ Meanwhile threat of U.S. economic sanctions persuaded Britain and France to withdraw.¹³⁷ Secretary of State John Foster Dulles later suggested, only partly in jest, that they should have ousted Nasser before leaving.¹³⁸

In October 1956 Hungarians staged a large uprising to withdraw from the Warsaw Pact, the Soviet-led equivalent of NATO, as well as to reduce or eliminate Moscow's intervention in their domestic affairs. The USSR dispatched approximately two hundred thousand troops and five thousand tanks to suppress the lightly armed rebels. To the distress of many onlookers, over twenty thousand Hungarians perished while the United States refused to intervene on their behalf.¹³⁹ In part to divert attention from this, Khrushchev repeated allegations that the United

¹³² Powaski, *The Cold War*, 118.

¹³³ John Biggs-Davidson, *The Uncertain Ally* (London: Christopher Johnson, 1957), 187-90.

¹³⁴ See McCormick, *America's Half-Century*, 123; Diggins, *The Proud Decades*, 301.

¹³⁵ See Spanier, *American Foreign Policy*, 121-22.

¹³⁶ Eisenhower, *The White House Years*, 41.

¹³⁷ Michael Graham Fry, "Decline, Sanctions and the Suez Crisis, 1956-57," *Diplomatic History* 17, no. 2 (1993): 323-29; Biggs-Davidson, *The Uncertain Ally*, 187; *FRUS* 1955-1957, 16: 851-55, 1238-39.

¹³⁸ Hoopes, *The Devil and John Foster Dulles*, 381.

¹³⁹ Powaski, *The Cold War*, 116-17; Mason, *The Cold War*, 28; *USWA* 1956: 343-46.

State, Britain and France were all “imperial” powers despite their apparent disagreement over the Suez Canal.¹⁴⁰ That disagreement might have addressed the means rather than the ends of “imperialism,” but it remained very serious, prompting speculation that the western alliance might never recover.¹⁴¹ As the Hungarian uprising had showcased the extreme nature of Soviet rule, the Suez crisis had showcased the extreme unpredictability of U.S. leadership.¹⁴²

U.S.–Soviet relations entered a phase of heightened insecurity.¹⁴³ Eisenhower sought and acquired congressional authority to forcibly intervene in the affairs of any Middle Eastern nation which appeared to be at risk of communism. Ronald E. Powaski refers to the so-called Eisenhower Doctrine as “the concluding link in the chain of [U.S.] security commitments” which extended to over forty nations. Critics questioned the wisdom of this “pactomania” for many reasons.¹⁴⁴ In the case of the Middle East, the Arab–Israeli dispute constituted the greatest threat to stability, and its non-resolution invited exploitation by the Soviet Union.¹⁴⁵ By excluding Israel the Eisenhower Doctrine avoided estranging the rest of the Middle East, but failed to generate widespread confidence. The U.S. network of alliances included many nations whose interests otherwise diverged and whose number prevented the United States from being able to defend them simultaneously.¹⁴⁶

¹⁴⁰ Gustáv Kecskés, “The Suez Crisis and the 1956 Hungarian Revolution,” *East European Quarterly* 35, no. 1 (2001): 47–58.

¹⁴¹ Diggins, *The Proud Decades*, 301.

¹⁴² See William Roger Louis, “Dulles, Suez and the British,” in Richard H. Immerman, ed., *John Foster Dulles and the Diplomacy of the Cold War* (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1990), 133–58; Willy Brandt, “The East–West Problem as Seen from Berlin,” *International Affairs* 34, no. 3 (1958): 297–304; Robert A. Divine, *Eisenhower and the Cold War* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1981), 15–16.

¹⁴³ Gaddis, *Russia, the Soviet Union and the United States*, 226–27.

¹⁴⁴ Powaski, *The Cold War*, 121.

¹⁴⁵ Alexander, *Holding the Line*, 187; Jason Kendall Moore, “Destabilizing the Middle East: U.S. Policy toward Palestine, 1943–1949,” *Journal of Church and State* 43, no. 1 (2001): 515–34.

¹⁴⁶ Gaddis, *Russia, the Soviet Union and the United States*, 230; *SIA 1956–1958* (London: Oxford University Press, 1962): 348–49.

The Soviet Union launched the world's first satellite, Sputnik, in October 1957, appearing to substantiate its claim to possess the technology to deliver inter-continental ballistic missiles.¹⁴⁷ Khrushchev boasted that "bomber planes can now be put in museums,"¹⁴⁸ and suggested that now the USSR might be able to neutralize the United States as a precursor to defeating NATO forces in Europe.¹⁴⁹ Eisenhower assured the American people of his full confidence that the Strategic Air Command remained a highly effective deterrent.¹⁵⁰ The Department of State nonetheless urged a prompt demonstration of U.S. ballistic technology to counteract Sputnik's damaging "psychological effects."¹⁵¹ After the United States quickly launched its own, much smaller satellite, the American public remained despondent,¹⁵² for it now seemed possible that the communist system might triumph.¹⁵³

The following August, China again started to bombard islands in the Formosa Strait. Khrushchev warned that the Soviet Union would fully support the Chinese against any U.S. intervention, and that it would not hesitate to use nuclear warheads if the conflict were to escalate.¹⁵⁴ Undeterred by this, Eisenhower ordered the U.S. Navy to escort Nationalist vessels in the disputed waters. As anticipated, the Chinese held their fire while U.S. officials pressured Chiang Kai-shek to substantially reduce his troops on Quemoy and Matsu—which numbered approximately 100,000—and to abandon the highly impractical objective of reclaiming mainland China.¹⁵⁵ These

¹⁴⁷ See *FRUS* 1955–1957, vol. 24, *Soviet Union; Eastern Mediterranean* (Washington: USGPO, 1989), 154; Denis Healey, "The Sputnik and Western Defense," *International Affairs* 34, no. 2 (1958): 145–56; Lloyd V. Berkner, "Earth Satellites and Foreign Policy," *Foreign Affairs* 36, no. 2 (1958): 221–31.

¹⁴⁸ See *FRUS* 1955–1957, 24: 167–68.

¹⁴⁹ *SIA* 1956–1958: 351–52.

¹⁵⁰ *USWA* 1958 (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1959), 7.

¹⁵¹ *FRUS* 1955–1957, 24: 183–84; Herbert S. Dinerstein, "The Revolution in Soviet Strategic Thinking," *Foreign Affairs* 36, 2 (1958): 241–52.

¹⁵² See *USWA* 1958: 4; Ambrose, *Rise to Globalism*, 246; Morris, *Iron Destinies*, 121.

¹⁵³ See *USWA* 1958: 13, 34.

¹⁵⁴ Powaski, *The Cold War*, 125.

¹⁵⁵ See Arthur Dean, "United States Foreign Policy and Formosa," *Foreign Affairs* 33, no. 3 (1955): 360–75.

developments greatly reduced the risk of a major regional conflict or global war,¹⁵⁶ yet the superpower's diplomacy, unlike their military strategies, had not undergone a New Look.¹⁵⁷ It reflected a traditional reliance on issuing threats while pursuing calculated retreats.

This pattern re-emerged in November 1958 the Soviet Union demanded negotiations to resolve the four-power occupation of Berlin within six months. If the United States, France and Britain were to refuse, it pledged to yield control of its zone to East Germany and to support that government in any conflict which might follow. The western powers, though resentful of this ultimatum, were loath to underestimate its seriousness. They immediately consulted with NATO and gained its approval to reply that negotiations would be acceptable only if the Soviet Union withdrew its threat and agreed to discuss Berlin relative to overall European security arrangements.¹⁵⁸ Soviet officials consented for two reasons. They appreciated that, like themselves, their western counterparts did not wish to seem overly compromising and had little incentive to do so as the regional balance of power appeared to be shifting to their advantage. For example, United States had recently deployed missiles in Central Europe while the Soviet Union appeared unable to do so in Eastern Europe—despite its bravado to the contrary.¹⁵⁹

The superpowers appeared closer than ever before to a direct conflict from which neither would be able to emerge victorious.¹⁶⁰ Their nuclear arsenals had approximately quadrupled since the United States had announced the New Look.¹⁶¹

¹⁵⁶ Eisenhower, *The White House Years*, 293-304; Diggins, *The Proud Decades*, 310.

¹⁵⁷ See Wolfe, "A New Look at the Soviet 'New Look.'"

¹⁵⁸ *USWA* 1959 (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1960), 138, 143-45, 148; *Selected Documents on Germany*, 334.

¹⁵⁹ Petr Lunák, "Khrushchev and the Berlin Crisis: Soviet Brinkmanship Seen from Inside," *Cold War History* 3, no. 2 (2003): 53-82; Spanier, *American Foreign Policy*, 140.

¹⁶⁰ *FRUS* 1958-1960, vol. 9, *Berlin Crisis 1959-1960; Germany; Austria* (Washington: USGPO, 1993), 12.

¹⁶¹ Ambrose, *Eisenhower*, 517; .

Though no progress was made in renegotiating Berlin's status within the six-month framework, the superpowers agreed to resolve the "abnormal situation" by diplomatic rather than military means.¹⁶² In May 1959 they held a foreign ministers conference in Geneva with representatives of Britain, France, as well as West and East Germany, the latter of which gained de facto recognition in the process.¹⁶³ The conference demonstrated that the superpowers and their principle allies shared an overarching commitment to their own self-preservation.¹⁶⁴ Khrushchev and Eisenhower carried this further by meeting face-to-face, and they established a degree of cordiality which, though it did not resolve the Berlin crisis, put an end to the war scare.¹⁶⁵

The hopeful though indecisive nature of U.S.–Soviet relations was epitomized by Article IV of the Antarctic Treaty. As discussed in the previous chapter, this article stipulated that the seven claimant nations would make no attempt to enforce their sovereignty rights and that the five other signatories would refrain from declaring any. These terms established the basis for an agreement which was geographically far removed from the major arenas of superpower conflict. In substance, however, it was closely linked. By December 1959, when the Antarctic Treaty was signed, the United States and Soviet Union had been forced to accept that their respective designs for humanity could not be fulfilled except at risk of mutual annihilation.¹⁶⁶ Peaceful coexistence had become equally imperative for both, and the frozen continent

¹⁶² For reference to the "abnormal situation," see *Selected Documents on Germany*, 351–52, 355.

¹⁶³ Spanier, *American Foreign Policy*, 140–41.

¹⁶⁴ See *FRUS* 1958–1960, 9: 35–45, 50–51.

¹⁶⁵ See *FRUS* 1958–1960, vol. 10, part 1, *Eastern Europe Region; Soviet Union; Cyprus* (Washington: USGPO, 1993), 392–402; *FRUS* 1958–1960, 9: 42–45; Ambrose, *Rise to Globalism*, 263–64; *USWA* 1959: 1.

¹⁶⁶ Andrew P.N. Erdmann, "'War No Longer has any Logic Whatsoever': Dwight D. Eisenhower and the Thermonuclear Revolution," in John Lewis Gaddis et al., eds., *Cold War Statesmen Confront the Bomb: Nuclear Diplomacy since 1945* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999), 87–119.

provided an ideal arena in which it could be achieved without jeopardizing the ideological alignment of an indigenous population.

The Department of State summarized U.S. Antarctic policy before 1939 as having adopted a passive tack based exclusively upon the non-recognition of other nation's territorial claims. Thereafter the policy entered a more "positive" phase with the establishment of the U.S. Antarctic Service under the command of Admiral Richard Evelyn Byrd. Long after the Second World War temporarily suspended the U.S. effort to establish rights on the basis of permanent occupation, as stipulated by the 1924 Hughes Doctrine, U.S. policy remained in a state of abeyance. The United States withheld a claim partially due to the evolution of its relations with the Soviet Union.¹⁶⁷ While the first internationalization proposal of 1948 had sought to bar the USSR, the second, presented a decade later, extended to it. The 1957–1958 International Geophysical Year provided the most direct explanation for this. Its influence also coincided with the pattern of superpower relations which often demonstrated that the limits of U.S. "hegemony."¹⁶⁸

Operation High Jump, which departed south in November 1946, appeared to indicate that the U.S. Antarctic policy would be divorced from the tenet of non-claimancy. The expedition was by far the largest to date, as its objective was the most urgent: to search for evidence of uranium which might be used to solidify the U.S. atomic monopoly.¹⁶⁹ Though no such evidence was discovered, common sense appeared to dictate that the government would forward an exploration-based

¹⁶⁷ See Department of State, Polar Regions: Secret Policy and Information Statement, 1 July 1946, NARA, RG 59, 800.014; Acting Secretary of State (Hoover) to Delegation to United Nations, 9 March 1956, no. 526, 9 March 1956, NARA, RG 59, 702.022. Two years before the Chilean Escudero Plan called for suspending the question of sovereignty, the Department of Interior had recommended a similar course. Department of Interior, Board of Geographical Names (Burriel), to Department of State, Division of Geography (Saucerman), 25 April 1946, NARA, RG 59, 800.014.

¹⁶⁸ See Ambrose, *Rise to Globalism*, 119.

¹⁶⁹ Jason Kendall Moore, "Seven Penguins and an Olive Branch: Antarctic Politics in *The New York Times*," *Estudios Norteamericanos* 2, no. 4 (2001): 125-36.

territorial claim over most or all of the continent.¹⁷⁰ This would have been consistent with the Truman Doctrine to oppose Soviet expansion wherever it might take place. Antarctica, though a relatively low priority, did hold possible economic and military significance. The Soviet Union denounced Operation High Jump as a form of “imperialist aggression” which,¹⁷¹ like the Marshall Plan, suggested that the United States was modeling itself after the Roman Empire.¹⁷² At the same time, the U.S. emphasis on Europe dictated a reduction of its other commitments,¹⁷³ and High Jump had already placed it in a far stronger position in the Antarctic than any of the seven claimant nations or the USSR.¹⁷⁴

The Department of State reasoned that it was less important to secure rights over the Antarctica than to promote some form of international cooperation which would exclude the USSR and enhance U.S. prestige in the rest of the world.¹⁷⁵ In June 1948 it attempted to secure this objective by proposing a “special regime” with the claimant nations,¹⁷⁶ which proved unwilling to renounce their sovereignty as stipulated. Fourteen months later, the United States chose to pursue an agreement based on the suspension rather than the renunciation of sovereignty. This shift demonstrated that U.S. officials sought to avoid imposing solutions on their Cold War

¹⁷⁰ U.S. officials viewed the need to exclude the USSR as “a matter of ordinary prudence.” Department of State, Secret Policy Statement on Polar Regions, 1 July 1951, NARA, RG 59, 702.022.

¹⁷¹ See Embassy in Peru to Department of State, 21 November 1946, no. 722; Ambassador in USSR (Smith) to Secretary of State, 21 November 1946, no. 4188, NARA, RG 59, 800.014.

¹⁷² See Graebner, *The Age of Global Power*, 83; Young, *Cold War Europe*, 2, 16-17; *DIA 1949–1950* (London: Oxford University Press, 1953): 17-19.

¹⁷³ Gaddis, *Russia, the Soviet Union and the United States*, 187.

¹⁷⁴ Department of State, Office of American Republic Affairs (Briggs) to Assistant Secretary of State (Braden), 25 April 1947, NARA, RG 59, 800.014.

¹⁷⁵ Department of State, Special Adviser for Geography (Boggs) to Office of American Republic Affairs (Woodward) et al., 2 June 1947; Department of State, Division of Northern European Affairs and Division of North and West Coast Affairs to Office of European Affairs et al., 8 September 1947; Department of State, Office of European Affairs (Raynor) to Division of Northern European Affairs (Green), 27 January 1948, NARA, RG 59, 800.014.

¹⁷⁶ Department of State, Office of European Affairs, Memorandum on Trusteeship Agreement for Antarctica, 1 March 1948; Department of State, Memorandum of Conversation, Division of Northern European Affairs, 20 July 1948, NARA, RG 59, 800.014. Joint Chiefs of Staff, JCS 1830/4: United States Antarctic Policy, 8 March 1948, NARA, RG 218, Geographical File.

allies, and to pursue their common objectives independent of the United Nations—in which the Truman administration had lost all confidence.¹⁷⁷ Unlike the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, the first U.S. internationalization proposal failed. They were both anti-Soviet in design, yet the need for this was far less urgent in the Antarctic, where nature posed a far more immediate threat than ideology.¹⁷⁸

Given Soviet willingness to confront the United States over Berlin, it was no surprise that Moscow was willing to do so over the Antarctic. Not only had the internationalization proposal been reported; it was publicly known that the United States and the seven claimant nations remained at odds. In June 1950 the USSR indicated that it would deny the legitimacy of any agreement reached without its participation.¹⁷⁹ From a certain perspective this development appeared to be an attempt “to keep the western powers off balance as part of a calculated ‘Cold War’ strategy.”¹⁸⁰ While Antarctic was not exempt from the bipolar struggle, the 1819–1821 Bellingshausen expedition provided a non-ideological rationale for the Soviet position. This expedition had been one the first to venture into Antarctic waters, whether or not it had actually discovered the continent, as the USSR claimed.¹⁸¹ While negotiations for an eight-power arrangement were underway, Sheldon W. Boggs, the author of the U.S. proposal, made an “unorthodox” recommendation to cooperate with the Soviet Union rather than seeking to exclude it.

¹⁷⁷ Hammond, *The Cold War Years*, 28.

¹⁷⁸ See *The New York Times Magazine*, 7 April 1940; *The New York Times*, 3 December 1946, 31 January 1957.

¹⁷⁹ Soviet Embassy in Washington to Department of State, 8 June 1950, no. 145108, NARA, RG 59, 702.022.

¹⁸⁰ Embassy in Oslo (Bay) to Department of State, 21 June 1950, no. 940, NARA, RG 59, 702.022

¹⁸¹ Embassy in Moscow (Kirk) to Department of State, 20 July 1950, no. 177, control 8747, NARA, RG 59, 702.022.

Indeed this might have been more effective means of garnering national prestige while also helping to reduce superpower tensions at large.¹⁸²

Within weeks of the Soviet declaration of interest in the Antarctic, North Korean troops invaded the South, and the United States chose to lead the UN-sanctioned war effort, which indirectly appeared to justify the internationalization proposal's exclusion of the USSR. It also temporarily suspended U.S. officials' concern over the future of Antarctica and discouraged their intervention in the dispute between Britain and the Latin American claimant nations. To some extent the Truman Doctrine and Marshall Plan had encouraged the Soviet Union to tighten its grip over Eastern Europe, and thus precipitated the Czech coup and Berlin blockade.¹⁸³ These policies' only responsibility for the Korean War, however, was having failed to discourage the USSR from acting by proxy. This exacerbated fears that the USSR might be able to exploit the Antarctic dispute between Britain and the Latin American nations,¹⁸⁴ yet like the United States it was unprepared to devote substantial time or resources to the frozen continent.

The Truman administration proved unable to use the U.S. atomic monopoly to gain concessions from the Soviet Union.¹⁸⁵ The iron curtain remained firmly in place by the time the USSR tested its first warhead in August 1949, and thereafter it grew virtually impenetrable. The containment doctrine appealed to Americans' sense of global responsibility,¹⁸⁶ yet many of their allies questioned the reliability of U.S. leadership. Though the North Atlantic Treaty Organization established an impressive

¹⁸² Department of State, Office of Intelligence Research (Boggs) to Bureau of British Commonwealth and Northern European Affairs (Ronhovde), 12 June 1953, NARA, RG 59, 702.022.

¹⁸³ Hammond, *The Cold War Years*, 56-57; Young, *Cold War Europe*, 16; LaFeber, *America, Russia and the Cold War*, 49-50.

¹⁸⁴ See Secretary of State (Marshall) to Secretary of Defense (Forrestal), 10 June 1948, NARA, RG 59, 800.014.

¹⁸⁵ Samuel R. Williamson, Jr., and Steven L. Reardon, *The Origins of U.S. Nuclear Strategy, 1945-1953* (New York: St Martin's Press, 1993), 52.

¹⁸⁶ Hogan, *A Cross of Iron*, 15; Edgar Ansel Mowrer, *An End to Make-Believe* (New York: Duell, Sloan and Pearce, 1961), 96-97.

framework for collective defense, U.S. officials indicated that they would not automatically enforce it unless the aggression were overt, and even in that case they refused to specify the retaliatory measures which might be implemented.¹⁸⁷ The alternatives soon became obvious, and they were both atomic in nature: massive deterrence or massive retaliation, the latter of which carried the risk that Washington might act independently and thereby subject its allies to a devastating Soviet counter-strike for a decision which some or all of them might oppose.¹⁸⁸

The failure to reach an eight-power agreement for Antarctica reflected similar perceptions of U.S. unreliability.¹⁸⁹ The claimant nations were perhaps discouraged by the United States having excluded the Korean peninsula from its defense perimeter and then promptly committed itself to defending the South.¹⁹⁰ This suggested any number of possibilities. It might make a territorial claim in the Antarctic but then refuse to acknowledge its suspension; it might both make and suspend a claim but then not enforce an agreement if the Soviet Union were to intervene, as in Czechoslovakia and Hungary; or it might respond to Soviet intervention even if no agreement were in place and then maintain an equally undesirable position. The worst possibility was that it might conduct nuclear tests in the Antarctic and subject the Southern Hemisphere nations to the risk of fallout.¹⁹¹

The New Look promulgated by the Eisenhower administration encouraged this kind of speculation. Though less new than the title suggested, it did substantially increase the reliance of the "free world" upon U.S. weapons of mass destruction. The

¹⁸⁷ Raymond Aron, "French Public Opinion and the Atlantic Treaty," *International Affairs* 28, no. 1 (1952): 1-8; *USWA* 1950: 102-3.

¹⁸⁸ See Dimbleby and Reynolds, *An Ocean Apart*, 185-88; Young, *Winston Churchill's Last Campaign*, 35.

¹⁸⁹ Most notably in relation to making a territorial claim which overlapped some or all of those already in place. See *FRUS* 1948, vol. 1, part 2, *General* (Washington: USGPO, 1976), 1000-1.

¹⁹⁰ Gaddis, *The Long Peace*, 96; Osgood, *Limited War*, 165.

¹⁹¹ *The New York Times Magazine*, 26 October 1954; *The New York Times*, 11 November 1954, 3 March 1955.

president fortunately sought opportunities to relax tensions with the Soviet Union, despite the bombastic rhetoric of Secretary of State John Foster Dulles.¹⁹² While his effort failed to curtail the escalating arms race, Eisenhower's experience as the former commander of Allied forces was a valuable resource. It cast his moderation not as a form of appeasement, but rather as the sagacity of a wartime hero.¹⁹³ This contributed to why he was able to side with the Soviet Union in condemning the Anglo–French invasion of Egypt without incurring charges that he must be a communist sympathizer. In relation to the Antarctic, this decision gravely offended two of the principle claimant nations.¹⁹⁴ It also indicated that U.S. allegiance could not be taken for granted even by members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. Those Argentine and Chilean officials who still hoped to eject Britain from the Antarctic must have derived some satisfaction from its public humiliation. At the same time they must have grasped that their own nations held far less significance to the United States.

As predicted, the 1957–1958 International Geophysical Year (IGY) heightened tensions over the Antarctic,¹⁹⁵ for now there was little hope of excluding the Soviet Union except forcibly and contrary to its UN invitation to participate in the eighteen-month event. The Eisenhower administration concurred with one Department of State official who ventured that “the United States has enough on its hands without undertaking to enlarge its domain” by announcing a territorial claim.¹⁹⁶ This course of action was viewed as likely to provoke a Soviet counter-claim and add

¹⁹² Dockrill, *The Cold War*, 61.

¹⁹³ See Ambrose, *Eisenhower*, 106–7.

¹⁹⁴ Newhouse, *The Nuclear Age*, 131; Ambrose, *Rise to Globalism*, 246; Dimpleby and Reynolds, *An Ocean Apart*, 203, 208–9.

¹⁹⁵ Department of State, Memorandum of Conversation, Bureau of British Commonwealth and Northern European Affairs (Horsey) et al., 12 March 1956, NARA, RG 59, 702.022.

¹⁹⁶ Department of State, Bureau of British Commonwealth and Northern European Affairs (Horsey) to Bureau of European Affairs (Merchant), 30 December 1955, NARA, RG 59, 702.022.

another layer of complexity to a dispute which already would have confounded international jurists for many years if, by some miracle, the claimant nations were to consent to arbitration.¹⁹⁷ As no such miracle could be expected, the United States abandoned its tentative plan to forward a claim as a prelude to an eight-power agreement. It now chose to include the Soviet Union—as well as Belgium, Japan and South Africa, the other non-claimant nations active in the south polar component of the IGY. This functional approach had become imperative since the USSR had established bases in the Australian Antarctic sector, and had no intention of leaving after the IGY.¹⁹⁸

In May 1958 the United States circulated a proposal to the eleven other IGY nations which was accepted as a basis for negotiations.¹⁹⁹ Its concern that the USSR might assert itself more forcefully in the Antarctic intensified after the launch of Sputnik,²⁰⁰ which most Americans regarded as evidence of a missile gap. Eisenhower, though aware that no such gap existed,²⁰¹ recognized that Soviet technology had in some way surpassed that of the United States, a fact which heightened his desire to reduce international tensions. The death of Secretary of State John Foster Dulles before the Antarctic Conference was also fortuitous in this regard. His bellicose rhetoric had suffered after the White House refused to intervene in the

¹⁹⁷ Embassy in Canberra (Emmons) to Department of State, 19 March 1956, NARA, RG 59, 702.022.

¹⁹⁸ Department of State, Memorandum of Conversation, Acting Secretary of State et al., 9 November 1956; Department of State, Memorandum of Conversation, Ambassador Paul C. Daniels et al., 5 February 1958, NARA, RG 59, 702.022; Embassy in Canberra (Sebald) to Secretary of State, 2 May 1958, no. 599, control 798, NARA, RG 59, 399.829. See *The New York Times*, 15 June 1957, 30 June 1957, 3 July 1957, 23 April 1958.

¹⁹⁹ Department of State to Representatives of Argentina, Australia, Belgium, Chile, France, Japan, Norway, New Zealand, South Africa, USSR, and United Kingdom, 24 March 1958, NARA, RG 59, 702.022.

²⁰⁰ See Department of State, Bureau of European Affairs (Kohler) to Office of Deputy Undersecretary of State (Daniels), 21 April 1959, NARA, RG 59, 399.829.

²⁰¹ Jerome H. Kahan, *Security in the Nuclear Age: Developing U.S. Strategic Arms Policy* (Washington: The Brookings Institution, 1975), 43, 46.

Hungarian uprising, and become anachronistic by the end of the decade.²⁰² His less confrontational successor, Christian A. Herter, appeared better suited for involvement with the Antarctic Conference where it became necessary for the U.S. delegation to make greater concessions than otherwise might have entertained.²⁰³

Former Secretary of State Dean Acheson observed that in the 1950s the United States began to lose the confidence of its allies due to its unwillingness to address the issues which they deemed most important.²⁰⁴ He cited the arms race as an example of this which severely handicapped the effectiveness of diplomatic initiatives, aside from failing to deter military confrontations.²⁰⁵ Indeed, U.S. officials had trouble devising effective policies since their hope for greater stability in the world did not permit them to ignore the unlikelihood that it could be achieved.²⁰⁶ Their effort to find a satisfactory middle-ground frustrated U.S. allies. Pertaining to the Antarctic, they pondered a territorial claim which either reflected the full scope of U.S. exploration or was limited to the last uncontested sector from 90° to 150° West.²⁰⁷ Some of the claimant nations encouraged the latter alternative to dispel

²⁰² Ambrose, *Rise to Globalism*, 246.

²⁰³ For example, the U.S. delegation's acceptance of the Soviet-sponsored nuclear test ban. Dulles' presence almost might have led the Soviet Union to renege on its acceptance of the indefinite suspension of sovereignty. See U.S. Delegation to Antarctic Conference (Phleger), Memorandum for Deputy Undersecretary of State (Merchant), 17 November 1959; Department of State, Bureau of Far Eastern Affairs to Office of the Deputy Undersecretary of State, 22 April 1959, NARA, RG 59, 702.022 Antarctic. See also H. Robert Hall, "Casey and the Negotiation of the Antarctic Treaty," in Julia Jabour-Green and Marcus Haward, eds., *The Antarctic: Past, Present and Future* (Hobart, Australia: Cooperative Research Centre for Antarctic and Southern Ocean Studies, 2002), 27-33. Since Dulles held a far more sophisticated appreciation of the Soviet Union than his rhetoric suggested, and he privately questioned the effectiveness of the massive retaliation doctrine, it is possible that he might have accepted the benefit of compromising. See John Lewis Gaddis, "The Unexpected John Foster Dulles: Nuclear Weapons, Communism and the Russians," in Immerman, *John Foster Dulles and the Diplomacy of the Cold War*, 47-77.

²⁰⁴ Acheson, *Power and Diplomacy*, 71.

²⁰⁵ See Mowrer, *An End to Make-Believe*, 188; Vanistart, "The Decline of Diplomacy."

²⁰⁶ See World Peace Foundation, *DAFR 1945-1946* (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1948): 21, 24; Stimson, "The Challenge to Americans"; Gaddis, *The Long Peace*, 44.

²⁰⁷ See Jason Kendall Moore, "Bungled Publicity: Little America, Big America and the Rationale for Non-Claimancy, 1946-1961," *Polar Record* 40, no. 212 (2004): 19-30.

concerns of the former, yet Washington chose neither to the disappointment of all parties.²⁰⁸

Many factors hampered the United States' desire to gain recognition for seeking the harmonious resolution of disputes.²⁰⁹ This objective was not entirely compatible with its unwillingness to renounce or limit its rights in any way, but throughout the period under consideration, it did prove responsive to outside influences—most notably the Chilean Escudero Plan and the Soviet-sponsored nuclear test ban. As such, its policy achieved its publicly stated goal of adapting to fluctuating circumstances in pursuit of a viable international agreement.²¹⁰ This success appeared to exemplify the hope for U.S. leadership in the world to become a showcase of “creative ideas [and] constructive proposals.”²¹¹

As Mary Kaldor observes, the Cold War demonstrated a number of inconsistencies which cannot be simply explained.²¹² However creative U.S. leadership might have been in the Antarctic, it often revealed a degree of hubris which Soviet leaders found intolerable and many others found discouraging.²¹³ The first internationalization proposal falsely assumed that the claimant nations would renounce their interests for the sake of accommodating a non-claimant nation whose citizens boasted of their reputation of being able “to sell refrigerators to Eskimos and

²⁰⁸ For example, Department of State, Memorandum of Conversation, Acting Secretary of State et al., 9 November 1956; Department of State, Memorandum of Conversation, Office of Inter-American Regional Political Affairs (Wilson), 7 February 1957, NARA, RG 59, 702.022. It was recognized that U.S. non-claimancy had become a source of frustration and insecurity among the other nations. Department of State, Memorandum by Office of Inter-American Regional Political Affairs (Wilson), 22 January 1957, NARA, RG 59, 702.022.

²⁰⁹ Department of State, Division of Northern European Affairs and Division of North and West Coast Affairs to Office of European Affairs et al., 8 September 1947, NARA, RG 59, 800.014.

²¹⁰ Department of State, Memorandum by Division of Northern European Affairs (Green), 11 February 1948, NARA, RG 59, 800.014; *The New York Times*, 26 February 1957, 19 February 1948.

²¹¹ Secretary of State James F. Byrnes quoted in *DAFR* 1945–1946: 24.

²¹² Mary Kaldor, *The Imaginary War: Understanding the East-West Conflict* (Oxford: Basil Blackwell Ltd, 1990), 115.

²¹³ Ambrose, *Rise to Globalism*, 183; Powaski, *The Cold War*, 66;

cigarettes to people with sore throats.”²¹⁴ Though the claimant nations were generally unreceptive to the Soviet Union’s anti-capitalist propaganda, they hesitated to accept the U.S. system as a model for the world.²¹⁵ They accepted the second internationalization proposal not because it was particularly innovative,²¹⁶ but because, after ten years of stagnation, it made a belated effort to accommodate their interests and prestige.²¹⁷

While U.S.–Soviet relations heavily influenced U.S. Antarctic policy, they were not the only set of relations to have that effect. U.S.–British–Chilean relations were equally significant as they demonstrated the extent to which the “free world” faced challenges in deterring Soviet expansion to the far south. The next two chapters explore this reality in which the United States’ loyalties were split between its foremost allies in Europe and Latin America, the region to which it was nearer but which it regarded as far less significant.

²¹⁴ Scott, *Political Warfare*, 92.

²¹⁵ In March 1947 Truman declared, “The American system can survive in America only if it becomes a world system.” Ambrose, *Rise to Globalism*, 19. For references to the “The American Century,” see Diggins, *The Proud Decades*, 73–74; Wittner, *Rebels against War*, 107; McCormick, *America’s Half-Century*, 1.

²¹⁶ The second proposal was motivated in part by concern that Soviet Union might present the issue to the United Nations. Department of State, Bureau of International Organization Affairs (Walmsley) to Office of Deputy Undersecretary of State (Daniels), 21 March 1958, NARA, RG 59, 702.022; Department of State, Memorandum of Conversation with Representatives of Argentina, Australia, Chile, New Zealand, United Kingdom, and the United States, 15 August 1958, NARA, RG 59, 399.829.

²¹⁷ See Acting Secretary of State (Herter) to Embassies in Buenos Aires, Canberra, London, Oslo, Paris, Santiago, and Wellington, 13 March 1958, CA-7882, NARA, RG 59, 702.022.

3. Trilateral Diplomacy

The significance of British–Argentine Antarctic relations is perhaps more widely appreciated than that of U.S.–Chilean or U.S.–British–Chilean Antarctic relations. Klaus J. Dodds writes that in the 1940s and 1950s British officials failed to thoroughly address Argentine claims to the Falkland Islands and Falkland Island Dependencies in hope that the dispute would remain indefinitely suspended.¹ Many signatories questioned the viability of Antarctic Treaty’s political status quo moratorium,² and the later Falklands or Malvinas War indicated that their skepticism had been warranted, even though the hostilities did not spread to the frozen continent. The previously published research included in this chapter demonstrates that the political status quo moratorium—without which there might have been no agreement—was the byproduct of U.S.–Chilean relations, and that British officials later maintained pressure to include the USSR. While the influence of the other signatory nations should not be discounted, it was far more “limited,” as the Australian role has been described.³

After the Second World War, the United States sought to nurture its reputation for pursuing the harmonious resolution of conflict, and the Antarctic provided an ideal opportunity for doing so. However, its reluctance to formalize its right had a counterproductive effect on the seven nations which had announced territorial claims

¹ Klaus-John Dodds, “Geopolitics in the Foreign Office: British Representatives of Argentina 1945–1961,” *Transactions of the Institute of British Geographers* 19, no. 3 (1994): 273–90.

² For example, see the French position as discussed in the previous chapter.

³ H. Robert Hall, “Casey and the Negotiation of the Antarctic Treaty,” in Julia Jabour-Green and Marcus Howard, eds., *The Antarctic: Past, Present and Future* (Hobart, Australia: Cooperative Research Centre for the Antarctic and Southern Ocean, 2002), 27–33.

This chapter includes material from Jason Kendall Moore, “A Typical Marriage: U.S.–British–Chilean Antarctic Relations, 1946–1949”, in Consuelo León Wöppke, Mauricio Jara Fernandez et al., *¿Convergencia Antártica? Los Contextos de la Historia Antártica Chilena, 1939–1949* (Valparaíso, Chile: Editorial Puntangleles, 2005), 193–210; Moore, “Alliance of Mistrust: the United States, Britain and Chile in the Quest for Antarctic Sovereignty, 1952–1959”, *Estudios Norteamericanos* 3, no. 3 (2004): 187–205.

to the region—Argentina, Australia, Britain, Chile, France, New Zealand and Norway—for they properly surmised that U.S. officials were entertaining plans to bring most or all the region under their jurisdiction. This fear was greatest in the Southern Cone nations, Chile and Argentina, which like most Latin American nations doubted their Good Neighbor warranted recognition as such. Similar concerns were prevalent in Britain where officials both resented the U.S. non-recognition policy and dreaded that a forthcoming U.S. claim might extend to the peninsular region, complicating its sovereignty dispute with the Latin American nations.

Klaus Dodds writes that Britain actually viewed the North American challenge as more “problematic” than the South American. The Royal Navy was unable and unwilling to challenge the U.S. Navy, whereas it went to great lengths to discourage Chilean and Argentine advances in the disputed territory.⁴ Deborah Shapley maintains that the United States sought to remain neutral in this increasingly dangerous competition between its Cold War allies.⁵ In many ways this is true, yet her position underemphasizes the pro-British tenor of U.S. policy,⁶ as well as the reservations which Britain and Chile shared toward the wisdom of accepting U.S. leadership in the far south. As more contemporary research has suggested, the direct and indirect collaboration among these three nations with laying the groundwork of the Antarctic Treaty of 1959. This chapter scrutinizes the elements of mistrust which bore upon their alliance.⁷

⁴ Klaus Dodds, *Pink Ice: Britain and the South Atlantic Empire* (London: I.B. Tauris Publishers, 2002), 75-76. See Klaus Dodds, “To Photograph the Antarctic: British Polar Exploration and the Falkland Islands and Dependencies Aerial Survey Expedition (FIDASE),” *Ecumene* 3, no. 1 (1996): 63-89.

⁵ Deborah Shapley, *The Seventh Continent: Antarctica in a Resource Age* (Washington: Resources for the Future, 1985), 53-54.

⁶ See Jason Kendall Moore, “Thirty-Seven Degrees Frigid: U.S.–Chilean Relations and the Spectre of Polar Arrivistes, 1950–1959,” *Diplomacy & Statecraft* 14, no.4 (2003): 69-93; Moore, “Maritime Rivalry, Political Intervention, and the Race to Antarctica: U.S.–Chilean Relations, 1939–1949,” *Journal of Latin American Studies* 33, no. 4 (2001): 713-38.

⁷ Moore, “Alliance of Mistrust.”

William F. Sater has described Chile and the United States as *Empires in Conflict*, despite their restraint from engaging open conflict,⁸ while Lionel Gelber has described Britain and the United States as “a married couple who seem unable to live happily together and yet cannot live apart.”⁹ The three nations’ interaction pertaining to the future of Antarctica revealed similar dynamics which finally led Britain and Chile to set aside their own dispute and consider forging an agreement independent of the United States. Although the smaller nations were unable to act upon that contingency—and had no reason to given the signature of the Antarctic Treaty—it is revealing that they so much as entertained it. They did not regard U.S. policy as merely indecisive, as Phillip W. Quigg refers to it,¹⁰ but rather as hypothetically more destabilizing than their own conflict of interests.

As officials at the time conceded, the United States was likely to gain approval for any means of conflict resolution it chose pertaining to the Antarctic quagmire. That was self-evident given its naval might and comparatively unlimited resources in the postwar world. These factors coupled with its leadership of the “free world” suggested that any agreement it sought would be endorsed, at least by the claimant nations which all shared a cautious to hostile attitude toward the Soviet Union. However, U.S. relations with Britain and Chile, two of the most anticommunist nations among the claimants, demonstrated that the extension of U.S. leadership to the far south was more circumstantial than circumspect. At a number of junctures, the U.S. refusal to deal forthrightly with the sovereignty dispute threatened

⁸ William F. Sater, *Chile and the United States: Empires in Conflict* (Athens, Georgia: The University of Georgia Press, 1990).

⁹ Lionel Gelber, *The Alliance of Necessity: Britain's Crisis, the New Europe and American Interests* (London: Robert Hale, Ltd., 1967), 13.

¹⁰ Phillip W. Quigg, *A Pole Apart: The Emerging Issue of Antarctica* (New York: McGraw Hill Book Company, 1983), 141.

to permit the eruption of hostilities on a scale which would have undermined any satisfactory resolution.

This chapter presents the trilateral relationship as unfolding in four phases. The first corresponds to the U.S. Navy's 1946–1947 Antarctic expedition, Operation High Jump, which led to predictions that the government would be reversing its non-claimant policy. The second phase traces the personal activism of Chilean President Gabriel Gonzalez Videla during the following season, Britain's dispatch of the heavy cruiser *Nigeria*, the first U.S. proposal for internationalization, and the Chilean counter-proposal known as the Escudero Plan, which the United States chose to accept in 1949. The third phase extends from the Soviet Union's demand to participate in any agreement to the hostile encounters between Britain and the Southern Cone nations in 1952 and 1953, which derailed negotiations pertaining to the Escudero Plan. The last phase surveys the remaining six years, toward the end of which Britain and Chile sought to devise their own agreement in case the negotiations surrounding the Antarctic Treaty were to collapse.

In November 1946 the United States dispatched the largest Antarctic expedition to date. Thirteen naval vessels and over four thousand sailors participated in Operation High Jump, commanded by Admiral Richard Evelyn Byrd whose previous expedition in 1939 had sought to extend the Monroe Doctrine to the South Pole.¹¹ Shortly thereafter the Second World War had shifted U.S. priorities to Europe and the Pacific, and the U.S. Antarctic Service disbanded before having the opportunity to act upon the government's Pan-American themes, including the possibility of a three-power condominium arrangement with the Southern Cone nations.¹² If seven years of polar inactivity had been difficult for Byrd, his patience was abundantly compensated. Operation High Jump was not simply the largest Antarctic expedition to date; its massive scale trivialized all that had come before. U.S. interest in the region had greatly increased,¹³ and officials were giving serious consideration to reversing their policy of territorial non-claimancy. High Jump was to circumnavigate the white continent for the first time ever, and in doing so made a strong case for exploration-based rights.¹⁴

The U.S. Navy also gained the opportunity to test military hardware which had not been utilized against the Axis powers.¹⁵ This aspect of its motivation generated hostile speculation, exacerbated by the navy's refusal to permit foreign observers. By default the operation was military in nature, given the navy's involvement, and the secrecy about its details generated the impression that the United States sought to militarize the planet's last frontier. Rumors of uranium lying

¹¹ R.E. Byrd to Department of State, Division of European Affairs (Cumming), 15 July 1939, NARA, RG 59, 800.014; *The New York Times*, 12 January 1939.

¹² Department of State, Division of American Republics to Office of American Republic Affairs (Briggs), 18 August 1939, NARA, RG 59, 800.014.

¹³ Consuelo León Wöppke, "Política y Políticas Antárticas Estadounidenses en la Década de 1940s," *Estudios Norteamericanos* 2, no. 1 (1998): 53-66.

¹⁴ For example, R.E. Byrd to R.H. Cruzen, 8 December 1946, BPRC, folder 1412.

¹⁵ Thomas R. Henry, *The White Continent: The Story of Antarctica* (New York: William Sloane Associates, 1950), ix.

beneath its ice cap led many domestic and foreign journalists to concur that High Jump was initiating a race for atomic materials among the United States and the seven claimants.¹⁶ The Department of State regretted that even government-affiliated newspapers of its closest ally, Britain, published allegations to this effect.¹⁷ The navy's admission that it viewed the Antarctic as a highly strategic resource was not helpful in counteracting alarmist speculation.¹⁸

The Chilean press took an especially suspicious attitude, calling for its government to act decisively.¹⁹ The nation had formalized its sovereignty claim over the sector from 53° to 90° West only six years earlier, but from the earliest days of statehood had regarded the Antarctic peninsula as an extension of its mainland.²⁰ British officials expressed concern that High Jump would be active in their sector from 20° to 80° West,²¹ but the intimacy of Anglo–American relations limited their “hysteria,” as U.S. officials dismissed the Chilean reaction.²² Unlike Pan–American relations, Anglo–American relations had always benefited from a sense of linguistic, cultural and political unity. The term Good Neighbor, though earnestly intended, most often conveyed irony when uttered south of the Rio Grande. While British officials were prone to empathize with their former colony, Chilean officials took a far more cautious approach. The Defense Ministry renewed its collaboration with Argentina, first to defend the Southern Cone nations' joint sector, from 25° to 90°

¹⁶ *The New York Times*, 6 November 1946; *Time*, 18 November 1946; *The New Republic*, 18 November 1946.

¹⁷ Embassy in London (Harrison) to Secretary of State, 7 November 1946, no. 2465; Ambassador in Santiago (Bowers) to Secretary of State, 8 August 1946, no. 14302, NARA, RG 59, 800.014; *The Times*, 3 December 1946, 18 December 1946.

¹⁸ *The New York Times*, 13 November 1946.

¹⁹ Department of State, Division of American Republics (Brundage) to Division of North and West Coast Affairs et al., 22 August 1946; Department of State, Division of North and West Coast Affairs to Office of American Republic Affairs et al., 29 November 1946, NARA, RG 59, 800.014.

²⁰ See Oscar Pinochet de la Barra, *Chilean Sovereignty in Antarctica* (Santiago: Editorial del Pacifico S.A., 1955).

²¹ Department of State, Office of American Republic Affairs (Briggs) to Office of European Affairs (Hickerson), 13 November 1946, NARA, RG 59, 800.014.

²² Department of State, Memorandum by Division of North and West Coast Affairs (Brundage), 5 May 1947, NARA, RG 59, 800.014.

West, and then to pursue a satisfactory delineation of their own overlapping claims.²³ U.S. officials regretted that the Latin Americans refused to acknowledge any other nation's rights or to accept Britain's proposal to seek a ruling from the International Court of Justice at The Hague.²⁴

In January 1947, as Operation High Jump was asserting North America's undeniable military aptitude, Chile dispatched a small, two-vessel Antarctic expedition.²⁵ What it lacked in size was compensated for by the presence of high-ranking domestic officials and Argentine representatives. Ambassador Claude G. Bowers informed the Department of State that Chileans wished to display their opposition to U.S. "designs" to gain a monopoly over Antarctica's strategic and mineral resources.²⁶ Officials in Washington interpreted this as an effort by anti-U.S. sectors of the population to maximize their allegations of North American imperialism.²⁷ In fact Byrd and the Department of State believed that High Jump would establish an unquestionable basis for a U.S. claim.²⁸ They urged the White House to re-evaluate the merits of the 1924 Hughes Doctrine, which stipulated that permanent occupation, rather than discovery, must be established prior to formalizing rights.²⁹ While Chilean officials expressed a desire for cooperation with the United

²³ Ambassador in Santiago (Bowers) to Secretary of State, 15 November 1946, no. 1003, NARA, RG 59, 800.014.

²⁴ Embassy in Buenos Aires (Burrows) to Secretary of State, [22 November 1946], no. 1305, NARA, RG 59, 800.014.

²⁵ *The New York Times*, 10 January 1947.

²⁶ Embassy in Santiago (Millard) to Secretary of State, 10 January 1947, no. 14796, NARA, RG 59, 800.014.

²⁷ Department of State, Division of North and West Coast Affairs (Brundage) to Assistant Secretary of State (Braden) et al., 10 February 1947, NARA, RG 59, 800.014; British Ambassador in Santiago (Leche), Annual Report on Chile—1946, 30 January 1947, AS 970/32/9, PRO, FO 497.

²⁸ Department of State, Office of American Republic Affairs (Briggs) to Assistant Secretary of State (Braden), 25 April 1947, NARA, RG 59, 800.014.

²⁹ For example, Joint Chiefs of Staff (Leahy) to Secretary of Defense, 26 March 1948, NARA, RG 218, Geographical File; Department of State, Bureau of European Affairs (Bonbright) to Deputy Undersecretary of State (Matthews), 15 July 1952, NARA, RG 59, 702.022.

States,³⁰ they also made no secret of their contempt for its failure to heed the inviolability of their Antarctic rights.³¹

After High Jump returned to the United States, having failed to substantiate a cornucopia of resources, atomic or otherwise, the race to Antarctica lost some of its appeal. Byrd and his second-in-command, Admiral Richard H. Cruzen, shifted emphasis from the continent's untapped wealth to its strategic value relative to hemispheric defense. Their mission's overall accomplishments had been impressive. It had charted over three hundred thousand square miles of new territory, as well as devising means of constructing airstrips on the polar ice cap.³² Though Washington still hesitated to advance a sovereignty claim, the explorers' statements revealed ongoing consideration of that alternative.³³ Anxiety persisted among the claimant nations since a U.S. claim was likely to overlap their own. The foreign ministers of the Southern Cone nations took preventative action by signing the Donoso-La Rosa agreement, which formalized their commitment to joint defense.³⁴

Due to this politically inhospitable climate, though ostensibly for economic reasons, the United States cancelled plans for Operation High Jump II.³⁵ The Department of State had a number of more urgent issues to address in the postwar world. Few career diplomats and elected politicians were alarmed by predictions that U.S. security hinged on control of the frozen continent. Relative to Eastern Europe, for example, Antarctica was a low priority, however beneficial it had been for

³⁰ Ambassador in Santiago (Bowers) to Secretary of State, 16 October 1947, 6 August 1948, no. 15673, NARA, RG 59, 800.014.

³¹ British Ambassador in Santiago (Leche) to Foreign Secretary (Bevin), 27 January 1947, AS 918/32/9, PRO, FO 497.

³² *The New York Times*, 9 February 1947, 7 March 1947.

³³ See Ambassador in Santiago (Bowers) to Secretary of State, 11 February 1948, no. 80, NARA, RG 59, 800.014.

³⁴ Embassy in Buenos Aires (Leeper) to Foreign Secretary (Bevin), 23 July 1947, AS 4461/8/51, PRO, FO 497.

³⁵ R.E. Byrd to H.F. Byrd, 27 August 1949, BPRC, folder 33; Consuelo León Wöppke, "High Jump II: Ambivalencias de la Política Estadounidense en 1949," *Estudios Norteamericanos* 3, no. 2 (2003): 91-107.

conducting an undisclosed range of military tests. Uranium remained desirable but Antarctica, supposing it possessed any, was resistant to the era's mining technology. High Jump II still would have instigated a new round of consternation throughout Europe, Latin America and elsewhere. U.S. officials sought to avoid this, and unlike their colleagues in Britain and the Southern Cone, they were under no pressure to act rashly.³⁶

In January 1948 Chilean President Gabriel González Videla announced his plans to join an expedition to reinforce the nation's Antarctic sovereignty. Journalists, like the population at large, responded with great enthusiasm, aware that he would be the first head of state to venture into the disputed territories.³⁷ During the weeks before his departure, Britain and Argentina exchanged notes of protest over the latter nation's construction of a base on Deception Island in the disputed archipelago.³⁸ The language was extremely polite, whereas the message was not; the nations firmly rejected each other's rights.³⁹ Buenos Aires permitted the notes to be published, as they indicated its willingness to negotiate, not as the British had proposed, by going before The Hague, but by holding an international conference.⁴⁰ Britain's receptiveness to this was unlikely since its colonial possessions in Honduras, the Falkland Islands, and the Falkland Island Dependencies antagonized most Latin

³⁶ See Joint Chiefs of Staff, JCS 2070/1, Importance of Operation High Jump II to National Security, 5 November 1949, NARA, RG 218, Geographical File.

³⁷ British Ambassador in Santiago (Leche) to Prime Minister (Attlee), 10 January 1948, AS 441/2/9, PRO, FO 497; Ambassador in Santiago (Bowers) to Secretary of State, 12 February 1948, no. 85, NARA, RG 59, 800.014; *La Estrella*, 10 January 1948, 12 February 1948. Many of the relevant Chilean newspaper articles from the dates cited herein have been reproduced in Consuelo León Wöppke and Mauricio Jara Fernández, eds., *Antártica: Testimonios Periodísticos, 1947–1957* (Valparaíso, Chile: Editorial Puntangeles, [2003]).

³⁸ *La Estrella*, 22 January 1948.

³⁹ Embassy in Buenos Aires (Leeper) to Foreign Secretary (Bevin), 30 January 1948, no. 58, AS 920/16/51, PRO, FO 463; *La Estrella*, 23 January 1948.

⁴⁰ *La Estrella*, 7 February 1948.

Americans. Its possible receptiveness to the proposal evaporated when Argentina sent two cruisers and six torpedo boats into the contested waters.⁴¹

Britons took umbrage at the Southern Cone's assertiveness.⁴² The Royal Navy dispatched the heavy cruiser *Nigeria* southward to put an end to Latin American bravado.⁴³ *The New York Times* falsely predicted that González Videla's trip might be delayed or aborted by news of the British decision.⁴⁴ Instead, the Chilean president forged onward to inaugurate a new military base. The ceremony revealed "genuine emotion," according to *La Estrella*, and the president recalled that from the days of their independence, Chileans had viewed the Antarctic as an essential component of their identity. Politicians across the ideological spectrum agreed that their national rights were beyond question and should not be subject to any form of compromise. The Chilean Antarctic, they believed, was a natural extension of the Chilean mainland, and Britain's denial of this fact was to be ignored.⁴⁵

The popularity of González Videla's statements concerned British officials in part because of the Axis sympathies prevalent in the Southern Cone nations. While the governments often sought to downplay this issue, the British regarded their presence in Antarctica as both a strategic and ideological threat.⁴⁶ Latin Americans, on the other hand, resented what they perceived as British colonialism in the Western Hemisphere, an issue which heightened the appeal of radical doctrines. The

⁴¹ *The Times*, 7 February 1948; *La Estrella*, 17 February 1948.

⁴² See Embassy in London (Douglas) to Secretary of State, 5 March 1948, A-589, NARA, RG 59, 800.014.

⁴³ See *The Times*, 17 February 1948.

⁴⁴ *The New York Times*, 16 February 1948.

⁴⁵ *La Estrella*, 17 February 1948, 18 February 1948.

⁴⁶ See Ambassador in Santiago (Leche) to Foreign Secretary (Bevin), 21 January 1947, AS 638/32/9; Foreign Secretary to British Ambassador in Santiago, 29 January 1947, no. 35, AS 3371/16/9, PRO, FO 497; Jaime Antonio Etchepare and Hamish I. Stewart, "Nazism in Chile: A Particular Type of Fascism in South America," *Journal of Contemporary History* 30 (1995): 577-605.

Department of State, which shared Britain's concerns,⁴⁷ repeated its stance denying that the hemispheric defense provision included in the Rio Treaty of 1947 applied to Antarctica.⁴⁸ Privately Secretary of State George C. Marshall considered *Nigeria's* involvement gratuitous and even somewhat undignified,⁴⁹ yet he still empathized with Britain's desire to halt the Latin Americans' "ostentation and defiance," as *The Times* described it.⁵⁰

Though Argentina had dispatched the larger task force, Chile led in the sphere of rhetoric. González Videla's declarations encapsulated anti-colonial sentiments throughout Latin America.⁵¹ His vision of Antarctica as the land of the future and his appeals to the Rio Treaty dominated the front pages or entire sections of newspapers throughout the region.⁵² Meanwhile the Chilean Foreign Affairs Ministry informed Washington that Britain's actions violated not only the Rio Treaty's hemispheric defense perimeter, as outlined in Article IV, but also Article III, which defined an attack on any American nation as an attack against all American nations.⁵³ The Chilean government made no distinction between its continental and polar sovereignty, and rectified any confusion about this by placing its Antarctic sector under jurisdiction of the Magellan province.⁵⁴

⁴⁷ For example, Department of State, Division of North and West Coast Affairs (Brundage) to Office of American Republic Affairs (Hussey), 31 October 1946, NARA, RG 59, Office of American Republic Affairs, Memoranda on Chile; Department of State, Division of North and West Coast Affairs (Brundage) to Assistant Secretary of State (Braden) et al., 10 February 1947, NARA, RG 59, 800.014.

⁴⁸ *The New York Times*, 19 February 1948.

⁴⁹ *FRUS* 1948, vol. 1, part 2, *General* (Washington: USGPO, 1976), 963-65.

⁵⁰ *The Times*, 19 February 1948.

⁵¹ Ambassador in Santiago (Bowers) to Secretary of State, 26 February 1948, no. 109, NARA, RG 59, 800.014.

⁵² Embassy in Chile (Trueblood) to Secretary of State, 19 February 1948, no. 133, NARA, RG 59, 800.014.

⁵³ *The Times*, 20 February 1948.

⁵⁴ *La Estrella*, 24 February 1948

Foreign Secretary Ernest Bevin deeply resented González Videla's public statements attacking Britain's "imperialist aims."⁵⁵ The Chilean Ambassador in London, Manuel Bianchi, suggested that the translation had distorted the president's language, but journalists around the world translated the most inflammatory excerpts identically—consistent with the Foreign Office's own personnel. Bevin condemned Chile's approach to the dispute as unreasonable, counterproductive, and reflective of the nation's sympathy for totalitarian methods, implicitly those of the defeated National Socialists.⁵⁶ In later discussions Bianchi noted that Bevin's remarks before the House of Commons were equally impassioned and offensive to Chileans. Bevin, unable to deny this, warned that Gonzalez Videla was acting as though Britain were a second-rate power, and that it would respond as forcefully as necessary to defend its rights. He surprisingly chose this moment to ask the ambassador for his personal reaction to president's behavior, and Bianchi confessed that it absolutely delighted him.⁵⁷

After returning from Antarctica, Gonzalez Videla continued to rail against British "aggression," and he won broad public support with his appeal for the United States to intervene in keeping with the so-called Good Neighbor Policy.⁵⁸ The Chilean Foreign Affairs Ministry, placing little faith in Washington, invited Argentine officials to a ceremony affirming their joint rights.⁵⁹ By the time *Nigeria* arrived to Deception Island and the British Governor of the Falkland Islands handed a note of protest to the Argentines stationed there,⁶⁰ no Southern Cone vessels remained in the

⁵⁵ *The Times*, 25 February 1948.

⁵⁶ Ambassador in Santiago (Leche) to Foreign Secretary (Bevin), 18 February 1948, AS 1132/16/51; Foreign Secretary to Ambassador in Santiago, 28 February 1948, AS 1417/16/51, PRO, FO 463.

⁵⁷ Foreign Secretary (Bevin) to Ambassador in Santiago (Leche), 2 March 1948, AS 1502/16/51, PRO, FO 463.

⁵⁸ *The Times*, 4 March 1948.

⁵⁹ *La Estrella*, 4 March 1948.

⁶⁰ *The Times*, 26 February 1948, 6 March 1948.

vicinity, and the immediate risk of an encounter passed. The Department of State did not accept Chile's position that the presence of the British vessel necessarily constituted an act of "aggression,"⁶¹ and it declined to be enter into four-power negotiations as they held the possibility of compromising U.S. or British interests or both.⁶²

Officials in Washington turned their attention from staging another expedition to regulating the continent in some manner to prevent a relapse of hostile naval displays. In late August 1948 they circulated a draft internationalization proposal to the seven claimant nations. It sought to forge an eight-power condominium based on the renunciation of sovereignty. From the Department of State's perspective, this arrangement was perfectly innocuous as the United States had no claim and therefore nothing to renounce. The nation's leadership of the "free world," though not always popular, was an undeniable reality which officials believed could be projected southward without great difficulty. However, none of the claimant nations was willing to renounce its rights either to accommodate Washington or for any reason whatsoever.⁶³ This attitude was most firmly held in Britain and the Southern Cone nations, for the proposal failed to acknowledge, much less to resolve the popular motivations for their dispute.⁶⁴

The proposal had been vague about the nature of an eight-power arrangement since many different viewpoints might have emerged. That stage of discussions never took place due to the sovereignty issue, which been dealt with bluntly rather than

⁶¹ See Department of State, Memorandum by Division of North European Affairs (Green), 17 July 1948, in Embassy in Santiago to Department of State, 19 July 1948, no. 477, NARA, RG 59, 800.014.

⁶² *FRUS* 1948, 1/2: 969.

⁶³ The British were believed to accept the U.S. proposal in principle, though that became a matter of semantics as they, like all of the claimant nations, opposed renouncing their rights. See Embassy in Washington (Nieto del Rio) to Chancellery, 28 August 1948, Confidential Cable 4821; Embassy in Washington (Nieto del Rio) to Foreign Affairs Ministry, 9 September 1948, MRECh.

⁶⁴ See Embassy in Washington (Nieto del Rio) to Foreign Affairs Ministry, 3 September 1948, Cable 4937, MRECh.

vaguely. While the claimant nations agreed that Antarctic's scientific value surpassed its immediate strategic or economic potential,⁶⁵ they did not accept an inverse corollary between cooperative research and the preservation of their national rights. The Southern Cone's earlier recommendation for an international conference now might have been followed to redraft the proposal, though the Department of State regarded that course as unwise.⁶⁶ The U.S. proposal floundered badly and there appeared to be no alternative until Chile tabled the Escudero Plan. Upholding the principle of sovereignty, it called for a five- to ten-year political moratorium to reduce tensions and permit the nations to reconsider their alternatives.⁶⁷ This initiative was highly practical except for its assumption that the passage of time would be conducive to reducing tensions.

With U.S. encouragement, Britain and the Southern Cone nations signed an agreement banning further hostile naval displays. Its terms were to confine their activities to normal levels, a meritorious ideal even though all parties continued to expand their military bases, issue notes of protests, and remain highly suspicious of each other.⁶⁸ More dangerous challenges nonetheless did subside as the United States slowly abandoned hope for the success of its internationalization proposal. In August 1949 Secretary of State Dean Acheson accepted the need to pursue an agreement based on the Escudero Plan in consultation with Britain and Chile.⁶⁹ Given assurances that its rights would not be compromised, Britain overcame its initial aversion to the Chilean scheme.⁷⁰ The smaller American republic appeared to

⁶⁵ See Foreign Affairs Ministry, Secret Memorandum, 9 August 1948, MRECh.

⁶⁶ Embassy in Washington (Nieto del Rio) to Foreign Affairs Ministry, 29 August 1948, Cable 4823/419, MRECh.

⁶⁷ Ambassador in Santiago (Bowers) to Secretary of State, 2 September 1948, no. 592, NARA, RG 59, 800.014; *La Estrella*, 21 September 1948, 3 November 1948.

⁶⁸ For example, Foreign Office Minute, 30 March 1951, 17 November 1951, A 15216, PRO, FO 371; *La Estrella*, 20 November 1950, 6 March 1951; *The Times*, 26 November 1951.

⁶⁹ *FRUS* 1949, vol. 1, *National Security Affairs* (Washington: USGPO, 1976), 804-6.

⁷⁰ British Embassy in Washington to Department of State, 18 October 1949, NARA, RG 59, 800.014.

have gained the opportunity to share leadership in determining the future of Antarctica.⁷¹

Meanwhile the Soviet Union had begun to express interest in basing rights on a nineteenth-century Russian expedition. The claimant nations and the United States hoped to avoid that prospect since a new set of disputed rights might indefinitely stall a general agreement. Some Department of State officials favored making a U.S. claim even before reaching an eight-power agreement,⁷² while others believed that maintaining the non-claimant policy, at least for the time being, was the best means of deterring Soviet action.⁷³ British officials largely blamed the indecisiveness of U.S. policy for granting Moscow time to draft an official memorandum demanding that it be involved in any future decisions.⁷⁴ It remained possible that the USSR might not interfere with an eight-power agreement signed without it, but the conclusion of such an agreement faced many obstacles.⁷⁵

Like U.S.–Chilean negotiations, U.S.–British negotiations addressed how to coordinate scientific research while maintaining the political status quo, pursuing a resolution to the sovereignty issue, and regulating the activities of non-signatory powers.⁷⁶ Disagreement emerged over whether to include fishing and whaling

⁷¹ Department of State, Bureau of European Affairs, Secret Memorandum for President, [17 January 1950], NARA, RG 59, 702.022.

⁷² Department of State, Division of River Plate Affairs (Dearborn) to Division of Northern European Affairs (Bream) et al., 25 March 1949, NARA, RG 59, 800.014.

⁷³ Embassy in Washington to Foreign Secretary (Bevin), 20 July 1950, no. 583, PRO, FO 371.

⁷⁴ Soviet Embassy in Washington to Department of State, 8 June 1950, no. 145108, NARA, RG 59, 702.022; Embassy in Moscow (Kelly) to Foreign Secretary (Bevin), 17 October 1950, no. 238, A 1529/36, PRO, FO 371; Foreign Office to Embassy in Washington (Franks), Memorandum on Soviet Antarctic Claims, 4 July 1950, no. 861, A 1529/18, PRO, FO 463.

⁷⁵ Embassy in Washington to Foreign Office, South American Department, 15 February 1949, [AS] 1057; Embassy in Santiago (Leche) to Foreign Office (Fordham), 8 March 1949, AS 1485, PRO, FO 371; Department of State, Memorandum of Conversation, Office of North and West Coast Affairs (Owen) et al., 13 June 1950, NARA, RG 59, 702.022.

⁷⁶ Embassy in Washington (Franks) to Foreign Secretary (Bevin), 24 October 1950, no. 930, A 1529/40, PRO, FO 371.

provisions,⁷⁷ but it was minor relative to the common desire to pre-empt the Soviet Union and other potential adversaries. The United States chose to negotiate separately with its two allies given the conflictive tenor of their own relations. It did not, however, choose to maintain an equal degree of confidentiality. The Department of State and Foreign Office made detailed revisions to the Escudero Plan while denying that they were involved in anything more than general discussions,⁷⁸ as would have been permissible under the U.S.–Chilean terms of understanding. Wary of inflaming anti-imperial sentiments throughout Latin America,⁷⁹ U.S. and British officials made a high priority of concealing the extent of their dialog.⁸⁰

The Soviet Union took no further initiative after issuing its declaration of interest, and negotiations surrounding the Escudero Plan failed to produce results. While the Anglo–American powers issued no response to the Soviet declaration,⁸¹ the Southern Cone powers abruptly denounced it.⁸² Britain might have preferred to do so, but hesitated since any rationale used to deny Soviet rights might also have been used to deny U.S. rights. Chile and Argentina were unwilling to accommodate either of the non-claimant superpowers. Instead they reiterated their joint defense agreement and unwillingness to recognize any other nation’s rights.⁸³ Hypothetically their position, like a U.S. claim, might have encouraged a hardening of the Soviet line. Given their minor standing in world affairs and their involvement with the

⁷⁷ Department of State, Memorandum of Conversation, Office of North and West Coast Affairs (Owen) et al., 7 September 1950, NARA, RG 59, 702.022.

⁷⁸ Embassy in Washington to Foreign Office, American Department, 13 January 1950, 1521/3/50, A 1529/1, PRO, FO 371.

⁷⁹ See Embassy in Washington (Franks) to Foreign Secretary (Bevin), 20 July 1950, no. 583, A 1529/22, PRO, FO 463.

⁸⁰ Foreign Office Minute, 24 February 1951, A 15216/1, PRO, FO 371.

⁸¹ Foreign Office to Embassy in Moscow (Nichols), 11 January 1951, no. 9, A 1529/36, in Embassy in Moscow (Kelly) to Foreign Secretary (Bevin), 17 October 1950, no. 238, A 1529/36, PRO, FO 371.

⁸² *La Estrella*, 22 August 1950, 30 August 1950.

⁸³ Embassy in Santiago (Hall) to Department of State, 12 September 1950, no. 259, NARA, RG 59, 702.022; Foreign Affairs Ministry, Confidential Memorandum, 19 May 1950; Foreign Affairs Minister (Vergara Donoso) to Foreign Affairs Ministry, Confidential Memorandum, 31 July 1951, MRECh.

peninsular dispute, it only had that effect on the British line. The Foreign Office anticipated that the two nation would seek to provoke conflict for domestic political reasons.⁸⁴

In February 1952 Argentina and Britain reached a new level of provocation for which they each blamed the other. The Argentine commander at Hope Bay—at the northern tip of the disputed peninsula—warned a British party of his orders to prevent any attempt to establish foreign bases. Since the party made no effort to deny that this was its purpose, the commander emphasized that he had every intention of following his orders. The Britons perhaps questioned his sincerity as they were unarmed civilians, and they even disregarded the machine-gun fire directed over their heads. Only when approached and surrounded by Argentines did they retreat to their vessel.⁸⁵ Though the episode involved neither bloodshed nor a heavy cruiser, such as *Nigeria*, it gained front-page coverage in *The New York Times* and papers around the world. The leading U.S. daily provided a factually based account which nonetheless portrayed the British as victims and the Argentines as victimizers.⁸⁶

The British Embassy in Buenos Aires offered a more balanced perspective, noting that the Argentine government had expressed “what amounted to an apology” even before the incident gained headlines. It also disagreed with those who held that the incident was part of a conspiracy to provoke hostilities.⁸⁷ Publicly the Argentine government declared that its soldiers had acted in error and been given more precise orders to avoid any further misunderstandings.⁸⁸ British authorities in the Falkland

⁸⁴ Foreign Office (Noble) to Colonial Office (Martin), [26 November 1950], A 1529/43, PRO, FO 371.

⁸⁵ *The Times*, 4 February 1952; Foreign Office, Commonwealth Relations Office to High Commissioners in Canada, Australia, New Zealand, and South Africa, [February 1952], A 15211/20, PRO, FO 371.

⁸⁶ *The New York Times*, 3 February 1952.

⁸⁷ Embassy in Buenos Aires (Allen) to Foreign Office (Cecil), 3 February 1952, A 15211/17; Colonial Office (Harrison) to Foreign Office (Cecil), 19 March 1952, A 15211/30, PRO, FO 371.

⁸⁸ *The Times*, 5 February 1952; Embassy in Buenos Aires (Mack) to Foreign Office, 4 February 1952, no. 33, A 15211/6, PRO, FO 371.

Islands insisted that this explanation lacked credibility and that there was no excuse for using machine-gun fire under any circumstance, whether against civilians or military personnel.⁸⁹ Despite his administration's official stance, Argentine President Juan Domingo Perón extolled the patriotism of the commander responsible for turning back the intruders. The British embassy asked what it was to infer from this, only to receive a passing assurance that there was no cause for alarm.⁹⁰

Officials in London determined that it was unwise to trust the Latin Americans. Aside from dispatching the frigate *Burghead Bay* to augment their presence in the contested archipelago,⁹¹ they resolved to establish a station at Hope Bay sometime in the future.⁹² The Argentines, they recognized, were fully capable of matching them base-for-base.⁹³ However, to be dissuaded by this fact seemed tantamount to surrendering, aside from being highly detrimental to recruitment for the British Antarctic program. Negotiations to disarm the Latin Americans would be hopeless, whereas arming British civilians was beyond consideration.⁹⁴ The situation, difficult from all perspectives, might have erupted if, as reported, London had dispatched six to eight warships to forcibly remove Argentines posted throughout the disputed territories.⁹⁵ While those reports were false, their spirit would be realized the following season.

⁸⁹ British Government in Falkland Islands to Colonial Secretary, 2 February 1952, A 15211/9, PRO, FO 371.

⁹⁰ Embassy in Buenos Aires (Mack) to Foreign Secretary (Eden), 3 May 1952, no. 95, A 15211/31, PRO, FO 371.

⁹¹ *The New York Times*, 5 February 1952.

⁹² *HMS Burghead Bay* to [British] Admiralty, 5 February 1952, A 15211/21; Colonial Secretary (Lyttelton) to Falkland Islands, Government House, 16 May 1952, no. 25, A 15211/34, PRO, FO 371.

⁹³ British Government in the Falkland Islands (Clifford) to Colonial Secretary, 31 January 1952, A 15211/5, PRO, FO 371.

⁹⁴ Colonial Office (Bennet) to Foreign Office (Cecil), 5 February 1952, A 15211/18, PRO, FO 371.

⁹⁵ Embassy in Buenos Aires (Mack) to Foreign Office, 6 February 1952, no. 39, A 15211/19, PRO, FO 371.

The Southern Cone nations had erected small outposts on Deception Island in the South Orkneys within four hundred yards of a British airstrip.⁹⁶ The Royal Navy expressed concern about destroying the outposts, though it, like the Argentine commander at Hope Bay, had to follow orders. It predicted that the “defensive” plan would provoke harsh condemnation and the possibility of serious retaliation. The government, which did not deny this, held that that the destruction of the outposts was imperative regardless of the consequences. The maneuver was only to involve a single vessel, yet the government believed it would demonstrate a firm commitment to defend a popular remnant of the British empire. It discounted the navy’s concern that only one other vessel would be able to provide assistance if resistance were encountered, a prospect which it regarded as highly unlikely.⁹⁷

The British Embassy in Santiago recommended informing the Chileans beforehand and encouraging the withdrawal of their personnel. Since the days when Gabriel González Videla had led efforts to defend the Chilean Antarctic,⁹⁸ the new president, Carlos Ibáñez del Campo, had established a friendly rapport with British diplomats, suggesting that he might warrant being “spared humiliation.”⁹⁹ The Foreign Office acknowledged that Chile’s presence on Deception Island was not intended as a form of provocation, but simply as a token of its rights. The arrest of Chileans was still deemed necessary to prevent them from intervening or later choosing to reinforce their position.¹⁰⁰ Though not directly informed of the

⁹⁶ British Magistrate (Clarke) of Deception Island to Officer Commanding Argentine Land Forces, 19 January 1953, PRO, FO 371.

⁹⁷ Foreign Office (Garvey), Record of Meeting with Admiralty (Brock), 2 February 1953, A 15121/8, PRO, FO 371.

⁹⁸ Alejandra Mora Sepúlveda, “Estados Unidos y la Antártica en los Cien Primeros días del Gobierno de Don Gabriel González Videla,” *Estudios Norteamericanos* 3, no. 2 (2003): 119-25.

⁹⁹ Embassy in Santiago (Stirling) to Foreign Office, 4 February 1953, A 15212/9, PRO, FO 371.

¹⁰⁰ Foreign Office to Embassy in Santiago, 7 February 1953, no. 21, PRO, FO 371.

upcoming maneuver, they were issued a note of protest indicating that their refusal to go before The Hague had exhausted Britain's patience.¹⁰¹

In February 1953 *Snipe* deployed one British magistrate, two policemen, and fifteen marines to remove any trace of the South American outposts on Deception Island.¹⁰² They did so without difficulty or compunction, in the process arresting and detaining the two Argentines and then deporting them to Buenos Aires.¹⁰³ The frigate docked in Port Foster held an additional eighteen marines in reserve and was prepared to counter any retaliatory strike.¹⁰⁴ The Southern Cone governments responded very mildly and hoped to avoid publicity since otherwise they might be compelled to assume an compromising stance. They were reluctant to confront the Royal Navy, even though the remainder of its fleet was too widely dispersed to provide support.¹⁰⁵ A brief hiatus ensued as the three governments waited for one of them to issue an apology or propose some form of appeasement. Unfortunately they had little time to determine how to prevent the incident from spiraling beyond control—or nearly beyond control.

Four days later *The New York Times* falsely reported the episode as having transpired on Valentine's Day. The Foreign Office held the Department of State responsible since that was the originally planned date which had been shared in confidence beforehand. British officials expressed displeasure but not surprise, given that the White House had often authorized such leaks.¹⁰⁶ They informed the

¹⁰¹ Embassy in Santiago (Stirling) to [Chilean] Foreign Affairs Ministry, 16 February 1953, no. 6, PRO, FO 371; *The Times*, 23 February 1953.

¹⁰² *The Times*, 23 February 1953.

¹⁰³ Foreign Office to Embassy in Buenos Aires, 19 February 1953, no. 83, PRO, FO 371.

¹⁰⁴ Royal Navy, Commander-in-Chief, Atlantic and West Indies, to Admiralty, 6 March 1953, A15212/155g, PRO, FO 371.

¹⁰⁵ Foreign Office (Barclay), Memorandum on Deception Island, 17 February 1953, A 15212/130; Admiralty to Royal Navy, Commander-in-Chief, Atlantic and West Indies, 18 February 1953, A15212/79, PRO, FO 371.

¹⁰⁶ Embassy in Buenos Aires (Mack) to Foreign Office, 19 February 1953, no. 76, A15212/73, PRO, FO 371.

Eisenhower administration that the non-disclosure of secrets was essential to preserve confidence in Anglo-American relations.¹⁰⁷ That issue aside, they felt compelled to release a brief public statement to justify their operation. Several officials, perhaps speaking without authorization, emphasized that the operation had sought to dispel any hope that Britain would compromise its rights.¹⁰⁸ Journalists throughout the Southern Cone denounced Britain's heavy-handed approach.¹⁰⁹ Chilean Foreign Minister Arturo Olavarria Bravo expressed "deep astonishment" that London had violated the three nations' agreement to avoid publicity.¹¹⁰

The Foreign Office correctly predicted that the circumstance would quickly deteriorate.¹¹¹ Public outrage inveighed heavily against prospects for a solution based on mutual compromise. Foreign Secretary Anthony Eden dispelled any such hope by going before the House of Commons to denounce the Southern Cone's "encroachment."¹¹² He was greeted with cheers and applause, behind which there lurked a nostalgia for an empire which Latin Americans found anathema. Their resentment extended beyond trite clichés to mockery. Chilean journalists referred to Britain as a "toothless lion" which sought to atone for its loss of positions around the world by turning to smaller Latin prey. Though this portrayal must have insulted the Foreign Office, as intended, it led some diplomats to concede an element of truth.¹¹³

The Southern Cone governments unsuccessfully demanded the reconstruction of their bases. They were aware that the Antarctic season had grown too late for

¹⁰⁷ Foreign Office Minute (Ridsdale), 19 February 1953, A 15212/96, PRO, FO 371.

¹⁰⁸ Foreign Office to Embassy in Buenos Aires, 23 February 1953, no. 93, [A 15212/97], PRO, FO 371.

¹⁰⁹ *The Times*, 21 February 1953.

¹¹⁰ *The Times*, 23 February 1953.

¹¹¹ Embassy in Buenos Aires (Mack) to Foreign Office, 20 February 1953, no. 85, A 15212/86; Foreign Office Minute (Stirling), 21 February 1953, A 15212/121; Embassy in Santiago (Stirling) to Foreign Office, 21 February 1953, no. 36, A 15212/90, PRO, FO 371.

¹¹² *The New York Times*, 24 February 1953.

¹¹³ Embassy in Santiago (Stirling) to Foreign Secretary (Eden), 6 March 1953, A 15212/159, PRO, FO 371.

that,¹¹⁴ yet the weather failed to deter their own maneuvers. Chile transferred aircraft from the southern city of Punta Arenas to Ushuaia, Argentina, in preparation for a counterstrike which was to be disavowed unless successful. Meanwhile reconnaissance flights attempted to monitor *Snipe* and its contingent of thirty-two marines.¹¹⁵ The Foreign Office, duly informed of this, warned that any strike would incur casualties,¹¹⁶ as British troops had been ordered to fire against a raiding party.¹¹⁷ Some intelligence reports held that the Latin Americans were losing their resolve; others held that they had chosen a date in mid-March for the joint maneuver.¹¹⁸ On some level British officials might have longed for another encounter, if only because they believed that they were likely to triumph.¹¹⁹

The month of March passed without open hostilities or new prospects for mediation. U.S. officials discouraged Britain's serious reconsideration of involving the Organization of American States rather than the International Court of Justice. The Department of State believed that this alternative would only embarrass Britain and stoke Latin American resentment toward the United States. It urged Britain to negotiate directly with Chile and Argentina,¹²⁰ yet the feasibility of this could hardly be taken for granted. Perturbed by Britain's opposition to reconstructing the Chilean base, Foreign Minister Olavarria issued a scathing denunciation which afforded no

¹¹⁴ Embassy in Santiago (Bowers) to Secretary of State, 24 February 1953, no. 348, control 9664, NARA, RG 59, 702.022; *The Times*, 26 March 1953.

¹¹⁵ Royal Navy, Commander-in-Chief, Atlantic and West Indies, to Admiralty, 6 March 1953, A15212/155g; Embassy in Santiago (Stirling) to Foreign Office, 24 February 1953, no. 44, A 15212/110, PRO, FO 371.

¹¹⁶ Foreign Office to Embassy in Santiago, 26 February 1953, no. 49, [A 15212/110], PRO, FO 371.

¹¹⁷ Foreign Office Minute (Garvey), 2 March 1953, A 15212/138, PRO, FO 371.

¹¹⁸ Embassy in Santiago (Sterling) to Foreign Office, 28 February 1953, no. 46, A 15212/127; Embassy in Buenos Aires (Mack) to Foreign Office, 2 March 1953, no. 94, A 15212/129, PRO, FO 371.

¹¹⁹ Minister of Defence (Alexander) to Prime Minister, 2 March 1953, A 15212/146, PRO, FO 371.

¹²⁰ Embassy in Santiago (Stirling) to Assistant Undersecretary of State (Barclay), 19 March 1953, A 15212/190; Embassy in Washington (Makins) to Foreign Office, 10 April 1953, no. 308, A 15212/211, PRO, FO 371; Embassy in Santiago (Bowers) to Secretary of State (Dulles), 2 April 1953, no. 728, control 738; Secretary of State to Embassy in Santiago, 3 April 1953, NARA, RG 59, 702.022.

room for retreat.¹²¹ The Chilean congress, armed forces, and public rallied behind his call to defend the nation's rights at all costs, including war with Britain.¹²² President Ibáñez and his cabinet, on the other hand, ignored that kind of appeal since any war with Britain would invite defeat. Olavarria dutifully—and somewhat apologetically—heeded the expectation for him to resign.¹²³

Later in the year Chile and the United States concluded a draft agreement for an overall settlement, but withheld it for several reasons. Argentina no longer seemed receptive to U.S. or British involvement,¹²⁴ and the Deception Island episode had displaced hope for any form of multilateral cooperation.¹²⁵ The diplomatic storm gradually receded as there were no further incidents or viable prospects for an overall resolution. In October 1954 the United States announced its preparation of a major expedition the following season, the scale of which exceeded the Department of Defense's original plan.¹²⁶ Domestic journalists lamented that the South Pole appeared to be drawing the attention of individuals who thought in terms of "jet bombers and intercontinental missiles."¹²⁷ British officials were not immune to that concern, but neither could they believe the reports by their own journalists that the United States sought to conduct nuclear tests in Antarctica. That seemed anathema to the forthcoming 1957–1958 International Geophysical Year (IGY) which was to unite

¹²¹ Foreign Office Minute (Garvey), 30 March 1953, A 15212/195, PRO, FO 371.

¹²² Embassy in Santiago (Bowers) to Secretary of State, 31 March 1953, no. 410, control 10818; Embassy in Santiago (Bowers) to Secretary of State, 1 April 1953, no. 415, control 308, NARA, RG 59, 702.022.

¹²³ Embassy in Santiago (Stirling) to Foreign Office, 2 April 1953, no. 63, A 15212/203, PRO, FO 371; Embassy in Santiago (Bowers) to Secretary of State, 4 April 1953, no. 419, control 1371, NARA, RG 59, 702.022.

¹²⁴ Department of State, Office of South American Affairs (Barall) to Office of American Republic Affairs (Woodward), 19 August 1953, NARA, RG 59, 702.022.

¹²⁵ Ambassador in Santiago (Bowers) to Secretary of State, 24 February 1953, no. 348, control 9664, RG 59, 702.022.

¹²⁶ *The New York Times*, 3 October 1954, 23 October 1954.

¹²⁷ *The New York Times*, 5 October 1954.

36 nations to advance humankind's knowledge of the planet.¹²⁸ British officials determined it was only prudent to inquire about the rumors, and they received the unequivocal denial which they had expected.¹²⁹

The Foreign Office still resented the departure of *Atka*, in preparation for the first Operation Deep Freeze, since the vessel would delve into the peninsular region and thereby violate British sovereignty. From the Southern Cone nations, the British expected as much, but not from the United States whose earlier internationalization plan they, unlike officials in the other claimant nations, had accepted for basis for discussion.¹³⁰ U.S. officials had not informed them of the vessel's destination before it was publicly announced. The British had not lobbied actively for U.S. recognition of their territorial rights, but they had expected a token of respect. For example, they might have replied to a visa request by issuing an invitation, bypassing the need for paperwork which might later be claimed to hold legal implications. This grievance heightened their sense that Washington was concealing or misrepresenting essential aspects of its Antarctic policy.¹³¹

Months later the British received a further indication of U.S. duplicity or vicissitude or both. The North Americans held that they had not yet delineated their territorial claim, but it would soon be forthcoming and likely exceed the draft claims previously under discussion. This foreshadowed a U.S. claim beyond the uncontested sector, 90° to 150° West, into the British sector, 20° to 80° West. *Atka*'s disregard for the polar remnants of the British empire would have been trivial compared to that scenario—which also would have infuriated the Southern Cone nations whose joint

¹²⁸ *The New York Times*, 11 December 1954.

¹²⁹ Foreign Office Minute, 28 October 1954, A 15214/24; Foreign Office Minute, 12 November 1954, A 15214/30E, PRO, FO 371.

¹³⁰ The United States devised its 1948 internationalization proposal in consultation with the British, who accepted it in principle except for its call for the renunciation of sovereignty. Secretary of State (Marshall) to Embassy in London, 16 July 1948, NARA, RG 59, 800.014.

¹³¹ *Time*, 29 March 1954.

sector extended from 25° to 90° West. Prime Minister Anthony Eden was keenly aware of the irony that the two superpowers held the greatest influence over the future of Antarctica, yet neither one had chosen to formalize its claim, leaving the other nations in a state of apprehension.¹³²

As the Foreign Office suspected, the Department of State viewed U.S. participation in the IGY as a means of bolstering the nation's prestige and the effectiveness of its Cold War propaganda.¹³³ The reticence of British officials toward these objectives only pertained to infringements upon their sovereignty. The larger issue was monitoring Soviet intentions to prevent the spread of communism to the bottom of the world. The indecisiveness of U.S. policy was not helpful in this regard. While pondering the least controversial way to modify the non-claimant, non-recognition policy, the Department of State instructed its representatives to report any information of Soviet plans for an expedition.¹³⁴ It happened that no such information became available prior to its public announcement in December 1955.¹³⁵ An earlier indication would have been preferred, but it most likely would have had no effect. U.S. policy had remained passive for years, despite earlier predictions that the IGY would have the effect of ushering the Soviets into Antarctica.¹³⁶

Increasingly urgent circumstances failed to mend divisions within the U.S. government. The Department of Defense prudently sought to avoid new military commitments. Accordingly it wished to postpone a sovereignty claim until further investigation might clarify Antarctica's strategic and economic value. The

¹³² Embassy in London (Zimmerman) to Department of State, 10 November 1955, no. 1068, NARA, RG 59, 702.022.

¹³³ Undersecretary of State (Hoover) to Deputy Undersecretary of State (Murphy), 23 April 1955, NARA, RG 59, 399.829; Foreign Office Minute, 15 July 1955, PRO, FO 371.

¹³⁴ Acting Secretary of State (Hoover) to Acting Secretary of Defense (Robertson), 7 November 1955, NARA, RG 59, 702.022.

¹³⁵ See National Security Council, NSC 5528, Antarctica, 12 December 1955, NARA, RG 59, Records of Policy Planning Staff.

¹³⁶ Department of State, Office of Intelligence Research (Boggs) to Bureau of British Commonwealth and Northern European Affairs (Ronhovde), 12 June 1953, NARA, RG 59, 702.022.

Department of State, on the other hand, believed that the upcoming IGY substantiated the region's worth, and continued avoidance to state U.S. rights would cause them to erode.¹³⁷ Both viewpoints were intrinsically logical. Their divergence reflected defense officials' concern about the link between territorial disputes and war, and the focus of their diplomatic colleagues on possible benefits. Government declarations falsely implied that the White House had accepted the Department of State's perspective. For example, one official told journalists that a forthcoming U.S. claim would envelop over half the continent.¹³⁸

In May 1957, one month before the IGY commenced, the Department of State reconsidered pursuing an agreement with the seven claimant nations. This hearkened back to the Escudero Plan with which Chile had responded to the first U.S. proposal for internationalization. Previous bilateral negotiations for such an agreement, to be facilitated by temporarily neglecting the sovereignty dispute, had stalled after the Deception Island incident. They had remained dormant as the IGY approached, bringing with it a new, more complex set of variables. All that had been left unchanged was a common desire to exclude the Soviet Union.¹³⁹ The United States addressed this by engaging in clandestine discussions with Australia, Britain and New Zealand. All involved officials appreciated that, if exposed, their talks might seriously disrupt cooperation with the IGY nations.¹⁴⁰ In their perspective that risk was necessary to ensure that the English-speaking nations would have a dominant role in whatever larger negotiations might follow.¹⁴¹

¹³⁷ Department of State, Bureau of British Commonwealth and Northern European Affairs (Raynor) to Bureau of European Affairs, 29 April 1955, NARA, RG 59, 702.022.

¹³⁸ Embassy in Canberra (Emmons) to Department of State, 19 March 1956, NARA, RG 59, 702.022.

¹³⁹ Department of State, Bureau of International Organisation Affairs (Wilcox) to Bureau of Inter-American Affairs et al., 13 May 1957, NARA, RG 59, 702.022.

¹⁴⁰ Secretary of State (Dulles) to Embassies in London, Canberra and Wellington, 14 September 1957, NARA, RG 59, 702.022.

¹⁴¹ Embassy in London (Whitney) to Secretary of State, 20 May 1958, no. 6680, control 13652, NARA, RG 59, 702.022.

Years earlier it had been revealed that the Department of State was informing the British of its ostensibly confidential negotiations with Chile. The Chilean Embassy in Washington had brought this to the attention of U.S. officials,¹⁴² who surprisingly did not reconsider the wisdom of clandestine negotiations, the disclosure of which undermined their quest for prestige. The Department of State nonetheless supported taking that risk.¹⁴³ When the press revealed that Britain was holding secret talks with Australia and New Zealand, the Foreign Office admitted that the negotiations were taking place and successfully concealed U.S. involvement in them. Otherwise, it was feared that Chile might have refused to join any international agreement.¹⁴⁴

The only understanding reached at the four-power talks, where dissent persisted over the Soviet Union, was that no resolution would be possible without U.S. approval.¹⁴⁵ While this seemed to be ideal for Washington, it had not determined the course of its own policy. The Department of State repeated its plea to forward rights over the unclaimed sector,¹⁴⁶ and the Department of Defense continued to dissent. President Dwight D. Eisenhower merely amplified U.S. devotion to the cooperative spirit of the IGY. A more pertinent development, which relieved Anglo-American strategists, was that the Southern Cone nations had not increased

¹⁴² Department of State, Memorandum of Conversation, Office of South American Affairs (Barall) et al., 5 March 1951, NARA, RG 59, 702.022.

¹⁴³ Department of State, Office of Deputy Undersecretary of State (Daniels) to Secretary of State, 13 November 1957, NARA, RG 59, 702.022.

¹⁴⁴ Embassy in Santiago (Zook) to Department of State, 13 February 1958, no. 804, NARA, RG 59, 702.022.

¹⁴⁵ Department of State, Memorandum of Conversation, Office of Inter-American Regional Political Affairs (Wilson), 3 October 1957, NARA, RG 59, 399.829; Embassy in Washington (Caccia) to Foreign Office, 14 March 1958, no. 602, A 15214/73, PRO, FO 371.

¹⁴⁶ Deputy Undersecretary of State (Daniels) to Secretary of State, 9 December 1957, NARA, RG 59, 702.022.

their Antarctic operations. Their nationalistic sentiment had been limited to declarations, which neither British nor U.S. officials deemed intolerable.¹⁴⁷

Frustrated by the tension between its anticommunism and the non-claimant policy, the United States opted for greater ideological flexibility. Its declaration of rights over the unclaimed sector would have reduced anxiety among the claimant nations only if accompanied by the forfeiture of its rights over the rest of the continent. The Departments of State and Defense held many incompatible perspectives, but agreed that the White House should not entertain that kind of forfeiture. Once announced, a U.S. claim should have the possibility to expand, they believed, and this dictated the reservation of all rights. Such insistence might have been discarded to forge an eight-power arrangement, but now it seemed useful in guarding against a Soviet claim. The reservation of rights was also more expedient than becoming involved with territorial disputes. For these and other reasons, U.S. opposition to excluding the USSR began to wither.¹⁴⁸

In March 1958 the Department of State completed a draft proposal which extended the Escudero Plan's political status quo moratorium indefinitely, rather than for a five- to ten-year period as originally intended. U.S. officials viewed this as the most expedient manner in which to pursue a twelve-power agreement, and accordingly stopped repeating their denial of other nations' rights. The previous pattern had burdened diplomatic relations, especially with the Southern Cone nation, and this was not compatible with the spirit of the IGY. With the least encouragement,

¹⁴⁷ Embassy in Santiago (Sanders) to Department of State, 20 June 1955, no. 947; Embassy in Santiago (Corrigan) to Department of State, 19 April 1956, no. 784, NARA, RG 59, 702.022; Embassy in Buenos Aires (Evans) to Foreign Office (Lloyd), 8 May 1956, no. 120, A 15213/8; British Naval Attaché in Buenos Aires to Director of Naval Intelligence, 16 November 1956, ARG.10207/598/56-85, PRO, FO 371.

¹⁴⁸ See Department of State, Bureau of British Commonwealth and Northern European Affairs (Lister) to Bureau of European Affairs (Jones), 3 June 1957, NARA, RG 59, 702.022; Foreign Office, American Department, Record of Discussion between British Prime Minister (Macmillan) and New Zealand Prime Minister (Nash), 23 January 1958, A 15214/82, PRO, FO 371.

Latin Americans seemed likely to rally in defense of their Antarctic rights. Worse, from the U.S. perspective, they could be expected to demand implementation of the Rio Treaty's hemispheric defense provisions. Secretary of State John Foster Dulles therefore instructed U.S. representatives to decline any comment on the issue.¹⁴⁹

Weeks later the North Americans circulated their proposal. The Soviet Union, they believed, was drafting its own proposal either for distribution to the IGY nations or to be brought before the UN General Assembly. The latter alternative was more repugnant for U.S. officials since it would have more severely curtailed their influence. The former alternative was also to be eschewed since it would have permitted the Soviet Union to steal the publicity which both superpowers desired.¹⁵⁰ While the Foreign Office did not question the legitimacy of such concerns, it had expected but not received any notification of the U.S. timetable. That expectation had seemed reasonable as British officials had convinced the United States to include the Soviet Union.¹⁵¹ As great as their influence had been in this regard, it had not offset the exasperating unilateral bent of North American diplomacy.

Chile's reaction to the U.S. proposal was less negative than its reaction to the secret four-power negotiations would have been, but neither was it uniformly positive. The Foreign Affairs Ministry drafted a lengthy message dwelling on Article 2, Clause 7 of the UN Charter which forbade intervention in the internal affairs of states. It insisted that this article was applicable to the Chilean Antarctic, over which

¹⁴⁹ See Embassy in Buenos Aires (O'Connor) to Department of State, 23 January 1958, no. 1089; Embassy in Santiago (Zook) to Department of State, 17 February 1958, no. 821; Secretary of State (Dulles) to Embassies in the American Republics, 27 February 1958, CA-7365, Confidential 2286, NARA, RG 59, 702.022.

¹⁵⁰ Department of State, Aide Memoir to Representatives of Argentina, Australia, Belgium, Chile, France, Japan, Norway, New Zealand, South Africa, USSR, and United Kingdom, 24 March 1958; Department of State, Bureau of International Organisation Affairs (Walmsley) to Office of Deputy Undersecretary of State (Daniels), 21 March 1958; Department of State, Bureau of Inter-American Affairs (Rubottom) to Secretary of State, 4 April 1958, NARA, RG 59, 702.022.

¹⁵¹ Foreign Office (Hankey) to Embassy in Buenos Aires, 28 March 1958, no. 86, A 15214/84; Foreign Office Minute, 9 September 1958, A 1527/34, PRO, FO 371.

the government had extended sovereignty nearly two decades earlier. The message proceeded to insist that the Rio Treaty would need to be revisited at the proposed Antarctic conference. Though not encouraged by the tone of the message, the Department of State was satisfied that it had revealed a grudging willingness to participate in an international forum.¹⁵²

All of the IGY nations accepted the principle of a conference and joined preliminary negotiations in Washington. These negotiations progressed far more laboriously than anticipated, and often seemed on the verge of dissolving for ideological reasons guised as technical disputes. Contrary to North American prophecies, Soviet involvement did not account for the only or most central difficulty.¹⁵³ None of the participants was certain if the United States would reverse its non-claimant policy, how Moscow might respond in that case, and whether twelve-power negotiations would be left with any reason to continue. The Department of State still had not ruled out the possibility of a claim, but ongoing disagreement within the U.S. government had the effect of reinforcing the non-claimant stance.¹⁵⁴ The most serious threat to the negotiations arose from India's threat to involve the General Assembly in determining Antarctica's future.

While the United States wished to prevent Antarctica from being placed under UN jurisdiction, General Assembly discussions might not have led to that result. India was believed to have no interest in seeking a trusteeship or establishing a presence on the continent. Rather its motivation related to fears that the continent would be militarized by the United States. The Department of State was distraught by

¹⁵² Embassy in Santiago (Belton) to Department of State, 15 May 1958, no. 767, control 9541, NARA, RG 59, 399.829; Embassy in Buenos Aires to Foreign Office, American Department, 16 May 1958, A 15214/130, PRO, FO 371.

¹⁵³ For example, Department of State, Bureau of European Affairs (Kohler) to Office of Deputy Undersecretary of State (Daniels), 21 April 1959, NARA, RG 59, 399.829.

¹⁵⁴ Jason Kendall Moore, "A 'Sort' of Self-Denial: United States Policy toward the Antarctic, 1950–1959," *Polar Record* 37 (2001): 14–27.

ongoing rumors to this effect, as well as the prospect that UN involvement might prompt the Southern Cone nations to table a proposal forcing the resolution of territorial disputes. As this would have capsized the Escudero Plan and invited unforeseen consequences, Chile stridently opposed involving the General Assembly while the United States remained silent. Only after it threatened to abandon the twelve-power negotiations did Washington choose to oppose the initiative and to exert due pressure for it to be withdrawn.¹⁵⁵

The Foreign Office regarded cooperation with the Southern Cone nations as essential as they were among the IGY nations most leery of internationalization. Chile, despite its recent stance, shared India's concern about U.S. motivations while the Britain had lost faith in Washington's ability to spread goodwill within the Western Hemisphere.¹⁵⁶ In September 1958 the two nations entered into negotiations with Argentina to establish their own agreement, either to function within the context of an overall agreement or independently if necessary. Chilean officials expressed doubts about its feasibility, but the Foreign Office remained optimistic as it now viewed them as both reasonable and cooperative.¹⁵⁷ The Argentines, whom it viewed as both less reasonable and less cooperative, happened to be more responsive to the idea. They viewed it as a means of resisting North American intervention,¹⁵⁸ which had become a more practical objective than winning U.S. support against British colonialism in the Falkland Island Dependencies.

¹⁵⁵ Department of State, Bureau of British Commonwealth and Northern European Affairs, Memorandum of Conversation, 12 March 1956; Department of State, Memorandum of Conversation, Office of United Nations Political and Security Affairs (Horsey) et al., 5 March 1956, NARA, RG 59, 702.022; Secretary of State (Dulles) to Embassy in New Delhi, 11 June 1958, NARA RG 59, 399.829; Foreign Office Minute, 26 June 1956, A 15218/68, PRO, FO 371.

¹⁵⁶ See Foreign Office Minute, 9 September 1958, A 15227/34, PRO, FO 371.

¹⁵⁷ Foreign Office Minute, 2 September 1958, A 15228/5, PRO, FO 371.

¹⁵⁸ Foreign Office (Hildyard) to Embassy in Washington (Muirhead), 12 September 1958, A 15228/6, 12 September 1958, A 15228/6, PRO, FO 371.

The budding coalition of former rivals quickly met a setback. The U.S. representative to the twelve-power negotiations called for expanding the three-power arrangement into a quadripartite scheme.¹⁵⁹ The British and Latin American representatives believed that Washington had no legitimate rights in the peninsular region, whether it was called Graham Land, Tierra O'Higgins or Tierra San Martin, in tribute to their own explorers. While they would remain divided over which term was most appropriate, they agreed that there was no basis for referring to it as Palmer Land, in reference to the nineteenth-century U.S. whaler alternately credited with discovering the region. Displeased by this turn of events, which had occurred when the trilateral negotiations were showing promise, a British official bemoaned that the United States appeared ready to foil any solution pursued without its direct involvement.¹⁶⁰

Meanwhile the general negotiations continued unimpeded since most delegations were unaware of various sub-negotiations.¹⁶¹ This is not to depict the negotiations as exceptionally productive or productive at all. They were so much to the contrary that speculation arose of the United States having lost enthusiasm for its own proposal, as it had for the first internationalization proposal.¹⁶² That speculation coincided with rumors that a large U.S. claim was in the offing, regardless of its effect on internationalization.¹⁶³ With resolve, if not enthusiasm, the White House abstained from that path to ensure full attendance at the conference it planned to host

¹⁵⁹ Embassy in Washington (Caccia) to Foreign Office, 10 September 1958, no. 2465, A 15228/9, PRO, FO 371.

¹⁶⁰ See Embassy in Washington (Muirhead) to Foreign Office, 1 October 1958, A 15228/16; Foreign Office to Embassy in Washington (Hood), 26 September 1958, AS 15228/14, PRO, FO 371.

¹⁶¹ See Embassy in Washington (Muirhead) to Foreign Office (Hankey), 24 April 1959, A 15214/105, PRO, FO 371.

¹⁶² Department of State, Memorandum of Conversation, Office of Inter-American Regional Political Affairs (Luboeansky) et al., 20 March 1959, NARA, RG 59, 399.829.

¹⁶³ See Embassy in Buenos Aires to Department of State, 3 November 1959, no. 693, NARA, RG 59, 399.829; *The New York Times*, 1 April 1959.

in October 1959. The preliminary meetings had not settled all contentious issues, such as how to interpret demilitarization, but neither had they disintegrated.

Twelve high-ranking delegations soon converged in Washington from every region of the world. Within weeks this impressive feat had to contend with signs that the rumors of a U.S. nuclear agenda were not fictitious. The Southern Hemisphere nations demanded a nuclear test ban, which the United States opposed, hoping that explosions might be deemed scientific rather than military in nature.¹⁶⁴ While Britain was not necessarily averse to gaining a new testing ground for its own weapons, the Southern Hemisphere nations refused to compromise. Instead they endorsed the unequivocal ban sponsored by the USSR, and the U.S. delegation finally yielded lest its Cold War rival seek to exploit a breakdown of the conference.¹⁶⁵ With that impediment removed, all parties signed the treaty in December 1959, and at last its ideals had gained a meaningful opportunity to flourish.

The Chancellor of Sweden once commented that reason played a much smaller role in governing the world than people generally assumed.¹⁶⁶ Three centuries later the United States, Britain, and Chile demonstrated the truth of his words by failing to secure their common objective to bar the Soviet Union. Many events discussed herein appear to explain this outcome, but its final significance must be judged unreasonable. To most of the world, ownership of the frozen continent held no significance, but for Britain, Chile, and Argentina—whose diplomatic role was negligible by comparison—it held significance comprehensible to ordinary citizens.

¹⁶⁴ U.S. Delegation to Antarctic Conference (Phleger), Memorandum for Deputy Undersecretary of State (Merchant), 17 November 1959, NARA, RG 59, 702.022; Embassy in Washington (Caccia) to Foreign Office, 5 November 1959, A 15214/294, PRO, FO 371.

¹⁶⁵ Embassy in Washington (Caccia) to Foreign Office, 7 November 1959, A 15214/292, PRO, FO 371.

¹⁶⁶ F.G. Bailey, *The Tactical Uses of Passion: An Essay on Power, Reason and Reality* (Ithaca, New York, 1983), 1, 11.

What the British wished to retain as a token of their decaying empire,¹⁶⁷ the South Americans valued for its economic potential and anti-colonial symbolism.¹⁶⁸ The years under consideration demonstrate that prejudices, misperceptions and intransigence can undermine the objectivity with which international affairs are conducted.¹⁶⁹

The desire of U.S. officials to appear neutral lacked either genuine neutrality or a reliable degree of bias. Since their discussions with Britain violated their pledge of confidentiality with Chile, they attempted first to conceal and then to deny their behavior, and neither effort proved successful. Between the *Nigeria* and Hope Bay incidents, the Chilean Embassy in Washington revealed knowledge of the Department of State's surreptitious approach. At the time that knowledge incurred disappointment but did not seriously effect U.S.–Chilean relations. After the Deception Island episode inspired threats of war and preparations for a counter-strike, Latin Americans throughout the Western Hemisphere denounced British colonialism as well as their Good Neighbor's benign neglect thereof. It was widely alleged that Washington must have approved of *Snipe's* agenda.¹⁷⁰ While the “damaging” transcripts which confirmed this were destroyed, U.S. neutrality remained highly unconvincing.¹⁷¹

From this standpoint the U.S. role was duplicitous, whereas from the British standpoint it was merely frustrating. Department of State press leaks were bothersome but did not impinge on the unique nature of Anglo–American relations,

¹⁶⁷ Dodds, “To Photograph the Antarctic.”

¹⁶⁸ Ambassador in Santiago (Bowers) to Secretary of State, 24 February 1948, no. 107, NARA, RG 59, 800.014.

¹⁶⁹ For similar conclusions, see David Cannadine, *How the British Saw Their Empire* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2001), xxi, 3; Eldon Kenworthy, *America/Americas: Myth in the Making of U.S. Policy toward Latin America* (University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1995), 18.

¹⁷⁰ Department of State, Memorandum of Conversation, Office of South American Affairs (Barall) et al., 5 March 1951, NARA, RG 59, 702.022.

¹⁷¹ Embassy in Washington (Beeley) to Foreign Office, American Department, 9 April 1953, A 15212/219, PRO, FO 371.

which Alexander DeConde defines in terms of shared culture, racial superiority, and global mission.¹⁷² U.S. and British officials shared pejorative attitudes toward Latin America. For example, they attributed the Southern Cone's activism to the "emotional and violent" Latin temperament.¹⁷³ Since British operations were equally strident, the perception of temperaments hinged on cultural perceptions.¹⁷⁴ Many U.S. officials involved with the Antarctic dispute, such as Ambassador Claude G. Bowers, were known for their contempt of Latin Americans.¹⁷⁵ Thomas Borstelmann notes that during these years Department of State officials internalized the prejudices of their era, most notably Secretary Dean Acheson whose disdain for Latin Americans extended to most non-Europeans,¹⁷⁶ whereas his successor, John Foster Dulles, was known to strike fear or loathing in the hearts of Europeans and non-Europeans alike.¹⁷⁷

Race and ideology were factors in the dispute over Antarctica, yet there is no conclusive evidence that they overwhelmed other factors, or that any specific factors were responsible for preventing a major escalation of the sovereignty dispute. The 1946–1959 era recast the ancient struggle between faith and reason as a struggle between pride and caution. Moreover it revealed that diplomacy had not evolved beyond the kind of intrigue capable of precipitating global conflict. According to Andrew Gyorgy, the parochialism of career diplomats had been replaced by the greater technical expertise and impartiality of professionals. Gyorgy believed that

¹⁷² Alexander DeConde, *Ethnicity, Race and American Foreign Policy* (Boston: Northeastern University Press, 1992).

¹⁷³ For example, Embassy in Santiago (Leche) to Foreign Secretary (Bevin), 11 February 1949, AS 1018/1011/9, PRO, FO 497; Embassy in Buenos Aires (Allen) to Foreign Secretary (Eden), 13 February 1952, A 15211/23, PRO, FO 371.

¹⁷⁴ See Cannadine, *How the British Saw their Empire*, xxi.

¹⁷⁵ Ambassador in Santiago (Leche) to Foreign Secretary (Bevin), 1 July 1949, AS 3535/1902/9, PRO, FO 497.

¹⁷⁶ Thomas Borstelmann, "Jim Crow's Coming Out: Race Relations and American Foreign Policy in the Truman Years," *Presidential Studies Quarterly* 29 (1999), 549-69.

¹⁷⁷ See chapter six.

international relations had begun to be based on open covenants, openly arrived at, the ideal championed by President Woodrow Wilson.¹⁷⁸ He did not mention the Antarctic Treaty perhaps because of its unique nature and relatively low significance for the North American public. He also might not have mentioned it because the preliminary negotiations were held in secret, and even the conference proceedings were anathema to Wilson's ideal.¹⁷⁹

U.S.–British–Chilean Antarctic relations suffered from a high degree of suspicion which extended to all parties involved in the negotiations which culminated in the 1959 treaty. The finally achieved ideals were substantial enough to convince many North American journalists that their officials had acted with vision and foresight.¹⁸⁰ While this assumption was inconsistent with many of the previously described events, the treaty encouraged selective memory. To emphasize the dichotomy between scientific and political cooperation would have been to question the harmonious spirit upon which the treaty's success depended. As such North American journalists did not explore why secrecy had been required to debate ideals cultivated for the good of humankind. They also ignored what had led Washington to abruptly imply its nuclear agenda after years of having denied it.¹⁸¹ The world at large was hesitant to contemplate that the Antarctic Treaty might be another Munich Agreement.

For quite different reasons, Britain and Chile were the two nations most likely to influence U.S. Antarctic policy and to limit the southward projection of U.S.

¹⁷⁸ Andrew Gyorgy, "International Relations: Concept and Application," in Saul Bernard Cohen, *Geography and Politics in a World Divided* (New York: Random House, 1963), 291-318.

¹⁷⁹ See Department of State, Bureau of British Commonwealth and Northern European Affairs (Lister) to Bureau of European Affairs (Jones), 3 June 1957, NARA, RG 59, 702.022; Paul C. Daniels, "The Antarctic Treaty," in Richard S. Lewis and Philip M. Smith, eds., *Frozen Future: A Prophetic Report from Antarctica* (New York: Quadrangle Books, 1973), 31-45.

¹⁸⁰ Jason Kendall Moore, "Bungled Publicity: Little America, Big America and the Rationale for Non-Claimancy, 1946–1961," *Polar Record* 40, no. 212 (2004): 19-30.

¹⁸¹ *The New York Times*, 3 March 1955. For reports of U.S. opposition to the nuclear test ban, see *The New York Times*, 26 November 1959, 28 November 1959.

dominance. Britain, aside from having defined much of its former colony's political and cultural identity, had become its most essential Cold War ally. Though Anglo-American unity began to falter in the Antarctic, it finally did adapt to the unique environment. U.S. receptiveness to a twelve-power agreement originated in Britain's determination that anti-colonial trends worldwide were undermining its Antarctic rights. The Foreign Office therefore saw greater advantage in gaining credit for promoting an international solution.¹⁸² With persistent encouragement, the United States would accept that rationale on its own terms, deciding that prestige was more valuable than any official delineation of rights might have been. The Chilean Escudero Plan thereby served as the *modus vivendi* for a general agreement, as well as for Anglo-American "pretensions," a term once used to disparage the Southern Cone nations' Antarctic rights.¹⁸³ As such the United States, Britain and Chile forged an alliance which, however mistrustful, bore substantial results.

The next chapter explores their non-Antarctic context of U.S.–British and U.S.–Chilean relations, which were united perhaps most of all by the prevalence of "anti-Yankee" sentiment in the smaller nations. To some degree this contributed to their willingness to ponder an Antarctic agreement which excluded the United States. Though Britain enjoyed much greater influence in world affairs than Chile did, neither nation was able to compete with "colossus of the north," as Latin Americans alternately referred to their Good Neighbor.

¹⁸² Royal Institute of International Affairs (Chatham House) to Foreign Office (Vincent), 16 November 1956, A 15238/2, PRO, FO 371.

¹⁸³ U.S. officials regarded the Southern Cone nations' Antarctic "pretensions" as disruptive to international cooperation. Embassy in Buenos Aires (O'Connor) to Department of State, 23 January 1958, no. 1089, NARA, RG 59, 702.022

4. U.S.–British and U.S.–Chilean Relations

The uncertainty which Britain and Chile shared in relation to U.S. Antarctic policy was characteristic of the other signatories of the 1959 treaty. It held greater significance as these two nations were directly involved in revising the first U.S. internationalization proposal to include the political status quo moratorium which served as the basis for the twelve-power negotiations. The Chilean Escudero Plan had outlined the political status quo moratorium which set aside the sovereignty dispute between the Southern Cone nations and Britain for up to a decade while less divisive aspects of an agreement were to be negotiated. As discussed in the previous chapter, the Department of State breached its pledge of confidentiality with the Chileans to seek British advice pertaining to the Escudero Plan. The department then tabled its second internationalization proposal without consulting beforehand with either nation, at which time British officials felt as perturbed as their Chilean counterparts had been as regards the U.S. breach of confidentiality.¹

This chapter analyses the general trends of U.S.–British and U.S.–Chilean relations which help to illuminate the three nations' interaction pertaining to the Antarctic. Britain and Chile valued their relations with the United States more than with each other, and their dispute over Antarctica generally did not imperil their mutual respect and cordiality.² The most important and dangerous exception was in

¹ See Jason Kendall Moore, "The Constructive Limits of Antarctic History, Yankee Imperialism and Chilean–Australian Relations through 1959," *Revista de Historia* 13–14 (2003–4): 173–78; Moore, "Frontier Mentalities and Perceptual Trends in U.S.–Chilean Antarctic Relations through 1959," *Estudios Norteamericanos* 3, no. 2 (2003): 69–80.

² During the late 1940s their notes of protest in relation to each other's Antarctic presence were written and exchanged in a cordial manner. The cordiality might have been "skin deep" as many officials believed, but Chileans retained a high degree of respect for Britain in general. See Embassy in Santiago (Leche) to Foreign Secretary (Bevin), 16 November 1948, AS 6418/3/9; Embassy in Santiago (Leche) to Foreign Secretary (Bevin), 11 February 1949, AS 1018/1011/9, PRO, FO 497. The extent to which Chile and Britain valued their relations with the United States more than with each other, or any other nation, can be measured in terms of dependency. While a formal "theory" of dependency did not

early 1953 when the Chilean foreign minister threatened war in response to the British attack on Deception Island in the South Orkneys. After it became clear that his threat would not be carried through, British–Chilean relations began to mend while anti-U.S. sentiment persisted in both nations. The terms of U.S. financial assistance were the major source of malcontent, yet their officials also resented U.S. interference in their negotiations for a trilateral Antarctic agreement, including Argentina, in case the second internationalization proposal were to fail.³

The Soviet Union's presence at the Antarctic Conference of 1959 encouraged the "free world" nations to set aside questions of ideology as well as of sovereignty. U.S. officials sought to discourage the USSR from provoking a dissolution of the conference as might have permitted it a new means of gaining support among the developing nations of the world. If their own clandestine negotiations with Australia, Britain and New Zealand, and later with Argentina, Britain, Chile and had been discovered, it is unlikely that Soviet officials would have refrained from a major publicity campaign detrimental to the future of Antarctica.⁴ The United States had sufficient difficulty generating favorable publicity among its allies. The exasperation of British and Chilean officials regarding its intervention in their Antarctic discussions paralleled their desire to act independently of it in other arenas.⁵ Former British Minister of Labor Aneurin Bevan summarized the issue in terms of "American dollars being pushed into pockets from which the bottoms had been cut by American policies."⁶

emerge in Latin America until the 1960s, its Marxist-oriented assumptions were commonplace in the preceding decades. See Louis A. Pérez, Jr., "Dependency," *Journal of American History* 77 (1990): 133–42.

³ See chapter three.

⁴ See Moore, "The Constructive Limits of Antarctic History," 174.

⁵ See Elizabeth Barker, *The British between the Superpowers, 1945–50* (London: The Macmillan Press Ltd., 1983), 231–33.

⁶ Aneurin Bevan, "Britain and America at Loggerheads," *Foreign Affairs* 36, no. 1 (1957): 60–67.

The administration of Harry S. Truman viewed its assistance to Britain and Chile as both magnanimous and imperative to limit the spread of communism. During the Berlin blockade of 1948–1949 Britain began to assume leadership of the pro-U.S. bloc of Europe while the Chilean government demonstrated the eagerness, though not the ability, to do so in Latin America.⁷ The administration of Dwight D. Eisenhower faced new challenges, in Britain related to the Anglo–French invasion of the Suez Canal, and in Chile related to the election of a former National Socialist as president. These challenges were formidable though not insurmountable. They receded in the wake of the Soviet launch of the world’s first satellite and the Chilean government’s unwillingness to act upon threats to nationalize U.S. copper companies. British and Chilean officials tempered their south polar nationalism while remaining concerned that the United States might reverse its non-claimant policy or otherwise contribute to a breakdown of the negotiations which produced the Antarctic Treaty.⁸

The British approach to the Soviet Union was more accommodating than that of the United States, and for most of the period under consideration the same was true of the Chilean approach.⁹ British officials were in a position to counsel U.S. restraint during events such as the Korean War and Berlin crises which held the risk of instigating a global conflict. Chilean officials enjoyed no such opportunity but shared the British desire to prevent Washington from acting upon its confrontational rhetoric,

⁷ The policies of the 1946–1952 Gonzalez Videla administration were in some ways more anticommunist than U.S. policies, whereas the 1952–1958 Ibañez administration initially entertained—or threatened to entertain—a pro-Soviet alignment, as discussed hereafter. For reference to the British approach to the Soviet Union and the United States, see Geoffrey Warner, “From Ally to Enemy: Britain’s Relations with the Soviet Union, 1941–1948,” in Michael Dockrill and Brian McKercher, eds., *Diplomacy and World Power: Studies in British Foreign Policy, 1890–1950* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 221–43; Sean Greenwood, *Britain and the Cold War, 1945–1991* (London: Macmillan Press Ltd, 2000), 66; Coral Bell, *The Debatable Alliance: An Essay in Anglo-American Relations* (London: Oxford University Press, 1964), 10–14; Lionel Gelber, *The Alliance of Necessity: Britain’s Crisis, the New Europe and American Interests* (London: Robert Hale, Ltd., 1967), 32.

⁸ See chapter three.

⁹ See footnote seven.

most notably the doctrine of massive retaliation. The two sets of officials had no reason to imagine that the failure of the Antarctic Conference would precipitate a nuclear exchange. Neither did they possess unreserved faith in U.S. leadership in the world—not even as it extended to the far south. The success of the Antarctic Conference negated any need for the contingency plans briefly under discussion, but not their motivation. Many aspects of U.S. foreign and economic policy contributed to perceptions of “Yankee imperialism.”¹⁰

The Second World War left Britain in a far more precarious circumstance than the United States. Its infrastructure had been seriously damaged and its industry had plummeted, transforming it the world’s largest debtor nation.¹¹ In the process of staving off German aggression, it had depleted its resources while granting U.S. access to many of the foreign markets which it had previously dominated.¹² It had suffered nearly three times as many casualties, relative to its total population, and over that many fatalities.¹³ The prolongation of America’s wartime assistance seemed appropriate for these reasons and because, as Prime Minister Clement Attlee declared, the two nations exemplified “the moral precepts upon which our whole civilization is founded.”¹⁴ Truman’s decision to end the lend-lease program in late August 1945 was greeted with dismay, for it suggested that the United States failed to appreciate

¹⁰ The issue of “anti-Yankee” sentiment is discussed hereafter. It was less prevalent in Britain, though many authors suggest that it is the reason why the Anglo-American relations were not genuinely “special.” For example, John W. Young, *Winston Churchill’s Last Campaign: Britain and the Cold War 1951–1955* (Oxford: Carendon Press, 1996), 337.

¹¹ Paul Kennedy, *The Realities behind Diplomacy: Background Influences on British External Policy, 1865–1980* (London: Fontana Press, 1981), 317–18.

¹² Lloyd C. Gardner, *Architects of Illusion: Men and Ideas in American Foreign Policy 1941–1949* (Chicago: Quadrangle Books, 1970), 123.

¹³ John Biggs-Davidson, *The Uncertain Ally* (London: Christopher Johnson, 1957), 104–5.

¹⁴ World Peace Foundation, *DAFR 1945–1946* (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1948), 845.

the extent to which Britain had sacrificed for the Allied cause.¹⁵

Truman recognized the need to provide evidence to the contrary. Though opinion polls indicated that Americans felt no particular responsibility for the British financial crisis,¹⁶ he sought to preserve some form of the wartime alliance. As yet it remained possible that the Soviet Union might adhere to postwar agreements in a manner which both nations found satisfactory, and their own continuity of interests was less questionable. In December his administration offered to extend a \$3.75 billion loan which the British parliament approved despite concerns that the terms were both unfair and unsustainable. The U.S. Congress did likewise since it further eroded British trade protections and laid the basis for unity against the Soviet Union if that were to become necessary.¹⁷ Repayment issues would force both sides to make unpleasant concessions, yet the sustainability of the agreement revealed that the smaller nation preferred to link its future to the United States rather than Europe.¹⁸

Culture and language were among the most obvious factors which explained the Anglo–American bond. Another related to the nations’ cooperation in developing the atomic bomb which had hastened the Japanese surrender. The British role had been modest though crucial in London’s perspective, and officials hoped that the joint research effort would now be continued for the sake of producing a British weapon. A number of agreements had indicated that this would be possible. During the war the U.S. weapon had been prioritized since most of the nuclear physicists were either American or American-based, and Washington had been able to divert over \$2 billion

¹⁵ See John Baylis, *Anglo–American Defense Relations 1939–1984*, 2nd ed. (London: Macmillan Press, 1984), 29; Harry S. Truman, *Memoirs*, vol. 1, *Year of Decisions 1945* (Hodder and Soughton, Limited, 1955), 145.

¹⁶ Joyce Kolko and Gabriel Kolko, *The Limits of Power: The World and United States Foreign Policy, 1945–1954* (New York: Harper & Row Publishers, 1972), 63–69.

¹⁷ See Stephen E. Ambrose, *Rise to Globalism: American Foreign Policy since 1938* (London: The Penguin Press, 1971), 18; Thomas J. McCormick, *America’s Half-Century: United States Foreign Policy in the Cold War* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1989), 55–56.

¹⁸ See *SLA 1951* (London: Oxford University Press, 1954), 71–72.

to the project.¹⁹ In August 1946 the congress negated all previous commitments by passing the Atomic Energy Act which forbade the disclosure of secrets to any other nation.²⁰ John Baylis writes that, although most British were incensed by this development, some viewed it as beneficial in forcing them to rely upon their own ingenuity.²¹

Britain's status as a major power continued to erode in December when it discontinued aid to Greece and Turkey.²² Preserving its influence in the Mediterranean was no longer feasible as its economic crisis had persisted despite the U.S. loan. Officials contemplated that the Soviet Union might seek to fill the vacuum, but this did not appear imminent since it had also been devastated by the war and had started withdrawing troops from Eastern Europe, its most important sphere of influence.²³ Foreign Secretary Ernest Bevin announced that Britain sought a cooperative relationship with the USSR and renewed a bilateral treaty to that effect.²⁴ Truman took a less amenable position, urging congress to extend \$400 million in aid to Greece and Turkey to prevent them from becoming Soviet satellites. His dramatic speech outlined the need to contain communism and maintained that the British withdrawal had placed the "free world" in jeopardy. While some U.S. officials privately admitted that this was not so, they did not contest the nature of the president's appeal.²⁵

The U.S. loan quickly disappeared over the harsh winter of 1946–1947, and

¹⁹ See Peter Pringle and James Spiegelman, *The Nuclear Barons* (London: Michael Joseph, 1981), 32–34; Margaret Gowing, *Britain and Atomic Energy 1939–1945* (London: Macmillan & Co. Ltd., 1964), 177, 234.

²⁰ See Herbert Nicholas, *Britain and the USA* (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1963), 58–67; Margaret Gowing, *Interdependence and Deterrence: Britain and Atomic Energy 1945–1952*, vol. 1, *Policymaking* (London: The Macmillan Press, Ltd., 1974), 108, 111.

²¹ Baylis, *Anglo-American Defense Relations*, 33–34.

²² Barker, *The British between the Superpowers*, 76–79.

²³ Melvyn Leffler, "Strategy, Diplomacy and the Cold War: The United States, Turkey and NATO, 1945–1952," *Journal of American History* 71, no. 4 (1985): 807–25.

²⁴ Nicholas, *Britain and the USA*, 42–44.

²⁵ Leffler, "Strategy, Diplomacy and the Cold War," 808, 816.

the plummeting exchange rate further disadvantaged the British, reducing the total value by approximately one-quarter. The stipulated austerity measures could not be upheld without sacrificing the basic welfare services upon which many citizens depended.²⁶ The Truman administration appreciated the sources of British dissatisfaction relating to the terms of the agreement.²⁷ It consented to more flexible terms also to discredit Soviet allegations that its true objective was to place Britain in a subservient position. The revised terms included an assurance that there would be no further suspension of payments if disagreements were to arise. They sought to clarify that the United States regarded Britain as its foremost ally in the United Nations, in the struggle against communism and in every other arena.²⁸

In June 1947 congress approved the European Recovery Program which more effectively began to ameliorate Britain's circumstance and raise standards of living throughout the region.²⁹ It also prompted a re-evaluation of the nation's cooperative stance toward the Soviet Union, which had declined to be involved with program and instead developed its own to consolidate its influence in Eastern Europe.³⁰ This outcome had not disappointed the Truman administration since cooperating with the USSR would have been highly infeasible.³¹ The Marshall Plan, as the program was also known, had been designed to prevent communist exploitation of economic and social unrest. The offer to include it had been a diplomatic gesture which failed to

²⁶ See "The Anglo-American Loan Agreement," *The World Today* 2, no. 4 (1947): 141-44; "The Sterling Crisis," *The World Today* 8, no. 4 (1952): 140-48.

²⁷ *DIA 1947-1948* (London: Oxford University Press, 1952), 170-71; *FRUS 1947*, vol. 3, *The British Commonwealth; Europe* (Washington: USGPO, 1972), 1-3, 9-13.

²⁸ *FRUS 1947*, 3: 90-93.

²⁹ Melvyn P. Leffler, *A Preponderance of Power: National Security, the Truman Administration and the Cold War* (Stanford, California: Stanford University Press, 1992), 183; Gardner, *Architects of Illusion*, 135; Thomas Balough, "The Outlook for Britain," *Foreign Affairs* 26, no. 4 (1948): 665-81.

³⁰ Ronald E. Powaski, *The Cold War: The United States and the Soviet Union, 1917-1991* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1998), 74.

³¹ R.B. Manderson-Jones, *The Special Relationship: Anglo-American Relations and Western European Unity 1947-56* (London: Willmer Brothers Limited, 1972), 8-10.

halt the further partitioning of continent.³² When the Soviet Union warned Britain not to join the Marshall Plan, Bevin retorted that it would not be intimidated. This exchange helped to resolve any uncertainty of the need for Britain to assume leadership of the pro-U.S. bloc.³³

Developments in Palestine strained Anglo–American unity in the region which provided the petrol supplies essential for Britain and the overall success of the Marshall Plan. The seven-member Arab League expressed solidarity with the Palestinians whose territory had been placed under British control after the First World War, and who strenuously opposed the Zionist agenda to establish a Jewish state. British troops had difficulty preserving order as Jewish immigration steadily rose and Palestinian resistance mounted. The Truman administration urged London to liberalize its immigration quota while refusing to intervene against Jewish organizations which funded illegal voyages and paramilitary activities. While Bevin appreciated that many Jews sought to flee memories of the Holocaust, he profoundly resented U.S. willingness to condone their violence.³⁴

When the British mandate terminated in May 1948, the state of Israel declared independence and the Arab League upheld its pledge to intervene in defense of the Palestinians.³⁵ Truman immediately recognized Israel to the chagrin of the many of his advisors and the British whose troops were hastily withdrawing. His decision was in keeping with American public opinion as well as the strength of the Jewish

³² Daniel Yergin, *Shattered Peace: The Origins of the Cold War and the National Security State* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company 1977), 314-15; Thomas G. Paterson, "The Marshall Plan Revisited," in Thomas G. Paterson, ed., *The Origins of the Cold War* (Lexington, Massachusetts: D.C. Heath and Company, 1974), 167-74.

³³ Nicholas, *Britain and the USA*, 46-47.

³⁴ Kennedy, *The Realities behind Diplomacy*, 364-65; Jason Kendall Moore, "Destabilizing the Middle East: U.S. Policy toward Palestine, 1943–1949," *Journal of Church and State* 43, no. 1 (2001): 115-34.

³⁵ The Arab League had made this pledge upon its formation in February 1945. Moore, "Destabilizing the Middle East," 118.

lobby.³⁶ It seriously damaged U.S. prestige throughout the Middle East,³⁷ though less than if the arms embargo had been lifted in favor of the Israelis. In that case he appreciated that the British might do the same in favor of the Arabs, embroiling the two allies in a war by proxy. That scenario, contemplated by officials on either side of the Atlantic, failed to transpire given Israel's rapid success in the field. The U.S. stance had exasperated but not alienated the Britain; it had also helped to ensure that the Jewish state would align itself with the "free world."³⁸

Shortly after the outbreak of the Arab–Israeli war, the Soviet Union blockaded western access to Berlin. The discontinuity of U.S. and British interests in the Middle East was of less significance than the prospect of the USSR gaining control over the city, as might have precipitated much further Soviet expansion. David Dimbleby and David Reynolds credit Bevin with persuading Truman to avoid a military response in favor of staging an airlift, and thereafter with moderating his rhetoric since British experts believed that the Soviet Union did not seek war.³⁹ The foreign secretary also gained support for having sixty atomic-capable U.S. bombers stationed on British soil—despite receiving no authority over their use.⁴⁰ In August they were supplemented by thirty more bombers, and there was no question of Britain's role as the most essential base for the deployment of U.S. power.⁴¹ The Truman

³⁶ Thomas G. Paterson, *The Making of the Cold War* (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 1979), 107.

³⁷ See H.W. Brands, *Inside the Cold War: Loy Henderson and the Rise of the American Empire, 1918–1961* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1991), 191–92; Leffler, *A Preponderance of Power*, 239–42; Moore, "Destabilizing the Middle East," 130.

³⁸ John W. Young, *Cold War and Detente 1941–91* (London: Longman, 1993), 109–10. Britain's difficulties in Palestine at this time corresponded to its general weakness in world affairs. Francis Boyd, *British Politics in Transition 1945–1963: A Short Political Guide* (London: Pall Mall Press, 1964), 185–86.

³⁹ David Dimbleby and David Reynolds, *An Ocean Apart: The Relationship between Britain and America in the Twentieth Century* (London: Hodder & Stoughton, 1988), 177–78.

⁴⁰ Curtis Keeble, *Britain, the Soviet Union and Russia* (London: Macmillan Press Ltd, 2000), 223–25; Baylis, *Anglo–American Defense Relations*, 39–41. Bevin implored the House of Commons that appeasement was more dangerous than confronting the risk of war. *USWA 1948–1949* (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1949), 139.

⁴¹ Nicholas, *Britain and the USA*, 50–51.

administration wisely concealed that none of bombers had carried atomic weapons, and very few of them had been modified to do so.⁴²

The U.S. Ambassador in London, Lewis W. Douglas, informed the Department of State of “an undercurrent” of negativity toward the United States among British officials and citizens at large. The suspicious manner in which they often dealt with him—for political rather than personal reasons—had recently turned irritable as well. In his estimation this was due to their anxiety that the Truman administration might permit the Berlin blockade to unleash to a war which would ensure their own destruction, regardless of how the United States might fare.⁴³ Douglas empathized with the circumstance in which they found themselves. As never before they had to accept having little or no control over their security and economy, and nearly every day brought further evidence of their dependence on the United States. He encouraged the administration to deal with them as generously as possible, for he believed that circumstances rather mismanagement were to blame for their predicament, and that they fundamentally accepted the need for Anglo–American unity.⁴⁴

The Berlin blockade produced a standoff which transformed the city into a “heroic symbol of liberty” and appeared to united the “free world.”⁴⁵ The risk of military escalation had substantially decreased by April 1949, yet the United States

⁴² Gregg Herken, *The Winning Weapon: The Atomic Bomb in the Cold War, 1945–1950* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1980), 258.

⁴³ *FRUS* 1948, vol. 3, *Western Europe* (Washington: USGPO, 1974): 1113–17. The telegram mentioned fears that the Berlin blockade might lead to war. It did not elaborate that in such case Britain’s destruction would be assured. That opinion, however, was rife as the nation was a much closer target for the USSR. See Chester Wilmont, “Britain’s Strategic Relationship to Europe,” *International Affairs* 29, no. 4 (1953): 409–17.

⁴⁴ *FRUS* 1948, 3: 1113–17.

⁴⁵ Arnold J. Toynbee used the phrase “heroic symbol of liberty.” Quoted in John Patrick Diggins, *The Proud Decades: America in War and in Peace 1941–1960* (New York: W.W. Norton & Company 1988), 81. At the same time he refrained from glorifying either of the superpower’s ideology or role in world affairs. Instead he urged them to abandon their “semi-religious faith and fanaticism” and deal with their dispute in a practical manner. Arnold J. Toynbee, “The International Outlook,” *International Affairs* 23, no. 4 (1947): 463–76.

demonstrated the firmness of its resolve by signing the North Atlantic Treaty Organization with ten of its European allies and Canada. This decision would contribute to the formation of the Warsaw Pact and more immediately, as hoped, to ending the blockade. Elizabeth Barker writes that it also fulfilled Bevin's long-standing objective to harness U.S. military might to the defense of Western Europe.⁴⁶ In the less optimistic perspective of Sean Greenwood, it carried the Britain's economic subservience to the United States into the military realm.⁴⁷ Despite criticism to that effect from left-wing parliamentarians, the government faced no serious opposition to joining the military alliance.⁴⁸

The communist victory in China in January 1950 presented Britain with a dilemma. Its alignment with the United States was unmistakable, though its trade with China remained a high priority. As important, officials believed that China would necessarily remain allied with the Soviet Union, for Yugoslavia had recently distanced itself from Moscow to pursue its own form of communism. They chose to recognize the government of Mao Tse-tung in spite of U.S. opposition, proving their willingness to act independently of their senior ally in cases when the survival of the "free world" was not directly threatened.⁴⁹ Their own legacy of imperialism, though perhaps no more benevolent than that of the United States, was certainly more flexible. Paul Kennedy contrasts it with America's inexperience in world affairs and the ambitions stoked by its ascendancy in the postwar era. The British government accepted the often thankless responsibility of serving as a bridge between the United

⁴⁶ Barker, *The British between the Superpowers*, 145.

⁴⁷ Greenwood, *Britain and the Cold War*, 66.

⁴⁸ See R. Gerald Hughes, "'We Are Not Seeking Strength for its Own Sake': The British Labor Party, West Germany and the Cold War, 1951-64," *Cold War History* 3, no. 1 (2002): 67-94; H.C. Allen, *Great Britain and the United States: A History of Anglo-American Relations, 1783-1952* (London: Odhams Press Limited, 1954), 888; Anthony Eden, "Britain and the Modern World," *Foreign Affairs* 26, no. 1 (1947): 15-23.

⁴⁹ Barker, *The British between the Superpowers*, 169, 174.

States, Europe and, in this case, communist China.⁵⁰

After North Korean troops invaded the south in June 1950, Britain was among the nations which most heartily endorsed the war effort, and it provided the largest non-American contribution.⁵¹ The UN Security Council authorized a multinational force to be placed under the command of U.S. General Douglas Macarthur. Soviet officials protested that this was illegal, but their arguments failed to persuade non-communist nations to tolerate the North Korean aggression.⁵² U.S. and British military expenditures rose substantially to meet the demands of collective security.⁵³ Americans accepted the need for this with few reservations, whereas a large segment of the British public deemed it inappropriate as financing the war directly impinged upon their social programs. Numerous members of the government resigned in protest of this development which they viewed as anathema to their nation's socialist orientation.⁵⁴

In November the Chinese forces intervening on behalf of North Korea dealt a major setback to UN forces, and Truman issued a statement indicating that the atomic bomb might be used. General Macarthur had made it known that he favored this alternative despite the risk that it might lead to a general war with China and perhaps the Soviet Union as well.⁵⁵ While it was the president who retained final authority for any such decision, his words suggested that it might soon be granted. Over one hundred British parliamentarians sent a letter of protest to Prime Minister Clement

⁵⁰ See Arthur Bryant, "Factors underlying British Foreign Policy," *International Affairs* 22, no. 3 (1946): 338-51; Kennedy, *The Realities behind Diplomacy*, 333.

⁵¹ Michael F. Hopkins, "The Price of Cold War Partnership: Sir Oliver Franks and the British Military Commitment in the Korean War," *Cold War History* 1, no. 2 (2001): 28-46; Michael R. Gordon, *Conflict and Consensus in Labor's Foreign Policy, 1914-1965* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1969), 222-24; Harry S. Truman, *Memoirs*, vol. 2, *Years of Trial and Hope 1946-1953* (Hodder and Stoughton, Limited, 1955), 418-20.

⁵² Department of State, *United States Policy in the Korean Crisis* (Washington: USGPO, 1950), 66-68.

⁵³ See Anthony Eden, "Britain in World Strategy," *Foreign Affairs* 29, no. 3 (1951): 341-50.

⁵⁴ Greenwood, *Britain and the Cold War*, 100-1; *SIA* 1951: 72.

⁵⁵ See *FRUS* 1950, vol. 3, *Western Europe* (Washington: USGPO, 1977), 1698-1703, 1760.

Attlee,⁵⁶ who shared their unease about being drawn into a broader conflict. He promptly flew to Washington to consult with Truman but failed to obtain the desired assurance.⁵⁷ The president merely expressed hope that atomic weapons would not be necessary and pledged to keep the British “informed of developments which might bring about a change in the situation.”⁵⁸

Truman’s later dismissal of MacArthur helped to avoid the worst-case scenario without dispelling concerns that Britain’s alliance with the United States was fundamentally misguided. This issue had produced a schism within the Labor Party which contributed to the re-election of Winston Churchill as Prime Minister in October 1951.⁵⁹ As the Royal Institute of International Affairs observed, there were no major changes of policy. Churchill remained committed to the Korean War while seeking to ease tensions with the nation’s European allies, which like the many Laborites decried its obsequiousness to Washington.⁶⁰ He discounted allegations of this nature, instead seeking to revive the “grand alliance” of the Second World War. However, both the Truman administration and that of Dwight D. Eisenhower, who was elected the following November, responded tepidly to his overtures.⁶¹

The United States and its UN allies accepted a negotiated settlement to the Korean War in July 1953. The doctrine of containment had proved effective though not resoundingly triumphant, as the armistice re-established the original border along the thirty-eighth parallel.⁶² The same outcome might have been achieved years earlier

⁵⁶ Truman, *Memoirs* 2: 418-20.

⁵⁷ Young, *Winston Churchill’s Last Campaign*, 36.

⁵⁸ *FRUS* 1950, 3: 1787.

⁵⁹ Greenwood, *Britain and the Cold War*, 100-1.

⁶⁰ *SIA* 1951: 79-80.

⁶¹ Dimpleby and Reynolds, *An Ocean Apart*, 192. The Department of State observed that Anglo-American relations were in a “disturbing state of disrepair,” primarily due to a lack of confidence in U.S. leadership. *FRUS* 1952-1954, vol. 6, part 1, *Western Europe and Canada* (Washington: USGPO, 1986), 991-92, 997-99.

⁶² Robert Endicott Osgood, *Limited War: The Challenge to American Strategy* (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1957), 190. The Eisenhower administration adopted the rhetoric of

but for the Truman administration's reluctance to compromise, lest it be charged with appeasement.⁶³ In the United States, Senator Joe McCarthy had dwelled on that issue and generated concerns, articulated by former Prime Minister Clement Attlee and others, that he was more powerful than the executive branch. McCarthy indignantly retorted that "comrade Attlee" must secretly endorse communist plans for Korea.⁶⁴ This allegation bore similarity to one of Attlee's discussions with Truman in December 1950, which the Department of State recorded as suggesting that he "wished all of Korea to be governed by the North Koreans."⁶⁵

The Berlin blockade and Korean War had resulted not in peace but rather "a precarious balance, a crisis always short of catastrophe" as Daniel Yergin describes the Cold War.⁶⁶ These interludes had also failed to demonstrate that Britain warranted recognition as a world power or that the United States duly appreciated its contribution to securing mutual objectives. Ambassador Douglas predicted that the latter trend held the capacity to seriously undermine U.S. foreign policy.⁶⁷ Britain's explosion of an atomic weapon the previous year had suggested that a more equitable relationship might yet be achieved. It had developed the technology independently and in doing so established a degree of parity with the superpowers.⁶⁸ The Eisenhower administration had responded by successfully urging congress to liberalize the Atomic Energy Act of 1946 to permit the exchange of non-military

communist roll-back in place of containment. It proceeded to broadcast this theme even though the North Koreans had not been rolled back, and it did not support anti-communist uprisings in East Germany and Hungary, as mentioned in chapter two. See Kenneth Osgood, "Form before Substance: Eisenhower's Commitment to Psychological Warfare and Negotiations with the Enemy," *Diplomatic History* 24, no. 3 (2000): 405-33.

⁶³ See chapter six.

⁶⁴ *USWA* 1953 (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1955), 68.

⁶⁵ *FRUS* 1950, 3: 1711.

⁶⁶ Yergin, *Shattered Peace*, 392,

⁶⁷ *FRUS* 1952-1954, vol. 6, part 1, *Western Europe and Canada* (Washington: USGPO, 1986), 997-99.

⁶⁸ F.S. Northedge, *British Foreign Policy: The Process of Re-Adjustment 1945-1961* (London: George Allen & Unwin Ltd, 1962), 171; Gowing, *Interdependence and Deterrence* 1: 449-50.

information with Britain.⁶⁹

Britain hoped that the United States might be of assistance in July 1956 when Egyptian President Gamal Abdel Nasser nationalized the Suez Canal.⁷⁰ Instead the Eisenhower administration refrained from any appearance that it sought to re-establish the colonial presence which Nasser and many leaders of the developing world held responsible for their own difficulties. At the same time U.S. officials appreciated that the British economy could not be sustained without access to the region, and they shared British concerns as regards Nasser's receptiveness to the Soviet Union.⁷¹ They urged a diplomatic resolution to assure that Egypt would operate the canal in an efficient and fair manner.⁷² This moderate position evoked resentment throughout Western Europe, a region where U.S. leadership was designed to counter Soviet influence,⁷³ yet in this case the superpowers had set aside their differences, each seeking favorable publicity for taking an anti-colonial stance.⁷⁴

In October, as negotiations were failing to produce satisfactory results, Britain and France invaded the Suez Canal. They had not sought Washington's approval beforehand and promptly aborted plans to carry military operations beyond Port Said, lest the United States impose economic sanctions, as had been threatened in keeping with its support for a UN resolution condemning the invasion.⁷⁵ Secretary of State John Foster Dulles privately expressed disappointment that they had not proceeded to

⁶⁹ Nicholas, *Britain and the USA*, 67-79.

⁷⁰ *SIA* 1956-1958 (London: Oxford University Press, 1962), 41.

⁷¹ See Stephen Blackwell, "Pursuing Nasser: The Macmillan Government and the Management of British Policy towards the Middle East Cold War, 1957-63," *Cold War History* 4, no. 3 (2004): 85-104.

⁷² *FRUS* 1955-1957, vol. 16, *Suez Crisis July 26-December 31, 1956* (Washington: USGPO, 1990), 46-47, 100-2, 126-27.

⁷³ *FRUS* 1955-1957, 16: 922-24; *USWA* 1956 (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1957), 270.

⁷⁴ *SIA* 1956-58: 70-71.

⁷⁵ Biggs-Davidson, *The Uncertain Ally*, 187-90; Baylis, *Anglo-American Defense Relations 1939-1984*, 73; Boyd, *British Politics in Transition*, 187.

overthrow the Egyptian government.⁷⁶ The Eisenhower administration had considered that objective but refrained since it would have further damaged U.S. prestige in the Arab world.⁷⁷ However, Dulles believed that by overthrowing Nasser the British and French would not have damaged their credibility much more than they already had, and he regretted that it was unwise for his government to publicly defend them.⁷⁸ Harold Macmillan, the new British prime minister, suggested that Americans might respond differently if their own empire were in a state of demise.⁷⁹

The Suez crisis produced the most serious rupture in Anglo–American relations in the twentieth century. It demonstrated that Britain relied so heavily on the United States that it was unable to assert itself even in the developing world.⁸⁰ Most citizens viewed the government’s decision to withdraw troops as a source of national humiliation, and the press exhibited an unprecedented degree of hostility toward the United States. Macmillan, despite his exasperation with U.S. policy, sought opportunities for reconciliation. In March 1957 he met with Eisenhower in Bermuda to discuss the deployment of U.S. nuclear missiles in Britain.⁸¹ The monumental nature of that agreement was surpassed later in the year when the Soviet Union launched the world’s first satellite, indicating that it possessed the technology for longer-range missiles than currently in the U.S. arsenal. This danger reinvigorated the Anglo–American alliance, leading to an agreement which established the unfettered

⁷⁶ Townsend Hoopes, *The Devil and John Foster Dulles* (Boston: Little Brown and Company, 1973), 381.

⁷⁷ Dimbleby and Reynolds, *An Ocean Apart*, 214–16.

⁷⁸ See *FRUS 1955–1957*, vol. 16, *Suez Crisis July 26–December 31, 1956* (Washington: USGPO, 1990): 867–68, 1114.

⁷⁹ *FRUS 1955–1957*, vol. 27, *Western Europe and Canada* (Washington: USGPO, 1992), 677.

⁸⁰ John W. Young, *Cold War Europe 1945–1991: A Political History*, 2nd ed. (London: Arnold, 1996), 132; Blackwell, “Pursuing Nasser,” 87.

⁸¹ *FRUS 1955–1957*, 27: 674; Dimbleby and Reynolds, *An Ocean Apart*, 203, 219–23.

exchange of nuclear information.⁸² Though Britain would remain unable to compete in the arms race, it had recently tested its own thermonuclear device, and the agreement further enhanced its standing.⁸³

In November 1958 the Soviet Union declared that if the four-power occupation of Berlin were not renegotiated, it would withdraw from its quadrant and fully assist the East Germans in any conflict which might arise. Macmillan played a key role in helping to prevent an escalation of the dispute. He visited Moscow the following February, convincing leaders there to withdraw their demand for a solution to be achieved within six months. He was able to maintain credibility as an “honest broker” since his administration sought to transform the abstraction of peaceful coexistence into an actual improvement of relations with the Soviet Union. By assuring Washington that Premier Nikita S. Khrushchev was responsive to this, Macmillan laid the groundwork for the four-power conference held in Geneva, as well as for Khrushchev’s later visit to the United States which ended the war scare, albeit without resolving the status of Berlin.⁸⁴ His diplomatic skills were a tribute to his nation’s long-standing objective to serve as a bridge between the East and West.⁸⁵

By 1960 animosity surrounding the Suez crisis had begun to dissipate.⁸⁶ While the United States had established predominance over much of world, Britain had established a partnership with it in which its own role was neither equal nor

⁸² Margaret Gowing, *Interdependence and Deterrence: Britain and Atomic Energy 1945–1952*, vol. 2, *Policy Execution* (London: The Macmillan Press, Ltd., 1974), 501; Baylis, *Anglo-American Defense Relations*, 90–92; Bell, *The Debatable Alliance*, 8, 56.

⁸³ S.J. Ball, “Military Nuclear Relations between the United States and Great Britain under the McMahon Act, 1946–1958,” *The Historical Journal* 38, 2 (1995): 439–54; Nicholas, *Britain and the USA*, 67–68; *USWA 1957* (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1958), 359–60.

⁸⁴ See *FRUS 1958–1960*, vol. 7, part 2, *Western Europe* (Washington: USGPO, 1993), 838, 845–47; Keeble, *Britain, the Soviet Union and Russia*, 258–59. Macmillan was not entirely comfortable with Khrushchev’s visit, as it held the possibility that the superpowers would reach an agreement without involving Britain or France. Michael R. Beschloss, *Mayday: Eisenhower, Khrushchev and the U-2 Affair* (London: Faber and Faber, 1986), 184.

⁸⁵ See Young, *Winston Churchill’s Last Campaign*, 321, 325; Young, *Cold War Europe*, 131.

⁸⁶ One author noted that the crisis, though highly dramatic, had no lasting effects. Martin Wight, “Brutus in Foreign Policy: The Memoirs of Sir Anthony Eden,” *International Affairs* 36, no. 3 (1960): 299–309.

subservient. It had been willing to pursue independent courses of action, as well as to retreat when they failed to yield the desired results. With U.S. assistance it had overcome its economic and military weakness after the Second World War, and effectively promoted the belief that the future of western civilization hinged on Anglo-American relations.⁸⁷ Its most crucial role was to limit confrontation with the Soviet Union both through its own policies and by moderating those of the United States.⁸⁸ As Margaret Gowing observes, it made every effort to avoid the final showdown which U.S. officials frequently seemed to be courting.⁸⁹ The tension between U.S. dogma and the British pragmatism yielded results which benefited the entire world.⁹⁰

Over the same period of U.S.-Chilean relations, the smaller nation also confronted severe economic conditions which required U.S. assistance. Not regarding Latin America as a high priority, the United States limited its assistance to small-scale loans and private investments.⁹¹ The disappointment which this generated was perhaps greatest in Chile even though it received a disproportionately high amount of assistance.⁹² During the late nineteenth century it had vied with the United States for hegemony in the Pacific, at one point threatening to send the U.S. fleet to the bottom

⁸⁷ See Dianne Kirby, "Divinely Sanctioned: The Anglo-American Cold War Alliance and the Defense of Western Civilization and Christianity, 1945-1948," *Journal of Contemporary History* 35, no. 3 (2000): 385-412; H.C. Allen, *The Anglo-American Relationship since 1783* (London: Adam & Charles Black, 1959), 18-19; Marquess of Salisbury, "Anglo-American Shibboleths," *Foreign Affairs* 36, no. 3 (1958): 401-8.

⁸⁸ Keeble, *Britain, the Soviet Union and Russia*, 207.

⁸⁹ Gowing, *Interdependence and Deterrence* 1: 91-92; Barker, *The British between the Superpowers*, 185.

⁹⁰ See Joseph Frankel, *British Foreign Policy 1945-1973* (London: Oxford University Press, 1975), 195-97; E. Vargas, "Anglo-American Rivalry: A Marxist View," *Foreign Affairs* 25, no. 4 (1947): 583-95; Northedge, *British Foreign Policy*, 19; Nicholas, *Britain and the USA*, 167-69.

⁹¹ Harold A. Bierck, *The United States and Latin America, 1933-1968* (London: The Macmillan Company, 1969), 32.

⁹² Heraldo Muñoz and Carlos Portales, *Elusive Friendship: A Survey of U.S.-Chilean Relations*, Orlando García Valverde, trans. (Boulder, Colorado: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1991), 21, 28.

of the ocean unless Washington stopped meddling in its disputes with its neighbors.⁹³ Thereafter the bilateral relationship had maintained a competitive, though less adversarial tenor,⁹⁴ and Chile's power gradually declined while the United States laid the groundwork for the distinctly "American" half of the twentieth century.⁹⁵ The nations' rivalry would prevail in spite of their gross disparity of resources.

Chileans regretted the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor perhaps less than the pressure which it generated for them to join the Allied war effort. Like most Latin Americans, they questioned the legitimacy of the Pan-American ideals which the United States had promulgated for decades.⁹⁶ Economic development in the Western Hemisphere was so inequitable that many perceived their Good Neighbor as merely self-interested.⁹⁷ Unlike most Latin Americans, their population was largely of German descent, and that segment and others were extremely sympathetic to National Socialism.⁹⁸ Even citizens who preferred the U.S. model questioned the wisdom of joining the Allied cause as it might render their long coastline vulnerable to a Japanese attack.⁹⁹ President Juan Antonio Rios appreciated these concerns but

⁹³ Jason Kendall Moore, "Maritime Rivalry, Political Intervention, and the Race to Antarctica: U.S.-Chilean Relations, 1939-1949," *Journal of Latin American Studies* 33, no. 4 (2001): 713-38; Moore, "Frontier Mentalities and Perceptual Trends."

⁹⁴ See William F. Sater, *Chile and the United States: Empires in Conflict* (Athens, Georgia: The University of Georgia Press, 1990).

⁹⁵ See McCormick, *America's Half-Century*.

⁹⁶ David Sheinin, "Rethinking Pan Americanism: An Introduction," in David Sheinin, ed., *Beyond the Ideal: Pan Americanism in Inter-American Affairs* (Westport, Connecticut: Praeger, 2000), 1-8; M. Margaret Ball, *The Problem of Inter-American Organization* (Stanford, California: Stanford University Press, 1944), 5, 15.

⁹⁷ See Jules R. Benjamin, "The Framework of U.S. Relations with Latin America in the Twentieth Century: An Interpretive Essay," *Diplomatic History* 11, no. 1 (1987): 91-112; Stephen G. Rabe, "The Elusive Conference: United States Economic Relations with Latin America, 1945-1952," *Diplomatic History* 2, no. 3 (1978): 279-94; Sidney Lens, *The Forging of the American Empire* (New York: Thomas Y. Crowell Company, 1971), 193; Julio César Jobet, "Consequences of Imperialist Penetration in Chile," in Luis E. Aguilar, ed., *Marxism in Latin America* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1968), 152-55. The U.S. national income was approximately ten times greater than that of the Latin American nations combined. Edward G. Miller, "A Fresh Look at the Inter-American Community," *Foreign Affairs* 33, no. 4 (1955): 634-47.

⁹⁸ Jaime Antonio Etchepare and Hamish I. Stewart, "Nazism in Chile: A Particular Type of Fascism in South America," *Journal of Contemporary History* 30 (1995): 577-605.

⁹⁹ Sater, *Chile and the United States*, 114; Claude G. Bowers, *Chile through Embassy Windows, 1939-1953* (Westport, Connecticut: Greenwood Press, 1958), 97-99.

subordinated them to the consequences of estranging the United States. In January 1943 he announced the severance of diplomatic relations with the Axis powers, emphasizing that this decision was in no way directed against the German people who had contributed so much to the nation.¹⁰⁰

Months later Vice President Henry A. Wallace visited Chile, one of the many destinations on his trip throughout Latin America which sought, in his own words, “to create the maximum of goodwill toward the United States.”¹⁰¹ While Chile was among most challenging nations in that regard, thousands of citizens greeted his arrival with enthusiasm. Their response affirmed his hope that the nation would remain a bulwark of democracy in the Western Hemisphere. Despite interludes of military rule, its system of governance had retained many similarities with the U.S. model.¹⁰² The U.S. Ambassador in Santiago, Claude G. Bowers, observed that never in Chilean history had a foreign visitor been as well received as Wallace, suggesting that the political climate was inhospitable to the Ríos administration being overthrown by a pro-Axis coup, as had been attempted years earlier by Carlos Ibañez del Campo, the nation’s former dictator.¹⁰³

U.S. officials maintained pressure for Chile to join the Allied cause if only as a token of hemispheric unity.¹⁰⁴ To minimize the backlash which might follow such a decision, they recommended “soft-pedaling” a declaration of war, that is, announcing

¹⁰⁰ *The New York Times*, 21 January 1943.

¹⁰¹ *FRUS* 1943, vol. 5, *The American Republics* (Washington: USGPO, 1965), 56-57.

¹⁰² The embassy referred to Chile as “the strongest functioning democracy in South America.” *FRUS* 1945, vol. 9, *The American Republics* (Washington: USGPO, 1969), 762-63.

¹⁰³ See *FRUS* 1943, 5: 63-67; *FRUS* 1944, vol. 7, *The American Republics* (Washington: USGPO, 1967): 788-89; Graham H. Stuart and James L. Tigner, *Latin America and the United States*, 6th ed. (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice Hall, Inc., 1975), 558.

¹⁰⁴ Hemispheric unity was central to the Pan-American ideals which dated back to the late nineteenth century. In the 1940s and 1950s the basis of those ideals shifted from the ideals of the French Enlightenment to U.S. strategic interests. Stephen M. Streeter, “The Myth of Pan Americanism: U.S. Policy toward Latin America during the Cold War, 1954-1963,” in *Beyond the Ideal*, 167-81.

the formalization of a pre-existent state of belligerency.¹⁰⁵ The Chilean government consented to this, provided that its statement could refer to Japan instead of Germany. In February 1945, after the Department of State determined that this would be satisfactory,¹⁰⁶ Rios issued the statement as mildly as possible. Chileans responded without great protest or enthusiasm, as the president expressed no intention of contributing troops to the war effort and by this time Germany's defeat appeared inevitable. Moreover factually based rumors held that otherwise their nation would be excluded from post-war negotiations and assistance.¹⁰⁷ Bowers viewed those rumors not as a threat so much as a friendly warning.¹⁰⁸

The Allied victory did not bring an immediate termination of the black lists which the U.S. government had imposed against foreign entrepreneurs believed to be sympathetic to the Axis powers. Though not the only nation to be dealt with in this manner, Chile found the policy especially frustrating since neither the lineage nor the beliefs of its population had changed. Its officials made some effort to comply without persuading the Department of State of their resolve.¹⁰⁹ The black lists fuelled anti-U.S. opinion, as had previous allegations Axis espionage networks had been permitted to function with impunity.¹¹⁰ The Department of State left the lists in place until July 1946 due to reports that the influential German segment of the population was attempting to rehabilitate Nazism. Any further extension might have been counterproductive in terms of publicity.¹¹¹ It also would have failed to address the

¹⁰⁵ *FRUS* 1945, 9: 755-57.

¹⁰⁶ *FRUS* 1945, 9: 768-70.

¹⁰⁷ See Stephen G. Rabe, *Eisenhower and Latin America: The Foreign Policy of Anticommunism* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1988), 9-10; *FRUS* 1943, 5: 820; *FRUS* 1945, 9: 760; *The New York Times*, 13 April 1945.

¹⁰⁸ Bowers, *Chile through Embassy Windows*, 129; Michael J. Francis, *Limits of Hegemony: United States Relations with Argentina and Chile during World War II* (Notre Dame, Indiana: University of Notre Dame Press, 1977), 195.

¹⁰⁹ *FRUS* 1946, vol. 11, *The American Republics* (Washington: USGPO, 1969), 575-81.

¹¹⁰ Bowers, *Chile through Embassy Windows*, 110; Sater, *Chile and the United States*, 117.

¹¹¹ See *FRUS* 1946, 11: 582-83.

growing number of citizens had begun to embrace communism, an ideology which more directly threatened U.S. interests.¹¹²

In October 1946 Gabriel Gonzalez Videla won the presidential election, becoming the fourth member of the Radical Party to lead the governing coalition established eight years earlier.¹¹³ William F. Sater writes that the Popular Front, as it was known, included members of the Radical, Socialist and Communist Parties who shared little in common except their disdain for rightist parties and each other.¹¹⁴ The Truman administration was not favorably predisposed to Communist Parties anywhere, given their perceived subservience to the Soviet Union, but it welcomed the election of Gonzalez Videla. It chose to demonstrate its support on a remarkably large scale, sending an entire war fleet—one aircraft carrier, one battleship and three destroyers—to the inauguration ceremony.¹¹⁵ Communist journalists portrayed this as a harbinger of increased U.S. intervention in the nation's affairs. Further to their dismay, the new president told U.S. representatives that he sought to expand bilateral economic cooperation.¹¹⁶

That desire was understandable as the nation confronted serious financial difficulties. Although it had not joined the war effort until the last year, it had contributed throughout by providing the United States with nitrates and strategic minerals.¹¹⁷ The most important of these had been copper, the sale of which had sharply decreased after the war, creating widespread economic and political

¹¹² Department of State, Division of North and West Coast Affairs (Brundage) to Division of River Plate Affairs (Hussey), 31 October 1946, NARA, RG 59, Office of American Republic Affairs, Memoranda on Chile; Embassy in Santiago (Leche) to Foreign Secretary (Bevin), 21 January 1947, no. 35, AS 638/32/9, PRO, FO 497.

¹¹³ Robert J. Alexander, *The Tragedy of Chile* (Westport, Connecticut: Greenwood Press, 1978), 26.

¹¹⁴ Sater, *Chile and the United States*, 109. For a similar conclusion, see Embassy in Santiago (Allen) to Foreign Office, American Department (Balfour), 19 April 1940, A 3057/51/9, PRO, FO 371/24182.

¹¹⁵ *USWA 1945–1947* (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1947), 244–45.

¹¹⁶ *The New York Times*, 8 October 1946, 7 November 1946.

¹¹⁷ The Department of State had regarded Chilean copper as essential for the war effort. *FRUS* 1945, 9: 788–89.

turmoil.¹¹⁸ Gonzalez Videla sought to deal fairly with the U.S. companies which dominated the industry while upholding the rights of Chilean workers, and this objective was not to be envied. The companies believed that they were being overtaxed; the workers believed that they were being exploited; and the president believed, as communists and others alleged, that Washington was intervening in the nation's internal affairs. At the same time he feared that the communists were using that issue to promote their own revolutionary agenda.¹¹⁹

The Department of State fully supported Chile's application for a \$10.3 million loan from the Export-Import Bank, an institution directly administered by the U.S. government. The bank approved this relatively modest sum which was used to sustain the nation's most basic infrastructure.¹²⁰ Gonzalez Videla proceeded to sign a comprehensive trade agreement with Argentina in December, securing a credit seventeen times that large and raising concerns about the possible formation of a Southern Cone bloc hostile to U.S. interests. Earlier in the year, the Department of State had unsuccessfully attempted to thwart the election of Argentine President Juan Domingo Perón whose campaign had dwelled on anti-U.S. themes.¹²¹ The department recognized that Gonzalez Videla had no personal affinity for Perón, but it properly inferred that the bilateral agreement sought to counteract U.S. influence.¹²² *The New York Times* ventured that it would be "more important to Argentina than the

¹¹⁸ Stuart and Tigner, *Latin America and the United States*, 638; Jobet, "Consequences of Imperialist Penetration in Chile," 153; *FRUS* 1945, 9: 793-94, 804-8.

¹¹⁹ *FRUS* 1946, 11: 606-14, 617-18.

¹²⁰ *FRUS* 1946, 11: 600-2.

¹²¹ See J.A. Camacho, "Latin America and the English-Speaking World," *International Affairs* 35, no. 1 (1959): 24-32; Roger R. Trask, "The Impact of the Cold War on United States-Latin American Relations, 1945-1949," *Diplomatic History* 1, no. 3 (1977): 271-84; Gordon Connell-Smith, *The Inter-American System* (London: Oxford University Press, 1966), 144-45.

¹²² *FRUS* 1945, 9: 733-34; *FRUS* 1946, 11: 612-14; *USWA* 1945-1947: 45-46.

taking of Austria or Czechoslovakia was to Hitler.”¹²³

While the Southern Cone nations often viewed the United States as their common enemy, they had a number of their own disputes related to sharing one the longest borders on the planet. Not long before the trade agreement was signed, Perón had expressed his resolve to secure access to at least one of Chile’s Pacific ports either through negotiation or armed conflict.¹²⁴ Thereafter he had assumed a less menacing tone, yet few Chileans believed that his intentions were benevolent.¹²⁵ Bowers viewed the government’s willingness to deal with him as directly related to its reliance on Argentine wheat and beef.¹²⁶ Gonzalez Videla was certainly not among those Chileans who looked favorably upon his authoritarian style of leadership. During the war he had led an organization expressing solidarity with those Argentines who opposed the military regime in which Perón gained prominence.¹²⁷ The two leaders tended to view each other as cautiously as they viewed the United States.¹²⁸

In April 1947 Gonzalez Videla dismissed the communist members of his cabinet as he held their party responsible for inciting labor unrest.¹²⁹ The Department of State referred to the situation as potentially disastrous, for the government had already been forced to ration coal, electricity and petrol. Any further strikes seemed likely to impair its provision of basic services as well as the repayment of its external

¹²³ *The New York Times*, 9 December 1946. It was predicted that Chileans’ exuberance about the agreement would soon pass, for the terms revealed that Argentina “drove a hard bargain.” Embassy in Santiago (Leche) to Foreign Secretary (Bevin), 27 December 1946, AS 126/126/2, PRO, FO 497/1.

¹²⁴ *FRUS* 1945, 9: 733-34.

¹²⁵ See Department of State, Memorandum by Division of North and West Coast Affairs (Davis), 9 September 1948, NARA, RG 59, 800.014.

¹²⁶ Bowers, *Chile through Embassy Windows*, 123-24.

¹²⁷ *The New York Times*, 24 October 1944.

¹²⁸ This trend solidified after Gonzalez Videla broke relations with the USSR the following year. Perón maintained good relations with it despite his opposition to domestic communism. See Embassy in Santiago (Leche) to Foreign Secretary (Bevin), 29 January 1948, AS 970/305/2, PRO, FO 497; *The New York Times*, 9 March 1947; Consuelo León Wöppke, “La Cuestión Antártica en 1947 y el Bloqueo Chileno-Argentino,” in León Wöppke, Mauricio Jara Fernández et al., *¿Convergencia Antártica? Los Contextos de la Historia Antártica Chilena, 1939–1949* (Valparaíso, Chile: Editorial Puntangeles, 2005), 101-16.

¹²⁹ See *The New York Times*, 17 April 1947.

debt. As yet it had resisted pressure to nationalize the U.S. companies widely blamed for the nation's woes, but its high taxation of them remained a serious point of contention.¹³⁰ Gonzalez Videla's anticommunist orientation provided the best hope of durability in U.S.-Chilean relations. His speeches repeated themes from the doctrine of containment, emphasizing that his administration rejected any involvement with the "treacherous" agenda of the Communist Party,¹³¹ whose members were soon removed from all levels of the government and their party outlawed.¹³²

These measures failed to produce tranquility. Clashes between workers and government authorities grew more numerous and more violent, often resulting in fatalities. The strike of eighteen thousand coal miners in October threatened to paralyze the nation's industrial production. They refused to return to work even after the government met their demand for a forty percent wage increase and a guarantee of their continued employment. Their recalcitrance appeared to be part of an effort to undermine the government's stability, as later confirmed when officials intercepted the Communist Party's instructions to the miners. To help Chile defeat this "test of strength," as the Department of State referred to it, the United States provided an emergency shipment of coal in addition to a further loan from the Export-Import Bank. This assistance was essential in permitting the government to resolve the strike on its own terms while surviving the hiatus before full production could be resumed.¹³³

¹³⁰ *FRUS* 1947, vol. 8, *The American Republics* (Washington: USGPO, 1972), 530, 536-38, 617-18.

¹³¹ *FRUS* 1947, 8: 497-500.

¹³² *The New York Times*, 20 August 1947.

¹³³ The armed forces imposed order by a variety of means including the forced conscription of some of the strikers and using tear gas against those who refused to surrender. *FRUS* 1947, 8: 501-3, 509-12; Bowers, *Chile through Embassy Windows*, 166-67.

Gonzalez Videla was so infuriated by the strike that he broke diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union.¹³⁴ Aside from appearances that the domestic Communist Party was an appendage of Moscow, Russian-language documents had been found among the leaders of the strike.¹³⁵ The president ordered the detention of the staff of the Soviet Embassy in Santiago until all Chileans in Moscow were given exit permits. Most citizens supported this move as the Soviet Union was reported to mistreat of their own officials, aside from challenging their nation's economic independence.¹³⁶ The president's anticommunist rhetoric hardened in line with his policies. Earlier he had declared war against Chilean communists while he now referred to the inevitability of a global conflict between the forces of "democracy and Red totalitarianism."¹³⁷ He berated those citizens who refused to accept this due to their "uncontrollable hatred of the United States."¹³⁸

The Department of State urged the Export-Import Bank to substantially increase its loans to Chile, which currently totaled \$48 million,¹³⁹ a miniscule fraction of U.S. credit and direct grants flowing to Western Europe and the Mediterranean.¹⁴⁰ Though Latin America was not directly at risk of Soviet expansion, officials valued Gonzalez Videla's ideological fervor which equaled or surpassed their own. Bowers observed that after breaking relations with USSR, he became the head-of-state most detested by communists around the world.¹⁴¹ That status enhanced his ongoing requests for assistance lest it appear, as communists claimed, that the United States

¹³⁴ *FRUS* 1947, 8: 511-12.

¹³⁵ *The New York Times*, 17 October 1947.

¹³⁶ See *DIA* 1947-1948: 788; *FRUS* 1947, 8: 515-16.

¹³⁷ *FRUS* 1947, 8: 501-3; *The New York Times*, 2 February 1948.

¹³⁸ *The New York Times*, 21 November 1948.

¹³⁹ *FRUS* 1948, vol. 9, *The Western Hemisphere* (Washington: USGPO, 1972), 435-37.

¹⁴⁰ Latin Americans strongly resented not receiving a comparable amount U.S. assistance. Among them Chileans were especially resentful as their prices had risen threefold since the late 1930s. See Rabe, "The Elusive Conference," 285; Bierck, *The United States and Latin America*, 26; *USWA* 1948-49: 253, 368-70.

¹⁴¹ Bowers, *Chile through Embassy Windows*, 170.

was willing to discard its allies to promote the business interests of its own citizens. By mid-1949 the economic situation had again deteriorated, and Gonzalez Videla insisted that it could not be remedied without further U.S. assistance. The Export–Import Bank approved an addition \$25 million loan to help the nation avoid catastrophe.¹⁴² While this objective was technically successful, it unleashed a violent series of protests against both the president and the United States.¹⁴³

In April 1950 Gonzalez Videla traveled to the United States at Truman's invitation. His visit, while producing no changes of policy, underscored Chile's alignment with the "free world." *The New York Times* displayed a front-page picture of the two leaders smiling broadly, anticommunists invigorated to be in each other's presence.¹⁴⁴ The image captured a moment which was genuine but fleeting, for after Gonzalez Videla departed, bilateral relations reverted to economic themes. U.S. assistance fell short of expectation despite being augmented by Truman's program of technical assistance for Latin America.¹⁴⁵ Point Four, as the program was known, relied on private investment rather than grants over which governments would have held far more discretionary power.¹⁴⁶ It also failed to generate enthusiasm since its objective was not purely humanitarian but designed to halt the spread of communism.¹⁴⁷ Gonzalez Videla supported this objective without having any affinity

¹⁴² *FRUS* 1949, vol. 2, *The United Nations; The Western Hemisphere* (Washington: USGPO, 1976), 594-96, 601-2.

¹⁴³ *The New York Times*, 26 October 1949, 9 November 1949.

¹⁴⁴ *The New York Times*, 13 April 1950.

¹⁴⁵ See *The New York Times*, 26 June 1949; *FRUS* 1951, vol. 2, *The United Nations; The Western Hemisphere* (Washington: USGPO, 1979), 1069-72, 1238, 1284-85.

¹⁴⁶ *USWA* 1950 (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1951), 344-46.

¹⁴⁷ "U.S. Technical Assistance to Latin America," *The World Today* 7, no. 2 (1951): 84-92. Stephen G. Rabe writes that the Truman administration effectively preserved the linkage between the Good Neighbor Policy and U.S. economic hegemony throughout Latin America. Rabe, *Eisenhower and Latin America*, 23-24.

for the U.S. companies which controlled ninety-five percent of the copper industry and generated approximately half of the national revenue.¹⁴⁸

The Department of State reported that by early 1951 many Chileans had lost faith that the government was either able or willing to defend their interests from U.S. pressure. The communist-inspired phrase “Yankee imperialism” had gained currency throughout the population from the extreme left to the extreme right.¹⁴⁹ Concerned by the volatility of this situation, U.S. officials negotiated an arrangement establishing the Chilean government’s control over twenty percent of the copper industry.¹⁵⁰ This concession was formidable, given the scale of U.S. investment, yet it failed to resolve disputes over the price at which the copper was to be sold. The government threatened to seize control over the entire industry if the price were lowered without its consent.¹⁵¹ Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs Edward G. Miller wrote to Bowers of his outrage to be threatened in that manner; “To me it is just one more instance of Gonzalez Videla and the Chileans going off half-cocked without [taking] any responsibility for their action.”¹⁵²

Further negotiations yielded no progress. Chilean officials insisted that domestic opinion prevented them from making concessions, to which their counterparts retorted that they were making no attempt to improve public perceptions of the United States, aside from being ungrateful for its loans and technical assistance.¹⁵³ The appearance of ingratitude reached a higher level in May when Gonzalez Videla acted on previous threats to assume full regulatory power over the

¹⁴⁸ *FRUS* 1951, 2: 1242-58.

¹⁴⁹ *FRUS* 1946, 11: 608-14; *FRUS* 1951, 2: 1239. The Council on Foreign Relations summarized, “Distrust and jealousy of the United States, hatred of an abstraction called ‘Yankee imperialism’, served as the common denominator of Latin American politics, just as trade relations with this country formed the common basis of Latin American economics.” *USWA* 1951 (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1952), 296.

¹⁵⁰ *FRUS* 1952–1954, vol. 5, *The American Republics* (Washington: USGPO, 1983), 672-75.

¹⁵¹ *FRUS* 1952–54, 5: 666-68.

¹⁵² *FRUS* 1952–54, 5: 677-79.

¹⁵³ *FRUS* 1952–54, 5: 666-68.

industry. He simultaneously expressed willingness to continue negotiations, though the Department of State observed that he was now holding “a gun at our head” as Chilean copper remained essential for the U.S. defense industry.¹⁵⁴ Truman was infuriated that the nation which he viewed as the United States’ closest regional ally was now threatening to undermine its position the Korean War. Though his opinion of Chileans, especially Gonzalez Videla, might have faltered, his sense of pragmatism did not. Within weeks he authorized an agreement which both recognized the Chilean government’s control over the industry and met its demand for higher prices.¹⁵⁵

In September 1952 Chileans elected Carlos Ibañez del Campo primarily due to high inflation and the perpetually low standard of living.¹⁵⁶ Gonzalez Videla’s campaign had also suffered from his reluctance to unequivocally denounce the United States, whereas Ibañez had publicized his desire to nationalize U.S.-owned copper mines, as more in keeping with the anti-Yankee spirit of the era.¹⁵⁷ The Department of State viewed his election as “a severe blow” comparable to the 1946 election of Juan Domingo Perón.¹⁵⁸ The two leaders were close friends united by their authoritarian predisposition and disdain for foreign intervention. Interestingly Perón had established a functional relationship with the United States after distancing himself from the Soviet sphere.¹⁵⁹ Bowers expressed confidence that this would be possible with Ibañez as he grasped that he needed the United States more than it

¹⁵⁴ The words “a gun to our head” were used by Edward G. Miller. *FRUS* 1952–54, 5: 672-79.

¹⁵⁵ *FRUS* 1952–54, 5: 679-85. Miller noted that the Chilean government viewed the agreement as “a great victory,” which he believed might encourage it to pursue increasingly “anti-Yankee” policies detrimental to either nation’s long-term interests. He took a degree of solace that Gonzalez Videla renewed an extremely unpopular military agreement with the United States. The Chilean president’s well-publicized threats not to do so might have had some bearing on U.S. concessions pertaining to the copper industry. See *FRUS* 1952–54, 5: 686-87; *USWA* 1953: 341.

¹⁵⁶ Alexander, *The Tragedy of Chile*, 34-35; “The Chilean Inflation,” *The World Today* 12, no. 3 (1956): 119-26.

¹⁵⁷ *SIA* 1953 (London: Oxford University Press, 1956): 339-40.

¹⁵⁸ *FRUS* 1952–54, 5: 687.

¹⁵⁹ George Pendle, “The Revolution in Argentina,” *International Affairs* 32, no. 2 (1956): 166-72; Stephen G. Rabe, “Dulles, Latin America and Cold War Anticommunism,” in Richard H. Immerman, ed., *John Foster Dulles and the Diplomacy of the Cold War* (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1990), 159-87.

needed him.¹⁶⁰ His background as a military dictator, who thereafter served as president of the National Socialist Party, was not considered dangerous. By his seventies, he had lost some of his revolutionary fervor.¹⁶¹

The United States sent representatives to the inauguration ceremony in hope that Bower's analysis would prove correct.¹⁶² The Perón administration did likewise in hope that his election would mark an end to U.S. dominance in Chilean affairs. While the Southern Cone nations signed an agreement renewing their cooperation, updating the one signed during the Gonzalez Videla administration, it seemed improbable that they would become too closely aligned as their own rivalries had not subsided. U.S. officials were more concerned by the new president's re-establishment of diplomatic and economic relations with the Soviet Union. His extreme form of nationalism appealed to many communists and communist sympathizers because it opposed intervention by either superpower.¹⁶³ Without specifically mentioning Chile, Secretary of State John Foster Dulles condemned this kind of non-alignment as immoral.¹⁶⁴ Fortunately his colleagues in Chile dwelled on more routine issues, such as copper prices and means of ensuring that U.S. companies would not be nationalized.

The Chilean government's control of the copper industry partially fulfilled its longing for "independence" but otherwise produced disappointing results.¹⁶⁵ By mid-

¹⁶⁰ *FRUS* 1952–54, 5: 691–92.

¹⁶¹ See *FRUS* 1952–54, 5: 709–21; Frederick B. Pike, *Chile and the United States, 1880–1962* (Notre Dame, Indiana: University of Notre Dame, 1963), 246–49; Sater, *Chile and the United States*, 109–10; *USWA* 1957: 271.

¹⁶² See *FRUS* 1952–54, 5: 693–97.

¹⁶³ *FRUS* 1951, 2: 1255; "Politics and Economics in Chile," *The World Today* 9, no. 2 (1953): 81–92; *SIA* 1953: 335, 347.

¹⁶⁴ William Hayter, "The Cold War and the Future," in Evan Luard, ed., *The Cold War: A Reappraisal* (London: Thames and Hudson, 1964), 307–28; Michael A. Guhin, *John Foster Dulles: A Statesman and His Times* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1972), 255.

¹⁶⁵ One author observed that the "slogan of an 'independent' foreign policy" was popular among anti-U.S. leaders, many of whom were communists or communist sympathizers. Adolf A. Berle, *Latin America: Diplomacy and Reality* (New York: Harper & Row Publishers, 1962).

1953 the nation had become the world's highest-priced supplier and accumulated a large surplus of unsold copper. Since the United States did not offer to purchase more than usual, the government indicated that it might be forced to sell to the Soviet bloc. The Department of State warned the Eisenhower administration that this would cause "irreparable damage" to U.S.-Chilean relations aside from being militarily valuable for the communist sphere. It urged further loans to Chile, demonstrating that the nation had more to gain from the United States than from the enemies of freedom.¹⁶⁶ As many loans had already been extended—and would later be increased—Eisenhower instead authorized negotiations to purchase the surplus copper if Chile agreed to prohibit sales to the Soviet bloc. After months of further negotiations, these terms were accepted and presented to the Chilean senate for final approval.¹⁶⁷

As Bowers had predicted, Ibañez was not opposed to compromising with the dreaded "colossus of the north."¹⁶⁸ In fact he pledged to veto any provision which the senate might add to the detriment of U.S. interests, and to support legislation to reduce the rate at which U.S. companies were taxed while re-establishing their control of sales. Like most Chileans, he presumed that additional loans would be contingent upon these issues, and the Department of State believed that this was perfectly appropriate. The current tax rate claimed over eighty percent of companies' profits, which were further diminished by government-imposed price controls. The department observed that this was highly inconsistent with allegations that Chile was

¹⁶⁶ *FRUS* 1952–54, 5: 697–99.

¹⁶⁷ The surplus weighed 100,000 tons, and the final agreement for its sale was reached in March 1954. *FRUS* 1952–54, 5: 705–6, 724–27, 746–47.

¹⁶⁸ The Royal Institute of International Affairs referred to widespread concern among Latin Americans that the "colossus of the north" would intervene in their affairs, as suggested by the U.S.-backed overthrow of the Guatemalan government in June 1954. *SIA* 1953: 366. See John Gillin and K.H. Silvert, "Ambiguities in Guatemala," *Foreign Affairs* 34 no. 3 (1956): 369–82; Cole Blasler, *The Hovering Giant: U.S. Responses to Revolutionary Change in Latin America* (University of Pittsburgh Press, 1976), 213.

being exploited—aside from the fact that it had received more U.S. assistance per capita than any other Latin American nation.¹⁶⁹ Willard R. Beaulac, the new U.S. Ambassador in Santiago, concurred that anti-Yankee sentiment was unwarranted, and suggested that it was the product of Latin Americans' tendency to blame others for their own failings.¹⁷⁰

Passage of the new copper legislation in mid-1955 so pleased U.S. companies and their shareholders that they increased their investment. The government's anti-inflationary policies were also starting to produce signs of economic stability. Heeding the Department of State's recommendation, Washington increased its loans and encouraged the International Monetary Fund to do likewise. The Ibañez administration, unlike the earlier Popular Front coalitions, was demonstrating a strong commitment to both the theory and the practice of the free market. The negative themes of the president's campaign had been abandoned, modified or reversed, as in the case of his opposition to military cooperation with the United States. At a meeting of American presidents in July 1956, Ibañez took the opportunity to thank Eisenhower and members of the Department of State for their support.¹⁷¹

In September 1958 Chileans chose Jorge Alessandri Rodriguez to carry forth the economic policies which had benefited many Chilean households and started to erode the popularity of anti-U.S. slogans. His election demonstrated the strength of the rising middle class, and the Department of State was optimistic that he would uphold his campaign pledge to form "a businessman's government."¹⁷² Alessandri's

¹⁶⁹ *FRUS* 1952–54, 5: 747–52.

¹⁷⁰ *FRUS* 1955–1957, 7: 783. This tendency of Latin Americans cannot be empirically verified. The ambassador's reference to it was in keeping with the perceptual difficulties which bore upon U.S.–Chilean relations throughout the era. See Moore, "Frontier Mentalities and Perceptual Trends."

¹⁷¹ *FRUS* 1955–1957, 7: 792–93, 804–6, 814–17, 823–27.

¹⁷² Alessandri was a member of the Liberal Party whose coalition was dominated by Conservatives. Pike, *Chile and the United States*, 249. See Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs (Rubottom) to Undersecretary of State for Economic Affairs (Dillon), 13 February 1959, in *FRUS* 1958–1960, vol. 5, *American Republics*, microfiche supplement (Washington: USGPO, 1991).

first year in government met Washington's highest expectations, resulting in further loans to bolster the population's resistance to communism and to restore its confidence in the effectiveness of the democratic system.¹⁷³ The U.S. Embassy in Santiago commended Alessandri's inclusion of leading economists in the decision-making process, as well as his opposition to all forms of totalitarianism. These factors, in its estimation, were responsible for generating an unprecedented degree of goodwill in the history of U.S.–Chilean relations.¹⁷⁴

Four years later historian Frederick B. Pike observed that Chile's reputation in foreign relations surpassed its size and population.¹⁷⁵ He did not specifically link this to Gonzalez Videla's activism pertaining to the Antarctic—as discussed in the previous chapter—or his virtual extortion of U.S. loans, but these issues demonstrated that he refused to be dealt with like a Central American, as he once warned representatives of a U.S. company prior to seizing control over the copper industry. Ibañez, despite his anti-Yankee rhetoric, proved more accommodating of U.S. interests, and Alessandri made no effort to guise his capitalistic orientation. The loans which all three presidents secured benefited the nation, though anti-Yankee sentiment remained high due to perceptions that the terms were unfair. The presidents often empathized with these perceptions, but dealt with U.S. officials and businessmen in a manner which they believed was necessary, and which often revealed both dignity and anger.

Neither were British leaders exempt from outbursts when Washington appeared to discard their interests. For example, the controversy over Palestine

¹⁷³ President Eisenhower to Jorge Alessandri Rodriguez, [February 1959]; Department of State, Director of Office of West Coast Affairs to Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs (Rubottom), 18 November 1959, in *FRUS* 1958–1960, 5: microfiche.

¹⁷⁴ Ambassador in Chile (Howe) to Department of State, 8 January 1960, in *FRUS* 1958–1960, 5: microfiche.

¹⁷⁵ Pike, *Chile and the United States*, ix.

infuriated Prime Minister Clement Attlee while entailing much greater risks than if U.S. companies in Chile had been nationalized. The creation of Israel embroiled the Middle East in a war which might have been indefinitely prolonged if the Anglo–American nations had lifted their arms embargoes. While the Department of State dreaded the possible formation a Southern Cone bloc hostile to U.S. interests, it did not predict that such a bloc would instigate a major conflict. U.S.–Chilean relations could not rival the international significance of U.S.–British relations, yet both sets of relations entailed a degree of resentment. It was much higher in Chile though more poignant in Britain as citizens generally expected more from the United States and were less susceptible to radical forms of nationalism.¹⁷⁶

U.S. Antarctic policy was less consistently pro-British than many Latin Americans believed. In refusing to acknowledge the disputed sector beneath South America as part of the Western Hemisphere, as stipulated by Rio Treaty of 1947,¹⁷⁷ it handicapped efforts to coerce a British withdrawal by non-violent means. This bias was both real and apparent, though otherwise the policy made few allowances for Britain's unique importance to the United States. On occasions to the contrary, British officials were dissatisfied that U.S. support remained highly equivocal to

¹⁷⁶ U.S. intelligence reports viewed the election of Ibañez as consistent with the rise of radical nationalism in Chile and throughout Latin America. *FRUS* 1952–1954, vol. 2, part 1, *National Security Affairs* (Washington: USGPO, 1984), 551–62; *FRUS* 1952–54, 5: 709–21.

¹⁷⁷ Article IV of the Treaty for Reciprocal Inter–American Assistance of 1947 outlined a defensive perimeter around the western hemisphere which extended to the North and South Poles. The signatories were to stand united against any armed attack upon this region. The U.S. delegation to the conference in Rio de Janeiro at which it was signed expressed the following reservation: “The definition of the region in Article IV has no bearing on the obligations of the parties to the treaty with respect to acts of aggression other than armed attacks.” The Truman and Eisenhower administrations would later insist that Britain's naval displays and other maneuvers in the “American” Antarctic did not constitute an armed attack. See Department of State, *Report of the Delegation of the United States of America to the Inter-American Conference for the Maintenance of Continental Peace and Security, Rio de Janeiro, Brazil, August 15–September 2, 1947* (Washington: USGPO, 1948), 61, 154–55.

avoid the impression of bias.¹⁷⁸ They also found that the policy reflected the unpredictability which characterized the nation's role in world affairs, and accordingly chose to defend their Antarctic interests more assertively than the United States preferred. They did so in anticipation that the sovereignty dispute would not escalate to the point of being exploited by the Soviet Union. U.S. officials, though less certain of this, refrained from publicly criticizing British actions which were detrimental to a pacifistic resolution of the sovereignty dispute.¹⁷⁹

The announcement of the Operation High Jump in late 1946 generated widespread concern that United States sought to militarize the Antarctica. British officials expressed displeasure that Washington had not sought their permission since the operation would be active in the British Antarctic sector.¹⁸⁰ Chilean officials, like a large segment of the population, responded with alarm, announcing plans to increase their cooperation with Argentina.¹⁸¹ The conflict of British and Chilean interests in the far south was, if nothing else, clearly delineated, whereas the reversal of the U.S. non-claimant policy might have entailed a declaration of rights over the entire continent. A declaration of U.S. rights over the uncontested sector from 90° to 150° West would have assuaged those fears, though at the expense of not recognizing the full extent of U.S. exploration.¹⁸² The non-claimant policy was indecisive rather than

¹⁷⁸ For example, Embassy in Washington (Beeley) to Foreign Office, American Department, 9 April 1953, A 15212/219, PRO, FO 371.

¹⁷⁹ At the 1948 Pan American Conference in Bogotá, the U.S. delegation refused to participate in discussions of European colonialism within the Western Hemisphere, maintaining that they would be unfairly biased against the unrepresented nations. Department of State, *Ninth International Conference of American States, Bogotá, Colombia, March 30–May 2, 1948: Report of the U.S. Delegation with Related Documents* (Washington: Division of Publications, 1948), 84-86.

¹⁸⁰ After hearing reports of Operation High Jump, a British official in Washington "muttered something about [Antarctica] being British territory and about our having failed to clear the expedition with his government. If London has any such notion as that I assume steps will be taken to disabuse our British friends of any belief that we consider Antarctica British." Department of State, Office of American Republic Affairs (Briggs) to Office of European Affairs (Hickerson), 13 November 1946, NARA, RG 59, 800.014.

¹⁸¹ Ambassador in Santiago (Bowers) to Secretary of State, 15 November 1946, no. 1003, NARA, RG 59, 800.014.

¹⁸² See chapter five.

pro-British or pro-Chilean. By the time Operation High Jump returned, however, the Truman administration had outlined global priorities among which Latin America was a minor consideration.¹⁸³

High Jump greatly increased the exploration-based criteria for U.S. Antarctic rights while contributing to anxiety that a U.S. claim would extend into the already disputed peninsular region. Chile responded by dispatching two small expeditions, the latter of which was led by Gonzalez Videla at a time when his nation was confronting severe economic difficulties. As *The World Today* noted, his personal involvement with the sovereignty dispute helped to divert attention from these difficulties.¹⁸⁴ It also reflected his strong leadership in dealing with the Communist Party, the Soviet Union and the United States. Though notorious for his anticommunist fervor, he had already started making the threats to seize control of U.S. companies which he later carried through to the horror of the Department of State and Truman himself.¹⁸⁵ His defense of the Chilean Antarctic paralleled his resolve to limit interference in the nation's economic affairs by either superpower. Allegations that he was beholden to Yankee imperialism distorted a reality which his opponents were able to criticize but not to surmount.

As the United States would have preferred Chile to assume a milder tack in the Antarctic, it would have preferred Britain not to dispatch the battle cruiser *Nigeria* as a warning to the Southern Cone nations.¹⁸⁶ This action forced Washington either to

¹⁸³ Mark T. Gilderhus writes that U.S. leaders often "embraced Latin American governments as political and military allies but otherwise looked upon the region as peripheral in importance," and their neglect in terms of aid was widely resented. Mark T. Gilderhus, *The Second Century: U.S.-Latin American Relations since 1889* (Wilmington, Delaware: Scholarly Resources, Inc., 2000), 113-14.

¹⁸⁴ "Chile's Economic Problems," *The World Today* 5, no. 1 (1949): 39-46.

¹⁸⁵ See *FRUS* 1946, 11: 617-18.

¹⁸⁶ Gonzalez Videla reportedly viewed the *Nigeria* incident as an act of aggression contrary to the both the Rio Treaty, as discussed below, and the Act of Chapultepec, signed two years earlier in Mexico, which also referred to the imperative of hemispheric defense. See Embassy in London (Bianchi) to Foreign Affairs Ministry, 4 March 1948, no. 61, MRECh; Department of State, *Report of the*

condone European intervention in the Western Hemisphere, contrary to the Monroe Doctrine, or to indirectly endorse Argentine and Chilean rights in the “American” Antarctic.¹⁸⁷ It pursued the first course in keeping with the European emphasis of its foreign policy and its “special” relationship with Britain, as dramatically showcased during the Berlin airlift. Gonzalez Videla denounced British colonialism nearly as passionately as he denounced communism, yet the Anglo–American alliance remained central to the “free world” with which he sought alignment. The Truman administration had also been careful to avoid committing itself to the extension of the Rio Treaty’s hemispheric defense boundaries to the South Pole.¹⁸⁸ This decision had corresponded to the increasingly anticommunist—rather than anti-British—focus of Pan American relations.¹⁸⁹

When the Department of State tabled its first internationalization proposal for the Antarctic in 1948, there were no indications that Britain, Chile or the other claimant nations would be willing to renounce their sovereignty, as called for, to forge an eight-power agreement barring the Soviet Union. The administrations of Clement Attlee and Gonzalez Videla shared Washington’s anticommunist orientation while objecting to the price of its extension to the far south. The proposal carried the non-recognition policy to the least tolerable extreme, reflecting the general insensitivity of the U.S. foreign relations which stoked anti-U.S. opinion in Britain, Chile, and around

Delegation of the United States of America to the Inter-American Conference on Problems of War and Peace, Mexico City, Mexico, February 21–March 8, 1945 (Washington: USGPO, 1946), 2-3.

¹⁸⁷ See footnote 177.

¹⁸⁸ See Connell-Smith, *The Inter-American System*, 192; Jason Kendall Moore, “Thirty-Seven Degrees Frigid: U.S.–Chilean Relations and the Specter of Polar Arrivistes, 1950–1959,” *Diplomacy & Statecraft* 14, no. 4 (2003): 69-93.

¹⁸⁹ The Ninth Inter-American Conference, held in Bogotá, Colombia, in 1948, produced a U.S.-sponsored resolution denouncing international communism. The Tenth Inter-American Conference, held in Caracas, Venezuela, in 1954, did likewise, providing a degree of justification for the later U.S. overthrow of the Guatemalan government. See *FRUS* 1948, 9: 193-201; *FRUS* 1952–1954, 5: 45-64; John Foster Dulles, “International Communism in Guatemala,” in Earl T. Glauert and Lester D. Langley, eds., *The United States and Latin America* (Reading, Massachusetts: Addison-Wesley Publishing Company, 1971), 141-45.

the world. The Escudero Plan offered hope of a satisfactory outcome, yet its distribution through the Chilean Embassy in Washington—without prior U.S. approval—was in keeping with the periodically un-conciliatory manner of Gonzalez Videla. The U.S. decision to confide with British officials about it, as later exposed, also served to undermine prospects for an immediate compromise.

The British destruction of Southern Cone outposts on Deception Island curtailed the limited progress which had been made by early 1953. The U.S. refusal to involve the Organization of American States frustrated Latin Americans, Chileans and Argentines most of all, but without leading to a breakdown of Pan American institutions or producing a schism within the “free world,” as some officials had envisioned.¹⁹⁰ Washington’s moderate response helped to preserve hemispheric unity against the danger of communist insubordination. This feat was all the more noteworthy since Chilean Foreign Affairs Minister Arturo Olavarria Bravo, who threatened war against Britain, was as anti-U.S. as he was anti-British, and the new president, Carlos Ibañez del Campo, had been elected with the support of both communists and National Socialists.¹⁹¹ His administration had many characteristics of “red fascism,” a term used by Les K. Adler and Thomas G. Paterson in reference to the post-war merger of Soviet and German totalitarianism in the North American mind.¹⁹²

The United States conducted its Antarctic policy as cautiously as it led the UN war effort in Korea. Its allies feared that it would permit the conflict to escalate

¹⁹⁰ Acting Secretary of State (Smith) to Embassy in London, 10 April 1953, A-1362, NARA, RG 59, 702.022. For earlier concerns of this nature, see *FRUS* 1947, 1: 1057-58.

¹⁹¹ See Ambassador in Santiago (Bowers) to Assistant Secretary of State for Latin American Affairs (Miller), 23 June 1952, NARA, RG 59, Records of Assistant Secretary of State for Latin American Affairs (Miller), 1949–1953; *FRUS* 1952–54, 5: 693-97.

¹⁹² Les K. Adler and Thomas G. Paterson, “Red Fascism: The Merger of Nazi Germany and Soviet Russia in the American Image of Totalitarianism, 1930s–1950s,” *American Historical Review* 75, no. 4 (1970): 1046-64. Another author observes that throughout Latin America, anti-U.S. sentiment was not merely a campaign issue, but a “widely held political value.” Herbert Goldhamer, *The Foreign Powers in Latin America* (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1972), 279-80.

beyond control, as suggested by Truman's remarks about using the atomic bomb. The president then dismissed General Douglas MacArthur to assure that he would retain final authority over any decision to that effect, which he truly hoped would not be necessary despite his refusal to pledge to seek British consent beforehand. The final armistice revealed that his successor, Dwight D. Eisenhower, also accepted the need for containment in cases where communist roll-back might precipitate a nuclear Armageddon. His moderate stance was not unlike that of Ibañez who once elected accepted the impracticality of acting upon his anti-Yankee rhetoric.¹⁹³ In refraining from overt favoritism, the Eisenhower administration's policy toward the Antarctic was able to sustain viable relationships with both Britain, Chile, and the nine other signatories of the Antarctic Treaty.¹⁹⁴

The long interval between the first and second U.S. proposals related most directly to the sovereignty dispute which had re-emerged in the last months of the Korean War. Any hope of reviving an eight-power condominium arrangement incorporating the Escudero Plan began to fade when the Soviet Union established its presence in the Antarctic in preparation for the 1957–1958 International Geophysical Year. Documents indicate that British officials deserved credit for persuading the United States to include it in discussions of the second proposal.¹⁹⁵ While this was consistent with their tendency to mediate between East and West, it remains possible that the United States would have pursued that course without encouragement. The Soviet Union had already indicated that it would deny the legitimacy of any agreement reached without its participation,¹⁹⁶ and fortunately the Ibañez

¹⁹³ See Sater, *Chile and the United States*, 126.

¹⁹⁴ That is, the nine other original signatories of the treaty.

¹⁹⁵ Foreign Office Minute, 9 September 1958, A 1527/34, PRO, FO 371.

¹⁹⁶ The Soviet Union had indicated this publicly as well as at an official level. Embassy in Moscow to Department of State, 15 February 1949, no. 86, NARA, RG 59, 800.014; *The New York Times*, 12 February 1949, 10 June 1950.

administration, unlike that of Gonzalez Videla, did not object in principle to dealing with communists.

Soviet Premier Nikita S. Khrushchev's visit to the United States in September 1959 bode well for the Antarctic Conference which opened the following month. His trip demonstrated that the superpowers were willing to resolve—or attempt to resolve—their disputes through negotiations rather than armed conflict.¹⁹⁷ The demilitarization clauses of the Antarctic Treaty were fully consistent with this trend, yet the U.S. delegation opposed the last-minute Soviet proposal to include a nuclear test ban. It finally yielded to prevent the conference from ending in failure and leaving it without an alternative. The option of forging an arrangement with Britain, Chile and Argentina—as briefly contemplated—would not have been viable as the Latin American nations insisted on the test ban. Like the other nations of the Southern Hemisphere, they were not swayed by the U.S. position that nuclear tests should be regarded as a legitimate form of scientific inquiry rather than a violation of the treaty's demilitarization clauses.¹⁹⁸

On this crucial issue the Southern Hemisphere nations gained influence in direct proportion to their support from the Soviet Union. They would have faced enormous pressure to comply if both superpowers had opposed a test ban. Even Prime Minister Harold Macmillan, whose alliance with the United States was unquestionable, acknowledged that it was difficult to resist the united will of “the two great powers.” He feared that Khrushchev's visit to the United States might lead to an agreement pertaining to Berlin without his involvement which would then be held “over [my] head.”¹⁹⁹ The signature of the Antarctic Treaty marked the end of a more complex series of negotiations to which Britain and Chile had made indispensable

¹⁹⁷ *USWA 1959* (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1960): 163-64.

¹⁹⁸ See chapter three.

¹⁹⁹ Beschloss, *Mayday*, 184.

contributions—encouraging Soviet involvement and contributing the Escudero Plan, respectively. In this context the two nations were not just allies of the United States but super-allies, as Hope M. Harrison describes nations aligned with either superpower which maintained a high degree of independence and significantly influenced its policy.²⁰⁰

Harrison specifically uses that term to reference to East Germany as it overcame Soviet reluctance to build the Berlin wall. Khrushchev viewed the Berlin crisis as a means of securing U.S. recognition of East Germany and promoting a long-term improvement in Cold War relations. The East Germany leader, Walter Ulbricht, lacked patience for these objectives and argued in favor of simply closing the border, a course which also helped to consolidate his power. A secondary objective of the decision to build the wall in August 1961 was to encourage him to assume a more cooperative attitude toward Moscow.²⁰¹ On the last day of the Antarctic Conference, Secretary of State Christian Herter issued a single-sentence declaration that the United States, Chile and Argentina agreed that that the Antarctic Treaty would in no way affect the Rio Treaty.²⁰² He did not elaborate that United States refused to accept the Latin American position that the British Antarctic constituted a violation of the Rio Treaty's hemispheric defense perimeter.²⁰³ The declaration of agreement was more

²⁰⁰ Hope M. Harrison, "Driving the Soviets up the Wall: A Super-Ally, a Superpower and the Building of the Berlin Wall, 1958–61," *Cold War History* 1, no. 1 (2000): 53–74.

²⁰¹ Ibid.

²⁰² Department of State, *The Conference on Antarctica, Washington, October 15–December 1, 1959: Conference Documents, the Antarctic Treaty and Related Papers* (Washington: USGPO, 1960), 68–69.

²⁰³ The Foreign Office briefly considered justifying the Soviet Union's exclusion from the first internationalization proposal on the basis of the Rio Treaty, even though Latin Americans sought to invoke it against the British presence in Antarctica as well as the Honduras. See Embassy in Moscow (Kelly) to Foreign Secretary (Bevin), 17 October 1950, no. 238, 152.2/24/50, A 1529/36; Embassy in Buenos Aires to Foreign Office, American Department (Cecil), 24 October 1950, A 1529/41, PRO, FO 371; *FRUS* 1948, 9: 88; *FRUS* 1949, 2: 430–35; Foreign Affairs Ministry, Division of Treaties and Boundaries, to Ambassador in Britain, 12 September 1947, Confidential no. 10; Foreign Affairs Ministry, Bianchi Mission, Circular Confidential no. 4, 1 April 1948, MRECh.

technically of disagreement,²⁰⁴ and this was the very quality which distinguished super-alliances from other types of alliances.

The Department of State once speculated that Britain was in such a weak position after the Second World War that it would not dare to “go out on a limb alone.”²⁰⁵ Chile was initially in better position, as it had not been subject to attack, but its economic dependency on the United States proved more difficult to surmount. Many individuals in both nations held that the expectations which accompanied U.S. support far outweighed the benefits. Episodes such as the Suez invasion—by which time Ibañez had abandoned his anti-Yankee platform—proved that the repercussions of truly independent action were serious enough to be deemed counterproductive. British and Chilean officials nonetheless maintained a degree of autonomy which the majority of citizens found acceptable. Their effort to form an Antarctic arrangement excluding the United States, while neither successful nor necessary, given the signature of the treaty, revealed a longing for self-determination which transcended the Rio Treaty.²⁰⁶

Anti-Yankee sentiment overshadowed U.S.–Chilean relations more than U.S.–British relations. Though U.S. intervention in European affairs was not always popular, its Cold War justification was more compelling. Latin America was at little risk of “Sovietization,” whereas the U.S. concept of hemispheric defense undermined the region’s hope to remove all vestiges of British colonialism and to prevent its

²⁰⁴ There was incessant Anglo–Chilean disagreement over Article IV of the Rio Treaty. U.S. officials assured Britain that, consistent with their public statements, they had no intention of recognizing its applicability to the Antarctic. See Embassy in Chile (Trueblood) to Secretary of State, 19 February 1948, no. 133; Department of State, Memorandum of Conversation, Division of Northern European Affairs (Green), 10 September 1948, NARA, RG 59, 800.014; Embassy in Santiago (Sterling) to Foreign Office, 21 February 1953, no. 33, A 15212/87, PRO, FO 371.

²⁰⁵ In the words of Ambassador Averill Harriman. Quoted in Patterson, *The Making of the Cold War*, 65.

²⁰⁶ For further analysis of U.S.–British Antarctic relations, see Consuelo León Wöppke, “Convergencias y Divergencias entre los Interes Anglo–Americanos en la ‘Antártica Sudamericano’ a Mitad del Siglo Pasado,” *Estudios Norteamericanos* 3, no. 3 (2004): 149–58.

governments from being overthrown if unreceptive to Washington's strategic designs. Even if Pan-American ideals had been pursued on a more equitable basis, they would have had difficulty rivaling the influence of Anglo-American relations or the Anglo-American-led military alliance. Chile perhaps took a leading role in Antarctic diplomacy to atone for its relatively minor standing in world affairs. While Britain's standing greatly had decreased after the Second World War, it assumed an equally important role pertaining to the inclusion of the Soviet Union. The roles played by these two nations indicated that, although the Cold War would persist, its terms would not be exclusively dictated by the superpowers.

The next two chapters evaluate the domestic factors which bore upon U.S. Antarctic policy. Officials spent considerably more effort promoting an international consensus pertaining to the future of the region than attempting to persuade elected representatives that the consensus advanced U.S. national interests. In fact the treaty was difficult to reconcile with the anticommunist sentiment embodied by Senator Joe McCarthy and the policies adopted by White House in the years which preceded and followed him. By including the Soviet Union, the Antarctic Treaty appeared to contradict the values which most Americans held dear.

5. U.S. Antarctic Opinion

Many Americans viewed the government's non-claimant policy toward the Antarctic as unnecessarily restrained and even inappropriate, given the legacy of U.S. explorers. As the policy remained in place, despite widespread rumors that it might reversed, journalists assumed an increasingly nationalistic tone which corresponded to the perspective of Admiral Richard Evelyn Byrd, who embodied U.S. Antarctic exploration during the era—and whose advice the government discounted. Elizabeth A. Kendall, an enigmatic and seemingly isolated citizen activist, kept officials throughout the Department of State and congress informed of her disdain for the non-claimant policy. Indeed her letters foreshadowed why a substantial minority of senators would oppose ratifying the Antarctic Treaty. Like Byrd, Kendall and many journalists, they viewed non-claimancy as an affront to the national interest based on the questionable assumption that it was necessary to avoid provoking a Soviet claim.

This chapter analyzes the domestic factors which bore upon U.S. Antarctic policy. When the Antarctic Treaty took effect in 1961, after being ratified by the twelve signatory nations, it established an unprecedented standard of international cooperation. Scholars have many reasons to dwell on its effectiveness and legitimacy,¹ yet in the process they simplify the nature of U.S. leadership by separating it from domestic factors. This tendency is understandable since U.S. Antarctic opinion posed a real but unrealized challenge to regime formation, whereas British and Latin American nationalism involved vindictive rhetoric and actual confrontations over disputed territory. The patriotic sentiment which many

¹ For example, O. Stokke and D. Vidas, eds., *Governing the Antarctic: The Effectiveness and Legitimacy of the Antarctic Treaty System* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1996). This chapter includes material from Jason Kendall Moore, "Bungled Publicity: Little America, Big America and the Rationale for Non-Claimancy, 1946–1961," *Polar Record* 40, no. 212 (2004): 19-30.

Americans held toward the Antarctic was mild by comparison, though not insignificant.²

Deborah Shapely and Christopher C. Joyner concur that Antarctica has failed to hold the attention of Americans and their leaders for more than brief periods.³ The truth of this assessment underscores the value of simulating a cultural perspective of the formative era when no international or domestic outcome could be taken for granted. Without the emergence of an organized pro-claimant lobby, the Antarctic Treaty's ratification passed by only eight votes. The narrowness of this margin invites consideration of what factors might have precipitated a legislative defeat in Washington, the very capital where the Antarctic Conference had been held to negotiate a U.S.-drafted proposal. A defeat in any of the capitals might have had an equally negative effect in practice, but not in theory. Since U.S. officials viewed the Antarctic as a valuable showcase for their enlightened leadership in world affairs, and had repeatedly made statements to this effect, they would have greeted treaty's non-signature or non-ratification with particular dismay.⁴

It was fortunate for all parties that U.S. domestic opinion never rallied against the government's willingness to suspend more traditional national interests. In hindsight it might appear unfair to criticize the Department of State for not taking measures to counteract the treaty's defeat, as it was devoted to foreign policy and did manage to unite a wide array of nations in the cause of devoting a continent to science.⁵ Criticism might seem trite as much as unfair if the department had been so

² See *Time*, 22 August 1960.

³ Deborah Shapely, *The Seventh Continent: Antarctica in a Resource Age* (Washington, DC: Resources for the Future, 1985); Christopher C. Joyner, "The Role of Domestic Politics in the Making of United States Antarctic Policy," in Stokke and Vidas, *Governing the Antarctic*, 409-31.

⁴ Department of State, Division of European Affairs and Division of North and West Coast Affairs, Memorandum, 8 September 1947, NARA, RG 59, 800.014.

⁵ See Richard S. Lewis, *A Continent for Science: The Antarctic Adventure* (New York: Viking Press, 1965).

inundated with other responsibilities that it never fathomed domestic opinion curbing U.S. leadership in the far south. Moreover, since its commitment to the 1924 Hughes Doctrine was only tentative, attempting to generate support for the non-claimant policy might have been counterproductive and, even if not, had little bearing on the success or failure of the Antarctic Treaty.⁶

While these issues are not without merit, publicity became a key component of U.S. Antarctic policy during the 1939–1941 Byrd expedition when the frozen terrain began to assume heightened political significance, and it remained so until the treaty was signed.⁷ Official statements consistently sought to allay other nations' concerns about U.S. motivations. Their first themes included Pan-Americanism and the Monroe Doctrine, while later themes would allude to the “red menace” and finally to more ecumenical ideals formulated, if necessary, to permit a limited rapprochement with the Soviet Union. The earlier themes were compatible with priorities shared by most Americans, or at least not actively protested. The last theme was purposefully more nebulous, as by then most Americans loathed communists anywhere—definitely on a continent that had been portrayed as a strategic and economic bonanza.

Prior to late 1946 some Americans who isolated themselves from the press might have been unfamiliar with either Byrd or the Antarctic itself. Thereafter, however, U.S. expeditions, the 1957–1958 International Geophysical Year (IGY), and the Antarctic Conference itself gained an amount of publicity difficult to ignore. While reports might not have been carefully scrutinized, their essence was easily understood, and it led to the question of why “big America” not yet brought Little America—as the informal U.S. sector was known—under its legal jurisdiction.⁸ It

⁶ As discussed hereafter, senators were more concerned with the treaty's inclusion of the USSR.

⁷ *FRUS*, 1939, vol. 2, *General* (Washington: USGPO, 1956), 11-14; Cordell Hull to F.D. Roosevelt, 1 August 1940; Patrick Hurley to C. Hull, 14 July 1942, BPRC, folders 1879, 1886.

⁸ See *The New York Times*, 14 July 1956.

only seemed to be a matter of time before the government would fulfill that objective, which it was known to have been under consideration for decades.

The Department of State shared that hope but defined its “foremost” objective as removing the Soviet Union from Antarctica after the IGY and excluding it from any later agreement. The treaty signed in December 1959 substantiated that the government’s approach had the opposite effect.⁹ While not relinquishing plans to forward a claim, it had hesitated to do so over the uncontested sector from 90° to 150° West, lest that be interpreted as forfeiting its right elsewhere, or based on its vast exploration, lest that antagonize the seven claimant nations. One of the perceived advantages of withholding a claim was to discourage the Soviet Union from responding with a counter-claim,¹⁰ yet the risk persisted that it might announce a claim without any form of provocation.¹¹

In January 1939 President Franklin D. Roosevelt declared that the Antarctic regions previously claimed by Byrd might be included in a sovereignty claim. He hesitated to propose one at the time due to the 1924 Hughes Doctrine, which required claims to be based on occupation rather than discovery, but his words reflected that advisers through the government recognized the benefits of abandoning that criterion given the

⁹ Department of State, Office of Inter-American Regional Political Affairs, Memorandum, 22 July 1957, NARA, RG 59, 702.022. See Secretary of State (Marshall) to Secretary of Defense (Forrestal), 10 June 1948, NARA, RG 59, 800.014.

¹⁰ See Department of State, Memorandum by Office of Inter-American Regional Political Affairs (Wilson), 22 July 1957; Assistant Secretary of State (Hill) to House Committee on Foreign Affairs (Gordon), [17 April 1957]; Department of State, Regional Planning Adviser for Far Eastern Affairs (Green), to Embassy in Tokyo (Horsey), 14 January 1958, in Secretary of State (Dulles) to Embassies in Canberra and Wellington, 11 February 1958, CA-6914, NARA, RG 59, 702.022; Secretary of State (Dulles) to Embassies in Buenos Aires, Canberra, London, Moscow, Oslo, Paris, Pretoria, Santiago and Wellington, 18 November 1957, no. 4572, NARA, RG 59, Records of the Policy Planning Staff.

¹¹ Department of State, Bureau of Inter-American Affairs to Secretary of State, 4 April 1958; House Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs (Engle) to Secretary of State (Dulles), 5 February 1957, NARA, RG 59, 702.022.

increasing need to secure access to natural resources.¹² Well-known German ambitions to that effect provided a further incentive to establish permanent bases in support of a U.S. claim. As such, Roosevelt had little difficulty persuading congress to fund Byrd's third expedition to the far south.¹³

The admiral sought to avoid the impression of engaging in a race with Germany or any other nation, though that impression was difficult to avoid.¹⁴ Nineteen thirty-nine marked an upsurge of international competition to secure Antarctic rights.¹⁵ The Southern Cone nations, Chile and Argentina, were highly interested in the peninsular region located directly beneath them. Since they had not yet made formal sovereignty claims, they had not yet come into conflict with Britain, which claimed part of the peninsular region, but conflict was foreseeable. Not only were pro-German sentiments high in the Southern Cone nations;¹⁶ Argentina explicitly rejected the Roosevelt administration's reference to the Monroe Doctrine as one rationale for the Byrd expedition. Like Chile it viewed the peninsular region as falling within the Western Hemisphere while denying that Latin America must accept U.S. leadership therein.¹⁷

The Byrd expedition appeared to indicate that U.S. officials recognized the need to engage in long-range strategies to preserve their nation's high standard of living.¹⁸ The fact that Antarctic's natural resources were untapped assumed greater

¹² Division of European Affairs to Office of Counselor (Moore), 13 June 1939; Office of Counselor (Moore) to President (Roosevelt), 14 June 1939; Department of Interior to Department of State (Cumming), 12 August 1939, NARA, RG 59, 800.014.

¹³ *The New York Times*, 12 January 1939, 3 June 1939.

¹⁴ R.E. Byrd to Department of State, Division of European Affairs (Cumming), 15 July 1939, NARA, RG 59, 800.014.

¹⁵ Department of State, Polar Regions: Secret Policy and Information Statement, 1 July 1946, NARA, RG 59, 800.014.

¹⁶ For example, Embassy in Santiago (Bentinck) to Foreign Secretary (Eden), 4 January 1938, PRO, BW 42.

¹⁷ See *The New York Times*, 25 July 1939.

¹⁸ *The Christian Science Monitor* observed that government sponsorship of his third expedition revealed a healthy degree of susceptibility to the "lure of resources unknown," which as never before

importance than the questions of how soon technological advances might permit them to be exploited and whether serious controversy might emerge as that prospect drew near.¹⁹ Moreover, self-interested exploration did not offend the United States' historical reluctance to engage in colonial practices. The continent was unpopulated and the seven nations which had announced or were preparing sovereignty claims—Argentina, Australia, Britain, Chile, France, New Zealand and Norway—were unable to agree among themselves on the most appropriate criteria for doing so. The Byrd expedition planned to establish three permanent bases to fulfill the criteria outlined by the Hughes Doctrine.²⁰

This was not the primary reason why the American public took heed of the expedition. Antarctica's geopolitical significance was comprehensible though hardly urgent compared to Europe where Germany's quest for natural resources was precipitating a major conflict. The Snow Cruiser provided Americans with a completely unique distraction from this issue. Designed by Dr. Thomas E. Poulter of the Armor Institute of Chicago, this vehicle weighed thirty-seven tons and used the largest rubber wheels ever produced, exceeding ten feet in diameter, which could be independently powered, steered, and hydraulically raised and lowered. Painted bright red with silver stripes extending the length of its 55-foot body, the Snow Cruiser was to "zigzag" effortlessly across the frozen tundra with a crew of four whose member

was arousing public interest. *The Christian Science Monitor*, 29 July 1939. See Jason Kendall Moore, "Tethered to an Iceberg: United States Policy toward the Antarctic, 1939–1949," *Polar Record* 35, no. 193 (1999): 125–34.

¹⁹ See President to Secretary and Undersecretary of State, 28 July 1939, NARA, RG 59, 800.014. The government was willing to consider means of placing a sector of the Antarctic under Pan American jurisdiction, though its immediate priority was to substantiate U.S. rights. *FRUS* 1939, 2: 9–10.

²⁰ For years the Department of State had contemplated that a sovereignty claim would appeal to most citizens without provoking much controversy abroad. Department of State, Memorandum by Office of Historical Adviser (Boggs), 23 May 1930, NARA, RG 59, 800.014. See *The New York Times*, 15 July 1939.

would sleep onboard.²¹ Poulter, a physicist who had previously accompanied Byrd to the Antarctic, had devised a means of surmounting the explorers' exclusive dependence on sled teams and camp sites.²²

En route from Chicago to Boston, where the expedition was preparing to depart, the Snow Cruiser drew tens of thousands of onlookers and hordes of journalists, followed by a truck which broadcast music to enhance the festive atmosphere.²³ Its progress was not impressive. The "monstrous, Martian-like creature" caused numerous traffic jams, getting stuck at roadsides, on bridges and in the countryside—locations which seemed to pose little challenge compared to the vast Antarctic expanses which it was conquer.²⁴ One disappointed young man remarked that he would rather take a old-fashioned tractor if he were in Byrd's place. He predicted, "That thing won't go far in the snow if it can't navigate sand."²⁵ Poulter remained steadfast in his conviction that the tests which it had undergone, though limited, were sufficient to ensure that it would meet the challenges before it.²⁶ He and the other crew members scoffed allegations to the contrary.²⁷

The Snow Cruiser's struggle to reach Boston in time for the expedition's departure was far more entertaining than the government's agenda to the lay the groundwork for a sovereignty claim. Aside from becoming stuck at several junctures, the vehicle reached a top speed of only ten miles per hour, less than half of its

²¹*Hobart Gazette*, 26 October, 1939; *Michigan City News-Dispatch*, 26 October 1939; *Gary Post-Tribune*, 26 October 1939; *Life*, 30 October 1939; *The New York Times*, 16 November 1939.

²² See *Hammond Times*, 26 October 1939.

²³ *LaPorte Herald-Argus*, 26 October 1939; *Hammond Times*, 26 October 1939.

²⁴ *Hobart Gazette*, 26 October, 1939; *Valparaiso Vidette-Messenger*, 26 October 1939, 27 October 1939; *Hammond Times*, 29 October 1939; *Michigan City News-Dispatch*, 30 October 1939; *Chesterton Tribune*, 2 November 1939; *LaPorte Herald-Argus*, 26 October 1939; *Life*, 13 November 1939; *The Lima News*, 23 January 2002.

²⁵*Valparaiso Vidette-Messenger*, 26 October 1939; *Hammond Times*, 27 October 1939.

²⁶*Michigan City News-Dispatch*, 26 October 1939.

²⁷*Gary Post-Tribune*, 26 October 1939; *Michigan City News-Dispatch*, 27 October 1939; *Hammond Times*, 29 October 1939.

estimated capacity.²⁸ It nonetheless did manage to reach Boston in time for *North Star*'s departure while Byrd remained behind to depart with his own *Bear of Oakland*, the expedition's other vessel. While all 160 crew members would reach the frozen continent unscathed, the four who planned to cover more over 670,000 miles of territory with the Snow Cruiser never gained that opportunity.²⁹ Their vehicle, though billed as a "monument to pioneering ingenuity,"³⁰ overheated and proceeded to sink through the snow and from there to the bottom of the ocean.³¹

While the dismal fate of the Snow Cruiser was left unpublicized, funds for the expedition threatened to be withheld due to allegations that Byrd was earning "fabulous sums" through commercial endorsements. Congressmen grew alarmed by reports that he had sold the rights for one company to promote its dog food in association with the expedition's sled teams.³² These reports were consistent with magazine stories which quoted Byrd as once having boasted, "I've put exploration into big business." It was well-known that his past sponsors had included John D. Rockefeller, Edsel Ford and others in whose honor he had named vessels, planes and newly discovered lands. His numerous exploration-based books were estimated to have earned over \$1 million of which he had taken a high percentage in royalties. According to *Reader's Digest*, he was so profit-oriented that he had once considered returning with penguins to sell to zoos or any individuals who might be interested and willing to maintain them.³³

²⁸*Life*, 13 November 1939.

²⁹ See *The New York Times*, 15 July 1939, 16 November 1939.

³⁰ Dean R. Freitag and J. Stephen Dibben, "Dr. Poulter's Antarctic Snow Cruiser," *Polar Record* 23, no. 143 (1986): 129-141.

³¹*Christian Science Monitor*, 16 April 1998.

³² R.E. Byrd to U.S. Maritime Commission (Mulroy), 28 September 1939; R.E. Byrd to R.H. Cruzen, 14 October 1940, BPRC, folders 2348, 1407.

³³*Reader's Digest*, January 1940. Byrd was reported not to have profited directly from his explorations, although his 1935-1936 speaking engagements had earned approximately \$190,000. *Life*, 30 October 1939. See Edwin P. Hoyt, *The Last Explorer: The Adventures of Admiral Byrd* (New York: The John Day Company, 1968), 71.

During the investigatory hearings officials testified that at present Byrd was engaged in no form of profiteering whatsoever—the company in question had not sought or received authorization, its only goal being to increase sales, not to provide an alternate means of subsidizing the mission or enriching Byrd.³⁴ Additional funds were provided thereafter to sustain a few dozen explorers left behind to maintain bases through mid-1941. Like Roosevelt, Byrd regretted that their well-being had been jeopardized for any reason, especially since he had drawn heavily from his own savings to cover the expedition's costs.³⁵ He complained to his brother, Senator Harry F. Byrd, of having spent \$50,000 to prepare *Bear of Oakland* for the expedition, yet still being subject to intense criticism if a single dollar of government funding were questionably dispersed.³⁶

Despite ongoing skepticism about Byrd's integrity from some quarters, *The New York Times* wrote that the more serious issue pertained to the challenge his expedition was posing to those nations with standing or forthcoming claims to Antarctic territory. It noted that suddenly politics had joined the traditional scientific and adventurous motives for exploration.³⁷ *Newsweek* surmised that Washington had to be more committed to the polar domain than suggested by the non-claimant policy.³⁸ No one more than Byrd hoped that this was the case, but he accepted that the resurgence of German interest in Antarctica was unlikely given the war in Europe, which trivialized the need to uphold, modify or abandon the Hughes Doctrine.³⁹

³⁴ See Department of Interior, U.S. Antarctic Service, to Gaines Food Company, 13 January 1940, NARA, RG 59, 800.014.

³⁵ *FRUS* 1939, 2: 11-14; Alden Hatch, *The Byrds of Virginia* (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1969), 359; *The New York Times*, 7 July 1939, 5 March 1940, 6 April 1940; *The Christian Science Monitor*, 29 July 1939; *Life*, 30 October 1939; *Reader's Digest*, January 1940.

³⁶ R.E. Byrd to H.F. Byrd, 11 August 1939, BPRC, folder 43.

³⁷ *The New York Times*, 6 August 1939.

³⁸ *Newsweek*, 18 November 1940, 19 May 1941.

³⁹ R.E. Byrd to Secretary of Navy, [May 1941], BPRC, folder 1410.

In November 1940, while the Byrd expedition was underway, Chile declared sovereignty over the Antarctic sector from 53° to 90° West. The U.S. Ambassador in Santiago reported that the government had acted merely to protect its interests rather than to antagonize the hemisphere's Good Neighbor.⁴⁰ In fact Byrd was tremendously popular in Chile. Months earlier the government had given him a hero's reception in Valparaíso, and he had established a warm rapport with leading officials including the president and foreign affairs minister.⁴¹ The Department of State recognized that Byrd's personal charm was a tremendous diplomatic asset,⁴² an assertion echoed by U.S. officials as far as New Zealand.⁴³

The U.S. Antarctic Service, which President Roosevelt had created to permit Byrd to coordinate his agenda with cabinet-level officials,⁴⁴ was disbanded after the 1939–1941 expedition. The Japanese bombing of Pearl Harbor abruptly and decisively re-ordered U.S. priorities, and Byrd played several important roles during the war, consistent with his status as a close friend of the president who was already decorated with every service medal which the government had to offer.⁴⁵ Aside from helping to establish U.S. bases in the South Pacific and, at least once, flying a fighter aircraft over Germany,⁴⁶ the admiral led efforts to reduce the overlapping responsibilities of the service branches. Fleet Admiral William D. Leahy and General of the Army George C. Marshall commended his diligence, noting that he had been

⁴⁰ Ambassador in Santiago (Bowers) to Secretary of State, 8 November 1940; Department of State, Memorandum by Undersecretary of State, 8 November 1940, NARA, RG 59, 800.014.

⁴¹ Claude Bowers to R.E. Byrd, 6 May 1940, BPRC, folder 865; *The New York Times*, 24 April 1940, 26 April 1940.

⁴² Cordell Hull to F.D. Roosevelt, 1 August 1940, BPRC, folder 1879.

⁴³ Patrick Hurley to C. Hull, 14 July 1942, BPRC, folder 1886.

⁴⁴ See *FRUS* 1939, 2: 7.

⁴⁵ F.D. Roosevelt to R.E. Byrd, 19 September 1940, BPRC, folder 1879. See *The New York Times*, 28 September 1940.

⁴⁶ R.E. Byrd to Chief of Naval Personnel, 10 May 1943, BPRC, folder 306; *The New York Times*, 4 December 1944.

chosen because of his ability to generate trust among all parties, in addition to his expertise.⁴⁷

The Allied victory in World War Two left the United States in a strong position to influence the world at large and especially the Antarctic, where its activities carried virtually no risk of military retaliation. The unpopulated continent seemed ideal for testing weapons not already used against the Axis powers, and some observers interpreted this as a perfect opportunity to turn “swords into ploughshares.”⁴⁸ In early 1946 one retired serviceman gained headlines by proposing a variation of that theme—using atomic bombs to blast through the ice cap and gain access to otherwise inaccessible minerals. The commentary which this generated included an estimate that thirty million bombs as powerful as the one dropped on Hiroshima would be required—at the cost of \$660 trillion or over two thousand times the national debt, and at the risk of flooding coastlines around the world.⁴⁹

There is no evidence that the government considered such ludicrous notion, though at the end of the year it aroused concern by announcing that Byrd would be leading a new expedition, Operation High Jump, which dwarfed the scope and objectives of all that had come before. The navy drew from the best of its ranks across the country, handpicking over four thousand scientists, technicians and managers for the most novel assignments of their careers. An anonymous officer told *The New York Times* that the operation was “highly strategic” in nature, as the military establishment had come to view the far south as a primary component of its global strategy.⁵⁰ Since the first priority was gaining access to new sources of atomic energy, photographers were hopeful of documenting evidence of fissionable

⁴⁷ W.D. Leahy, G.C. Marshall and E.J. King to R.E. Byrd, 15 December 1944, BPRC, folder 2205.

⁴⁸ Thomas R. Henry, *The White Continent: The Story of Antarctica* (New York: William Sloane Associates, 1950), ix.

⁴⁹ *The New York Times*, 31 January 1946, 2 February 1946, 10 February 1946.

⁵⁰ *The New York Times*, 9 November 1946.

materials. *Time* observed that High Jump's military orientation tarnished its scientific credibility, and *The New Republic* more simply declared the beginning of an international race for uranium.⁵¹

The Department of State carefully briefed Byrd on the need to publicize the expedition's scientific ends, but its effort was gratuitous. The admiral was a highly decorated figure who had proved his effectiveness collaborating with top officials, not least of all regarding propaganda for his previous expeditions. He repeated the diplomatic agenda to his operational commander, Richard H. Cruzen, who fully concurred with the need to avoid incriminating press leaks.⁵² The Department of State complicated its public relations task by failing to engage in any thorough investigation of the bases for other nations' claims, and which bases, aside from permanent or semi-permanent occupation, might be chosen by the United States. This put Byrd in a difficult position, since there ten reporters were accompanying Operation High Jump and he, unlike diplomatic officials, could not respond tersely to their question and send them home.⁵³

When High Jump started back to the United States, *Newsweek* noted the peculiarity of the navy's silence regarding mineral wealth, the expectation of which had lent Antarctica a distinctly Cinderella-like quality.⁵⁴ High Jump had produced no evidence of uranium,⁵⁵ yet policymakers were not shaken in their belief that the quest for natural resources, especially those of strategic value, warranted a prolonged effort. Byrd privately disdained the nation's "reckless" consumerism, which in his view, like

⁵¹ *Time*, 18 November 1946; *The New Republic*, 18 November 1946.

⁵² R.E. Byrd to R.H. Cruzen, 12 August 1946, BPRC, folder 1412. See *Newsweek*, 2 December 1946; Hatch, *The Byrds of Virginia*, 373.

⁵³ R.E. Byrd to Chief of Naval Operations, 15 April 1947, BPRC, folder 7295; Department of State, Memorandum of Conversation, Assistant Secretary of State (Braden) et al., 12 November 1946; Department of State, Memorandum by Division of Northern European Affairs (Green), 11 February 1948, NARA, RG 59, 800.014; *The New York Times*, 8 January 1947.

⁵⁴ *Newsweek*, 10 March 1947; *Travel*, January 1947.

⁵⁵ Department of State, Division of Northern European Affairs and Division of North and West Coast Affairs to Office of European Affairs et al., 8 September 1947, NARA, RG 59, 800.014.

that of the government, had started to deplete its mineral and oil reserves. He counseled an official claim for this reason, among others, but was dependable in following orders inconsistent with his own beliefs and the public record thereof.⁵⁶ In an obviously scripted press conference upon his return to the United States, Byrd denied ever having supported a formal sovereignty claim and insisted that Antarctica was of no strategic importance. His second-in-command, Admiral Richard H. Cruzen, played devil's advocate, reflecting on the lessons of Alaska.⁵⁷

That widely criticized territorial purchase, for a sum that yielded a much greater return in natural resources, allowed the U.S. Navy to present its diversion of manpower to the Antarctic as a long-term investment. Cruzen's position was not only logical; it revived one of the central issues raised to urge congressional funding of the 1939–1941 expedition. *The New York Times* had analyzed countless issues in the intervening six years, so many that it did not pause to review its own coverage of the previous appropriations debate. With each argument Cruzen employed against Byrd, he better qualified as the senior officer's heir apparent. His contention that defending the mainland someday might summon the needs to defend the South Pole resurrected Byrd's earlier appeals to the Monroe Doctrine.⁵⁸ For some reason, angst in the Department of State that Byrd's statements might contradict official policy—whichever direction this might take—did not extend to self-contradictory statements made at the government's urging.⁵⁹ The government might have intended

⁵⁶ R.E. Byrd, Undated Report for Chief of Naval Operations, [circa 1947], BPRC, folder 7296; *FRUS* 1948, vol. 1, part 2, *General* (Washington: USGPO, 1976), 962.

⁵⁷ *The New York Times*, 15 April 1947; *New York Herald Tribune*, 15 April 1947. For a similar reference to Alaska, see *Christian Science Monitor Magazine*, 29 July 1939.

⁵⁸ See *The New York Times*, 12 January 1939, 8 July 1939, 5 March 1940, 9 February 1947.

⁵⁹ Department of State, Division of North and West Coast Affairs (Brundage) to Assistant Secretary of State (Braden) et al., 10 February 1947, NARA, RG 59, Office of American Republic Affairs, Memoranda on Chile.

the press conference to stimulate a national debate or, even more likely, to generate public confusion resulting in a useful degree of apathy toward national rights.

The non-claimant policy persisted despite reports of government plans to forward rights in the wake of High Jump.⁶⁰ *Newsweek* did not criticize the U.S. Navy's failure to state a clear political intention, as this transcended the role of the armed services, but it did regret that Washington appeared to be ignoring the obvious—that whatever riches might lie beneath it, the Antarctic merited a claim.⁶¹ *Travel* bluntly alleged that officials were failing to seize the opportunity before them.⁶² His public statements notwithstanding, Byrd shared a more desperate variety of this perspective. Securing Antarctica as a base for cold-weather training exercises was imperative to narrow the advantage held by the USSR in this arena, lest it precipitate an invasion of Alaska or Greenland.⁶³ While he might have been encouraged by the tone of some journalists, he forecasted a national scandal if his security assessment were made known.⁶⁴

The admiral refrained from publicizing the issues that personally distraught him, insofar as they related to his perception of the national good, for such behavior would have been injurious to the chain of command, civil-military relations and his own future. From close involvement with the Roosevelt administration and ongoing feedback from his brother in the senate, he appreciated that rumors and press leaks could be counterproductive. He discounted this effect in regard to the navy's support for High Jump II, since he and the top echelon of the first operation both shared

⁶⁰ *The New York Times*, 6 January 1947.

⁶¹ *Newsweek*, 10 March 1947.

⁶² *Travel*, January 1947.

⁶³ Prospective Commander of High Jump II (Byrd) to Secretary of Defense, 29 August 1949, in Joint Chiefs of Staff, JCS 2070, 30 September 1949, NARA, RG 218, Geographical File.

⁶⁴ R.E. Byrd to H.F. Byrd, 28 September 1949, BPRC, folder 50.

enthusiasm for it and had received informal endorsements from many sectors.⁶⁵ The later cancellation infuriated him most of all because of the false promises made by officials throughout the administration. The public explanation citing economics heightened his outrage since the navy confidentially admitted its falsehood. While he dwelled on a conspiracy involving the Department of Defense and the White House, his brother commiserated that the expedition had more than adequate popular and congressional support.⁶⁶

L.A. Rose provides an insightful portrait of Byrd in the wake of his *Assault on Eternity* via Operation High Jump, which set that set the standard for modern exploration. To an extent the admiral did react “like a jilted lover” to the cancellation of High Jump II, but much of his contempt for those who postponed his “South Polar dreams,” as Rose refers to them, related to the improbability that Washington would advance a sovereignty claim until another expedition were underway. His dreams were not those of a small-minded egoist but rather those of a someone whose dearest vision was being neglected due to issues such as more frugal opportunities for cold-weather training in the Arctic. If, as Rose contends, his character was extraordinarily complex, the same could be observed of the U.S. role in the world during this period, when many far-reaching commitments strained the government’s time and resources.⁶⁷ Byrd’s desire to place Antarctica among these commitments was unduly optimistic rather than complex.

Operation High Jump had begun to entangle the United States in a sovereignty dispute which by 1948 bore evidence of intractability. Efforts by Byrd to promulgate

⁶⁵ R.E. Byrd to Paul Siple, 13 August 1948; R.E. Byrd to R.H. Cruzen, 6 October 1949, folder 1412; R.H. Cruzen to Byrd, 28 June 1949, BPRC, folders 812, 1412.

⁶⁶ R.E. Byrd to H.F. Byrd, 27 August 1949, folder 33; H.F. Byrd to R.E. Byrd, 30 September 1949, BPRC, folders 33, 50. See *Washington Time Herald*, 26 August 1949.

⁶⁷ See L.A. Rose, *Assault on Eternity: Richard E. Byrd and the Exploration of Antarctica, 1946–47* (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 1980), 252–53. See Peter Beck, *The International Politics of Antarctica* (New York: St Martin’s Press, 1986), 41.

the neutrality of his government had little chance of success and virtually none of leading the Southern Cone nations and Britain to refrain from pressing their contradictory rights. The admiral refused to accept that High Jump II would have exacerbated the three-sided dispute. There was “no reason whatsoever,” he believed, to hold another expedition hostage to international relations,⁶⁸ yet events involving Deception Island suggested that the Truman administration’s restraint was well-justified. Not only did the island’s name aptly convey the spirit of mistrust; its natural harbor and strategic location were ideal, causing the British to regard it as the “key” to the Falkland or Malvinas Dependencies.⁶⁹

Washington viewed non-claimancy as the best means of distancing itself from this controversy, but the alternative, while offering no panacea, might have helped to forestall the naval displays of 1948. That is, the announcement of U.S. rights over the archipelago in question might have deterred Britain from dispatching the battle cruiser *Nigeria* to rebuke the Southern Cone nations’ ambitions. London had sought to involve the International Court of Justice, only to have Santiago and Buenos Aires insist that their rights were beyond The Hague’s jurisdiction. Their counterproposal to meet in Argentina incurred a British rejection for approximately the same reason: each power sought a venue perceived to be in its favor.⁷⁰ As *Nigeria* headed south with plans to join *Snipe* at Deception Island,⁷¹ Argentina sent two cruisers and six torpedo boats for operations in Tierra del Fuego, and President Gabriel Gonzalez

⁶⁸ R.E. Byrd to A.W. Radford, 7 September 1949, BPRC, folder 2799.

⁶⁹ Colonial Office (Eastwood) to Ministry of Food (Feavearyear), 17 May 1950, in Colonial Office to Foreign Office, American Department, no. 88442/1/50, A 15225/3, 17 May 1950, PRO, FO 371/81139. See Vivian Fuchs, *Of Ice and Men: The Story of the British Antarctic Survey 1943–73* (Oswestry, Shropshire: Anthony Nelson, 1982).

⁷⁰ See Oliver Holmes, “Antarctic Claims Raise Colonial Issue in Americas,” *Foreign Policy Bulletin* 39 (1960), 180–81.

⁷¹ Embassy in London (Gallman) to Secretary of State, 18 February 1948, no. 604, NARA, RG 59, 800.014.

Videla personally led a mission to assert Chile's presence in what it called Tierra O'Higgins.⁷²

This situation appeared to confirm the prediction by *The New Republic* of a "dog-eat-dog context to grab land and squabble over bases."⁷³ Walter Sullivan insinuated that the strategic position of U.S. icebreakers at Marguerite Bay was no coincidence,⁷⁴ but periodicals generally trivialized the developments. For example, *Time* and *Newsweek* noted that British and Argentine crews maintained sufficiently cordial relations when docked at Deception Island to hold soccer matches, their only point of contention being which side should be regarded as the home team.⁷⁵ The engaging tenor of these reports sided with British perceptions that the current incident was little more than a comic operetta. While the *Nigeria* standoff aroused the appetite but not the enterprise for blood-letting,⁷⁶ questions of national prestige were motivating officials to engage in activities which were dangerously unproductive.⁷⁷

The *Nigeria* incident somewhat tempered the anger which Byrd felt over the cancellation of Operation High Jump II. As a veteran military strategist, he grasped that his own endeavors were less important than the need for harmony among Washington's Cold War allies. The Department of State months later proposed a condominium arrangement with the seven claimant nations to deter possible Soviet advances. The claimants were amenable to this objective but recoiled at the price at which it was to be achieved: the renunciation of their sovereignty rights. While the Southern Cone nations and Britain were least willing to entertain this, given their

⁷² *The New York Times*, 10 February 1948, 19 February 1948.

⁷³ *The New Republic*, 18 November 1946.

⁷⁴ *The New York Times*, 22 February 1948.

⁷⁵ *Time*, 1 March 1948; *Newsweek*, 1 March 1948.

⁷⁶ See Paul Siple, *90° South: The Story of the American South Pole Conquest* (New York: G.P. Putnam's Sons, 1959), 83.

⁷⁷ See Embassy in London (Douglas) to Secretary of State, 27 February 1948, A-480, NARA, RG 59, 800.014.

nationalistic sentiments, Chile refused to be perceived as a spoiler. It responded with the Escudero Plan to postpone debate over conflicting claims for five to ten years during which the other aspects of a condominium could be negotiated.⁷⁸ This alternative seemed reasonable on its own terms but had no mitigating effect on Anglo–American disquietude over the harsh rhetoric and increasing solidarity of the Southern Cone nations.⁷⁹

In June 1950 the Soviet Union insisted that no final decisions should be made without its participation, and it alluded to the 1819–1821 Bellingshausen expedition as a possible basis for its own sovereignty claim. The Department of State withheld any response to the USSR, augmenting its non-recognition, non-claimant policy with non-communication.⁸⁰ Byrd, who publicized his dread of Soviet encroachment in the far south, also publicized his resolve to lead another expedition after the Korean War. He appreciated that the government had chosen silence as the best means to avoid provoking a Soviet claim or expedition, yet in his view it was equally necessary to maintain an active U.S. presence. As the case for Operation High Jump II, his enthusiasm was rebuffed, the navy flatly denying that it had any plans for another Byrd expedition.⁸¹

One of the few recent patterns in which officials could take solace was the abeyance of further *Nigeria* incidents. The corresponding window of opportunity to reach some kind of agreement, eight-power or otherwise, began to close in February 1952 when Argentine soldiers prevented a team of British geologists from

⁷⁸ See Moore, “Tethered to an Iceberg.”

⁷⁹ *The New York Times*, 24 February 1948; Department of State, Bureau of British Commonwealth and Northern European Affairs (Hulley) to Office of North and West Coast Affairs (Mills), 4 January 1950; Department of State, Memorandum of Conversation, Office of Intelligence Research (Boggs) et al., 16 January 1952, NARA, RG 59, 702.022; Foreign Office Minute, 19 February 1953, no. 83, PRO, FO 371.

⁸⁰ Embassy in Moscow (Kirk) to Department of State, 20 July 1950, no. 177, control 8747, NARA, RG 59, 702.022; Embassy in Washington to Foreign Office, 20 July 1950, PRO, FO 463.

⁸¹ *The New York Times*, 24 November 1951.

disembarking at Hope Bay in the Antarctic peninsula.⁸² Intensive Anglo-American negotiations suspended conflict only until the next February when British personnel dismantled small Argentine and Chilean bases on Deception Island.⁸³ The U.S. Navy had been nowhere in the vicinity, yet Latin Americans fumed that Washington denied the applicability of its hemispheric defense commitments.⁸⁴ With the re-emergence of this issue, the opportunity for barring Soviet participation passed, straining relations among the four powers well beyond hope for a condominium arrangement. No one lamented this more than Byrd, who stalwartly questioned the benefits of withholding an official claim.⁸⁵

During this interlude one self-motivated citizen, Elizabeth A. Kendall, appealed for the government to do “something constructive and progressive.” She chastized its allegiance to the Hughes Doctrine, as occupation was a highly uninviting prospect even when so much was at stake. Antarctica’s untapped mineral resources, she ventured, might be sufficient to ignite a war—as both the United States and Britain recognized after the Deception Island incident.⁸⁶ Kendall held that formalizing a U.S. claim would be the best means of postponing that risk until further exploration could justify or deny the need to field a military deterrent. Senators had been responsive to her recommendation for Moscow to waive its “shadowy claims” as a settlement for its wartime debt, and the committee for public works urged

⁸² *The New York Times*, 3 February 1952. See Beck, *The International Politics of Antarctica*, 34-35; David Winston Heron, “Antarctic Claims,” *Foreign Affairs* 32 (1954), 661-67.

⁸³ Embassy in Buenos Aires (Nufer) to Department of State, 23 February 1953, no. 1067, NARA, RG 59, 702.022; Colonial Office (Harrison) to Foreign Office (Garvey), 26 March 1953, A 15212/196, PRO, FO 371.

⁸⁴ Department of State, Office of European Affairs to Secretary of State, 18 February 1948, NARA, RG 59, 800.014; Acting Secretary of State (Smith) to Embassy in London, 10 April 1953, A-1362, NARA, RG 59, 702.022.

⁸⁵ Department of State, Memorandum of Conversation, Bureau of British Commonwealth and Northern European Affairs (Hilliker) et al., 11 September 1952, NARA, RG 59, 702.022.

⁸⁶ E.A. Kendall to, 17 July 1950, in Chairman of Senate Committee on Foreign Relations (Connally) to Assistant Secretary of State (McFall), 20 July 1950; Ambassador in Santiago (Bowers) to Secretary of State, 31 March 1953, no. 410, control 10818, NARA, RG 59, 702.022; Foreign Office (Garvey), Record of Meeting with Admiralty (Brock), A 15121/8, 2 February 1953, PRO, FO 371.

reconsideration of this alternative.⁸⁷ The Department of State held firm in opposition to this tack or any other proactive stance to defend U.S. Antarctic rights.⁸⁸ Events soon outpaced whatever influence Kendall or Byrd might have exerted.

In late 1954 President Dwight D. Eisenhower ordered *Atka* to the region west of the Antarctic peninsula, just beyond the unclaimed sector from 90° to 150° West. Its purpose was to investigate the forthcoming U.S. contribution to the 1957–1958 International Geophysical Year (IGY) announced by the United Nations. *The New York Times* referred to this as “blood-tingling news” for Americans who had been deprived of vicarious adventure since Operation High Jump. While acknowledging that the National Security Council had sanctioned the voyage for strategic reasons, the editors permitted themselves a bit of exuberance since Antarctica was still “the last frontier.” By including the Soviet Union among the dozens of nations to collect scientific data worldwide, and specifically among those to be active on the white continent, the IGY fulfilled a cycle in the service of *Atka*, which had been part of lend-lease aid to the Soviet Union.⁸⁹ A broader interpretation unsettled those sectors of the government and populace intent on stemming the tide of communism; Antarctica, before the announcement of the IGY, had been an ideal location for attaining this goal.

Ambassador Paul C. Daniels, Antarctic advisor to the Department of State, referred to a “gentleman’s agreement” to avoid political controversy during preparations for the IGY and the 18-month period itself.⁹⁰ That held in action but not

⁸⁷ Senate Committee on Public Works (Case) to Assistant Secretary of State (McFall), 10 February 1951, NARA, RG 59, 702.022.

⁸⁸ Assistant Secretary of State (McFall) to Chairman of Senate Committee on Foreign Relations (Connally), [20 July 1950], NARA, RG 59, 702.022.

⁸⁹ *The New York Times*, 5 October 1954, 29 November 1954. See John H. Roscoe, “Exploring Antarctica Vicariously: A Survey of Recent Literature,” *Geographical Review* 48, no. 3 (1958): 406–27.

⁹⁰ Paul C. Daniels, “The Antarctic Treaty,” in Richard S. Lewis and Philip M. Smith, eds., *Frozen Future: A Prophetic Report from Antarctica* (New York: Quadrangle Books, 1973), 31–45.

in spirit, as reports envisioned the final destiny of Antarctica as a U.S., British or joint Anglo–American zone for nuclear tests.⁹¹ Walter Sullivan leveraged his credibility as science editor of *The New York Times* in favor of this idea, as the continent had no indigenous human population and relatively few species of plants and animals. This purpose, he wrote, was consistent with the navy’s diversion of eighteen hundred sailor, seven vessels and an air squadron to Operation Deep Freeze I in the 1955–1956 season.⁹² Navy spokesmen made no implication of having this purpose, but they did allude to the possibility of a forthcoming claim, as Deep Freeze I planned to act on the 16-year-old objective to establish permanent bases.⁹³

Byrd was pleased by another opportunity for command after the cancellation of High Jump II, but quite displeased that the Soviet Union was among the nations that the IGY had called to duty in the far south—along with the seven claimant nations, Belgium, Japan and South Africa. The admiral shared the concern of the National Security Council and Joint Chiefs of Staff that the twelve-nation plan to establish nearly sixty outposts threatened to erode the basis for a U.S. claim.⁹⁴ Before and after he arrived in Antarctica, Byrd remarked that until Washington acted he would have to consider Little America his personal property.⁹⁵ Good humor helped to conceal his anxiety over the government’s failure to recognize the claims that he had made on its behalf with encouragement from the Department of State. Each day he was growing more prone to accept the perspective of Elizabeth A. Kendall, who

⁹¹ For example, Embassy in Santiago (Sanders) to Department of State, 14 March 1955, no. 645, NARA, RG 59, 702.022.

⁹² *The New York Times*, 26 October 1954, 3 April 1955, 21 December 1955.

⁹³ *The New York Times*, 3 November 1955.

⁹⁴ Joint Chiefs of Staff (Carns), Memorandum for the Chief of Naval Operations, 14 January 1955, SM-29-55; Joint Chiefs of Staff (Hillyard), Memorandum for Deputy Director for Strategic Plans, 3 April 1957, SM-268-57, NARA, RG 218, CCS 092; National Security Council, NSC 5528: Antarctica, 12 December 1955, NARA, RG 59, Records of the Policy Planning Staff. See Lewis, *A Continent for Science*, 65; H.G.R. King, *The Antarctic* (London: Blandford Press, 1969), 238-39.

⁹⁵ *The New York Times*, 20 November 1955, 29 December 1955.

excoriated non-claimancy as an insult to all U.S. Antarctic explorers, past and present.⁹⁶

British officials in Washington believed that Antarctica had no immediate strategic value, as Byrd had stated after *High Jump*, but warned, in keeping with his true opinion, “Things change very fast in the world.”⁹⁷ The number of origin of bases under construction attested to this, as did the ability of the government to invest \$250 million in the IGY without encountering much opposition in congress.⁹⁸ Over the months of illness before his death in March 1957, Byrd had the opportunity to witness his own five Antarctic expeditions being continued by George Dufek, commander of the remaining Operations Deep Freeze, which would implement a sustainable U.S. presence. *The New York Times* attributed this presence to a single factor—that Byrd had driven “the opening wedges and planted the American flag.”⁹⁹ As there could be no doubt of the admiral’s significance, there could be no assurance that the government would recognize it as fully as he had hoped.

Later in the year, congressional interest reached an unprecedented level prompting six representatives to visit the continent to keep abreast of scientific breakthroughs surrounding the IGY, as well as the political climate and its bearing on U.S. policy. One congressman coupled a decades-old assertion of the region’s strategic value with a new hope that it also might become a popular tourist destination. While tourist destinations also could be strategic—Paris, for example—the congressman’s statement revealed tension between military and utopian objectives. The House Foreign Commerce Committee recommended a course beneficial to either set of objectives: abdicating the Hughes Doctrine and making a

⁹⁶ See *FRUS* 1939, 2: 11-14; E.A. Kendall to Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, 17 July 1950.

⁹⁷ Department of State, Memorandum of Conversation, Office of Inter-American Regional Political Affairs (Wilson), 20 September 1957, NARA, RG 59, 702.022.

⁹⁸ See *National Geographic Magazine*, October 1959.

⁹⁹ *The New York Times*, 13 March 1957.

sovereignty claim. One senator, eager to carry this initiative further, called for prohibiting the construction of Soviet bases, and his attitude was gaining popularity in congress.¹⁰⁰

There was every sign that the IGY would accompany a major political development, and it did in March 1958 when the Department of State circulated a second internationalization proposal. In permitting the retention of sovereign rights but denying their enforcement, the proposal became an acceptable basis for Washington to host negotiations with the eleven other IGY nations active in the far south.¹⁰¹ Chile had drafted the political moratorium a decade years earlier as a means of excluding the USSR,¹⁰² so its application now was less than ideal. Lamenting that the United States had allowed the Soviet Union to participate in the IGY, *The Christian Century* bleakly summarized, “Beggars can’t be choosers” while *American Mercury* elaborated, “We’re losing the Antarctic.”¹⁰³ Kendall, who for years had kept the government informed of her disgust for the non-claimant policy, now berated the government for its readiness to “hand away rich territory” for the sake of a few idealistic scientists.¹⁰⁴

This lone citizen activist had followed the press carefully, read and reread official statements, and found nothing to allay her concern that no action was being taken to protect U.S. rights. She noted the irony that the government was investing heavily in radar systems for the north polar vicinity while opening the south to the

¹⁰⁰ *The New York Times*, 1 November 1957, 29 November 1957, 14 February 1958, 17 February 1958; *Newsweek*, 3 March 1958.

¹⁰¹ Department of State, Aide Memoire to Representatives of Argentina, Australia, Belgium, Chile, France, Japan, Norway, New Zealand, South Africa, USSR, and United Kingdom, 24 March 1958, NARA, RG 59, 702.022.

¹⁰² See Ambassador in Santiago (Bowers) to Secretary of State, 19 July 1948, no. 495, NARA, RG 59, 800.014.

¹⁰³ *The Christian Century*, 25 June 1958; *American Mercury*, November 1958.

¹⁰⁴ E.A. Kendall to Committees and Individual Members of Congress, 16 November 1958, in Senate Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs (Dworshak) to Assistant Secretary of State (Macomber), 16 September 1959; E.A. Kendall to Secretary of State (Herter), 8 December 1958, NARA, RG 59, 399.929.

communist enemy. While apparently unconcerned that the British presence in the Falkland Dependencies perturbed the other American republics, she questioned why the Rio Treaty was not being invoked if only to exclude the Soviet Union. In short she viewed internationalization as a concept better suited for Mars than for Earth, a planet brimming with weapons of mass destruction and divided by superpowers willing to use them. She pleaded for officials to be “realistic” and deal with establishing “concrete sovereignty” rather than adhering to the non-claimant policy that in her well-informed opinion marked “a complete reversal of thrift, common sense [and] wisdom.”¹⁰⁵

In October 1959, the informal twelve-power negotiations evolved into the Antarctic Conference held in Washington. This major event opened with an address conveying wonderment that more was known about the bright side of the moon than about the Antarctic interior. This foretold of what Kendall had dreaded: the frozen continent would be dealt with like an extra-terrestrial body, not a realm in which U.S. rights stretched back to the 1820–1821 voyage of Nathaniel Palmer. While *Time* correctly predicted a treaty maintaining the political status quo, its reference to the friendly atmosphere of the conference was not entirely accurate.¹⁰⁶ Passionate debate emerged over a long-denied U.S. scheme to use the continent as a testing ground for nuclear weapons. The U.S. delegation faced strenuous opposition from an unlikely coalition between the Southern Hemisphere nations and the Soviet Union. In the end it yielded, lest the conference dissolve and thereby rob the United States of the

¹⁰⁵ Ibid.; E.A. Kendall to Appropriations Committee and Individual Members of Congress, 11 September 1959, NARA, RG 59, 399.829.

¹⁰⁶ *Time*, 26 October 1959.

international prestige which officials had prioritized over more tangible, historically based objectives.¹⁰⁷

The Antarctic Treaty, signed in December 1959, equally compromised the ambitions of the twelve signatory nations by leaving sovereignty claims in place but denying their enforcement. That provision removed the most serious impediment to unlimited technical cooperation. Peter Briggs describes the treaty as laying the harmonious foundation for a laboratory at the bottom of the world or, as Richard S. Lewis puts it, devoting a continent to science.¹⁰⁸ These impressive themes dominated headlines of the era, replacing skepticism toward the U.S. non-claimant policy. Between one and five thousand personnel now occupied Antarctic year-round,¹⁰⁹ with more likely to follow given the treaty's liberal accession clause and increasing expeditions by the original signatories. Lewis naturally conveys enthusiasm for the treaty's scientific implications, but notes that the conference leading to it might never have occurred but for the unfeasibility of resource exploitation.¹¹⁰

A great ideal had been achieved under many questionable pretences. For the other treaty signatories the most questionable of these had involved the U.S. non-claimant policy, which seemed to guise an un-stated agenda. Fortunately the Department of State had imposed a veil of secrecy over the conference to prevent issues such as nuclear testing from igniting protests abroad,¹¹¹ and the U.S. delegation

¹⁰⁷ See Embassy in London (Gallman) to Secretary of State, 18 February 1948, no. 604, NARA, RG 59, 800.014; Department of State, Memorandum of Conversation, Office of United Nations Political and Security Affairs (DePalma), 5 March 1956; Department of State, Office of Deputy Undersecretary of State (Owen), Notes for National Security Council Briefing, 9 December 1959, NARA, RG 59, 702.022; U.S. Delegation to Antarctic Conference (Phleger), Memorandum for Deputy Undersecretary of State (Merchant), 17 November 1959, NARA, RG 59, 399.829. See *The New York Times*, 3 March 1955.

¹⁰⁸ Peter Briggs, *Laboratory at the Bottom of the World* (New York: D. McKay Company, 1970); 1970; Lewis, *A Continent for Science*.

¹⁰⁹ Lewis and Smith, *Frozen Future*, x.

¹¹⁰ Lewis, *A Continent for Science*, 282. See Walter Sullivan, "Antarctica in a Two-Power World," *Foreign Affairs* 36 (1957), 154-66.

¹¹¹ See Daniels, "The Antarctic Treaty."

had been willing to compromise. At the same time, the government had committed a strategic lapse in not taking measures to encourage the treaty's ratification. One senator denounced the outcome as marking a "dismal end to one of the brightest, proudest chapters of American history."¹¹² He and twenty-one of his colleagues saw no evidence of the superb foresight that *America* attributed to the United States.¹¹³ Instead, they saw evidence of what Kendall referred to as a "free-for-all" that benefited Moscow while disgracing past and present U.S. explorers.¹¹⁴

In the lag of U.S. exploration following Operation High Jump, *The New York Times* jested that Byrd had chosen to renew the theme of untapped mineral wealth to justify his lust for adventure.¹¹⁵ Indeed the spirit of the 63-year-old admiral hearkened to earlier decades when he was an Annapolis cadet known for his thrill-seeking impulse.¹¹⁶ Once he had invited a long-time friend to accompany him on a treasure hunt in Nova Scotia "just for the fun of the thing."¹¹⁷ By that standard the Antarctic offered still greater rewards and diversion. In pursuit of these objectives he simultaneously grew convinced of the imperative to forward national rights and aged into a grandfatherly figure who personified U.S. Antarctic exploration. One fellow aeronautics enthusiast put it more forcefully that he had become a model "representative of the people," though he had neither been elected nor appointed to a diplomatic post.¹¹⁸

¹¹² *Time*, 22 August 1960.

¹¹³ See *America*, 27 August 1960.

¹¹⁴ E.A. Kendall to Committees and Individual Members of Congress, 16 November 1958.

¹¹⁵ *The New York Times*, 25 November 1951.

¹¹⁶ *Reader's Digest*, January 1940. *The New York Times* once referred to Byrd's "penchant for hunting out trouble and getting away from it with a whole skin," such as when "he flew thirty-five miles behind enemy lines in a P-38 with flak bursting around him" and then dropped low to observe "hundreds of German infantrymen taking pot-shots at him from the ground." *The New York Times*, 4 December 1944.

¹¹⁷ R.E. Byrd to R.B. Fosdick, 7 May 1932, BPRC, folder 1649.

¹¹⁸ J.E. Mooney to R.E. Byrd, 2 June 1941, BPRC, folder 2272.

Aware that he would be heading south again, as commander of Operation Deep Freeze I, his blood must have tingled as journalists' did in vicarious expectation.¹¹⁹ He expressed satisfaction that his Antarctic endeavors were generating more favorable press than his earlier ones in the Arctic.¹²⁰ This understatement corresponded to his occasional discomfort with having others regard him as a celebrity—presumably more because of the attention it drew to his personal affairs rather than any aversion to praise.¹²¹ In one protest of what he regarded as inaccurate coverage, he acknowledged his over-sensitivity to criticism.¹²² This tendency, however, did not cause him to shy from public involvement, for between expeditions he made nationwide speaking tours and participated in broadcasts devoted to Cold War themes.¹²³ He was not simply the best-known explorer of the era.¹²⁴ He was an individual known by his unusually multifaceted associations.

In his later years, Byrd might have underestimated his popularity, concerned by the re-emergence of indictments directed against his character and business ventures, which had declined substantially by the time of Operation High Jump. So too he might have questioned the responsiveness of the public to his instigation of a pro-claimant lobby. While this form of activism would have violated his chain-of-command orientation as a naval officer, his confidence in elected and appointed officials had begun to falter over the years that they ignored him or made false promises. Operation Deep Freeze I to some extent counteracted what he referred to as

¹¹⁹ See *The New York Times*, 5 October 1954.

¹²⁰ R.E. Byrd to National Defense Committee, 5 October 1954, BPRC, folder 2223.

¹²¹ R.E. Byrd to H.F. Byrd, 26 October 1939; R.E. Byrd to G.P. Putnam's Sons, 18 March 1941, BPRC, folders 43, 1699.

¹²² R.E. Byrd to United Press Associates, 9 May 1947, BPRC, folder 2793.

¹²³ R.E. Byrd to R. Parker, 13 November 1947; R.E. Byrd to O.K. Armstrong, 28 February 1949, BPRC, folders 2173, 1079.

¹²⁴ *Time*, 18 November 1946, 31 December 1956; *The Christian Science Monitor*, 29 July 1939; Rose, *Assault on eternity*, 18

his “martyrdom complex,”¹²⁵ but his gloom over the government’s devotion to the Hughes Doctrine must have consolidated after his last command. He knew of the forthcoming IGY and might have presumed that, if the government failed to reverse its stance beforehand, it was extremely unlikely to do so while cooperating in the field with eleven other powers.

Once retired from active duty after Operation High Jump,¹²⁶ Byrd might have considered himself justified in taking advantage of his widespread popularity to speak as a private citizen and urge his fellow Americans to abandon the outdated Hughes Doctrine. It is difficult to believe, given his stature and the mood of the press, that such an effort would have failed. It is less difficult to appreciate his hesitation since, by leading a grassroots movement, he would have lost credibility among most officials and risked besmirching his legacy. A few more years of good health might have eroded his inhibition to re-enter the realm of domestic politics on his own terms instead of as an unflagging lobbyist for the Roosevelt administration.¹²⁷ In any case his death at the crucial juncture of 1957 deprived the United States of a resource at once symbolic and practical, unlike the nation’s Antarctic policy.

Howard J. Wiarda write that culture filters, shapes and mediates all human responses, which in turn can vary greatly among individuals who shared the same universal goal. He links the complexity of measuring cultural influence on policy to how socio-economic factors lead different groups to incompatible viewpoints.¹²⁸ While his perspective resounds with self-evident clarity germane to most issues, it is not applicable to widespread dissatisfaction regarding U.S. non-claimancy. For

¹²⁵ R.E. Byrd to H.F. Byrd, 27 August 1949, BPRC, folder 33.

¹²⁶ *The New York Times*, 23 February 1948.

¹²⁷ See Text of Radio Address by R.E. Byrd on Columbia Broadcasting Service, 12 November 1937; R.E. Byrd to F.D. Roosevelt, 18 March 1941; Text of Speech by R.E. Byrd at Madison Square Garden, New York City, 18 August 1941, BPRC, folders 3503, 2902.

¹²⁸ Howard J. Wiarda, *The Soul of Latin America: The Cultural and Political Transition* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2001), 2-3.

Americans, the Antarctic was a novel abstraction unrelated to their civil liberties or personal standard of living. Its mineral wealth, which might have benefited all Americans, ended up benefiting none. The least troubling aspect of this outcome was its equitability, as also the case regarding a sovereignty claim. Any loss or gain was so far removed from the daily routine of citizens that a majority could either tolerate or welcome Antarctica's apparent exemptions from power politics.¹²⁹

With some form of public encouragement, it remains likely that many would have joined the indefatigable crusade waged by Elizabeth A. Kendall. Her biography—unfortunately not to be found among her letters preserved among Department of State papers—might or might not have been as intriguing as the readily available accounts of Byrd's life. She remains invaluable for this chapter. With her assistance, perhaps the Antarctic Colony Associates would have received government assistance, as requested, to maintain a U.S. presence in Antarctica consistent with the Hughes Doctrine.¹³⁰ Instead the Department of State responded without a trace of encouragement,¹³¹ and the state of Florida witnessed the demise of one of its most eccentric not-for-profit organizations.¹³²

The eight votes by which the Antarctic Treaty won ratification certainly might have been swayed by influences other than Byrd, although his popularity and convictions made him the leading candidate to become an exponent of U.S. Antarctic nationalism. There is no record of the slogan "Little America for the Little

¹²⁹ See Akira Iriye, "Culture and Power: International Relations as Intercultural Relations," *Diplomatic History* 3 (1979), 115-28.

¹³⁰ Antarctic Colony Associates (Krouse), to Secretary of State (Acheson), 7 July 1950, NARA, RG 59, 702.022.

¹³¹ Department of State, Division of North and West Coast Affairs (Hulley), to Antarctic Colony Associates (Krouse), 7 July 1950, NARA, RG 59, 702.022.

¹³² Sheldon W. Boggs, who had drafted the 1948 U.S. internationalization proposal, was impressed by that Associates' detailed proposal which made "more sense than I thought possible from such a seemingly fantastic enterprise." Department of State, Office of Intelligence Research (S.W. Boggs) to Bureau of British Commonwealth and Northern European Affairs (Hulley), 27 September 1950, NARA, RG 59, 702.022.

Americans” ever having gained currency, yet traces of that sentiment were perceptible. The Department of State hoped to stifle it since the U.S. policymaking tack required tremendous flexibility. Analysts are bound to disagree over the wisdom of that approach, and it should be hoped that they will disagree over the relevancy of pro-claimant opinion. The likes of Kendall and George D. Krouse, founder of the Antarctic Colony Association, deserve the attention—whether as biographical subjects in their own right or as neglected components of geopolitical maneuvering.

As posited by *The Times* [London] indices, journalism is an indispensable tool for understanding any nation’s history, and herein it has demonstrated that U.S. reporters shared Byrd’s common sense pertaining to the Antarctic. They also displayed ample insight pertaining to the region’s geopolitical implications. Those affiliated with *The New York Times* wrote with eloquence deserving of front-page column space, which it frequently gained. Walter Sullivan is a particularly engaging figure for historians. Through his newspaper reports and more academic literature, he affirmed that journalists can fulfill their professional duties, such as meeting a reasonable standard of objectivity, without having to conceal their sense of patriotism.¹³³

At times Sullivan and his colleagues Bernard Kalb, Edward A. Morrow and C.L. Sulzberger did engage in what David Broder refers to as “imaginative exercises” which can mislead the public either intentionally or due to the non-availability of pertinent information.¹³⁴ They nonetheless provided a useful and generally accurate overview of the foreign policy agendas harbored by the superpowers and claimant nations. Alarmist speculation regarding Chile and Argentina emerged, but did not

¹³³ See Sullivan, “Antarctica in a Two-Power World”; Sullivan, *Quest for a Continent* (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1957); Ted Galen Carpenter, *The Captive Press: Foreign Policy Crises and the First Amendment* (Washington: Cato Institute, 1995), vii.

¹³⁴ David S. Broder, *Behind the Front Page: A Candid Look at How the News is Made* (New York: Simon and Shuster, 1987), 94.

provide an effective segue for explaining U.S. non-claimancy.¹³⁵ Journalists deserved credit for simply predicting or encouraging a policy reversal rather than misplacing blame that it never occurred. Given the tension between massive U.S. exploration and the government's insouciant attitude toward declaring rights, neither ordinary Americans nor the journalists who informed them were able to distinguish between rumors and truth.¹³⁶ It is noteworthy that officials sometimes confronted the same situation.¹³⁷

Walter LaFeber refers to the challenge posed to diplomatic historians by social historians who contest the value of research devoted exclusively to the interaction between or among governments. He also applauds that challenge for having prompted diplomatic historians to integrate a larger number of culturally oriented perspectives into their work,¹³⁸ ideally achieving what Barry Rubin describes as a balance between official details and journalistic conjecture.¹³⁹ The domestic context of the U.S. non-claimant policy, like the international context thereof, was based on official conjecture. As the seven claimant nations properly suspected that the United States might reverse its position and make a sovereignty claim, journalists expected as much and diplomats actively kept that possibility under consideration even as twelve-power negotiations were underway.¹⁴⁰

¹³⁵ See Jason Kendall Moore, "Seven Penguins and an Olive Branch: Antarctic Politics in *The New York Times*," *Estudios Norteamericanos* 2, no. 4 (2001): 125-36.

¹³⁶ G.W. Allport and L. Postman, *The Psychology of Rumor* (New York: Russell and Russell, 1947), 24; Howard Kurtz, *Media Circus: The Trouble with America's Newspapers* (New York: Times Books, 1993), 144; A.E. Weiss, *Who's to Know? Information, the Media and Public Awareness* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1990), 7.

¹³⁷ See Department of State, Memorandum of Conversation, Assistant Secretary of State (Braden) et al., 12 November 1946, NARA, RG 59, 800.014.

¹³⁸ Walter LaFeber, "The World and the United States," *American Historical Review* 100, no. 4 (1995), 1015-33.

¹³⁹ Barry Rubin, *Secrets of State: The State Department and the Struggle over Foreign Policy* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1985), vii.

¹⁴⁰ See Jason Kendall Moore, "Alliance of Mistrust: The United States, Britain and Chile in the Quest for Antarctic Sovereignty, 1952-1959," *Estudios Norteamericanos* 3, no. 3 (2004): 187-205.

The history of the Antarctic Treaty benefits from applying LaFeber's perspective to the corollary between policymaking and public opinion. While the frozen continent lacked any culturally oriented perspective derived from an indigenous population, U.S. press reports offered the closest possible approximation thereof, reinforced by Byrd's perspective. The admiral's letters are a priceless resource in attempting to simulate what might be described as the U.S. Antarctic mentality. With increasing urgency he appealed for officials to forward a sovereignty claim. Policymakers agreed that the continent was valuable, though not valuable enough to risk the controversy which might surround the announcement of U.S. rights—an alternative which they preferred to save for a possible breakdown of the twelve-power negotiations.

The Department of State's dread of a Soviet counterclaim served to rationalize the unwillingness of officials throughout the government to spend more time attempting to reach a consensus. U.S. policy lacked the assertiveness which characterized U.S. exploration. Officials were neither fully devoted to non-claimancy nor able to project that appearance abroad. Their concern about provoking the USSR was exaggerated given the nature of their 1958 proposal to leave claims in place but prohibit their enforcement. It is conceivable that a U.S. claim might have derailed the twelve-power negotiations which culminated in the Antarctic Treaty. It equally conceivable that a U.S. claim made at that time, with the understanding that it was merely nominal, would have been satisfactory.¹⁴¹ A similar plan had been given active consideration in relation to forming the eight-power condominium arrangement which the United States proposed in 1948.¹⁴²

¹⁴¹ In that case a Soviet counterclaim also would have been nominal and had no effect on the United States' tribute to its own explorers.

¹⁴² See Department of State, Office of Undersecretary of State (Butler), Memorandum on Antarctica, 27 May 1948, NARA, RG 59, 800.014.

Unlike the vast majority of officials in Washington,¹⁴³ Byrd linked the question of U.S. sovereignty to both his assessment of the national interest and his personal prestige.¹⁴⁴ His reaction to the cancellation of Operation High Jump II evidenced his difficulty separating the two. His letters on the subject bear evidence of self-pity and admitted bitterness—for which he later and perhaps gratuitously apologized.¹⁴⁵ Long before his obituaries aptly restated the fact,¹⁴⁶ he was recognized as a national hero who, regardless of his business connections, had done more than anyone other North American to publicize Antarctica's strategic significance.¹⁴⁷ His prestige in Chile was especially noteworthy as that nation made the most concerted effort to displace the initial U.S. hope for it or the six other claimants to renounce their sovereignty.¹⁴⁸ The Department of State was well justified to acknowledge that his popularity was a diplomatic resource,¹⁴⁹ and its neglect of his advice naturally contributed to his disappointment.

As Byrd was returning to the United States with Operation High Jump, he informed the navy of his difficulty convincing journalists that the non-claimant policy was anything other than a "smokescreen."¹⁵⁰ Indeed he regarded it as such, as many

¹⁴³ With the possible exception of Sheldon W. Boggs and Robert E. Wilson, the Department of State's leading Antarctic specialists who both favored advancing a national claim based on exploration and drafted numerous plans to that effect.

¹⁴⁴ For example, R.E. Byrd to Vice Chief of Naval Operations (Radford), 12 August 1949; R.E. Byrd to A.W. Radford, 9 October 1953, BPRC, folder 2799.

¹⁴⁵ Byrd implied an apology by encouraging one of his friend and colleagues to destroy a letter he had written, which in hindsight seemed "very bitter." He clarified, "I am not bitter. I am sore as hell." R.E. Byrd to A.W. Radford, 7 September 1949. He once wrote to his brother of his "martyr complex" which he attributed to "the rotten treatment I have received." R.E. Byrd to H.F. Byrd, 27 August 1949, BPRC, folders 2799, 50.

¹⁴⁶ For example, *The New York Times*, 12 March 1957. One obituary encapsulated Byrd's perspective by recalling a question he had once posed to reporters: "What good is Antarctica? What good is a baby?" *Newsweek*, 25 March 1957.

¹⁴⁷ Perhaps his only rival in this regard was Chilean President Gabriel Gonzalez Videla with whom Byrd shared many characteristics, and from a technical perspective, Chile is as American as the United States. See Jason Kendall Moore, "Frontier Mentalities and Perceptual Trends in U.S.-Chilean Antarctic Relations through 1959," *Estudios Norteamericanos* 3, no. 2 (2003): 69-80.

¹⁴⁸ See Jason Kendall Moore, "Maritime Rivalry, Political Intervention, and the Race to Antarctica: U.S.-Chilean Relations, 1939-1949," *Journal of Latin American Studies* 33, no. 4 (2001): 713-38.

¹⁴⁹ Cordell Hull to F.D. Roosevelt, 1 August 1940, BPRC, folder 1879.

¹⁵⁰ R.E. Byrd to C.W. Nimitz, BPRC, folder 7295.

of his public declarations strongly implied. The Department of State's concern that he was speaking too forthrightly of the continent's value was understandable,¹⁵¹ though its own officials had no reason to believe that their statements would be able to counteract widespread perception that they must be entertaining the same thoughts.¹⁵² By incessantly coupling the non-claimant policy to the reservation of all rights, they attempted to guise their objectives in a manner which at the same time implied them. Byrd's frustration with this circumstance was shared by many officials, journalists and citizens such as Elizabeth A. Kendall and George D. Krouse.¹⁵³

The Snow Cruiser provides an apt metaphor for U.S. Antarctic policy. Over the two decades which preceded the Antarctic Treaty, the United States possessed great technological and economic resources. It was well prepared to become the leader of the "free world," and in many cases it used that position both wisely and to its own advantage. The Antarctic Treaty was certainly beneficial for the world at

¹⁵¹ For reference to Byrd's statement, see Department of Interior, U.S. Antarctic Service, Memorandum for R.E. Byrd, 22 August 1939; Department of State, Division of North and West Coast Affairs to Office of American Republic Affairs et al., 29 November 1946; Embassy in Santiago (Millard) to Secretary of State, 10 January 1947, no. 14796; Department of State, Division of North and West Coast Affairs (Brundage) to Assistant Secretary of State (Braden) et al., 10 February 1947; Embassy in Paris (Caffery) to Secretary of State, 12 February 1947, no. 7582, NARA, RG 59, 800.014; Embassy in Buenos Aires (Nufer) to Secretary of State, 29 July 1954, no. 50, control 12841; Office of Inter-American Affairs (Herron) to Office of South American Affairs (O'Conner), 30 July 1954; Embassy in Buenos Aires (Siracusa) to Department of State, 5 August 1954, no. 95; Department of State, Office of Undersecretary of State (Bishop) to Office of Secretary of Defense (Godel), 26 May 1955; Department of State, Memorandum of Conversation, Bureau of British Commonwealth and Northern European Affairs (Crowley), 27 April 1956, NARA, RG 59, 702.022.

¹⁵² For official declarations reserving all rights, see *The New York Times*, 8 November 1940, 28 December 1946, 9 August 1948, 10 January 1956, 14 March 1956, 15 April 1956, 1 June 1959. For official reference to the reservation of all rights, see *FRUS* 1939, 2: 1; *FRUS* 1947, vol. 1, *General* (Washington: USGPO, 1973): 1043-50; Department of Interior, Board of Geographical Names (Burril), to Department of State, Division of Geography (Saucerman), 25 April 1946; Ambassador in Santiago (Bowers) to Secretary of State, 3 March 1948, no. 121, NARA, RG 59, 800.014; Department of State, Memorandum of Conversation, Office of South American Affairs (Dearborn), 30 August 1954; Department of State, Office of Legal Adviser (Phleger) to Secretary of State, 30 January 1955; Secretary of State (Dulles) to Embassy in Santiago, 7 August 1956, A-26; Department of State, Bureau of International Organization Affairs (DePalma) to Bureau of European Affairs et al., 9 August 1956; Department of State to Chilean Embassy in Washington, 14 September 1956; Deputy Undersecretary of State (Daniels) to Secretary of State, 9 December 1957; Department of State, Office of the Undersecretary of State (Richard) to Bureau of Inter-American Affairs (Rubottom), 8 January 1958; Embassy in Lima (Sayre) to Department of State, [15 May 1958], no. 853, NARA, RG 59, 702.022.

¹⁵³ For one particularly bleak assessment, see *FRUS* 1948, 1/2: 1003.

large, given its demilitarization protocols and nuclear test ban, yet it came to fruition without affirming the least token of U.S. rights. Officials appeared to enjoy the opportunity to assure a different outcome without serious repercussions, but their policy suffered from the unrecoverable design flaw of non-claimancy. Likewise the Snow Cruiser was an engineering marvel which failed abysmally because it had been tested in sand rather than snow.¹⁵⁴ Though the many Americans disappointed by the non-claimancy were unsure who to blame, they could be certain that it was neither Byrd nor the Armor Institute of Chicago.

It would be tempting but inaccurate to portray the admiral as both a cultural symbol and a political actor. The reviewed documents do not indicate that he again sought to involve himself in domestic politics, as he had as a lobbyist for the Roosevelt administration.¹⁵⁵ Even if toward the end of his life he had more actively publicized his support for a U.S. claim, the White House was unlikely to have responded. It had neglected the more objective arguments made in favor of a claim by diplomatic specialists whose assessment of the national interest was in now way linked to enhancing their personal prestige. Whether or not Byrd was as egomaniacal as sometimes portrayed,¹⁵⁶ one obituary defined his legacy as related to “the advancement of scientific knowledge for the benefit of all mankind.”¹⁵⁷ The Department of State would continue to portray U.S. policy as such, less out of

¹⁵⁴ Freitag and Dibben, “Dr. Poulter’s Antarctic Snow Cruiser,” 130, 136.

¹⁵⁵ See R.E. Byrd to F.D. Roosevelt, 18 March 1941, BPRC, Folder 2902.

¹⁵⁶ For example, Morgan Sherwood, “Review of *Alone on Ice*,” *Journal of American History* 86, no. 3 (1999): 1426-27.

¹⁵⁷ Richard B. Black, “Obituary: Admiral Richard Evelyn Byrd, 1888-1957,” *The Geographical Journal* 123, no. 2 (1957): 278-79. Black continued that Byrd’s death “was received in all quarters of the globe with deep sorrow and cognizance that a great man of the century had passed,” as recognized by “editorials in the leading papers and grassroots publications of the world.” Richard B. Black, “Obituary: Richard Evelyn Byrd,” *Geographical Review* 47, no. 4 (1957): 579-81.

conviction than because cultural or humanistic symbolism had become more expedient than political action.¹⁵⁸

The next chapter evaluates U.S. Antarctic policy relative to the nation's security policies which internally led to persecution of communists and alleged communists, and which externally precipitated a reliance on the doctrine of massive nuclear retaliation. These issues help to explain why U.S. Antarctic opinion failed to produce substantial opposition to the 1959 treaty, the terms of which required the government both to leave its own rights unstated and to cooperate with the Soviet Union.

¹⁵⁸ The Antarctic Treaty has aptly been referred to as a "form of non-solution" based on political evasion. Finn Sollie, "The Political Experiment in Antarctica," in Richard S. Lewis and Philip M. Smith, eds., *Frozen Future: A Prophetic Report from Antarctica* (New York: Quadrangle Books, 1973), 46-63.

6. U.S. National Security

In August 1960 the United States became the sixth of twelve nations to ratify the Antarctic Treaty. The senate might have approved it by a wider margin if Admiral Richard Evelyn Byrd had not died three years earlier. As the most famous U.S. explorer of the era, he had consistently urged a declaration of rights to help exclude the Soviet Union or, if that were impossible, to demonstrate a firm commitment to defend U.S. interests. By demilitarizing the frozen continent and indefinitely suspending the question of sovereignty, the treaty produced a result which was satisfactory though inconsistent with the anticommunist objectives which largely motivated U.S. policy at home and abroad. It is possible that Byrd, contrary to his own beliefs, might have helped to assuage concerns that the treaty's inclusion of the USSR was unwise.¹ In his absence, the government left senators to ratify the treaty based on the assumption that it must be in U.S. interests or the Department of State would not have tabled the draft upon which it was based.²

This chapter analyses the national security dynamics which influenced U.S. policy from the end of the Second World War through the nation's ratification of the Antarctic Treaty. U.S.–Soviet relations grew increasingly hostile over this period. While other chapters address the diplomatic and military components of the superpowers' rivalry, this chapter explores the linkage between the internal and external communist threat as perceived by U.S. officials.³ President Harry S. Truman initiated a loyalty program to expel communists and communist sympathizers from

¹ See chapter five.

² Senator Richard B. Russell made a statement to this effect. *The New York Times*, 11 August 1960.

³ In short Russians were viewed as “the external devil” while domestic communists and others who refused to “accept the imperatives of American hegemony” were viewed as the internal devil. Thomas J. McCormick, *America's Half-Century: United States Foreign Policy in the Cold War* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1989), 69-70.

the federal government, lest they undermine his effort to halt Soviet expansion. The effectiveness of this program, as measured by dismissals and resignations, was not insubstantial, and it was reinforced by the emergence of Senator Joe McCarthy. When Dwight D. Eisenhower took office in 1953, he strengthened the loyalty program and did not intervene against legislation which outlawed the domestic Communist Party. These developments paralleled expanding U.S. obligations and the widespread conviction that the Soviet Union should not be appeased.⁴

Sanjay Chaturvedi writes that the senate's debate of the Antarctic Treaty grew heated, most notably over the inclusion of the USSR. The treaty's defeat, he observes, remained a distinct possibility until the end.⁵ The Department of State had contemplated a negative outcome in part because it had refrained from any effort to promote the treaty. The Soviet Union's participation in the 1957–1958 International Geophysical Year (IGY) had made its involvement in a final agreement likely but nonetheless unpalatable. Even after the IGY had commenced, the department had sought “to ease the Russians out if possible.”⁶ This circumstance highlights the treaty's counterintuitive nature. That is, it legitimated the Soviet Union's presence in Antarctica while Washington sought to contain or reverse that presence everywhere else.

Byrd had failed to convince the government that Antarctica held strategic importance. In one of his most urgent appeals to the Joint Chiefs of Staff, he outlined

⁴ See Richard M. Freeland, *The Truman Doctrine and the Origins of McCarthyism* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1975), 115; *The New York Times*, 26 May 1958. By January 1957 the United States had established bases or rights for bases in 38 nations, and was engaged in discussions with twenty others. *FRUS 1955–1957*, vol. 19, *National Security Policy* (Washington: USGPO, 1990), 411.

⁵ Sanjay Chaturvedi, *Dawning of Antarctica: A Geopolitical Analysis* (New Delhi: Segment Books, 1990), 97.

⁶ Department of State, Memorandum by Office of Inter-American Regional Political Affairs (Wilson), 22 July 1957, NARA, RG 59, 702.022.

contingencies which seemed trivial relative to events such as the Berlin blockade.⁷ At the time, however, the government was taking extreme measures to combat the risk of internal subversion posed by a miniscule segment of the population. The membership of the Communist Party had decreased substantially since the end of the Second World War, and even then it had been negligible.⁸ Byrd inflated the white continent's significance no more than his fellow citizens inflated the government's susceptibility to being overthrown. While his devotion to U.S. values and institutions was well-publicized, it was no assistance in his effort to alter the government's stance toward the Antarctic or to build public support to that end. During the period under consideration, the continent lacked sufficient drama or intrigue to hold the American public's attention.⁹

Meanwhile congressional investigations found that some Americans not only preferred the communist system, but were willing to betray their nation. One of the most disturbing cases involved Alger Hiss, a former Department of State employee alleged to have forwarded materials to the Soviet Union. Another involved a report that Truman had promoted a treasury official despite knowing that he was a Soviet spy. The House of Representatives complied with Truman's refusal to testify, but the fact that it had subpoenaed a former president revealed the nation's obsession with security. According to Murray B. Levin, most Americans viewed the investigations

⁷ For example, Byrd called for intensifying the U.S. Antarctic program to gain cold-weather training opportunities. The navy agreed that the continent was ideal for this, but neither it nor the Joint Chiefs of Staff shared his concern that the nation might be unable to defend itself from the Soviet Union if its troops were to overrun Greenland. U.S. Navy (Dennison) to Department of State, Division of Northern European Affairs (Cumming), 22 November 1946, NARA, RG 59, 800.014; Joint Chiefs of Staff, JCS 2070, 30 September 1949, NARA, RG 218, Geographical File.

⁸ David Caute, *The Great Fear: The Anti-Communist Purge under Truman and Eisenhower* (London: Secker & Warburg, 1978), 185.

⁹ This was unlike the best-selling novels which Mickey Spillane wrote in the 1950s. Their protagonist, Mike Hammer, had no qualms about violence, no respect for civil liberties and—presumably—no interest in the Antarctic. See Stephen J. Whitfield, *The Culture of the Cold War* (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1991), 34-37.

as a “perfectly sensible” response the Soviet challenge.¹⁰ Far less sensible was the need to involve the USSR in Antarctica. Events such as the Korean War and Berlin crisis had demonstrated officials’ willingness to negotiate under pressure and compromise when necessary. However, the frozen continent posed no risk of a large-scale war if the treaty were to fail.¹¹

In January 1945 Representative John E. Rankin introduced a bill to establish the special committee on un-American activities on a permanent basis. When created seven years earlier it had been known as the Dies Committee in reference to its sponsor Martin Dies.¹² Its investigation of subversive movements within the United States had been discontinued before the nation entered the Second World War.¹³ Aside from failing to uncover any pressing dangers, it had earned notoriety for as its bombastic methods. Witnesses had often been harangued and denied the protections taken for granted in a court of law. Rankin preferred to dwell on the committee’s record of exposing possible threats to the nation’s internal security. After a heated debate, he forced a roll-call vote which succeeded by a narrow margin to establish the House Un-American Activities Committee (HUAC). The editors of *The New York Times* responded without enthusiasm, for it seemed likely that the term un-American would be applied to any opinion with which the committee disagreed.¹⁴

¹⁰ Murray B. Levin, *Political Hysteria in America: The Democratic Capacity for Repression* (New York: Basic Books, Inc., Publishers, 1971), 220.

¹¹ In 1953 there had been some risk of a limited conflict between the Britain and the Southern Cone nations, Chile and Argentina. See chapter three.

¹² *The New York Times*, 4 January 1945. See Robert Griffith, “American Politics and the Origins of ‘McCarthyism’,” in Robert Griffith and Athan Theoharis, eds., *The Specter: Original Essays on the Cold War and the Origins of McCarthyism* (New York: Franklin Watts, Inc., 1974), 1-17; John Earl Haynes, *Red Scare or Red Menace? American Communism and Anticommunism in the Cold War Era* (Chicago: Ivan R. Dee, 1996), 66.

¹³ Robert K. Carr, *The House Committee on Un-American Activities, 1945–1950* (Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press, 1952), 17-18.

¹⁴ They correctly foresaw a resurgence of “persecution in place of impartial investigation.” *The New York Times*, 5 January 1945.

Within weeks of the Japanese surrender, the HUAC chose to investigate the Communist Party of the United States. This decision, though linked to concern about the Soviet Union's post-war ambitions, more specifically related to declarations by the party's chairperson, William Z. Foster. He berated the injustices of the capitalist system as well as the Truman administration's apparent disregard for the United Nations. He also revealed that the party would be taking a more radical position than during the war, based on confronting all vestiges of imperialism at home and abroad.¹⁵ When called before the HUAC, Foster and three other Communist Party leaders refused to substantiate if they were beholden to foreign influences, and the hearings quickly turned as acrimonious as before the HUAC had been granted permanent standing. Under the best circumstance, the witnesses might not have been completely forthcoming. Instead, they were confronted with hostility and disclosed as little as possible.¹⁶

The HUAC believed that the Communist Party exercised far greater influence than its size seemed to suggest. Its membership had rapidly declined after reaching an all-time high of eighty thousand the previous year.¹⁷ Equally dangerous communists were thought to remain outside the party, advancing their ideology through the media and various front organizations. The committee's decision to question radio broadcasters was, according to Foster, "the most outrageous infringement of American freedom in one hundred years."¹⁸ The conduct of the hearings supported that perspective. For example, Rankin called one witness as a "slime-mongering kike" and then grew so incensed that he was barred from the floor for the remainder

¹⁵ *The New York Times*, 19-20 September 1945, 18 October 1945. See Irving Howe and Lewis Coser, *The American Communist Party: A Critical History, 1919-1957* (Boston: Beacon Press, 1957), 437-48.

¹⁶ *The New York Times*, 20 September 1945, 23 September 1945, 27 September 1945, 7 October 1945.

¹⁷ This number was given by the Communist Party. Other sources held that the membership had surpassed 100,000 in the pre-war era. See *The New York Times*, 7 March 1948, 23 September 1956.

¹⁸ *The New York Times*, 19 October 1945.

of the day.¹⁹ Many non-communist organizations such as the Veterans League of America protested his anti-Semitism, but to no avail. He would continue to overshadow the more moderate chairperson and other members.²⁰

The discovery of a Soviet spy ring in Canada in early 1946 underscored the seriousness of the objective before the HUAC. Rankin warned that it spread throughout the United States, utilizing some or all of the organizations already thought to be infiltrated by communists. The Department of State assured the public that there was no evidence of this,²¹ yet at a press conference President Truman refused comment on an earlier statement that he had not succumbed to “the unholy fear” of the USSR which had become typical of many Americans.²² Events suggested that a degree of concern, if not fear, was warranted. The HUAC proceeded to investigate suspected front organizations including the Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Committee, the National Federation for Constitutional Liberties, and the National Council for Soviet–American Friendship. By refusing to submit the documents requested of them, their leaders reinforced the impression that they were Soviet agents. The house voted decisively in favor of charging them with contempt of congress.²³

In August 1946 the Department of State announced the dismissal of forty employees believed to be involved with foreign governments unsympathetic to the United States. The official statement, which did not mention the Soviet Union, was issued to counteract rumors that hundreds or thousands had been dismissed for

¹⁹ *The New York Times*, 13 February 1946. See Albert Fried, ed., *McCarthyism, the Great American Red Scare: A Documentary History* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1997), 16.

²⁰ *The New York Times*, 25 February 1946, 15 April 1946, 18 May 1946.

²¹ *The New York Times*, 17 February 1946, 20 February 1946.

²² *The New York Times*, 22 February 1946.

²³ See Harry S. Truman, *Memoirs*, vol. 2, *Years of Trial and Hope 1946–1953* (Hodder and Stoughton, Limited, 1955), 291–95; *The New York Times*, 9 March 1946, 29 March 1946, 8 June 1946, 2 August 1946.

ideological reasons. Forty dismissals were far less than predicted, yet the department indicated that it would be rigorous in its continuing to screen employees.²⁴ The Department of War followed this trend, barring unreliable personnel from sensitive positions and officer-training schools.²⁵ Fifty war veterans gathered in Washington to protest the assumption that communists were necessarily disloyal. They emphasized their message by purporting to be members of the Communist Party. While many Americans believed that the Soviet government was opportunistic and reversed its policies whenever necessary, the protesters believed that this was true of their own government.²⁶

As a senator Truman had criticized the Dies Committee for generating an atmosphere of distrust and xenophobia.²⁷ As president he found it necessary to support the objectives of the HUAC, if not the committee itself. In November 1946 he established a commission to investigate the loyalty of the federal government's two million employees. An earlier investigation had found widespread evidence of disloyalty, especially within the Department of State. Truman ordered the commission—formed by representatives of the Departments of Justice, State, Treasury and War, in addition to the Civil Service Commission—to evaluate that finding and uncover any new evidence of possible treachery.²⁸ This initiative was in keeping with the “bitterly reactionary” mood of congress, as David Caute describes it.²⁹ At the same time the president sought to ensure that the accused parties would be

²⁴ *The New York Times*, 8 April 1946, 14 August 1946.

²⁵ *The New York Times*, 9 March 1946.

²⁶ See *The New York Times*, 24 March 1946.

²⁷ Truman, *Memoirs* 2: 291-95.

²⁸ *The New York Times*, 26–27 November 1946.

²⁹ Caute, *The Great Fear*, 27

dealt with in an equitable manner.³⁰ It did not bode well that headlines referred to loyalty program as a purge.³¹

As the commission was preparing its report, the Department of Justice arrested Gerhart Eisler, a German native reputed to be one of the Communist Party's foremost strategists. Officials announced that he had violated the Enemy Alien Act of 1798. Interestingly the act had never been used—or intended for use—except in time of war. A more plausible explanation was that Eisler had been arrested to guarantee his appearance before the HUAC. His wife claimed to be astonished since during the war they had experienced no difficulties pertaining to their immigration status or beliefs.³² Once detained on Ellis Island in New York City, Eisler was unable either to flee or participate in activities which the Soviet Union reportedly used to infiltrate other societies. Former communists told the HUAC that these activities included provoking race riots, distributing anti-capitalist propaganda, and urging friendship with the USSR.³³

In March 1947 President Truman appealed to congress for \$400 million to assist Greece and Turkey in their struggle against communism. There were many reasons why the legislature would embrace this and proceed to carry the doctrine of containment even further. Neither the Soviet Union's presence in Eastern Europe nor its uncooperative attitude in the United Nations could be denied. As important was that Truman employed metaphors of disease and other calamities to indicate the United States would perish unless citizens were willing to confront the dangers surrounding them. The president's stoic manner heightened the effectiveness of the message, demonstrating his own capacity to face great adversity without overreacting,

³⁰ Truman, *Memoirs* 2: 291-95; Freeland, *The Truman Doctrine*, 137-38.

³¹ *The New York Times*, 26–27 November 1946, 13 April 1947, 12 September 1947.

³² *The New York Times*, 5 February 1947.

³³ *The New York Times*, 21 January 1946, 2 August 1946, 9 February 1947. See Carr, *The House Committee*, 234.

as well as the nation's capacity to save the world in the process of saving itself.³⁴

According to Thomas J. McCormick, he believed that the exaggerated nature of his speech was necessary to gain public support.³⁵

Weeks later Truman issued Executive Order 9835, otherwise known as the Loyalty Order, in accord with the commission's report that a substantial number of federal employees were unreliable. The communist threat overseas had permeated the very fabric of the nation,³⁶ and the administration sought to do as much as possible on both fronts. The Loyalty Order called for investigating all federal employees and dismissing those who were unable to alleviate concerns pertaining to their background or current affiliations. Government agencies began to forward lists of their employees to the Federal Bureau of Investigation to be cross-referenced with its files. The program's administrative component was predicted to cost \$50 million while no amount could be estimated for the field investigations, as the need for them had yet to be determined.³⁷ It remained inconceivable that the total sum would approach the \$400 million. If only in this way, internal security appeared to be less onerous than the external variety.³⁸

The Department of Justice began compile a list of communist-front organizations, as the commission had also recommended.³⁹ Membership therein was to be regarded as sufficient grounds for dismissal. Attorney General Tom Clark assumed the responsibility of reviewing all information and deciding which organizations to include. The Loyalty Order deferred to his judgment in defining a

³⁴ Robert L. Ivie, "Fire, Flood and Red Fever: Motivating Metaphors of Global Emergency in the Truman Doctrine Speech," *Presidential Studies Quarterly* 29, 3 (1999): 570-91.

³⁵ McCormick, *America's Half-Century*, 75-77.

³⁶ Richard M. Fried, *Nightmare in Red: The McCarthy Era in Perspective* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1990), 9.

³⁷ *The New York Times*, 13 April 1947.

³⁸ The Civil Service Commission and Federal Bureau of Investigation spent approximately \$36 million on the program through 1952. Eleanor Bontecou, *The Federal Loyalty-Security Program* (Westport, Connecticut: Greenwood Press, Publishers, 1953), 148-49.

³⁹ Truman, *Memoirs* 2: 291-95.

“subversive” organization, as well as a “sympathetic association” if an individual’s membership therein could not be substantiated.⁴⁰ The loyalty program helped to “scare hell out of the country,” as Truman had once been advised in relation to foreign policy.⁴¹ It also reinforced the public’s tendency to view internationally minded liberals as communists.⁴² Truman hoped to demonstrate that it was possible to be a liberal anticommunist, but the loyalty program failed to confirm this.⁴³ It led to approximately twelve hundred dismissals and six thousand resignations of individuals whose beliefs—or suspected beliefs—had been thoroughly stigmatized.⁴⁴

In July 1947 congress approved the National Security Act. It most notably established the National Security Council (NSC) to advise the president on foreign policy issues which held military significance. The members were to include representatives of each branch of the armed services, the secretary of state and the newly created position of secretary of defense—which was to be held by a civilian to prevent the military establishment from wielding undue influence. Walter Millis suggests that this objective was difficult to achieve since none of the members was democratically elected, and the civilians among them fully accepted the military perspective that force had become a necessary evil.⁴⁵ At the time it was contemplated that the nation’s militarization might be detrimental to individual freedoms, but few

⁴⁰ See *The New York Times*, 23 March 1947, 12 September 1947.

⁴¹ This phrase was used by Senator Arthur H. Vandenberg. Alan D. Harper, *The Politics of Loyalty: The White House and the Communist Issue, 1946–1952* (Westport, Connecticut: Greenwood Publishing Corporation, 1969), 46–47.

⁴² Ralph S. Brown Jr., *Loyalty and Security: Employment Tests in the United States* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1958), 6.

⁴³ See Michael J. Hogan, *A Cross of Iron: Harry S. Truman and the Origins of the National Security State, 1945–1954* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), 119.

⁴⁴ Barton J. Bernstein, “America in War and Peace: The Test of Liberalism,” in Barton J. Bernstein, ed., *Towards a New Past: Dissenting Essays in American History* (New York: Pantheon Books, 1968), 289–321.

⁴⁵ See Walter Millis, “The National Security Act,” in Raymond G. O’Connor, ed., *American Defense Policy in Perspective: From Colonial Times to the Present* (New York: John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 1965), 307–11; Alfred D. Sander, “Truman and the National Security Council, 1945–1947,” *Journal of American History* 59, no. 2 (1972): 369–88; Anna Kasten Nelson, “President Truman and the Evolution of the National Security Council,” *Journal of American History* 72, no. 2 (1985): 360–78.

questioned the need to give security considerations first priority.⁴⁶ General Dwight D. Eisenhower, who had led the Allies to victory in Europe, remarked that the nation again required Minute Men if democracy were to survive in the world.⁴⁷

The HUAC did its part by sending members to the west coast where communists were reportedly thwarting the production of films which championed the American way of life. A number of actors claimed that this was an extension of the Roosevelt administration's pressure to glorify the Soviet system. They cited the 1943 film *Song of Russia* as the most blatant example, and chairperson J. Parnell Thomas agreed, informing congress that it was obviously hostile to U.S. values.⁴⁸ While preparations began for a more extensive investigation, the film industry sought advice from former Secretary of State James F. Byrnes in relation to maintaining its freedom of expression without being socially irresponsible. Civil libertarians applauded this move as helping to counteract the impression that Hollywood was teaming with saboteurs. They hoped that the involvement of Byrnes would deter unfair allegations, such as when Hollywood had once been blamed for making anti-Nazi pictures as a ploy to draw the nation into the war.⁴⁹

In the interim Victor A. Kravchenko, a defector, told the HUAC that he had seen many classified U.S. documents when employed by the Soviet purchasing commission. He warned that spies were everywhere and virtually all Soviet officials posted in the United States were active in this capacity. He also maintained that communist sympathizers were more dangerous than actual communists whose publications like *The Daily Worker* were clearly propaganda, whereas other

⁴⁶ *The New York Times*, 27 July 1947, 21 September 1947.

⁴⁷ *The New York Times*, 24 September 1947.

⁴⁸ Carr, *The House Committee on Un-American Activities*, 57-58; Whitfield, *The Culture of the Cold War*, 127; Haynes, *Red Scare or Red Menace?*, 71; *The New York Times*, 15 May 1947.

⁴⁹ *The New York Times*, 8 June 1947, 13 September 1947.

publications sought to exploit the open-mindedness of readers.⁵⁰ His testimony augmented fears that internal subversion, if left unchecked, might lead to the demise of the U.S. system.⁵¹ Andrei Gromyko, the Soviet Ambassador to the United Nations, did not question the reliability of Kravchenko. He simply compared the HUAC to a dog which had chosen to lick its stomach because it had nothing else to do. He added, "Sometimes this attracts spectators."⁵²

The committee opened its film hearings in October, making room for over a hundred reporters and permitting national networks and Washington radio stations to record every word. The witnesses and interrogators displayed a full range of emotion, and the crowd often burst into applause when anticommunist sentiments were given voice.⁵³ The most poignant evidence of un-Americanism arose when some individuals refused to say if they were or even had been members of the Communist Party. The question, they argued, infringed upon their First Amendment freedom of expression and association. One of them pointed out that General Eisenhower had refused to designate his political affiliation, and "what's good enough for [him] is good enough for me."⁵⁴ This humorous response did not sway the determination that they were in contempt of congress. Each of the Hollywood Ten, as they were known, was sentenced to one year in jail despite protests from many prominent individuals and organizations.⁵⁵

Concern about a possible war with the Soviet Union failed to dispel unease about the manner in which the hearings had been conducted. Contrary to

⁵⁰ *The New York Times*, 23 July 1947.

⁵¹ See *The New York Times*, 27 December 1946, 10 December 1947.

⁵² *The New York Times*, 23 July 1947.

⁵³ *The New York Times*, 22 October 1947, 26 October 1947.

⁵⁴ *The New York Times*, 29 October 1947.

⁵⁵ Brown, *Loyalty and Security*, 150-51, 155; Lary May, "Movie Star Politics: The Screen Actors' Guild, Cultural Conversion and the Hollywood Red Scare," in Lary May, ed., *Recasting America: Culture and Politics in the Age of the Cold War* (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1989), 125-53.

expectations, the press coverage was generally negative.⁵⁶ The “big show,” as one headline referred to it, undermined the public’s faith in the qualities which distinguished American institutions from those of other nations.⁵⁷ The witnesses had not been permitted defense counsel, and some journalists portrayed the HUAC as more dangerous than the conspiracy allegedly taking place in Hollywood. The major studios and professional associations uttered no such opinion. Instead they chose to bar individuals believed to harbor communist sympathies, and requested further congressional oversight. They also started making a larger number of anticommunist films, regardless of their merit, and continued to blacklist some of the most talented writers and performers.⁵⁸

In April 1948 the HUAC unanimously endorsed a bill to imprison for up to a decade any communist leader found guilty of conspiring to overthrow the government. The bill refrained from outlawing the Communist Party or targeting its members indiscriminately. Representative Richard M. Nixon explained that citizens would be allowed to believe anything they pleased as long as they refrained from illegal activities. He had no desire to limit free speech, but rather “to strike a body blow at the American cadre of the Soviet-directed communist conspiracy.”⁵⁹ The House accepted this logic and passed the Mundt Bill, as jointly sponsored by Karl E. Mundt and Nixon.⁶⁰ The bill called for communist and communist-front organizations to register with the attorney general and to include this fact on their publicity materials. Furthermore their members were to be denied passports.⁶¹

⁵⁶ Carr, *The House Committee on Un-American Activities*, 73-75.

⁵⁷ *The New York Times*, 23 October 1947.

⁵⁸ See Les K. Adler, “The Politics of Culture: Hollywood and the Cold War” in Griffith and Theoharis, *The Specter*, 240-61; *The New York Times*, 23 October 1947, 26 November 1947.

⁵⁹ *The New York Times*, 10 April 1948.

⁶⁰ This was alternately known as the Mundt-Nixon Bill. Carr, *The House Committee on Un-American Activities*, 80.

⁶¹ *The New York Times*, 20 May 1948.

William Z. Foster promptly denounced the Mundt Bill and vowed that the Communist Party, which he chaired, would never abide it. He also vowed that American communists would refuse to join any war with the USSR, as they believed that the United States would be responsible for its instigation. Soon thereafter federal authorities arrested Foster and eleven of the party's other leaders, all of whom had been under investigation for over a year. As the Mundt Bill had not yet become law, the government charged them with violating the Smith Act of 1940, which also prohibited conspiracies to overthrow the government and carried the same penalties. The communists denied being involved with any form conspiracy, and they had anticipated the charge. They released a previously prepared statement claiming that their arrest was part of the "criminal bipartisan" effort to provoke a war with the Soviet Union.⁶²

Many Americans believed that the measures taken against domestic communists were unnecessarily severe.⁶³ However, they generally agreed with Truman that the USSR bore responsibility for postwar difficulties and should be resisted at every opportunity. With this in mind the president called for an immediate draft to be supplemented by a long-term program of universal military training. Secretary of State George C. Marshall elaborated that diplomacy, though an essential component of the nation's democratic vision, would only result in appeasement unless it were backed with force.⁶⁴ The training program failed to gain congressional support, but a selective service bill passed in June 1948. It required all men between 18 and 26 years of age to register for military service and, if called, to serve for a period of 21 months. This constituted the first peacetime draft in U.S. history,

⁶² *The New York Times*, 29 May 1948, 21 July 1948.

⁶³ *The New York Times*, 4 August 1948.

⁶⁴ *The New York Times*, 18 March 1948.

underscoring the nation's resolve to meet the communist threat wherever it might emerge.⁶⁵

By the end of the year the HUAC investigation of Alger Hiss, a former Department of State employee, produced compelling evidence of espionage. Hundreds of microfilmed documents were found at his home, lending credibility to the allegation that he had once been part of a network which forwarded classified material to the Soviet Union. Former Assistant Secretary of State Adolph A. Berle announced that he took the charge very seriously. In the past he had known that Hiss was sympathetic to the Soviet Union, but had refused to believe that this necessarily compromised his integrity.⁶⁶ While it was true, as Hiss argued, that his sympathy had been consistent with the Roosevelt administration's policies toward the USSR, the microfilm revealed a serious breach of protocol. This handicapped his effort to discredit the proceedings. It still could not be proved that Hiss had been a spy, but a federal grand jury found ample cause to indict him for perjury.⁶⁷

In October 1949 the ruling against the Communist Party leaders set a dismal prospect for Hiss who was then awaiting a second trial as the first had resulted in a hung jury. It found eleven of the defendants guilty of conspiring to overthrow the government, and six of their lawyers guilty of contempt of court. One received a commuted sentence of three years in prison, due to his distinguished service in the second world war, while the others each were sentenced to five years in prison.⁶⁸ Their lawyers were sentenced to between one and six months depending on how flagrant the judge viewed their behavior over the course of the nine-month trial, one

⁶⁵ Hogan, *A Cross of Iron*, 144-46, 155, 158.

⁶⁶ *The New York Times*, 4 December 1948, 15 December 1948.

⁶⁷ Allen Weinstein, *Perjury: The Hiss-Chambers Case* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1978), 42-43; Fried, *Nightmare in Red*, 23; *The New York Times*, 15-16 December 1948.

⁶⁸ The judge indicated that he would have issued longer sentences, but in 1948 congress had reduced the maximum penalty for violating the Smith Act from ten to five years. *The New York Times*, 22 October 1949.

of the longest ever held. The American Politburo, as the eleven were known, declared that the verdict reflected the government's complete disregard for the Bill of Rights. No evidence indicated that they had planned or advocated the overthrow of the U.S. government, only that their articles and speeches were compatible with the idea—as was now deemed illegal.⁶⁹

Three months later the perjury charge against Hiss also resulted in a five-year sentence. The court ruled that he had deliberately misled the HUAC regarding his involvement with Whittaker Chambers, his accuser who had been a communist until the signing of the Hitler–Stalin pact.⁷⁰ Chambers emerged as a minor celebrity despite his ideologically tainted background. He wrote a best-selling memoir whose greatest enthusiasts included Richard M. Nixon. The Berlin blockade had heightened the appeal of its anticommunist message while further discrediting the Roosevelt era.⁷¹ Secretary of State Dean Acheson nonetheless expressed sympathy for Hiss, whom he regarded as having been an outstanding public servant despite his poor judgment in copying official documents. Nixon called the secretary's position “disgusting” since for him and many others Hiss was not only a perjurer, but a traitor.⁷²

Senator Joe McCarthy gained headlines in February 1950 by proclaiming that a large number of communists and communist sympathizers remained in the Department of State. He initially held that 205 individuals warranted this description, though he soon reduced the estimate to 57 and then back up to 81. His demand for an investigation was coupled with a warning. If President Truman failed to cooperate, he

⁶⁹ David A. Shannon, *The Decline of American Communism: A History of the Communist Party of the United States since 1945* (Chatham, New Jersey: The Chatham Bookseller, 1959), 197-99; *The New York Times*, 15–16 October 1949, 22 October 1949.

⁷⁰ Weinstein, *Perjury*, 3-5.

⁷¹ See Whitfield, *The Culture of the Cold War*, 18-19; Haynes, *Red Scare or Red Menace?*, 181.

⁷² See Weinstein, *Perjury*, 506-7; *The New York Times*, 26 January 1950.

would expose the Democratic Party as abetting the international communist movement.⁷³ The Senate Foreign Relations Committee promptly established a subcommittee devoted to internal security, chaired by Millard Tydings but dominated by McCarthy, who became the first witness to testify.⁷⁴ While the Truman administration correctly predicted that McCarthy would be unable to substantiate his allegations, it falsely assumed that he would be discredited as a result.⁷⁵ His alarmist tack seized the public imagination to such a degree that the president abandoned his refusal to turn over the government's loyalty files.⁷⁶

The National Security Council took a broader perspective of these issues which served to advance McCarthy's career. Its sixty-eighth report, referred to as NSC-68, called for massive rearmament to counteract the USSR's hostility to the "free world."⁷⁷ The report held that the risk of military conflict was necessary to block further Soviet expansion, lest individual liberties be jeopardized everywhere on the planet.⁷⁸ Stephen E. Ambrose writes that this assumption carried with it the responsibility to expand U.S. military commitments as far as possible.⁷⁹ The secretary of state recognized that the report's portrayal of the world was somewhat

⁷³ See Jeff Broadwater, *Eisenhower and the Anti-Communist Crusade* (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 1992), 13; Athan Theoharis, *Seeds of Repression: Harry S. Truman and the Origins of McCarthyism* (Chicago: Quadrangle Books, 1971), 16; *The New York Times*, 12 February 1950.

⁷⁴ Earl Latham, *The Communist Controversy in Washington: From the New Deal to McCarthy* (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1966), 270-71.

⁷⁵ See Harper, *The Politics of Loyalty*, 137-38.

⁷⁶ Fried, *Nightmare in Red*, 126-28.

⁷⁷ Norman Graebner, "The Sources of Post-War Instability," in Norman Graebner, ed., *The National Security: Its Theory and Practice, 1945-1960* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1986), 3-36; Ronald E. Powaski, *The Cold War: The United States and the Soviet Union, 1917-1991* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1998), 85.

⁷⁸ A passage of the report maintained that "a defeat of free institutions anywhere is a defeat everywhere." John Lewis Gaddis, *Russia, the Soviet Union and the United States: An Interpretive History*, 2nd ed. (New York: McGraw-Hill Publishing Company, 1990), 205.

⁷⁹ Stephen E. Ambrose, "The Military Dimension: Berlin, NATO and NSC-68," in Thomas G. Paterson, ed., *The Origins of the Cold War* (Lexington, Massachusetts: D.C. Heath and Company, 1974), 175-84.

arbitrary, but he viewed this as necessary to persuade others to heed its dictates.⁸⁰ It is noteworthy that it had been written not by military officials but by the Department of State's Policy Planning Staff.⁸¹ As the containment doctrine expanded, so too did the need for the armed services to enforce fundamentally political objectives.⁸²

George Kennan, the primary architect of containment doctrine, had recently left the Policy Planning Staff due to his concern that the government was overemphasizing its military component. His strategy had called for long-term vigilance based on the premise that the Soviet Union sought to avoid a direct confrontation as much as the United States did.⁸³ He viewed NSC-68 as preparing the nation for total war in false hope of achieving total victory, either through intimidation or open conflict.⁸⁴ While accepting the need for military preparedness, he disagreed with the extent called for by Paul Nitze—the author of the report who had succeeded him as chairperson of the Policy Planning Staff—for it suggested that all regions of the world held equal importance for the United States.⁸⁵ NSC-68 amounted to a “papal bull,” in the words of William Appleman Williams,⁸⁶ rather than viable blueprint to defend national interests and promote them when appropriate.⁸⁷

⁸⁰ John C. Donovan, *The Cold Warriors: A Policy-Making Elite* (Lexington, Massachusetts: DC Heath and Company, 1974), 96.

⁸¹ Charles R. Morris, *Iron Destinies, Lost Opportunities: The Arms Race between the USA and the USSR, 1945–1987* (New York: Harper & Row, Publishers, 1988), 66–67.

⁸² Samuel P. Huntington, “The Interim Years: World War II to January 1950,” in O'Connor, *American Defense Policy in Perspective*, 298–306.

⁸³ John Lewis Gaddis, *Strategies of Containment: A Critical Appraisal of Postwar American National Security Policy* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1982), 83.

⁸⁴ See George F. Kennan, *American Diplomacy 1900–1950* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1951), 95, 101.

⁸⁵ Gaddis, *Russia, the Soviet Union and the United States*, 203; Gaddis, *Strategies of Containment*, 92. See Walter LaFeber, *America, Russia and the Cold War, 1945–1992*, 7th ed. (New York: McGraw Hill Inc, 1993), 96; George F. Kennan, *Memoirs 1950–1963*, vol. 2 (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1972), 111.

⁸⁶ Ernest R. May, ed., *American Cold War Strategy: Interpreting NSC-68* (Boston: Bedford Books of St Martin's Press, 1993), 135.

⁸⁷ Kennan criticized many NSC reports for the same reason. As he once summarized, they presented the Soviet threat as static and thereby called for predetermined responses. *FRUS* 1949, vol. 1, *National*

The outbreak of the Korean War in June 1950 suggested that the Soviet strategy to dominate the planet included giving tacit support to other communist regimes.⁸⁸ The NSC believed that Moscow was not necessarily ready for a final showdown with the west, but hoped that the conflict would damage U.S. prestige around the world and engender hostility throughout Asia.⁸⁹ The North Korean invasion had been timed as though to have this effect; McCarthy was already calling the president's anticommunist credentials into question, and he suddenly gained another reason to attack the secretary of state.⁹⁰ Neither friends nor foes of Dean Acheson could deny that he had excluded South Korea from the perimeter of nations which the United States designated as vital for its own security and pledged to defend.⁹¹ Partisanship had reached such a divisive level that Truman avoided seeking congressional authority to respond to one of the most blatant cases of aggression since Pearl Harbor.⁹²

Acheson regained some of his prestige by claiming that the Kremlin had forced the nation to lead the "struggle against evil."⁹³ Americans were receptive to this kind of terminology and dubious that the communist enemy had yet been

Security Affairs; Foreign Economic Policy (Washington: USGPO, 1976), 381-84. It has been observed that many or most U.S. officials tended to ignore "all evidence of Soviet moderation, circumspection and restraint." Melvyn Leffler, "American Conception of National Security at the Beginning of the Cold War, 1945-48," *American Historical Review* 89, no. 2 (1984): 364-81.

⁸⁸ See Powaski, *The Cold War*, 84, 91.

⁸⁹ *FRUS* 1950, vol. 1, *National Security Affairs; Foreign Economic Policy* (Washington: USGPO, 1977), 332.

⁹⁰ See Harper, *The Politics of Loyalty*, 140; Freeland, *The Truman Doctrine*, 349.

⁹¹ John Lewis Gaddis, *The Long Peace: Inquiries into the History of the Cold War* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1987), 96; Robert Endicott Osgood, *Limited War: The Challenge to American Strategy* (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1957), 165; Norman A. Graebner, *Cold War Diplomacy: American Foreign Policy, 1945-1960* (Princeton, New Jersey: D. Van Nostrand Company, Inc., 1962), 55; Henry A. Kissinger, *Nuclear Weapons and Foreign Policy* (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1957), 42-43.

⁹² See John W. Mason, *The Cold War 1945-1991* (London: Routledge, 1996), 18-19.

⁹³ Lloyd C. Gardner, *Architects of Illusion: Men and Ideas in American Foreign Policy 1941-1949* (Chicago: Quadrangle Books, 1970), 205.

eradicated at home.⁹⁴ In September congress passed the Internal Security Act of 1950 by an overwhelming majority in both houses.⁹⁵ It tightened existing subversion laws and required all communist and communist-sympathetic organizations to register with the attorney-general, whom it vested with the authority to deport foreign subversives.⁹⁶ While these objectives were similar to his own, Truman regarded them as too draconian.⁹⁷ He vetoed the legislation in an attempt to preserve citizens' constitutional rights. Congress overrode the veto, and the board established to review the federal loyalty standard recommended more stringent criteria. Dismissals had previously been based on "reasonable grounds" to suspect disloyalty, whereas now "reasonable doubt" of loyalty would be sufficient.⁹⁸

The president approved NSC-68 the same month as the Internal Security Act became law, but hesitated to pursue the total victory against communism which it implied. In April 1951 he replaced General Douglas Macarthur as commander of the UN forces attempting to defeat the North Koreans.⁹⁹ The general had repeatedly publicized his dissatisfaction with the government's unwillingness to use the atomic bomb. Though Truman was seriously considering this alternative—and had publicized this fact—he wished to leave no doubt that he would be the one to make the final decision.¹⁰⁰ In this way his dismissal of Macarthur affirmed the principle of civilian control over the military. However, it provoked outrage throughout the

⁹⁴ See Geoffrey Chandler, "American Opinion and Foreign Policy," *International Affairs* 31, no. 4 (1955): 447-58; Gabriel A. Almond, *The American People and Foreign Policy* (New York: Harcourt, Brace and Company, 1950), 97.

⁹⁵ Harper, *The Politics of Loyalty*, 162; Freeland, *The Truman Doctrine*, 352.

⁹⁶ William R. Tanner and Robert Griffith, "Legislative Politics and 'McCarthyism': The Internal Security Act of 1950," in Griffith and Theoharis, *The Specter*, 172-89; Harper, *The Politics of Loyalty*, 153.

⁹⁷ Carr, *The House Committee on Un-American Activities*, 9-11; Cate, *The Great Fear*, 34.

⁹⁸ Selma R. Williams, *Red-Listed: Haunted by the Washington Witch Hunt* (Reading, Massachusetts: Addison-Wesley Publishing Company, 1993), 161; Harper, *The Politics of Loyalty*, 180-82.

⁹⁹ Mason, *The Cold War*, 21-23.

¹⁰⁰ See Gaddis, *The Long Peace*, 118; Lawrence S. Wittner, *The Struggle against the Bomb*, vol. 1, *One World or None: A History of the World Nuclear Disarmament Movement through 1953* (Stanford, California: Stanford University Press, 1993), 261-62.

nation. Not only were Truman and Acheson burned in effigy; Republicans threatened to begin impeachment proceedings. McCarthy denounced the general's fate as a victory for communism, and millions of Americans throughout the nation greeted Macarthur like a returning hero.¹⁰¹

The Truman administration recognized the infeasibility of its original hope to unify the Korean peninsula by military means. U.S. allies were unwilling to go beyond the terms of the UN mandate to defend the south, for anything more held the risk of igniting a global conflict.¹⁰² In June the Soviet Union proposed an armistice which established borders similar to those which would be accepted two years later. At the time the White House sought to avoid being charged with appeasement.¹⁰³ Since the war had been depicted as nothing less than "a holy mission," consenting to the armistice would have been morally offensive as well as politically imprudent.¹⁰⁴ The public nonetheless responded to Eisenhower's pledge in the 1952 presidential election to pursue a negotiated settlement.¹⁰⁵ His simultaneous pledge to support the liberation of Eastern Europe left no doubt of his anticommunist resolve.¹⁰⁶ Americans viewed the selectiveness of this approach as necessary and in November proceeded to elect the first Republican president since Herbert Hoover.¹⁰⁷

¹⁰¹ John Spanier, *American Foreign Policy since World War II*, 6th ed. (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1968), 94; Whitfield, *The Culture of the Cold War*, 59-60.

¹⁰² Osgood, *Limited war*, 173, 176; *FRUS* 1950, 1: 423-25; *FRUS* 1951, vol. 1, *National Security Affairs, Foreign Economic Policy* (Washington: USGPO, 1979), 70.

¹⁰³ McCormick, *America's Half-Century*, 105.

¹⁰⁴ Athan Theoharis, "The Road to McCarthyism," in Paterson, *The Origins of the Cold War*, 193-203.

¹⁰⁵ Norman Graebner, *The Age of Global Power: The United States since 1939* (New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1973), 106-7.

¹⁰⁶ Stephen E. Ambrose, *Rise to Globalism: American Foreign Policy since 1938* (London: The Penguin Press, 1971), 217.

¹⁰⁷ That year Eisenhower won the largest number of votes ever cast for a presidential candidate, and he exceeded that record four years later. His success related in part to his emphasis on the "spiritual values" which motivated his Cold War policies and other agendas. Gerald Bergman, "The Influence of Religion on President Eisenhower's Upbringing," *Journal of American & Comparative Cultures* 23, no. 4 (2000): 89-107.

Eisenhower had supported McCarthy's re-election campaign while distancing himself from the extreme tactics used to rid the government of communists.¹⁰⁸ Shortly after taking office, he found that it was impossible to distinguish between the senator and his behavior. McCarthy now directed allegations against the Voice of America (VOA), which fell under the Department of State's jurisdiction. The conspiracy which he targeted involved everything from where transmitters had been placed, to the nuances of scriptwriting, to cases of Soviet speeches being broadcast without further comment. The Voice of America, McCarthy insisted, should be called the Voice of Moscow.¹⁰⁹ The least preposterous evidence related to four hundred books by communist authors discovered in VOA libraries overseas. The new secretary of state, John Foster Dulles, banned the books and dismissed the employees believed responsible for having purchased them.¹¹⁰

In April 1953 Eisenhower issued Executive Order 10450, greatly expanding the loyalty program instigated by his predecessor. It required all facets of federal employees' behavior to be consistent with the interests of national security. The grounds for dismissal now included alcoholism, homosexuality and other forms of immorality which might compromise their reliability.¹¹¹ The new program included no formal mechanisms such as Truman's loyalty review board. Rather it took a highly decentralized approach, permitting each government agency to conduct its own investigations, and denying employees the right to appeal.¹¹² According to Richard M. Fried, the president sought to demonstrate that he was addressing the loyalty issue

¹⁰⁸ Broadwater, *Eisenhower and the Anti-Communist Crusade*, 33.

¹⁰⁹ Latham, *The Communist Controversy*, 323-27, 336-42.

¹¹⁰ Stephen E. Ambrose, *Eisenhower: The President*, vol. 2, 1952-1969 (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1984), 81.

¹¹¹ Latham, *The Communist Controversy*, 369; *The New York Times*, 17 December 1953.

¹¹² Eleanor Bontecou, "President Eisenhower's 'Security' Program," *BAS* 9, 6 (1953): 215-18, 220.

as forcefully as McCarthy, but while upholding due process.¹¹³ The morale of civil servants nonetheless began to plummet. One Department of State employee remarked, on condition of anonymity, “I am making an intense effort to fade into the wallpaper.”¹¹⁴

The end of the Korean War in July 1953 relieved one source of the anxiety upon which the McCarthy thrived,¹¹⁵ yet the pillars of nation’s Cold War policy remained firmly in place. The defense budget had approximately quadrupled, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization had proved essential, and officials still believed that communist victories anywhere posed a threat to national interests.¹¹⁶ While the concept of total victory no longer seemed feasible, the U.S.-led crusade for freedom would proceed in a manner which Charles R. Morris describes as strategically amorphous.¹¹⁷ General Macarthur had drawn attention to the same phenomenon. After being dismissed, he had testified before congress that the Truman administration lacked any coherent plan for the war.¹¹⁸ Years later most Americans accepted its termination as sufficient, as this was what Eisenhower had pledged and delivered.¹¹⁹

In November the House Un-American Activities Committee (HUAC) regained the publicity which it had enjoyed in the pre-McCarthy era. The attorney general declared that Truman had nominated Henry Dexter White, then assistant secretary of the treasury, to become director of the International Monetary

¹¹³ Fried, *Nightmare in Red*, 133.

¹¹⁴ This words were spoken in relation to the secretary of state’s earlier call for “positive loyalty.” *The New York Times*, 24 January 1953, 28 February 1953, 4 March 1954.

¹¹⁵ John Patrick Diggins, *The Proud Decades: America in War and in Peace 1941–1960* (New York: W.W. Norton & Company 1988), 117-18.

¹¹⁶ Morris, *Iron Destinies*, 85; Mason, *The Cold War*, 21-23. H.W. Brands summarizes, “To protect their virtue, Americans armed to the teeth.” H.W. Brands, *The Devil We Knew: Americans and the Cold War* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1993), 39.

¹¹⁷ Morris, *Iron Destinies*, 85-86.

¹¹⁸ Osgood, *Limited War*, 190-93.

¹¹⁹ See Henry M. Wriston, “The Fabric of American Opinion on Foreign Affairs,” *International Affairs* 28, no. 2 (1952): 144-55.

Fund—despite knowing that he was a Soviet agent. Truman denied this and emphasized that he had asked White to resign as soon as evidence of his disloyalty had emerged.¹²⁰ He adamantly refused to testify before the HUAC about the incident. The fact that he had been subpoenaed, he claimed, demonstrated that the Eisenhower administration had embraced McCarthyism. Rancor persisted even after the HUAC indicated that it would not force him to comply.¹²¹ The former president held a nationwide broadcast to defend his integrity, only then to be attacked by J. Edgar Hoover, director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation. One headline aptly summarized that the prestige of all parties and the nation as a whole had been seriously damaged.¹²²

Eisenhower, though keenly anticommunist, sought to avoid dealing directly with McCarthy in hope that the senator would self-destruct.¹²³ This success of this became foreseeable when his charges extended to the Central Intelligence Agency and the U.S. Army, in the latter case leading to senate hearings from April to June 1954. McCarthy alleged that a dentist employed at the army post in Fort Monmouth, New Jersey, had been promoted despite reports which identified him as a security risk.¹²⁴ In short he resurrected the same kind of charges directed against Harry Dexter White. Though the case of health worker was minor by comparison, it was deemed worthy of attention, and the proceedings confirmed Truman's opinion that McCarthy was "a

¹²⁰ White resigned in April 1947 and died the following year, shortly after appearing before the HUAC. See Weinstein, *Perjury*, 3-5; *The New York Times*, 7 November 1953.

¹²¹ Under pressure from the Republican Party, Harold H. Velde, chairperson of the HUAC, declared, "The committee has no intention of attempting to force the cooperation of those who, although shielded by an uncertain and ill-defined immunity, have a continuing and sacred duty to cooperate in all respects where the public safety and the public welfare are concerned." The Democratic members immediately distanced themselves from the statement. *The New York Times*, 13 November 1953.

¹²² The headline read "All Lose in White Case." The subtitle continued, "[Attorney-General Herbert] Brownell and Truman and Eisenhower and Congress and the U.S. [Are] Discredited." *The New York Times*, 13 November 1953, 17-18 November 1953.

¹²³ M.L. Dockrill, *The Cold War 1945-1963* (London: Macmillan Education Ltd, 1988), 61.

¹²⁴ Fried, *McCarthyism*, 178-79.

political gangster.”¹²⁵ The senator attacked the army’s special counsel so viciously that at one point he broke into tears.¹²⁶ Most Americans, unsettled by the frequency of such incidents, began to view McCarthy as an incorrigible bully and source of national disgrace.¹²⁷

In August 1954 the senate unanimously approved the Communist Control Act which classified the Communist Party as an appendage of Moscow. As such it was deprived of any legal standing and barred from taking part in elections. Members were permitted to be subversively minded as long as they refrained from joining the conspiracy to which their party was allegedly devoted.¹²⁸ No one more than Eugene Dennis could have appreciated the irony of this situation, for he had been found guilty of the conspiracy in question, as well as for contempt of court and contempt of congress. At the time he was still in prison reflecting on how to preserve the future of the Communist Party and his role as its general secretary. He would succeed in part because of his willingness to blame for excesses of Stalinism, rather than U.S. legislation, for the steep decline in party membership.¹²⁹

As the year came to an end, the senate chose to rebuke McCarthy. His belligerence during the army hearings might have been sufficient cause alone. He had sealed his fate by taking responsibility for one of his assistant’s effort to have a friend released from military service ostensibly for the sake of the investigation. This misuse of authority was perhaps more serious than questions of etiquette, though the

¹²⁵ Diggins, *The Proud Decades*, 117-18.

¹²⁶ Fried, *McCarthyism*, 178-81; *The New York Times*, 10 June 1954.

¹²⁷ Thomas Doherty, “Point of Order,” *History Today* 48, no. 8 (1998): 33-37; Fried, *Nightmare in red*, 138.

¹²⁸ The house approved the act by a margin of 265:2. The original version had called for outlawing membership in the party. *The New York Times*, 20 August 1954, 25 August 1954. See Mary S. McAuliffe, “Liberals and the Communist Control Act of 1954,” *Journal of American History* 63, no. 2 (1976): 351-67.

¹²⁹ *The New York Times*, 15 October 1949, 29 August 1950, 3 May 1956, 23 September 1956; Joseph R. Starobin, *American Communism in Crisis, 1943-1957* (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1972), 231-32.

senate avoided a formal censure in favor of passing a condemnation which limited none of McCarthy's rights.¹³⁰ The desired effect was achieved. The senator's offensive tactics became a relic of the past, and the bitter partisanship which had divided the nation for nearly five years began to recede. However, the phenomenon of McCarthyism would outlive the senator, who happened to have begun his career as a Democrat.¹³¹ Even the most progressive members of congress appreciated the need to be perceived as staunchly anticommunist.¹³²

Bertrand Russell observed that the government's persecution of citizens remained extremely intolerant.¹³³ The risk of treason was not entirely fictitious, he conceded, but it was being dealt with in a hysterical and counterproductive manner.¹³⁴ An increasing number of U.S. officials agreed with the British philosopher. For example, one former member of the Subversive Activities Control Board had become an outspoken critic of the loyalty program. Thousands of federal employees had resigned or been dismissed without being given the opportunity to face their accusers or because of their past affiliations which had been consistent with the nation's wartime alliance with the Soviet Union.¹³⁵ Most Americans remained oblivious to the need to uphold the civil liberties of dissidents,¹³⁶ but as Russell hoped, they had not

¹³⁰ Fried, *McCarthyism*, 178-79.

¹³¹ See Patrick Maney, "Joe McCarthy's First Victim," *The Virginia Quarterly Review* 77, no. 3 (2001): 529-36.

¹³² See *McCarthyism*, 2, 178-81; Fried, *Nightmare in red*, 169-70; Lawrence S. Wittner, *Rebels against War: The American Peace Movement, 1941-1960* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1969), 216-17.

¹³³ Bertrand Russell, *Has Man a Future?* (London: George Allen & Unwin Ltd, 1961), 46; *The New York Times*, 2 March 1952.

¹³⁴ *The New York Times*, 14 February 1954.

¹³⁵ This board was created by the Internal Security Act of 1950. The member referred to was former Senator Harry P. Cain. *The New York Times*, 23 February 1956, 3 June 1955. Between 1953 and 1956 there were approximately fifteen hundred security-related dismissals and six thousand resignations. Cate, *The Great Fear*, 274-75.

¹³⁶ Samuel A. Stouffer, *Communism, Conformity and Civil Liberties: A Cross-Section of the Nation Speaks its Mind* (Garden City, New York: Doubleday & Company, Inc., 1955), 59, 87; Lawrence N. Strout, "McCarthyism Revisited: TRB's Story," *Journal of American Culture* 22, no. 2 (1999): 77-84.

been completely desensitized to the virtue of political moderation.¹³⁷ American communists would still face “massive retaliation,” as the U.S. military strategy was known, but it would be somewhat less massive than in the past.¹³⁸

McCarthy’s death in May 1957 evoked little passion in the United States. The balanced tone of the press related to the low profile which he had kept in the two and a half years since being reprimanded. His unhealthy appearance had also discouraged most journalists from reveling in his demise. The British press, on the other hand, was less restrained. Among the many scathing editorials which followed, one referred to him as the most-hated man in the world. McCarthy might have viewed that status as a tribute to his self-promotion, for as he once remarked, his personality had become more important than his message.¹³⁹ His legacy was unique though his agenda had been fundamentally compatible with the Truman and Eisenhower administrations. As Robert Griffith writes, he was the product rather than the instigator of the U.S. Cold War mentality.¹⁴⁰

In June 1957 a Californian took his life rather than having to testify at the HUAC hearings in San Francisco. His final letter stated his unwillingness to be “assassinated by publicity.” Federal authorities had repeatedly questioned him about his former affiliation with leftist organizations and unsuccessfully demanded that he reveal the names of the others who had been involved.¹⁴¹ His case was neither

¹³⁷ See Hans Kohn, *American Nationalism: An Interpretive Essay* (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1957), 223.

¹³⁸ See Latham, *The Communist Controversy*, 321. The Department of Justice made 145 indictments under the Smith Act from 1948 to 1956, resulting in 108 convictions, five severances and ten acquittals. Seventy or more of the convictions were later reversed or sent back to court and then abandoned. At least eighteen cases were left un-prosecuted. Caute, *The Great Fear*, 208.

¹³⁹ *The New York Times*, 4–5 May 1957.

¹⁴⁰ Griffith and Theoharis, *The Specter*, ix. See Broadwater, *Eisenhower and the Anti-Communist Crusade*, 112; Athan Theoharis, “The Rhetoric of Politics: Foreign Policy, Internal Security and Domestic Politics in the Truman Era, 1945–1950,” in Barton J. Bernstein, ed., *Politics and Policies of the Truman Administration* (Chicago: Quadrangle Books, 1970), 196–241.

¹⁴¹ *The New York Times*, 18 June 1957.

unprecedented nor limited to U.S. citizens.¹⁴² Two months earlier, a Canadian ambassador had jumped to his death in response to senate allegations that he was a communist. Both the Ministry of External Affairs and the Department of State had expressed confidence in his integrity, yet the senate had proceeded with the investigation. After the suicide, the Canadian government expressed disappointment with the U.S. legislature while opposition leaders charged it with “murder by slander.”¹⁴³

Supreme Court decisions gradually began to restore the civil liberties which had been abridged in the quest for national security. The most important required that convictions under the Smith Act be based on evidence of an actual conspiracy to overthrow the government, rather than an affinity for the writings of bygone Soviet rulers.¹⁴⁴ The federal loyalty program continued but limited its focus to sensitive positions.¹⁴⁵ While congressional investigations declined sharply, this was less due to public opposition than to the lack of evidence that they remained necessary. They had reflected nearly ubiquitous support for the nation’s position in the Cold War while encouraging the self-censorship of meaningful dissent.¹⁴⁶ The U.S. reign of terror, though mild by French or Soviet standards, had been remarkably effective.¹⁴⁷

¹⁴² For example, one of the four individuals convicted under the Smith Act in 1953 took his own life. *The New York Times*, 21 January 1958. In the 1946 Democratic primary in Wisconsin, McCarthy defeated Robert LaFollette Jr who was also an anti-communist. In early 1953 he killed himself fearing that he might be called before the senate and attacked for not having done enough to combat the Soviet menace. Maney, “Joe McCarthy’s First Victim,” 533-34.

¹⁴³ *The New York Times*, 5 April 1957. For Eisenhower’s comments, see Broadwater, *Eisenhower and the Anti-Communist Crusade*, 197.

¹⁴⁴ Haynes, *Red Scare or Red Menace?*, 193; *The New York Times*, 21 January 1958, 4 February 1958, 4 March 1958.

¹⁴⁵ Whitfield, *The Culture of the Cold War*, 166.

¹⁴⁶ Ellen W. Schrecker, *No Ivory Tower: McCarthyism and the Universities* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1986), 339-41.

¹⁴⁷ In September 1946 Secretary of Commerce Henry A. Wallace had been forced to resign after publicly denouncing the “reign of terror at home.” Cate, *The Great Fear*, 31. In June 1949 a Department of State spokesperson conceded that there might be some “witch-hunting” in the United States, as Wallace and others charged, but he insisted that it was much worse in the USSR. *Pravda* held that it was misleading to distinguish. See *The New York Times*, 26 September 1945, 20 September 1947, 3 January 1948, 27 March 1948, 30 June 1949.

Americans were relieved that McCarthyism yielded to Nixonism, a less belligerent version of the same phenomenon,¹⁴⁸ and they had to accept that the limitation of either one. Millions of foreign communists remained diametrically opposed to U.S. interests,¹⁴⁹ and the Soviet Union had appeared to surpass U.S. technology for delivering intercontinental missiles.¹⁵⁰ Public anxiety over the growing number and destructives of nuclear weapons had contributed to spy scares.¹⁵¹ In their aftermath, war scares had also reached new heights. The Eisenhower administration continued to portray the communist threat in ominous terms to ensure that citizens would remain vigilant. Secretary of State John Foster Dulles gained the most notoriety for the harshness of his rhetoric.¹⁵² For example, *Life* magazine depicted him as a war-monger who traveled the world seeking to terrify foreigners as much as he terrified Americans.¹⁵³

In November 1958 the Soviet Union insisted on renegotiating the four-power occupation status of Berlin. Otherwise it pledged to support the East German government in any war which might result from western non-compliance. Since the admission of West Germany to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization three years earlier,¹⁵⁴ the United States had repeatedly held that any attack against it would be tantamount to a declaration of war.¹⁵⁵ Eisenhower had determined that it would not automatically resort to nuclear weapons in that case, but recognized that there might

¹⁴⁸ Arthur M. Schlesinger Jr., a professor of history, defined Nixonism as “a kind of kid-gloves McCarthyism.” *The New York Times*, 19 November 1954.

¹⁴⁹ See Philip Wylie, “Panic, Psychology and the Bomb,” *BAS* 10, no. 2 (1954): 37-40, 63.

¹⁵⁰ Morris, *Iron Destinies*, 120-21.

¹⁵¹ Whitfield, *The Culture of the Cold War*, 9. Recently declassified documents indicate that Soviet espionage networks were as sophisticated and widespread as feared at the time. David McKnight, *Espionage and the Roots of the Cold War* (London: Frank Cass, 2002), 7.

¹⁵² Townsend Hoopes, *The Devil and John Foster Dulles* (Boston: Little Brown and Company, 1973), 161.

¹⁵³ Richard D. Challener, “The National Security Policy from Truman to Eisenhower,” in Graebner, *The National Security*, 39-75.

¹⁵⁴ Ambrose, *Rise to Globalism*, 241-44.

¹⁵⁵ Petr Lunák, “Khrushchev and the Berlin Crisis: Soviet Brinkmanship Seen from Inside,” *Cold War History* 3, no. 2 (2003): 53-82.

be no other way to halt Soviet troops.¹⁵⁶ Since the ultimatum over Berlin held the possibility of forcing him to apply the doctrine of massive retaliation, he proposed that general negotiations, including topics such as arms control and disarmament, which might help to defuse the crisis. Soviet Premier Nikita Khrushchev was willing to consider this, for he also recognized that military conflict would be self-destructive.¹⁵⁷

Neither side was prepared to back down in the “war of nerves” which followed.¹⁵⁸ The United States insisted that the USSR had no legal basis for withdrawing from the occupation agreement,¹⁵⁹ which the USSR insisted had been nullified by West Germany’s admission to NATO. The six-month deadline for a resolution, imposed by the Soviet Union, led to a compromise: a foreign ministers conference rather than the summit meeting which Khrushchev preferred. Delegations from the four occupying powers and East and West Germany convened in Geneva from May to August 1959, and the Soviet Union withdrew its deadline and pledged not to cede control of its sector to East Germany while negotiations were underway.¹⁶⁰ Some analysts regretted that the crisis was promoting western acquiescence to Soviet hegemony in Eastern Europe. Not only had Khrushchev announced his preference for a divided Germany; the conference had bestowed legitimacy on the East German government.¹⁶¹

¹⁵⁶ *FRUS 1958–1960*, vol. 3, *National Security Policy; Arms Control and Disarmament* (Washington: USGPO, 1996), 79-97.

¹⁵⁷ See Jerome H. Kahan, *Security in the Nuclear Age: Developing U.S. Strategic Arms Policy* (Washington: The Brookings Institution, 1975), 24.

¹⁵⁸ *Ibid.*, 25.

¹⁵⁹ *Selected Documents on Germany and the Question of Berlin 1944–1961* (London: Her Majesty’s Stationery Office, 1961), 334.

¹⁶⁰ Powaski, *The Cold War*, 127-28; *SIA 1959–60* (London: Oxford University Press, 1964), 21-22, 35.

¹⁶¹ Henry A. Kissinger, “The Search for Stability,” *Foreign Affairs* 37, no. 4 (1959): 537-60; Spanier, *American Foreign Policy*, 140-41; *USWA 1959* (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1960): 154.

The Geneva Conference had started to allay concerns that the White House was so obsessed with military issues as to discount the value of negotiations.¹⁶² Eisenhower went further by inviting Khrushchev to visit the United States, and the immediate risk of a global conflict subsided when the Soviet premier accepted. In September 1959 Americans responded with horror and delight as he toured a number of major cities before proceeding to Camp David for discussions with Eisenhower. Charles E. Morris describes his visit as a “traveling circus.”¹⁶³ Khrushchev, though not always charming, was less inhuman and recalcitrant than Americans had expected.¹⁶⁴ He praised Eisenhower for having had the courage and wisdom to invite him,¹⁶⁵ and for recognizing that peaceful coexistence was more than a slogan.¹⁶⁶ Like the conference, the visit served to demonstrate that the U.S. attitude toward communism was far more permissive than at the height of McCarthyism.¹⁶⁷ The Communist Party, still outlawed but permitted to function, interpreted this as proof that U.S. Cold War policies had failed.¹⁶⁸

Six weeks later the Antarctic Conference opened in Washington, attended by delegations from the four nations—Britain, France, the Soviet Union and United States—whose conflict over Berlin had yet to be resolved. The other delegations were of less importance in the struggle between democracy and communism, and they hoped to prevent it from engulfing the frozen continent. The treaty which they helped to negotiate included articles which prohibited nuclear tests and the disposal of

¹⁶² Repeated statements by the secretary of state had generated this impression. See *The New York Times*, 16 January 1958; George F. Kennan, “Disengagement Revisited,” *Foreign Affairs* 37, no. 2 (1959): 187-210.

¹⁶³ Morris, *Iron Destinies*, 153.

¹⁶⁴ *USWA* 1959: 163-64.

¹⁶⁵ *SIA* 1959-60: 42-43.

¹⁶⁶ See *FRUS* 1958-1960, vol. 9, *Berlin Crisis 1959-1960; Germany; Austria* (Washington: USGPO, 1993), 40-41, 50-51; Dean Acheson, “The Illusion of Disengagement,” *Foreign Affairs* 36, no. 3 (1958): 371-82.

¹⁶⁷ See *FRUS* 1958-1960, 9: 42-45.

¹⁶⁸ *The New York Times*, 3 November 1959.

radioactive waste.¹⁶⁹ Though disputes emerged, they were resolved in a more genuine spirit of peaceful coexistence than applicable to the populated continents. The seven nations with territorial claims had yielded to the inclusion of five others whose rights were either less credible or undeclared.¹⁷⁰ To do otherwise would have been unlikely as both superpowers were among the non-claimants, yet the treaty signed in December 1959 exempted one region from the security dilemmas which confounded the rest of the planet.¹⁷¹

The ratification of the Antarctic Treaty, which had not yet been sent to the senate, met a potential setback in May 1960 when the Soviet Union shot down an U.S. reconnaissance plane over its territory.¹⁷² Eisenhower had already determined that a comparable violation of U.S. airspace might warrant a declaration of war, and there were no indications that Khrushchev would respond lightly. The president had authorized the flights upon assurances that they were unlikely to be discovered, and the incident met his worst fears of a publicity disaster.¹⁷³ After his initial denial, followed by various half-truths and untruths, he accepted full responsibility and insisted that surveillance was necessary to defend the nation from a Soviet missile attack. He refused either to blame others within his administration or to apologize to Khrushchev. Fortunately, the Soviet premier refrained from any military response,

¹⁶⁹ See chapter one.

¹⁷⁰ The seven claimant nations were Argentina, Australia, Britain, Chile, France, New Zealand and Norway. The five non-claimants were Belgium, Japan, South Africa, the Soviet Union and the United States.

¹⁷¹ See Phillip W. Quigg, *A Pole Apart: The Emerging Issue of Antarctica* (New York: McGraw Hill Book Company, 1983), 153; Richard S. Lewis, *A Continent for Science: The Antarctic Adventure* (New York: Viking Press, 1965), 282. Ronald Powaski writes that the Antarctic Treaty provided the one of the few “bright spot[s]” in a dismal year of international relations. Powaski, *The Cold War*, 125.

¹⁷² The Royal Institute of International Affairs observed that this incident “was the reality, Camp David the illusion, of international politics.” *SIA* 1959–60: 10.

¹⁷³ *FRUS* 1958–1960, vol. 10, part 1, *Eastern Europe Region; Soviet Union; Cyprus* (Washington: USGPO, 1993), 260-62, 264-65.

simply abandoning his summit meeting with Eisenhower in Paris.¹⁷⁴

George Kennan regarded the U-2 incident as destroying the career of the one Soviet statesman with whom a more peaceful form of coexistence might have been achieved.¹⁷⁵ Most Americans, on the other hand, blamed Khrushchev for both the failure of the summit and the ongoing dispute over Berlin, whereas they admired the “dignity” which had motivated their president to accept responsibility for the incident.¹⁷⁶ Charles R. Morris writes that the goodwill surrounding Khrushchev’s visit had now been irretrievably lost.¹⁷⁷ The Soviet premier was no longer praising Eisenhower, but excoriating his attempt to justify an unjustifiable action—however differently Americans chose to view it.¹⁷⁸ The senate was left to debate the Antarctic Treaty in a much different environment than when it had been signed eight months earlier. Its ratification affirmed that the U.S. commitment to peace had not been fully extinguished.¹⁷⁹

This outcome was also desirable from a practical standpoint. In 1958 the Department of State had tabled the internationalization proposal which laid the groundwork of the treaty. The first U.S. internationalization proposal, circulated one decade earlier, had not succeeded primarily due to its call to renounce sovereignty. Many senators favored a declaration of the nation’s rights since the second proposal allowed territorial claims to remain in place, though not to be enforced. Documents reveal that they appreciated the patriotic merit of a claim, as espoused most fervently

¹⁷⁴ He also cancelled the president’s invitation to visit the USSR. Lunák, “Khrushchev and the Berlin crisis,” 67-68; *FRUS* 1958–1960, 10/1: 522-28, 532-33.

¹⁷⁵ Michael R. Beschloss, *Mayday: Eisenhower, Khrushchev and the U-2 Affair* (London: Faber and Faber, 1986), 379.

¹⁷⁶ See Diggins, *The Proud Decades*, 337-38.

¹⁷⁷ Morris, *Iron Destinies*, 147.

¹⁷⁸ *FRUS* 1958–1960, 9: 439-40, 452-53; Beschloss, *Mayday*, 259.

¹⁷⁹ In his state-of-the-union address, Eisenhower had referred to the Antarctic Treaty as “one instance where our initiative for peace has recently been successful,” and stressed that the U.S. “is always ready to participate with the Soviet Union in serious discussions of these or any other subject that may lead to peace with justice.” *The New York Times*, 8 January 1960.

by Elizabeth A. Kendall, apparently the only American concerned enough about the issue to engage in a letter-writing campaign. They also appreciated her desire to exclude the USSR.¹⁸⁰ The fact remained that the nation's credibility was at stake since it had invited Soviet participation. Given the pace of Antarctic diplomacy, a better alternative might have been impossible or required another ten years to negotiate.¹⁸¹

The New York Times commended the senate for displaying "political wisdom and maturity" in the face of Soviet military threats and an ongoing campaign of espionage directed against the American people. According to the editors, the ratification was a productive means of combating "the paranoid atmosphere reigning in Moscow."¹⁸² This observation demonstrated that the atmosphere reigning in Washington bore traces of McCarthyism. Congressional investigations had waned, yet citizens remained subject to fines or imprisonment if they failed to comply. The Supreme Court had limited the scope of the Fifth Amendment by requiring witnesses to provide self-incriminating testimony while exempting them from prosecution based on their own words. This ruling failed to uphold the spirit of the Fifth Amendment as self-incriminating testimony might lead to further revelations from which a citizen would not be exempt from prosecution.¹⁸³ The attitude of *The New York Times* toward the ratification of the Antarctic Treaty betrayed the us-versus-them logic which the

¹⁸⁰ See chapter five.

¹⁸¹ Peter Briggs writes that the delay between the two U.S. proposals revealed that "diplomacy is a slow business." Peter Briggs, *Laboratory at the Bottom of the World* (New York: David McKay Company, Inc., 1970), 17.

¹⁸² *The New York Times*, 12 August 1960.

¹⁸³ Ellen W. Schrecker, *No Ivory Tower: McCarthyism and the Universities* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1986), 341; Walter Goodman, *The Committee: The Extraordinary Career of the House Committee on Un-American Activities* (London: Secker & Warburg, 1968), 367; *The New York Times*, 27 March 1956.

government had institutionalized.¹⁸⁴

The wisdom of the treaty was less certain than the anticommunist mood of the nation and the gravity of the Berlin crisis. The traits widely attributed to the Soviet Union—by journalists, senators and the public at large—were not those of a reliable partner in the Antarctic or anywhere else.¹⁸⁵ They were the traits of a nation which still sought to overthrow the U.S. government despite the relative harmlessness of the American Politburo.¹⁸⁶ Any rationale for including it in the treaty lacked harmony with the federal loyalty program and national security apparatus. The “Soviet thrust into the Antarctic,” of which *Congressional Record* had warned, could be expected to continue in spite of the treaty’s demilitarization clauses.¹⁸⁷ While this risk was benign compared to Soviet troops overrunning Europe, a substantial minority of senators had attempted to defeat it. Their effort was unsuccessful despite being more consistent with the American thrust in world affairs.

Senator Richard B. Russell summarized that his colleagues who favored the treaty did so only because of their “blind and unreasoning faith in the Department of State.” The treaty was not “diametrically” opposed to U.S. national interests, as he claimed,¹⁸⁸ but the Department of State had made no effort to clarify the arguments in its favor. Indeed there was some merit in seeking to cooperate with the Soviet Union in Antarctica. Publicity of its scientific achievements—the most likely

¹⁸⁴ See Levin, *Political Hysteria in America*, 220; Hogan, *A Cross of Iron*, 209.

¹⁸⁵ For example, in his state-of-the-union address in 1954, Eisenhower said, “When a citizen knowingly participates in the communist conspiracy he no longer holds allegiance to the United States.” Opinion polls indicated that eighty percent of Americans favored his proposal to deprive such individuals of their citizenship. By 1960 the “communist conspiracy” appeared somewhat less foreboding, but the U-2 affair put an end to the emerging détente. See Beschloss, *Mayday*, 357; Whitfield, *The Culture of the Cold War*, 14-15; *The New York Times*, 8 January 1954.

¹⁸⁶ Attorney General J. Howard McGrath stated that the conviction of the eleven communists was based on their intent rather than their behavior. He elaborated, “I do not think [they] could accomplish the overthrow of the government. Let us not be hysterical and lose our balance over it.” *The New York Times*, 21 October 1949.

¹⁸⁷ *Congressional Record*, 17 July 1957.

¹⁸⁸ *The New York Times*, 11 August 1960.

“threat”—was bound to flourish regardless of its presence in the Antarctic.¹⁸⁹ As important, the failure of the treaty would not have encouraged it to withdraw from the continent. The Department of State had enjoyed the opportunity to make such arguments in favor of ratification, but chosen to let it pass. Russell was correct that the faith demonstrated by his colleagues was unprompted. Whether it was also unjustified depended on perceptions of the treaty’s significance—which the majority of senators determined was minor enough to justify setting aside traditional national interests.

As Sanjay Chaturvedi notes, this outcome was not guaranteed.¹⁹⁰ In fact the day of the vote a Department of State official commented that the treaty appeared to lack the necessary support.¹⁹¹ The eight-vote margin by which it passed was a welcome surprise, but no cause for jubilation. The department had taken a passive approach because it also questioned the wisdom of involving the USSR, though attempting to exclude it might have been counterproductive. Once the Soviet presence in Antarctica had been established, in preparation for the International Geophysical Year (IGY), officials took a conciliatory line while nurturing hope that it might be voluntarily rescinded.¹⁹² This hope had always been distant, and it passed altogether when many of the IGY participants, including the Soviet Union, chose to extend their activities in the far south.¹⁹³ While the treaty provided effective

¹⁸⁹ For concern about this kind of Soviet propaganda in the Antarctic, see Embassy in Wellington (Crutcher) to Department of State, 10 March 1958, no. 479, NARA, RG 59, 702.022; Embassy in Moscow (Mark) to Department of State, 15 August 1958, no. 115, NARA, RG 59, 399.829. These documents reflect the more general concern that “applause for communist science in many parts of the world is applause for communism itself.” See Edward Teller and Allen Brown, *The Legacy of Hiroshima* (London: Macmillan & Co. Ltd., 1962), 144.

¹⁹⁰ Chaturvedi, *Dawning of Antarctica*, 97.

¹⁹¹ *The New York Times*, 11 August 1960.

¹⁹² For example, Department of State, Memorandum by Office of Inter-American Regional Political Affairs (Wilson), 22 July 1957, NARA, RG 59, 702.022.

¹⁹³ The National Security Council initially favored drafting a U.S. territorial claim in consultation with the friendly claimant nations, to be announced after the completion of the IGY on 31 December 1958. It was rumored that the USSR planned to stay thereafter. The Department of State sought to limit post-

guidelines for preserving the status quo, the Department of State was not oblivious to concerns that it still might fail to “mollify an implacable aggressor.”¹⁹⁴

Senator Thomas J. Dodd argued that the Treaty, despite its many noble objectives, had to be viewed as “an act of appeasement” since it made the USSR an equal partner with the United States and ten other “free world” nations.¹⁹⁵ What he viewed as appeasement, others viewed as idealism, necessity or both. Five years earlier the charge of appeasement would have generated more alarm. A decade earlier it might have caused the entire government to quiver, as when McCarthy made his initial allegation that the Department of State was infested with communists.¹⁹⁶ However, by 1960 some form of appeasement had become necessary to prevent the dispute over Berlin from igniting a nuclear confrontation. If the Antarctic Treaty had been defeated on the grounds that it constituted appeasement, then Eisenhower might have been subject to charges of treason. Not only had he invited Khrushchev to visit the United States; the Communist Party claimed to have benefited as a result.¹⁹⁷

The Department of State viewed the treaty’s ratification much as it had viewed the press conference which followed Operation High Jump’s return to the United States in April 1947. Admiral Richard Evelyn Byrd and his second-in-command held in a friendly debate as regards the strategic value of Antarctica. Byrd, contrary to his

IGY activities to a minimum and thus discourage the USSR’s involvement in a final resolution. However, this was an extremely infeasible objective since the USSR, like most nations active in the Antarctic at this time, expected that the United States was preparing a claim and still hoped to exclude it, in keeping with the first internationalization plan. See Department of State, Bureau of Inter-American Affairs (Snow) to Secretary of State, 26 August 1957, NARA, RG 59, 399.829; Department of State, Office of Deputy Undersecretary of State (Daniels) to Secretary of State, 13 November 1957, NARA, RG 59, 702.022.

¹⁹⁴ In a letter to editor, Senator Thomas J. Dodd denounced the treaty as “a gratuitous giveaway of American rights in the hope that this will somehow mollify an implacable aggressor.” *The New York Times*, 11 July 1960.

¹⁹⁵ For the similar opinions of Senators Clair Engle and Ernest Gruening, see *The New York Times*, 15 June 1960.

¹⁹⁶ See Melvyn Leffler, “Adherence to Agreements: Yalta and the Experiences of the Early Cold War,” *International Security* 11, no. 1 (1986): 88-123; Athan Theoharis, “Roosevelt and Truman on Yalta: The Origins of the Cold War,” *Political Science Quarterly* 87, no. 2 (1972): 210-41.

¹⁹⁷ One headline declared, “Communists Here See Party Gaining” from Khrushchev’s trip. *The New York Times*, 3 November 1959.

personal convictions, insisted that it was minimal while Admiral Richard H. Cruzen held that it was sufficient to warrant a declaration of U.S. rights. As discussed in the previous chapter, the event was staged in hope of gauging public opinion. The press was favorable to a declaration of U.S. rights, though the issue was not of great importance to Americans at large.¹⁹⁸ The ratification process forced senators to grapple with the merit of a treaty which clearly did “appease” the Soviet Union, and the Department of State was uncertain both of the outcome and which one it might prefer.¹⁹⁹

The non-ratification of the treaty would have a minor source of embarrassment for the Eisenhower administration—at least domestically. Dread pertaining to Soviet advances was understandable, but the U.S. Navy had proved its aptitude in the region and the risk of major hostilities was infinitesimal. Likewise the loyalty program and federal legislation had virtually eliminated the threat of internal subversion. A Soviet offensive in Antarctica was no more likely than the Communist Party overthrowing the government. In the scope of world affairs, Antarctica was a flea on the back of a dog, as David Caute describes the Communist Party of the United States.²⁰⁰ To collaborate with the Soviet enemy in such an environment provided a token of goodwill which was more difficult or impossible to achieve elsewhere.

The first internationalization proposal, which the Department of State circulated in June 1948, had sought to exclude the Soviet Union from the Antarctic by forging a condominium arrangement with the seven claimant nations. This objective

¹⁹⁸ This was a consistent trend. See Deborah Shapley, *The Seventh Continent: Antarctica in a Resource Age* (Washington: Resources for the Future, 1985), 21.

¹⁹⁹ The non-ratification of the treaty might have led to the formation of a three-power arrangement with Australia and New Zealand, as clandestinely under discussion in case the twelve-power negotiations were to break down—as often seemed likely. Another three-power arrangement was under consideration by Argentina, Britain and Chile. There is no evidence that these arrangements could have been implemented. In some ways they might have been more difficult than the Treaty. See Jason Kendall Moore, “The Constructive Limits of Antarctic History, Yankee Imperialism and Chilean–Australian Relations through 1959,” *Revista de Historia* 13–14 (2003–4): 173–78.

²⁰⁰ Caute, *The Great Fear*, 185.

was perfectly in keep with the Truman Doctrine to halt the spread of communism, and it gained a sense of urgency when the Soviet Union blockaded western access to Berlin. The claimant nations, though not all staunchly pro-U.S., responded favorably to the anti-Soviet nature of the proposal. They contested the need to renounce their sovereignty, as called for, and pursued means of surmounting this issue. The following August, Secretary of State Dean Acheson chose to revise U.S. policy in accord with the Chilean Escudero Plan, which had called for “shelving” the sovereignty issue for five to ten years during which the technicalities of the arrangement could be negotiated.²⁰¹

This hopeful development failed to produce results for a variety of reasons, none of which related to the common objective of excluding the USSR. Between the initial U.S. proposal and Acheson’s acceptance of the Escudero Plan, China fell under communist rule and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization was signed. Shortly thereafter the Soviet Union detonated its first atomic weapon, further highlighting the need for a consensus in the Antarctic. Negotiations stalled as U.S. attention shifted to the Korean War, and the claimant nations had little reason to believe that the Soviet Union would annex the continent in the near future. The U.S. commitment to an eight-power agreement seemed likely to persist as the Truman administration had instigated the loyalty program and begun criminal proceedings against leaders of the Communist Party.

The outlook for an agreement improved, at least conceptually, when the Eisenhower administration strengthened the loyalty program and congress outlawed the Communist Party. The goal of excluding the Soviet Union from the frozen terrain complemented these policies but was less urgent from a domestic standpoint. The

²⁰¹ See chapter one.

U.S. role in the world now adopted the doctrine of massive retaliation. While there was no cause to threaten its application in Antarctica—since Washington had not announced a territorial claim and the region fell outside the purview of either NATO or the Warsaw Pact—Eisenhower’s anticommunist resolve was beyond question. Unfortunately, from a North American standpoint, preparations for the International Geophysical Year ushered the Soviet enemy to the shores of the last continent. The second U.S. internationalization proposal sought to avoid controversy by involving the USSR. This change of policy was not unreasonable, though many of the claimant nations—like some officials within the Department of State—questioned its validity.²⁰²

Like the senators who voted in favor of the treaty, the Eisenhower administration appreciated the case in favor of a national claim as well as the hypothetical benefit of reverting to an eight-power arrangement. Its decision to include the USSR entailed a degree of frustration which was more readily understood than internalized. The perspective of Thomas J. Dodd and his colleagues failed to resonate since Antarctica had no constituency, and anti-communist themes were more effectively applied to people and conspiracies rather than a distant continent primarily known for its scientific value. The senate debate might have been more memorable if McCarthy or Byrd had been involved, and resulted in a more decisive vote one way or the other. The final margin was adequate but uninspired.²⁰³ The same might be observed of the treaty, for it was the product of forced optimism rather than of virtue.²⁰⁴

²⁰² See chapter one.

²⁰³ The 66:21 margin by which the Treaty passed was very narrow compared to the overwhelming or unanimous margin given to anticommunist legislation. The tally was 38 Democrats and 28 Republicans in favor, and 17 Democrats and 4 Republicans against. *The New York Times*, 11 August 1960.

²⁰⁴ Moore, “The Constructive Limits.”

Barton J. Bernstein asserts that Truman was a victim of his own policies as they gave rise to McCarthyism.²⁰⁵ Eisenhower might have borne no direct responsibility for the former president being called before the House Un-American Activities Committee,²⁰⁶ but his anticommunist policies were even more rigid. The Antarctic difficulty which faced his administration paralleled Truman's in relation to McCarthyism. The Department of State had made countless declarations in favor of international cooperation at the bottom of the world, and the Soviet Union had sought the opportunity to participate in a final resolution. For the Eisenhower administration to deny it that opportunity would have exposed the disingenuousness of its own rhetoric. As Truman was not forced to testify, the government was not forced to pursue an arrangement without Soviet participation—which might have been more difficult than the alternative.²⁰⁷ A sense of relief accompanied both outcomes.

As the government would have had little difficulty making an Antarctic claim, it would have had little difficulty arresting thousands or tens of thousands of domestic communists. It refrained from either course lest the apprehension surrounding its policies be fully legitimated. Journalists accurately reported that it was considering a territorial claim and using the continent for further military testing. Others held that the nation's persecution of domestic communists offended the nation's traditional devotion to free speech and association. Meanwhile the government denied abusing or planning to abuse its power, and its denial was not implausible. In the Antarctic it maintained a status quo to its own detriment while its purge of domestic communists led to no more than a few hundred arrests, followed by many acquittals or relatively short sentences. U.S. Cold War policies, though often poorly formulated or

²⁰⁵ See Bernstein, "America in War and Peace," 131; Freeland, *The Truman Doctrine*, 360.

²⁰⁶ Eisenhower told the press that he would not have subpoenaed Truman, whom he claimed to regard as a patriot, and that he had not been informed beforehand of the attorney-general's declaration regarding Harry Dexter White. *The New York Times*, 12 November 1953, 17 November 1953.

²⁰⁷ See footnote 199.

counterproductive or both,²⁰⁸ were tempered by the nation's innate political conservatism.²⁰⁹

The next chapter pertains to the arms race which brought not only the superpowers but all humanity to the brink of Armageddon. While this issue has been discussed in several of the preceding chapters, it merits separate consideration to underscore the influence of world opinion on the United States' decision to accept the Antarctic Treaty's inclusion of a nuclear test ban. This decision, though inconsistent with U.S. national security policies, incurred no serious risks. The only risk was that the USSR might retain the diplomatic advantage which it gained primarily through advocating a global test ban.

²⁰⁸ See John Lewis Gaddis, "The Long Peace: Elements of Stability in the Post-War International System," *International Security* 10, no. 4 (1986): 99-142.

²⁰⁹ See Kohn, *American Nationalism*, 223; Levin, *Political Hysteria in America*, 220.

7. The Anti-Nuclear Movement

In the 1920s U.S. journalists began to include scientific developments among the most newsworthy events, a trend which greatly increased after the Second World War demonstrated that technology was capable of altering the course of history.¹ Research and development during the Cold War assumed a military emphasis to the detriment of those scientists who sought funding for purely theoretical work.² Though nuclear physics had once fallen into that category, the government was loath to believe that other fields would lead to such monumental breakthroughs—or that they would be needed in the effort to protect the “free world” from communist aggression. Many scientists needed no encouragement to join security-related projects while others did so only out of necessity and contrary to their predisposition to believe that science should be used for the benefit of all humankind. Michael Aaron Dennis write that, in this regard, many scientists appeared to be communists or communist sympathizers,³ yet the vast majority were prudent enough not to state or imply any affinity for the Soviet model.⁴

Journals such as *Social Studies of Science* have detailed many of the politically related aspects of science during the Cold War,⁵ a topic which is herein limited to the

¹ Bruce V. Lewenstein, “Cold Fusion and Hot History,” *Osiris* 7 (1992): 135-63.

² By the late 1950s, approximately half of U.S. engineers and one quarter of scientists were employed by the federal government, and approximately two-thirds of scientific research at universities and in industry was government funded. Warner R. Schilling, “Scientists, Foreign Policy and Politics,” in *Scientists and National Policymaking*, Robert Gilpin and Christopher Wright, eds. (New York: Columbia University Press, 1964), 144-73. See also Ralph E. Lapp, *The New Priesthood: The Scientific Elite and the Uses of Power* (New York: Harper & Row, Publishers, 1965), 13; Daniel J. Kevles, “Scientists, the Military, and the Control of Postwar Defense Research: The Case of the Research Board for National Security, 1944-46,” *Technology and Culture* 16, no. 1 (1975): 20-47.

³ Michael Aaron Dennis, “Accounting for Research: New Histories or Corporate Laboratories and the Social History of American Science,” *Social Studies of Science* 17, no. 3 (1987): 479- 518.

⁴ For a discussion of the self-censorship of government critics, whether scientists or otherwise, see the previous chapter.

⁵ For example, C. Stewart Gilmor, “Federal Funding and Knowledge Growth in Ionospheric Physics, 1945-81,” *Social Studies of Science* 16, no. 1 (1986): 105-33; David A. Hounshell, “Epilogue: Rethinking the Cold War; Rethinking Science and Technology in the Cold War; Rethinking the Social

arms race, the most universally significant, well-publicized, and contentious application of human ingenuity. After the success of the U.S. atomic bomb, the development of which he had overseen, J. Robert Oppenheimer wrote that nuclear physicists had known a sin for which they would never be able to deny responsibility.⁶ Few U.S. officials felt a similar sense of guilt or any guilt whatsoever. One senator expressed the more popular sentiment that the United States must “move forward with the atomic bomb in one hand and the cross in the other.”⁷ The government’s effort to do so was less successful than anticipated, as discussed in the previous chapters, and its “atomic diplomacy” met with increasing negative opinion which helped to exempt at least one continent, the Antarctica, from weapons of mass destructions.⁸

Proposals to regulate the use of atomic energy met limited success after the Second World War. The development of peaceful initiatives, such as reactors, failed to curtail the possibility that the next major war would eradicate human civilization. The link between science and destruction was more salient than that between science and international cooperation, the declared objectives of U.S. Antarctic policy. Early suggestions to use atomic bombs to gain access to continent’s mineral resources were never pursued for many reasons, such as the danger of flooding coastlines.⁹ By the mid-1950s that risk seemed benign compared to a nuclear exchange in which

Study of Science and Technology,” *Social Studies of Science* 31, no. 2 (2001): 289-97; David K. van Keuren, “Cold War Science in Black and White: U.S. Intelligence Gathering and Its Scientific Cover at the Naval Research Laboratory, 1948–62,” *Social Studies of Science* 31, no. 2 (2001): 207-29; Mark Solovey, “Introduction: Science and the State during the Cold War: Blurred Boundaries and a Contested Legacy,” *Social Studies of Science* 31, no. 2 (2001): 165-70.

⁶ Quoted in Brian Easlea, *Fathering the Unthinkable: Masculinity, Scientists and the Nuclear Arms Race* (London: Pluto Press Limited, 1983), 85.

⁷ Senator Edward Martin quoted in Stephen J. Whitfield, *The Culture of the Cold War* (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1991), 87.

⁸ The term “atomic diplomacy” gained currency in the 1960s and was closely associated with the New Left. Since then many other authors have agreed with the premise of the term that the United States sought to use its briefly held atomic monopoly to extract concessions from the Soviet Union. See Lloyd J. Graybar, “The 1946 Atomic Bomb Tests: Atomic Diplomacy or Bureaucratic Infighting,” *Journal of American History* 72, no. 4 (1986): 888-907.

⁹ *The New York Times*, 31 January 1946, 2 February 1946, 13 February 1946. See chapter five.

hundreds of millions would perish and the survivors would envy the dead.¹⁰

International negotiations pertaining to the future of Antarctica never dwelled on that scenario, though in the final days of the Antarctic Conference in Washington, the U.S. delegation objected to a Soviet proposal to include a nuclear test but quickly yielded due to pressure from the Southern Hemisphere nations.¹¹

This chapter provides an overview of the anti-nuclear movement and its bearing on the Antarctic Treaty of 1959. While previous chapters have alluded to the “bomb” relative to U.S.–Soviet and U.S.–British relations, as well as U.S. national security policies, this chapter analyses the increasing hostility of world opinion toward the U.S. nuclear program. A U.S. rejection of the test ban would not have altered the global balance of power. However, it would have incurred extremely negative publicity at a time when officials were actively seeking to improve their nation’s reputation abroad. The Soviet Union’s reputation, though by no means impeccable, benefited from its persistent calls for a global test ban and the prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons.¹² In early 1958 it announced a voluntary suspension which the United States and Britain agreed to uphold after finishing their current series of tests. Five years later the three nations signed and ratified a formal ban which did not extend to underground tests. In the interim the Antarctic Treaty had exempted one continent from all forms of nuclear tests.

The 1963 ban held greater significance as no nuclear warheads had been stationed in the far south and, even if the treaty had not included a ban, tests would have required justification in keeping with its demilitarization protocols. Without

¹⁰ See John Strachey, *On the Prevention of War* (London: Macmillan & Co. Ltd., 1962), 7-8; Bertrand Russell, *Has Man a Future?* (London: George Allen & Unwin Ltd, 1961), 33.

¹¹ See chapter three.

¹² See Henry A. Kissinger, *Nuclear Weapons and Foreign Policy* (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1957), 365-66.

success the U.S. delegation sought to reserve this possibility.¹³ The reviewed documents affirm press coverage at the time that it had not expected the Soviet proposal,¹⁴ so its position was not as fully developed as it otherwise might have been. By default it reflected the conviction that nuclear tests, however justified, were essential to deter Soviet aggression. This conviction had been reinforced by the non-use of weapons of mass destruction since Hiroshima and Nagasaki. Its applicability to the Antarctic remained questionable in light of the region's minimal strategic importance. The risk of Soviet aggression in Eastern Europe was exponentially greater while bombers, submarines and short-range missiles provided more efficient means of delivering a strike. U.S. acceptance of the ban indicated that officials viewed tests in the Antarctic as desirable though non-essential.

This chapter dwells on how U.S. officials responded to the Soviet "peace offensive" which they viewed as a guise to undermine their national security, much as Soviet officials viewed the U.S. linkage of inspection rights to arms control proposals as a guise for espionage.¹⁵ The "peace offensive" led to the Antarctic Treaty's inclusion of the first nuclear prohibition in history. While equivocal bans were briefly considered, they were abandoned in favor of the Soviet-sponsored total ban.¹⁶ A growing number of anti-nuclear activists called for imposing such a ban worldwide. They included communists, non-communists and anti-communists who believed that

¹³ See U.S. Delegation to Antarctic Conference (Phleger), Memorandum for Deputy Undersecretary of State (Merchant), 17 November 1959, NARA, RG 59, 702.022; Department of State (Fergusson), Office Memorandum, 24 November 1959, NARA, RG 59, 399.829.

¹⁴ For example, *The New York Times*, 28 November 1959.

¹⁵ See Michael Mandelbaum, *The Nuclear Revolution: International Politics before and after Hiroshima* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981), 25; Henry A. Kissinger, "Missiles and the Western Alliance," *Foreign Affairs* 36, no. 3 (1958): 383-400; John Foster Dulles, "Challenge and Response in United States Policy," *Foreign Affairs* 36, no. 1 (1957): 25-43; *USWA* 1958 (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1959), 55-57.

¹⁶ U.S. documents are not entirely consistent with British documents on the positions assumed by the Argentine, Australian and Soviet delegations. The discrepancies pertain to which delegation first presented a ban and whether it was to be comprehensive in nature. See Embassy in Washington (Caccia) to Foreign Office, 22 October 1959, A 15214/260; Embassy in Washington (Hankey) to Foreign Office (Hildyard), 5 November 1959, A 15214/332, 5 November 1959, A 1521, PRO, FO 371.

self-preservation must transcend questions of ideology. President Dwight D. Eisenhower acknowledged that their campaign directly influenced his acceptance of the voluntary test suspension in 1958, at which point it was still gathering momentum. It is true that few of the activists might have regarded the Antarctic Treaty as germane to their quest to save people rather than penguins,¹⁷ yet they indirectly contributed to the U.S. decision to accept the test ban.

Many of the physicists involved with developing the atomic bomb recommended consulting with the Soviet Union before using it against Japan, in hope that an arms race might be avoided. After their advice was neglected and relations with the Soviet Union quickly soured, they began to mobilize public opinion in favor of international control mechanisms which would not benefit either side in the Cold War. *Bulletin of Atomic Scientists* offered a range of perspectives which sometimes diverged from that of the editor, Eugene Rabinowitch, who never tired of criticizing U.S. policy. The government dismissed the publication as unfairly biased while having to accept that its tenor was gaining currency around the world.¹⁸ This chapter draws heavily from the *Bulletin* since most of its contributors wrote with first-hand knowledge not only of science but of the moral dilemmas related to its application. They helped to counteract the public's tendency to ignore questions of life-and-death,¹⁹ offering strategic insights which U.S. officials selectively adopted.

In December 1938 two physicists at the University of Berlin split an atom of uranium by bombarding it with neutrons, a process known as fission which substantiated

¹⁷ A Department of State official had once adopted this reasoning to determine that the UN trusteeship system was inapplicable to Antarctica. Department of State, Office of European Affairs (Raynor) to Division of Northern European Affairs (Green), 27 January 1948, NARA, RG 59, 800.014.

¹⁸ See Lawrence S. Wittner, *The Struggle against the Bomb*, vol. 2, *Resisting the Bomb: A History of the World Nuclear Disarmament Movement, 1954–1970* (Stanford, California: Stanford University Press, 1997), 134–35.

¹⁹ See Philip Wylie, "Panic, Psychology and the Bomb," *BAS* 10, no. 2 (1954): 37–40, 63.

Albert Einstein's hypothesis that mass held the potential to release a great amount of energy.²⁰ While the physicists did not immediately grasp the military significance of their experiment, this became the subject of hundreds of articles written by other physicists and sensationalized by the press. The doomsday themes which characterized science fiction suddenly encroached upon the realm of fact. Journalists around the world began to speculate that the future of the planet might be imperiled if further experiments were conducted. *Scientific American* observed that tabloids could not have hoped for better material and that their most alarming predictions were not beyond comprehension.²¹ Less than half a century had passed between the discovery of radioactivity and the splitting of the atom; now scientists were poised to make even more rapid breakthroughs.²²

Years earlier the Hungarian physicist Leo Szilard had warned that the atom held a tremendous capacity for destruction. Shortly after fleeing to Britain to escape persecution by the Third Reich, he had acquired two patents related to the construction of an atomic bomb though failed to generate interest within the government.²³ The 1938 experiment heightened his resolve to develop a weapon before the Germans did, and this objective was shared by other refugee scientists, many of whom were Jewish. In late 1939 Szilard drafted a letter to President Franklin D. Roosevelt, warning that Germany might use uranium from Czechoslovakian mines to develop an atomic bomb. Einstein lent his name to it in hope that the message

²⁰ Ronald E. Powaski, *March to Armageddon: The United States and the Nuclear Arms Race, 1939 to the Present* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1987), 3.

²¹ Spencer R. Weart, *Nuclear Fear: A History of Images* (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1988), 77-80. The editor of *Scientific American* publication later elaborated, "Man has taken his life in his hands." Arthur Herzog, *The War-Peace Establishment* (New York: Harper & Row, Publishers, 1963), xi-xii.

²² Brian Easlea, *Fathering the Unthinkable: Masculinity, Scientists and the Nuclear Arms Race* (London: Pluto Press Limited, 1983), 40.

²³ Peter Pringle and James Spigelman, *The Nuclear Barons* (London: Michael Joseph, 1981), 3-7.

would not be ignored, and indeed it was not.²⁴ After reading the letter, Roosevelt declared, “This requires action.” It has been suggested that those words marked the U.S. entry into the nuclear arms race.²⁵

Roosevelt established the Office of Scientific Research and Development in June 1941, placing it under the direction of Vannevar Bush, an engineer by training who also chaired the National Defense Resources Board established the previous year to develop military applications for science. The office shared this objective while focusing more specifically on uranium research.²⁶ American scientists shared Szilard’s belief that this was only prudent and, like Roosevelt and many other officials, they regarded their nation’s entry into the war as extremely likely. The following month British physicists determined that an atomic bomb was theoretically feasible and should be pursued with haste given the assumption that the side which first developed the technology would also be the first to use it. In October Bush gained authorization to proceed with the research directed to that end, and the following year Roosevelt ordered the production phase to commence.²⁷

The Manhattan Project, as the secret U.S. initiative was known, brought civilian scientists under military jurisdiction for a longer and more closely supervised period than even before.²⁸ Bush maintained positive relations with army personnel, whereas

²⁴ Lapp, *The New Priesthood*, 48-49; Martin J. Sherwin, *A World Destroyed: Hiroshima and its Legacies*, 3rd ed (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2003), 27.

²⁵ Powaski, *March to Armageddon*, 4-5.

²⁶ The board was later placed under jurisdiction of the office. Donald C. Swain, “Organization of Military Research,” in Melvin Kranzberg and Carroll W. Pursell, Jr., eds., *Technology in Western Civilization*, vol. 2, *Technology in the Twentieth Century* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1967), 535-48. For further elaboration, see James Phinney Baxter III, *Scientists against Time* (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1946), 14-15.

²⁷ Richard G. Hewlett and Oscar E. Anderson, Jr., *A History of the United States Atomic Energy Commission*, vol. 1, *The New World, 1939-1946* (University Park, Pennsylvania: The Pennsylvania State University Press, 1962), 45-46; Sherwin, *A World Destroyed*, 13, 30-31; Lapp, *The New Priesthood*, 60.

²⁸ Samuel R. Williamson, Jr., and Steven L. Reardon, *The Origins of U.S. Nuclear Strategy, 1945-1953* (New York: St Martin’s Press, 1993), 6; James L. Penick, Jr., et al., eds., *The Politics of American Science 1939 to the Present*, Revised Edition (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Massachusetts Institute of Technology Press, 1972), 10.

the scientists often displayed contempt for individual officers or the army's bureaucratic procedures or both.²⁹ Herbert York and Allen Greb somewhat misleadingly refer to the scientists as equal partners in the Manhattan Project.³⁰ This was the ideal to which Bush aspired, yet many of the scientists regarded themselves as more important to the war effort than the military itself, and they resented being subject to rigid system of compartmentalization which hampered their ability to share information. The army, on the other hand, resented their hubris and aversion to the chain of command. Its concern about espionage, though understandable, inadvertently delayed the bomb's production.³¹

Another divisive issue arose over the whether an atomic weapon should be used unless absolutely necessary. In the perspective of General Leslie D. Grove, commander of the Manhattan Project, the more important question was whether it would achieve victory more quickly than otherwise possible and thereby save American lives. This perspective contradicted the scientists' hope for atomic energy to eventually be used to benefit all humanity.³² Most of all it was anathema to Niels Bohr's hope that U.S.-Soviet relations would not degenerate into an arms race. A Danish Jew, regarded as one of the world's leading physicists, he joined the Manhattan Project in 1944 and urged informing the Soviet Union of it.³³ In a discussion with Roosevelt that August, it seemed that his idea might be given serious consideration. However, Roosevelt believed that the weapon might be useful in counteracting Soviet ambitions in Eastern Europe, and he not only ignored Bohr's

²⁹ Sherwin, *A World Destroyed*, 44.

³⁰ Herbert York and Allen Greb, "Scientists as Advisers to Governments," in Joseph Rotblat, ed., *Scientists, the Arms Race and Disarmament* (London: Taylor & Francis Ltd., 1982), 83-99.

³¹ See Sherwin, *A World Destroyed*, 48, 58-61; Lapp, *The New Priesthood*, 62.

³² Sherwin, *A World Destroyed*, 58, 92.

³³ Joseph I. Lieberman, *The Scorpion and the Tarantula: The Struggle to Control Atomic Weapons, 1945-1949* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1970), 31-32; Robert Gilpin, *American Scientists and Nuclear Weapons Policy* (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1962), 42-44.

recommendation; he placed him under surveillance to prevent any unauthorized disclosure of information.³⁴

With the defeat of Germany rapidly approaching in early 1945 and no evidence that either it or Japan had made substantial progress in developing an atomic bomb,³⁵ many scientists lost enthusiasm for the Manhattan Project. Their motivation had related to saving the world from Hitler, whom they resented far more than the Japanese leaders who had ordered the attack on Pearl Harbor.³⁶ In March Einstein—who was never directly involved with the project—appealed to Roosevelt. He noted Bohr's concern about the poor communication between scientists and the military, as well as the risk of an arms race if the USSR were not consulted prior to a U.S. decision to use the bomb.³⁷ Szilard also wrote a letter to the president which repeated these themes and urged a demonstration of the bomb's strength coupled with an invitation for the Soviet Union to participate in establishing a system of international control.³⁸ The president died in April 1945 before reading either of the letters or choosing to act upon similar advice from Secretary of War Henry L. Stimson.³⁹

Harry S. Truman assumed the office of chief executive after serving as vice president for less than three months. He had conferred with Roosevelt on only two occasions, neither of which the former president had deemed appropriate for

³⁴ Bertrand Goldschmidt, *The Atomic Complex: A Worldwide Political History of Nuclear Energy* (La Grange Park, Illinois: American Nuclear Society, 1982), 13-14; Barton J. Bernstein, "The Quest for Security: American Foreign Policy and International Control of Atomic Energy, 1942-1946," *Journal of American History* 60, no. 4 (1974): 1003-44; Martin J. Sherwin, "The Atomic Bomb and the Origins of the Cold War: U.S. Atomic Energy Policy and Diplomacy, 1941-45," *American Historical Review* 78, no. 4 (1973): 945-68; Niels Bohr, "For an Open World," *BAS* 6, no. 7 (1950): 216-17, 219.

³⁵ See Powaski, *March to Armageddon*, 12-13.

³⁶ See Pringle and Spigelman, *The Nuclear Barons*, 32.

³⁷ Lieberman, *The Scorpion and the Tarantula*, 61-63.

³⁸ See Leo Szilard, "Atomic Bombs and the Postwar Position of the United States in the World—1945," *BAS* 3, 12 (1947): 351-53.

³⁹ Powaski, *March to Armageddon*, 10-11; Lieberman, *The Scorpion and the Tarantula*, 59. [Review citations.]

mentioning that the United States was on the verge of developing a weapon which, in the best case, would revolutionize the nature of international relations and serve to promote the nation's democratic ideals.⁴⁰ In the interim Stimson had re-evaluated his position, contemplating that the time had come for the United States to speak with actions rather than words.⁴¹ The new president appointed a special committee to report on this issue and accepted its conclusion that no prior demonstration should be made in case the weapon failed, and that the first and only objective should be ending the war as quickly as possible.⁴²

Some of the Manhattan Project's leading figures, including Szilard and Bohr, dissented with the special committee's report. They issued a "solemn petition" known as the Franck Report which emphasized the need to view atomic energy in terms of the long-range objective of preventing an arms race with the Soviet Union rather than as a military expedient.⁴³ The primary author was James Franck, a German physicist and Nobel laureate who believed that Japan should be given ample warning and the Soviet Union informed of the U.S. strategic agenda, lest postwar relations be mired in conflict. An informal poll found that many of the physicists in Chicago and Manhattan, for example, opposed using the bomb without making a demonstration beforehand,⁴⁴ but their position was not typical of the tens of thousands of individuals affiliated with the project.⁴⁵ It was more widely held among British scientists, some of whom compared using the atomic bomb against Japan to using a

⁴⁰ See Powaski, *March to Armageddon*, 13, 16; Sherwin, *A World Destroyed*, 8.

⁴¹ Lieberman, *The Scorpion and the Tarantula*, 74-75.

⁴² See Leslie R. Groves, *Now It Can Be Told: The Story of the Manhattan Project* (London: Andre Deutsch Publishers, 1962), 265; Goldschmidt, *The Atomic Complex*, 16-18.

⁴³ See Robert Jungk, *Brighter than a Thousand Suns: A Personal History of the Atomic Scientists*, James Cleugh, trans. (London: Penguin Books, 1956), 169-70; Russell, *Has Man a Future?*, 20-21; Easlea, *Fathering the Unthinkable*, 109.

⁴⁴ Powaski, *March to Armageddon*, 17-18; Gilpin, *American Scientists and Nuclear Weapons Policy*, 44-47; Lieberman, *The Scorpion and the Tarantula*, 107-8.

⁴⁵ See Lapp, *The New Priesthood*, 81-82; Sherwin, *A World Destroyed*, 41-42.

sledgehammer to crack a nut.⁴⁶

After Germany surrendered in May, officials throughout the Truman administration believed that Japan faced imminent defeat.⁴⁷ It was known to be seeking the opportunity to discuss a conditional surrender with the Soviet Union, which had not yet entered the war in the Pacific and lacked enthusiasm to assume an intermediary role.⁴⁸ Assistant Secretary of State Joseph D. Grew urged the White House to abandon its demand for an unconditional surrender and instead permit Japan to retain its emperor, as this was its only request. Allied broadcasts suggested that the emperor might be left in place after an unconditional surrender, but avoided making a firm commitment.⁴⁹ There remained a number of ways to force the issue, such as further conventional bombing or a naval blockade. The atomic bomb was no longer essential from a military perspective,⁵⁰ yet there remained many incentives to use it. For example, the government had invested over \$2 billion for which it would eventually be held accountable.⁵¹

In July Truman received news that the atomic bomb had been successfully tested, releasing the explosive force of nineteen thousand tons of TNT.⁵² While this force could be achieved by traditional means, it required thousands of aircraft and

⁴⁶ Ronald W. Clark, *The Birth of the Bomb: The Untold Story of Britain's Part in the Weapon that Changed the World* (London: Phoenix House Ltd., 1961), 191, 200; Lieberman, *The Scorpion and the Tarantula*, 156-59.

⁴⁷ Vannevar Bush, *Modern Arms and Free Men: A Discussion of the Role of Science in Preserving Democracy* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1949), 91

⁴⁸ See Edward Teller and Allen Brown, *The Legacy of Hiroshima* (London: Macmillan & Co. Ltd., 1962), 18-20; Robert J.C. Butow, *Japan's Decision to Surrender* (Stanford, California: Stanford University Press, 1954), 119-22.

⁴⁹ Powaski, *March to Armageddon*, 20-21.

⁵⁰ See John Newhouse, *The Nuclear Age: From Hiroshima to Star Wars* (London: Michael Joseph, 1989), 47; Stephen Harper, *Miracle of Deliverance: The Case for the Bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki* (London: Sidgwick & Jackson, 1985), 204; Gregg Herken, *The Winning Weapon: The Atomic Bomb in the Cold War, 1945-1950* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1980), 210; Barton J. Bernstein, "Truman and the A-Bomb: Targeting Non-Combatants, Using the Bomb, and his Defending the 'Decision'," *Journal of Military History* 62, no. 3 (1998): 547-70.

⁵¹ Roosevelt had once remarked that the \$2 billion spent on the bomb would never be investigated if it worked, though it would be mercilessly investigated by congress if it did not. Lapp, *The New Priesthood*, 63.

⁵² Tom Huntington, "Dawn over Trinity," *American History* 36, no. 1 (2001): 18-21.

extensive logistical support.⁵³ The atomic bomb provided “the miracle of deliverance” in a single warhead.⁵⁴ Truman chose to withhold the details from the Soviet leader, Joseph Stalin, as their meeting continued at the Potsdam Conference. When Stalin mentioned Japan’s desire for a conditional surrender, Truman replied that he questioned its sincerity and would continue to demand unconditional terms.⁵⁵ He also mentioned, as an aside, that the United States had developed a weapon which might be helpful in forcing the Japan to acquiesce. What he failed to grasp was that Stalin already knew of the bomb by way of a Soviet agent within the Manhattan Project and, as the scientists had predicted, he regarded the U.S. position as tantamount to “atomic blackmail.” Truman’s only strategic deception was believing that he was in control.⁵⁶

As discussed in chapter two, the bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki succeeded in bringing the Second World War to an end. Citizens throughout the Allied nations experienced a great sense of relief accompanied, at least initially, by a sense of jubilation. They were also forced to contemplate that the world would never be the same. One television broadcaster acknowledged that the atomic bomb was one of the greatest scientific achievement in modern times while suggesting that it could also be compared to Frankenstein. A St. Louis newspaper carried this theme further, claiming that the bomb had signed humankind’s death warrant. James Reston of *The New York Times* wrote that Americans glimpsed their own future “in that terrible flash” ten thousand miles away while another journalist ventured that it would have been better if the bomb had failed and then been “bundled up in a sack and lost in a

⁵³ See George Thomson, “Hydrogen Bomb: The Need for a Policy,” *International Relations* 26, no. 4 (1950): 463-49.

⁵⁴ See Harper, *Miracle of Deliverance*.

⁵⁵ Hewlett and Anderson, *A History of the United States Atomic Energy Commission* 1: 386-87, 397-98.

⁵⁶ Vladislav M. Zubok, “Stalin and the Nuclear Age,” in John Lewis Gaddis et al., eds., *Cold War Statesmen Confront the Bomb: Nuclear Diplomacy since 1945* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999), 39-61. See Bernard Brodie, “The Atom Bomb as Policy Maker,” *BAS* 4, no. 12 (1948): 377-83.

river like an unwanted kitten.” The title of an article in *The Saturday Review* grew so popular as to become a part of everyday speech: “Modern man is obsolete.”⁵⁷

A survey of Manhattan Project scientists after Japan’s surrender found that most denied feeling any sense of no remorse.⁵⁸ They viewed themselves as simply having followed orders like those soldiers who had been on the front lines, and took pride in the fact that their research had saved up to a half million U.S. lives.⁵⁹ That perspective contained an element of validity even though Japan might have been defeated by other means or surrendered upon assurances that the emperor would be retained, as he finally was, to the bemusement of many past and present observers.⁶⁰ What disturbed those individuals who had signed the Franck Report was not the loss of life in itself, but rather that it had not been absolutely imperative and had served to further antagonize the Soviet Union. Though many were communist sympathizers, their objection to bomb’s use was not ideologically based. To an extent they felt guilty by association with what they regarded as the government’s short-sidedness.⁶¹

These scientists, though disappointed by their failure to influence the course of the Manhattan Project, remained devoted to the cooperative use of atomic energy.⁶² George Kennan, leading architect of the containment doctrine, remarked that they were “as innocent as six-year-old maidens,” and military officials held them in even lower esteem, as their stance often coincided with Soviet propaganda that the United

⁵⁷ Paul Boyer, *By the Bomb’s Early Light: American Thought and Culture at the Dawn of the Atomic Age* (New York: Pantheon Books, 1985), 4-5, 14-15, 40.

⁵⁸ Weart, *Nuclear Fear*, 113.

⁵⁹ See Harry S. Truman, *Memoirs*, vol. 1, *Year of Decisions 1945* (Hodder and Soughton Limited, 1955), 347. That official estimate was greatly exaggerated. Paul Joseph, “Forgetting and Remembering Hiroshima in the U.S.,” *Policy Review* 12, no. 2 (2000): 291-97; Stanley Goldberg, “What Did Truman Know, and When Did He Know It?” *BAS* 54, no. 3 (1998): 18-19; Martin J. Sherwin, “Hiroshima as Politics and History,” *Journal of American History* 82, no. 3 (1995): 1085-93.

⁶⁰ For example, Jungk, *Brighter than a Thousand Suns*, 201, 205; Sherwin, *A World Destroyed*, 235-37.

⁶¹ See Englebert Broda, “The Dilemma of Scientists in the Nuclear Age,” in Rotblat, *Scientists, the Arms Race and Disarmament*, 71-82; Lawrence S. Wittner, *The Struggle against the Bomb*, vol. 1, *One World or None: A History of the World Nuclear Disarmament Movement through 1953* (Stanford, California: Stanford University Press, 1993), 57; Lieberman, *The Scorpion and the Tarantula*, 10-11.

⁶² See Alice Kimball Smith, “Behind the Decision to Use the Atomic Bomb: Chicago, 1944-45,” *BAS* 14, no. 8 (1958): 288-312.

States was an aggressive nation.⁶³ In November they formed the Federation of Atomic Scientists, quickly renamed the Federation of American Scientists (FAS) to reach a broader constituency. Within months it attracted over three thousand members, established liaisons with sixty non-governmental organizations, and launched *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists*, the cover of which featured a doomsday clock set at seven minutes to midnight. It also followed Szilard's recommendation to create a parallel organization, directed by Einstein, which began raising funds to prevent humanity from being extinguished.⁶⁴

The FAS sought to assure that the Manhattan Project would be brought under the political system of checks and balances to limit the risk that the bomb might be used again. In pursuit of this objective it sent over thirty members to Washington to lobby against the May-Johnson Bill which called for placing the Atomic Energy Commission (AEC), which assumed control of Manhattan Project,⁶⁵ under military jurisdiction. There they made their presence known through the media, appeals to individual legislators and testimony before congress.⁶⁶ Their enthusiasm and sincerity were as unmistakable as their youthful appearance. Richard G. Hewlett and Oscar E. Anderson Jr. write that as "boy scientists challeng[ing] the giants of politics at their own game," they presented the nation with a real-life version the hit movie *Mr. Smith Goes to Washington*.⁶⁷ Meanwhile Szilard contributed to the alternative McMahon Bill which called for placing the AEC under civilian control,⁶⁸ and he and his

⁶³ Wittner, *The Struggle against the Bomb* 1: 71, 263-64. Kennan later opposed the arms race and, more specifically, the government's decision to develop the hydrogen bomb. John Major, *The Oppenheimer Hearing* (New York: Stein and Day Publishers, 1971), 106.

⁶⁴ Boyer, *By the Bomb's Early Light*, 60-64; Joseph Rotblat, "Movements of Scientists against the Arms Race," in Rotblat, *Scientists, the Arms Race and Disarmament*, 115-57; W.A. Higgenbotham, "The Federation of American Scientists," *BAS* 4, no. 1 (1948): 21-22.

⁶⁵ See Pringle and Spigelman, *The Nuclear Barons*, 91.

⁶⁶ Jessica Wang, *American Science in an Age of Anxiety: Scientists, Anticommunism and the Cold War* (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 1999), 16.

⁶⁷ Hewlett and Anderson, *A History of the United States Atomic Energy Commission*, 448.

⁶⁸ Wang, *American Science in an Age of Anxiety*, 18-19.

colleagues warranted much of the credit for its ratification as the Atomic Energy Act of 1946.⁶⁹

The legislative process had entailed a number of compromises which the FAS found disconcerting. The Atomic Energy Act included severe restrictions on the exchange of information,⁷⁰ much like those which had delayed the production of the bomb by up to a year.⁷¹ It also outlined harsh penalties, including the death sentence, for the unauthorized disclosure of information. While excluding active military personnel from the AEC, it welcomed retired officers as they were technically civilians regardless of their patterns of thought.⁷² Jessica Wang insightfully notes that the establishment of civilian control did not ensure a commitment to civilian objectives.⁷³ After the defeat of the May-Johnson Bill, the FAS lost much of its enthusiasm for domestic politics. As neither congress nor the executive branch appeared eager to cooperate with the Soviet Union,⁷⁴ it retreated to its original objective to convince the public that atomic weapons should be placed under international control.⁷⁵

In June 1946 the United States presented the United Nations with a plan to create an international agency to ensure that all atomic energy programs and uranium reserves would be used for peaceful purposes. The agency was to have full inspection rights as well as the authority to order military retaliation against any nations found to be engaged in non-peaceful research. Those nations which had already acquired

⁶⁹ See Alice Kimball Smith, *A Peril and a Hope: The Scientists' Movement in America, 1945-47* (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1965), 435.

⁷⁰ Harold P. Green and Alan Rosenthal, *Government of the Atom: The Integration of Powers* (New York: Atherton Press, 1963), 2-3; Boyer, *By the Bomb's Early Light*, 49-52.

⁷¹ Lapp, *The New Priesthood*, 61.

⁷² See Groves, *Now It Can Be Told*, 394-95; Norris Bradbury, 'Los Alamos—The First 25 Years', in Lawrence Badash et al, eds., *Reminiscences of Los Alamos 1943-1945* (Dordrecht, Holland: D. Reidel Publishing Company, 1980), 161-75.

⁷³ Wang, *American Science in an Age of Anxiety*, 24-25.

⁷⁴ See Merle Miller, "The Atomic Scientists in Politics," *BAS* 3, no. 9 (1947): 242, 252.

⁷⁵ Donald A. Strickland, *Scientists in Politics: The Atomic Scientists' Movement, 1945-46* (Purdue University Studies, 1968), 125.

military stockpiles were to destroy them at some point in the future once the inspection system had proved effective.⁷⁶ The plan was widely perceived as a means of preserving the U.S. atomic monopoly, and Bernard Baruch, after whom it was named, furthered that impression by adopting a belligerent tone.⁷⁷ As the Soviet Union refused to accept the plan, the United States refused to accept its demand for a prohibition of the use and production of atomic weapons and the destruction of all existing stockpiles.⁷⁸ John Newhouse writes that the arms race which the Baruch Plan sought to prevent had already gained too much momentum.⁷⁹

While the UN debate was underway, the United States conducted two atomic tests in the Bikini Atoll in the South Pacific, and they were among the most widely reported events since the bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki eleven months earlier. The first test was much less powerful than expected. The second, though also disappointing from a military standpoint,⁸⁰ proved to be as sensationalistic as journalists could have hoped. The warhead was detonated underwater and spewed radioactivity in all directions, thoroughly contaminating a fleet of abandoned vessels, which was later sunk as it could not be decontaminated. This experiment indicated that radiation had a poisonous effect whether used for military purposes or for scientific research, as *Time* magazine pointed out.⁸¹ A survey found that ninety percent of Americans were aware of the tests and seventy-five percent that they had

⁷⁶ Department of State, *Documents on Disarmament 1945–1959*, vol. 1, 1945–1956 (Washington: USGPO, 1960), 11–12; Norman Cousins and Thomas K. Finletter, “A Beginning for Sanity,” *BAS* 2, nos. 1–2 (1946): 11–14.

⁷⁷ John Hancock, “The U.S. Plan for Control of Atomic Energy,” *BAS* 2, nos. 5–6 (1946): 14–15; Boyer, *By the Bomb’s Early Light*, 56.

⁷⁸ See *FRUS* 1946, vol. 6, *Eastern Europe; The Soviet Union* (Washington: USGPO, 1969), 765–66; Harry S. Truman, *Memoirs*, vol. 2, *Years of Trial and Hope 1946–1953* (Hodder and Stoughton, Limited, 1955), 12–13.

⁷⁹ Newhouse, *The Nuclear Age*, 64.

⁸⁰ Lawrence S. Wittner, *Rebels against War: The American Peace Movement, 1941–1960* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1969), 167.

⁸¹ Ruth Levy Guyer, “Radioactivity and Right: Clashes at Bikini Atoll,” *American Journal of Public Health* 91, no. 9 (2001): 1371–76.

involved ships.⁸² The survey did not specifically address radiation, yet this issue began to emerge as one of the scientists' foremost concerns.

Those Americans who favored the atomic tests recognized that they were unhelpful in building the spirit of international cooperation upon which the success of the Baruch Plan depended.⁸³ Others feared that they were antithetical to that spirit, as Stalin suggested in an interview with American journalists. The Truman administration, he declared, sought to intimidate the Soviet Union with atomic weapons, but in that regard they were "quite insufficient."⁸⁴ It had become clear to all parties that further UN debate served little purpose as the USSR consistently vetoed U.S. proposals, and there were few signs that either of the superpowers was willing to compromise.⁸⁵ Without much remorse the members of the UN commission on atomic energy permitted it to expire in mid-1948.⁸⁶ Approximately sixteen months later, the Soviet Union successfully tested its first atomic weapon, ending the U.S. monopoly more quickly than some officials had expected.⁸⁷ Eugene Rabinowitch, editor of *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists*, expressed hope that this development would lead Washington to assume a more conciliatory approach.⁸⁸

The General Advisory Committee of the AEC, chaired by J. Robert

⁸² Leonard S. Cottrell, Jr., and Sylvia Eberhart, *American Opinion on World Affairs in the Atomic Age* (New York: Greenwood Press, Publishers, 1948), 15, 18. See Sylvia Eberhart, "How the American People Feel about the Bomb," *BAS* 3, no. 6 (1947): 146-49, 168; William L. Laurence, "The Bikini Tests and Public Opinion," *BAS* 2, nos. 5-6 (1946): 2, 17.

⁸³ See Lee A. Dubridge, "What about the Bikini Tests?," *BAS* 1, no. 11 (1946): 7, 16; Lloyd J. Graybar, "The 1946 Atomic Bomb Tests: Atomic Diplomacy or Bureaucratic Infighting," *Journal of American History* 72, no. 4 (1986): 888-907.

⁸⁴ Zubok, "Stalin and the Nuclear Age," 52.

⁸⁵ *USWA 1948-1949* (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1949), 410-11, 419.

⁸⁶ Boyer, *By the Bomb's Early Light*, 55-56.

⁸⁷ For example, in 1945 Groves had insisted that the USSR would require twenty or more years, whereas the Manhattan Project scientists had correctly foreseen a Soviet bomb within four to five years. See Lieberman, *The Scorpion and the Tarantula*, 74-77; Pringle and Spigelman, *The Nuclear Barons*, 42-43. As an observer at the time noted, this development had the effect of thrusting the USSR "back in the forefront in power-political relations." B.K. Blount, "Science as a Factor in International Relations," *International Affairs* 33, no. 1 (1957): 71-78.

⁸⁸ Eugene Rabinowitch, "Forewarned—But Not Forearmed," *BAS* 5, no. 10 (1949): 273-75, 292.

Oppenheimer, the highly esteemed physicist regarded as father of the atomic bomb,⁸⁹ issued a unanimous report which urged the government not to pursue the development of the hydrogen bomb. Such a weapon relied on fusing rather than splitting atoms and was believed capable of producing exponentially greater destruction which, if used on a large scale, might exterminate humankind.⁹⁰ The committee believed that an increased production of atomic bombs would be sufficient deter the Soviet Union. Its report stressed the need to place “some limitations on the totality of war” while the FAS warned that if the United States developed a hydrogen bomb, the USSR would feel compelled to do likewise.⁹¹ In January 1950 President Truman dismissed the report in favor of the Joint Chiefs of Staff’s view that national security must not be jeopardized for any reason, even if that meant pursuing a “weapon of genocide.”⁹²

As discussed in the previous chapter, U.S. internal security policies had reached an excessive level which was soon carried further by the outbreak of the Korean War. Stanley Weart refers to this situation in explaining the death sentences issued to Julius and Ethel Rosenberg for atomic espionage.⁹³ The otherwise unexceptional couple was charged with having been part of a network which passed classified information about the Manhattan Project to the Soviet Union, as supported by the testimony of several witnesses, one of whom had already confessed his guilt.⁹⁴ During the trial Julius made the unwise decision to speak highly of the communist

⁸⁹ See Pringle and Spigelman, *The Nuclear Barons*, 108.

⁹⁰ See Albert Einstein, “What the Scientists Are Saying: Arms Can Bring No Security,” *BAS* 6, no. 3 (1950): 71.

⁹¹ Teller and Brown, *The Legacy of Hiroshima*, 43-46.

⁹² Williamson and Reardon, *The Origins of U.S. Nuclear Strategy*, 115-16, 125. See David Alan Rosenberg, “American Atomic Strategy and the Hydrogen Bomb Decision,” *Journal of American History* 66, no. 1 (1979): 62-87. See Federation of American Scientists, “Break the Deadlock,” *BAS* 6, no. 3 (1950): 74.

⁹³ Weart, *Nuclear Fear*, 121.

⁹⁴ Roger M. Anders, “The Rosenberg Case Revisited: The Greenglass Testimony and the Protection of Atomic Secrets,” *American Historical Review* 83, no. 2 (1978): 388-400.

system,⁹⁵ encouraging the judge to hold him and his wife responsible for the loss of American lives in Korea and the possible loss of millions more as a result of the Soviet Union's possession of the atomic bomb.⁹⁶ However valid this position might have been, eastern bloc nations and some Americans viewed the Rosenbergs as heroes in the quest for nuclear parity and the de-escalation of Cold War tensions.⁹⁷

In October 1952 the Supreme Court refused to review their sentence, and President Dwight D. Eisenhower refused to grant clemency despite appeals from British politicians, U.S. clergymen, and world-renowned figures including Albert Einstein and Pope Pius XXII.⁹⁸ While the Rosenbergs awaited execution, the United States regained the lead in the arms race. It conducted the first test of a hydrogen weapon, and as foreseen its destructiveness was without precedent. The explosive force was approximately one thousand times greater than bomb dropped over Hiroshima, and the test site, an island in the Eniwetok Atoll, was transformed into an underwater crater which stretched one-mile in diameter.⁹⁹ Many observers believed that this had the effect of defeating any hope for an arms control agreement with the Soviet Union. Oppenheimer was not the most outspoken among them, yet he was known to disagree with the government's position.¹⁰⁰

The strategic advantage gained by the United States lasted less a year. The Soviet Union tested its first hydrogen weapon in August 1953, gravely undermining

⁹⁵ David Cauter, *The Great Fear: The Anti-Communist Purge under Truman and Eisenhower* (London: Secker & Warburg, 1978), 62-66.

⁹⁶ Richard M. Fried, *Nightmare in Red: The McCarthy Era in Perspective* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1990), 115-16; Wang, *American Science in an Age of Anxiety*, 292.

⁹⁷ John F. Neville, *The Press, the Rosenbergs and the Cold War* (Westport, Connecticut: Praeger, 1995), 139; Michael E. Parrish, "Cold War Justice: The Supreme Court and the Rosenbergs," *American Historical Review* 82, no. 4 (1977): 805-42.

⁹⁸ Cauter, *The Great Fear*, 66-68.

⁹⁹ Bernard Brodie, *Strategy in the Missile Age* (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1959), 154; Richard G. Hewlett and Jack M. Holl, *Atoms for Peace and War, 1953-1961: Eisenhower and the Atomic Energy Commission* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1989), 3; Powaski, *March to Armageddon*, 59.

¹⁰⁰ Herbert F. York, *The Advisors: Oppenheimer, Teller and the Superbomb* (San Francisco: W.H. Freeman and Company, 1976).

the self-confidence of the “free world.”¹⁰¹ The doomsday clock on the cover of *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists*, one of the era’s best-known symbols, advanced from seven to two minutes before midnight.¹⁰² Compounding Americans’ trepidation was the appearance that their government lacked a coherent strategic vision. Hamilton Fish Armstrong pointed to the reluctance of the Eisenhower administration either to appease the USSR or to launch a preventative war or to simply preserve the doctrine of containment—which it denounced as both inadequate and immoral.¹⁰³ There were, he implied, no other alternatives. The Council on Foreign Relations suggested that one might be found in accepting the notion of peaceful coexistence, as the White House appeared to be doing in spite of its harsh rhetoric.¹⁰⁴

That December Eisenhower delivered his famous Atoms-for-Peace proposal before the United Nations. It called for governments to contribute fissionable materials to an international agency which would direct them to the benefit of humankind.¹⁰⁵ During the speech over three thousand delegates remained absolutely silent, then unanimously burst into applause and cheered as never before in the history of the organization.¹⁰⁶ The initial euphoria falsely suggested that the proposal would be accepted and perhaps even lead to a more comprehensive agreement.¹⁰⁷ While every nation admired the spirit of Atoms-for-Peace, many within and outside the Soviet bloc objected to the control mechanisms to be established, which suggested that the foremost U.S. objective was to prevent other nations from developing atomic

¹⁰¹ *USWA* 1953 (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1955), 348.

¹⁰² Boyer, *By the Bomb’s Early Light*, 64; Weart, *Nuclear Fear*, 217.

¹⁰³ Hamilton Fish Armstrong, “The World is Round,” *Foreign Affairs* 31, no. 2 (1953): 175-99.

¹⁰⁴ *USWA* 1954 (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1956), 35.

¹⁰⁵ Department of State, *Documents on Disarmament* 1: 393-400.

¹⁰⁶ Stephen E. Ambrose, *Eisenhower: The President*, vol. 2, 1952–1969 (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1984), 149.

¹⁰⁷ See *FRUS* 1952–1954, vol. 6, part 1, *Western Europe and Canada* (Washington: USGPO, 1986), 1017-18.

weapons.¹⁰⁸ Kenneth Osgood describes the proposal in relation to Vice President Richard M. Nixon's recommendation to make a dramatic proposal which the Soviet Union would never accept, and thus score a victory in the realm of psychological warfare.¹⁰⁹

The Soviet delegation to the United Nations noted the incompatibility of the proposal's objective to relax international tensions and its refusal to ban the use of nuclear weapons.¹¹⁰ U.S. officials maintained, as they would throughout the decade, that such a ban would only be meaningful once effective means of regulation were put in place. While many variations of this theme were being debated, the superpowers engaged in the most potent military build-up in history.¹¹¹ In March 1954 the United States conducted a test in the Marshall Islands, specifically in the Bikini Atoll, one of twenty-nine atolls over which it had been granted a UN trusteeship after the Second World War.¹¹² The test produced a radioactive cloud much larger than anticipated, contaminating a 7,000-square-mile region and requiring the immediate evacuation of 246 islanders, many of whom contracted radiation sickness. The twenty-three crew members of *Lucky Dragon*, a Japanese fishing vessel which had strayed into the vicinity and gone unnoticed, were similarly afflicted—and one of them perished as a result.¹¹³

In an attempt to control the negative publicity generated by this, Eisenhower invited AEC Chairperson Lewis Strauss to join him at a press conference. For weeks the White House had released no pertinent details and the AEC gone no further than

¹⁰⁸ Harold L. Nieburg, *Nuclear Security and Foreign Policy* (Washington: Public Affairs Press, 1964), 80, 85-87; Martin J. Medhurst, "Atoms for Peace and Nuclear Hegemony: The Rhetorical Structure of a Cold War Campaign," *Armed Forces and Society* 23, no. 4 (1997): 571-93.

¹⁰⁹ Kenneth Osgood, "Form before Substance: Eisenhower's Commitment to Psychological Warfare and Negotiations with the Enemy," *Diplomatic History* 24, no. 3 (2000): 405-33.

¹¹⁰ Department of State, *Documents on disarmament* 1: 405.

¹¹¹ See Medhurst, "Atoms for Peace and Nuclear Hegemony," 575.

¹¹² Jonathan M. Weisgall, "Time to End the 40-Year Lie," *BAS* 50, no. 3 (1994): 3.

¹¹³ See Robert A. Divine, *Blowing on the Wind: The Nuclear Test Ban Debate, 1954-1960* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1978), 1-5; Lapp, *The New Priesthood*, 121-25.

to issue a 42-word statement acknowledging that the test had taken place.¹¹⁴ Strauss now clarified that, like a second less widely reported test, it had “added enormous potential to our military posture,”¹¹⁵ and he provided assurances that radioactive fallout was less dangerous than widely feared.¹¹⁶ In response to a question about the capacity of the weapon, he indicated that it was sufficient to destroy any metropolis and much or all of its vicinity. Robert Divine writes that this replaced concern over fallout with near panic over a nuclear holocaust.¹¹⁷ The next day *The New York Times* published a map outlining the blast radius if local readers were to be targeted.¹¹⁸

British Prime Minister Winston Churchill viewed the U.S. tests as transforming the hydrogen bomb from a nightmarish abstraction into a topic which dominated public opinion around the world.¹¹⁹ Unlike some Conservatives, he opposed the Labour Party’s proposal for a test suspension and played an active role to ensure that it was defeated.¹²⁰ He proved less influential on the world stage in part because of his reputation for being pro-American, and in part because Britain had recently gained the status of a nuclear power.¹²¹ Albert Einstein and Pope Pius XII again united, this time to be among many eminent figures calling for a worldwide test ban. In the governmental realm they were joined most notably by Indian Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru.¹²² Thousands of ordinary Americans also took it upon themselves to send letters to the White House in support of a ban. The vast majority, however, shared the official perspective that further tests were necessary to deter

¹¹⁴ *The New York Times*, 25 March 1954.

¹¹⁵ *The New York Times*, 1 April 1954.

¹¹⁶ Pringle and Spigelman, *The Nuclear Barons*, 244-46.

¹¹⁷ Divine, *Blowing on the Wind*, 12-13.

¹¹⁸ *The New York Times*, 1 April 1954.

¹¹⁹ *FRUS* 1952-1954, 6/1: 1085.

¹²⁰ Divine, *Blowing on the Wind*, 20-21.

¹²¹ See Margaret Gowing, *Interdependence and Deterrence: Britain and Atomic Energy 1945-1952*, vol. 1, *Policymaking* (London: The Macmillan Press, Ltd., 1974), 449-50.

¹²² Powaski, *March to Armageddon*, 75.

Soviet aggression.¹²³

The Federation of American Scientists (FAS) not only questioned the wisdom of the government's military policy; it challenged the legitimacy of the program to dismiss individuals from the AEC on the basis of their past or present affiliations and beliefs. This program applied to all federal employees, as discussed in the previous chapter, but disproportionately impacted atomic scientists.¹²⁴ For example, the FAS made no effort to deny that many of its members were communists, former communists and communist sympathizers.¹²⁵ Eugene Rabinowitch warned that the program hindered American science,¹²⁶ as the Soviet bloc had produced many the world's finest researchers—and was continuing to do so.¹²⁷ Oppenheimer also addressed this issue in *Bulletin of the American Scientists* and urged the government to uphold America's long tradition of freedom.¹²⁸ Unlike the editor, he refrained from comparing the employment program to a Soviet purge or suggesting that his opinions were in any way "heretical."¹²⁹ He merely questioned if the production of more and more powerful weapons benefited U.S. national security.¹³⁰

Oppenheimer's criticism, though highly restrained, encouraged the government to revisit allegations that he was an agent of the Soviet Union.¹³¹ For

¹²³ Divine, *Blowing on the Wind*, 18-19.

¹²⁴ Gellhorn, *Security, Loyalty and Science* (Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press, 1950), 129-30.

¹²⁵ For example, Edward Shils, "Freedom and Influence: Observations on the Scientists' Movement in the United States," *BAS* 13, no. 1 (1957): 13-18.

¹²⁶ Eugene Rabinowitch, "The 'Cleansing' of AEC Fellowships," *BAS* 5, nos. 6-7 (1949): 161-62. See Edward Shils, "Security and Science Sacrificed to Loyalty," *BAS* 11, no. 3 (1955): 106-9, 130.

¹²⁷ This trend gained widespread recognition when the Soviet Union launched Sputnik in October 1957. See Caryl P. Haskins, "Science in Our National Life," *Foreign Affairs* 37, no. 1 (1958): 19-30; Daniel J. Kevles, *The Physicists: The History of a Scientific Community in Modern America* (New York: Vitae Books, 1979), 385.

¹²⁸ J. Robert Oppenheimer, "A Letter to Senator McMahon," *BAS* 5, nos. 6-7 (1949): 163, 178.

¹²⁹ See Rabinowitch, "The 'Cleansing' of AEC Fellowships"; Rabinowitch, "Atomic Spy Trials: Heretical Afterthoughts," *BAS* 7, no. 5 (1951): 139-42, 157.

¹³⁰ J. Robert Oppenheimer, "Atomic Weapons and American Policy," *Foreign Affairs* 31, no. 4 (1953): 525-35.

¹³¹ Philip M. Stern, *The Oppenheimer Case: Security on Trial* (London: Rupert Hart-Davis, 1969), 1-5; Lapp, *The New Priesthood*, 109-10.

many years officials had known of his sympathy for communism, his close affiliation with Communist Party members—including his wife, brother and former mistress—and his membership in organizations believed to be controlled by communists. At the time they had determined that his sense of honor would prevent him from disclosing any classified information.¹³² In December 1953 Eisenhower suspended his security clearance pending further investigation and placed him under surveillance to prevent him from fleeing the nation.¹³³ The AEC hearings were held four months later and gained more attention than the senate proceedings in which Senator Joe McCarthy alleged that the army had been infiltrated by communists. Until now Oppenheimer had been regarded as an “untouchable” patriot.¹³⁴

The views which Oppenheimer expressed during the hearings were moderate, even apologetic at times,¹³⁵ and the scientific community largely supported him. Though it encompassed a wide range of political opinion, it agreed that that an adverse decision would undermine the trust essential to its ongoing cooperation with the government.¹³⁶ Unfortunately, in its perspective, the AEC chose not to reinstate his security clearance. No new evidence had been uncovered that called his loyalty into question. Rather the AEC identified inconsistencies in his testimony and determined that no risks should be taken in defending the nation from potential threats.¹³⁷ *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists* attributed the decision more specifically to his opposition to the hydrogen bomb.¹³⁸ A former president of the FAS remarked, “Seldom on this side of the Iron Curtain has a citizen who has served his country as

¹³² Pringle and Spigelman, *The Nuclear Barons*, 107-11.

¹³³ Hewlett and Holl, *Atoms for Peace and War*, 45-46, 80-81.

¹³⁴ Major, *The Oppenheimer Hearing*, 13.

¹³⁵ See Gilpin, *American Scientists*, 8-9; Joseph Boskin and Fred Krinsky, *The Oppenheimer Affair: A Political Play in Three Acts* (Beverly Hills: The Glencoe Press, 1968), 43.

¹³⁶ Hewlett and Holl, *Atoms for Peace and War*, 43-45.

¹³⁷ Powaski, *March to Armageddon*, 60-61; *The New York Times*, 2 June 1954.

¹³⁸ Roland Sawyer, “More than Security,” *BAS* 10, no. 7 (1954): 284.

well as J. Robert Oppenheimer been more miserably rewarded by his government.”¹³⁹

The Eisenhower administration continued to promulgate the doctrine of massive nuclear retaliation while seeking to limit the risk of confrontation. It opposed the elimination or reduction of its stockpile or the prohibition of the first use of nuclear weapons lest Soviet troops overrun Western Europe.¹⁴⁰ In July 1955 the president met with British, French and Soviet leaders in Geneva to promote international cooperation and table the Open Skies proposal to permit the aerial inspection of nuclear facilities.¹⁴¹ This proposal, though far less ambitious than either the Baruch Plan or the Atoms-for-Peace proposal, failed to break the arms control stalemate.¹⁴² The Soviet Union dismissed it as a guise for espionage while, like the United States, actively participating in the First Geneva Conference on the Peaceful Use of Atomic Energy which opened the following month. Scientists from thirty-six nations presented over one thousand papers which scrupulously avoided military issues.¹⁴³ As Einstein once remarked, physics was less complicated than politics.¹⁴⁴

Ralph E. Lapp, a regular contributor to *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists*, was among many observers who questioned if the “spirit of Geneva” would yield meaningful results. After studying debris from the U.S. test in the Bikini Atoll, he had determined that the warhead had been designed to maximize radioactive fallout.

¹³⁹ Boskin and Krinsky, *The Oppenheimer Affair*, 81; Charles Thorpe, “Disciplining Experts: Scientific Authority and Liberal Democracy in the Oppenheimer Case,” *Social Studies of Science* 32, no. 4 (2002): 525-62.

¹⁴⁰ See William R. Frye, “The Disarmament Dilemma,” *BAS* 12, no. 3 (1956): 81-83.

¹⁴¹ John Lewis Gaddis, *Russia, the Soviet Union and the United States: An Interpretive History*, 2nd ed. (New York: McGraw-Hill Publishing Company, 1990), 223.

¹⁴² Hans J. Morgenthau, “Has Atomic War Really Become Impossible?” *BAS* 12, no. 1 (1956): 7-9; Eugene Rabinowitch, “Ten Years that Changed the World,” *BAS* 12, no. 1 (1956): 2-6, 32.

¹⁴³ See *Yearbook of the United Nations* 1955 (New York: United Nations Department of Public Information, 1956), 13-14; Chalmers M. Roberts, *The Nuclear Years: The Arms Race and Arms Control, 1945-70* (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1970), 32-33; *USWA* 1955 (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1957), 273-80. One author maintains that the Soviet Union gave more serious consideration to the Open Skies proposal than it seemed. W.W. Rostow, *Open Skies: Eisenhower's Proposal of July 21, 1955* (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1982), 79.

¹⁴⁴ Michael Mandelbaum, *The Nuclear Question: The United States and Nuclear Weapons, 1946-1976* (London: Cambridge University Press, 1979), 7; Ralph E. Lapp, “The Lesson of Geneva,” *BAS* 11, no. 8 (1955): 275, 308.

Another physicist had reached the same conclusion, renewing fears that the government was withholding pertinent data from the public.¹⁴⁵ In February 1955 the AEC attempted to counteract this impression by releasing one of its most detailed reports to date which admitting that radiation was a serious issue. *Newsweek* magazine referred to the report as confirming “the terrible truth” of the atomic age. For citizens throughout the nation that entailed having to accept that the tests being conducted in Nevada produced large radioactive clouds which drifted thousands of miles and were not necessarily harmless.¹⁴⁶ For nearby ranchers it meant having to believe, as the AEC insisted, that there was no direct relationship between the sudden death of their cattle and their exposure to fallout.¹⁴⁷

The anti-nuclear movement achieved a major breakthrough in July 1955 when British philosopher Bertrand Russell issued an appeal for governments to put the interest of humanity before their perceived strategic advantage. He had drafted it in collaboration Einstein who had died earlier in the year and spent his last days lamenting the arms race. Nine other prominent individuals had also endorsed it, not as citizens of the six nations which they represented but, in the text’s words, “as members of the species man whose continued existence is in doubt.” One week later fifty-two Nobel laureates issued a similar appeal, calling for governments to renounce the use of nuclear weapons.¹⁴⁸ H.W. Brands describes this as repudiating the logic of the Eisenhower administration’s defense strategy which linked the survival of the United States to the destruction of the world.¹⁴⁹ The two appeals helped to rekindle

¹⁴⁵ See Pringle and Spiegelman, *The Nuclear Barons*, 247; Ralph E. Lapp, “Fallout and Candor,” *BAS* 11, no. 5 (1955): 170, 200.

¹⁴⁶ Divine, *Blowing on the Wind*, 38, 41-42.

¹⁴⁷ *The New York Times*, 12 October 1955.

¹⁴⁸ Wittner, *Rebels against War*, 235-37; Wittner, *The Struggle against the Bomb* 2: 5-7, 35-36. See Bertrand Russell, “The Atomic Bomb and the Prevention of War,” *BAS* 2, nos. 7-8 (1946): 19-21.

¹⁴⁹ H.W. Brands, “The Age of Vulnerability: Eisenhower and the National Insecurity State,” *American Historical Review* 94, no. 4 (1989): 963-89.

hope that a sense of self-preservation, if not morality, would produce an international accord.¹⁵⁰

The Eisenhower administration did not immediately pursue this objective since many officials questioned both the motivation of its supporters and the reliability of the Soviet Union to fulfill its international agreements.¹⁵¹ As the Federation of American Scientists (FAS) welcomed members regardless of their ideology, the Russell-Einstein declaration enlisted the support of Frédéric Joliot-Curie, a French communist who had recently gained headlines for insisting that no truly “progressive” scientist would collaborate with the U.S. program in any way.¹⁵² The nation’s participation in the Geneva Conference had started to dispel the impression that it was only concerned with war, and the National Security Council recognized the need to gain further “psychological advantages.”¹⁵³ One alternative was to propose a one-year test moratorium. Not only would this serve to extend the U.S. technological lead and prevent the USSR from proposing a moratorium after it had gained a stronger position; it might decrease the popularity of Soviet proposals to reduce or eliminate current stockpiles, which the United States opposed under any circumstance.¹⁵⁴

In July 1957 scientists from the United States, Britain, the Soviet Union—the three nuclear powers—and seven other nations met in Nova Scotia at the first Pugwash Conference on Science and World Affairs. The FAS and British Atomic Scientists’ Association had been discussing it for many years and redoubled their effort following the Russell-Einstein declaration. The conference demonstrated that

¹⁵⁰ See Boyer, *By the Bomb’s Early Light*, 69-70; Easlea, *Fathering the Unthinkable*, 120-23.

¹⁵¹ See *FRUS* 1955–1957, vol. 20, *Regulation of Armaments; Atomic Energy* (Washington: USGPO, 1990): 1-7; Wittner, *The Struggle against the Bomb* 1: 242-43.

¹⁵² *The New York Times*, 6 April 1950, 10 April 1950.

¹⁵³ *FRUS* 1955–1957, 20: 46, 212.

¹⁵⁴ *FRUS* 1955–1957, 20: 56-57, 232.

individuals from opposite sides in the Cold War were capable of pursuing universal objectives. While many speakers dealt with highly technical issues,¹⁵⁵ Eugene Rabinowitch took the opportunity to chastise the U.S. government for refusing to consider any nuclear agreement which did not include foolproof controls. He insisted that this qualification was unrealistic, as foolproof controls did not exist, and that an imperfect agreement would still be preferable to none.¹⁵⁶ Though the conference failed to generate much publicity in the United States, it greatly solidified an international network of scientists devoted to cooperating both within and outside their laboratories.¹⁵⁷

Tests that year convinced much of the world that the nuclear powers had little concern for the danger of radioactive fallout. For example, a series of Soviet tests had circled the globe with debris and contaminated rainfall over Japan. Instead of expressing remorse, Premier Nikita S. Khrushchev boasted of possessing bombs powerful enough to melt the icecaps and flood the entire planet. Robert Divine describes this as symptomatic of the insensitivity of the nuclear powers, or as one Japanese scientist declared, their willingness to use the rest of the world like guinea pigs. As U.S. opposition was also substantially rising,¹⁵⁸ Linus Pauling, a Nobel laureate chemist based in California, had little difficulty gathering signatures for his petition to end nuclear tests. By January 1958 he had gathered over nine thousand from dozens of nations, including prominent U.S., British and Soviet scientists, and forwarded the petition to the United Nations.¹⁵⁹ While this organization was unable to

¹⁵⁵ Wittner, *Rebels against War*, 251; Wittner, *The Struggle against the Bomb* 2: 33-34.

¹⁵⁶ Eugene Rabinowitch, "About Disarmament," *BAS* 13, no. 8 (1957): 277-82.

¹⁵⁷ See Wittner, *The Struggle against the Bomb* 2: 35-37; Eugene Rabinowitch, "The Frozen Map," *BAS* 13, 6 (1957): 208-11, 215.

¹⁵⁸ Divine, *Blowing on the Wind*, 119-20, 141-42.

¹⁵⁹ By July Pauling had gathered over eleven thousand signatures. See Wittner, *The Struggle against the Bomb* 2: 37-39; Pringle and Spigelman, *The Nuclear Barons*, 248-49; Emelyanov, "Scientists in Opposition to the Arms Race," in Rotblat, *Scientists, the Arms Race and Disarmament*, 101-12.

act independently of the nuclear powers, many members heartily embraced the petition.¹⁶⁰

As British Prime Minister Harold Macmillan predicted,¹⁶¹ the Soviet Union renewed the issue of a test suspension which it had brought before the United Nations three years earlier as a resolution to prohibit atomic weapons.¹⁶² This time it directly approached the United States with the more limited proposal for a two- to three-year suspension. The United States had considered taking the initiative in this regard but determined that further tests were more beneficial than the publicity to be gained by a proposing a suspension, especially after the launch of Sputnik had dramatically affirmed the Soviet Union's technological expertise.¹⁶³ It rejected the Soviet proposal, insisting that it must be linked to effective control mechanisms. This response was predictable as the USSR had consistently opposed such mechanisms for over a decade.¹⁶⁴ Somewhat less predictable was that it announced a voluntary test suspension in March. While this generated immense pressure on the Anglo-American nations to do likewise, they opted to proceed with their scheduled tests.¹⁶⁵

Among the many organizations to protest this development, the U.S. National Committee for Non-Violent Action took the most sensationalistic tack. Four of its members attempted to sail into the zone where the government was conducting a series of tests known as Operation Hardtack. In May their small vessel, *Golden Rule*, was intercepted in Hawaiian waters en route to the Marshall Islands. After being put on probation for attempting to defy the Atomic Energy Commission's regulations,

¹⁶⁰ See *The New York Times*, 11 August 1958.

¹⁶¹ *FRUS* 1958–1960, vol. 7, part 2, *Western Europe* (Washington: USGPO, 1993): 796.

¹⁶² See *Yearbook of the United Nations* 1955: 8-9.

¹⁶³ See *FRUS* 1955–1957, 20: 232; Divine, *Blowing on the Wind*, 200; Powaski, *The Cold War*, 124; James R. Killian, Jr., *Sputniks, Scientists and Eisenhower: A Memoir of the First Special Assistant to the President for Science and Technology* (Cambridge, Massachusetts: The MIT Press, 1977), 2-6.

¹⁶⁴ For example during the 1946 debate over the Baruch Plan. See *FRUS* 1946, 6: 765-66.

¹⁶⁵ See Hans A. Bethe, *The Road from Los Alamos* (New York: Simon & Shuster, 1991), 50-51; Roberts, *The Nuclear Years*, 48.

they made a second attempt and again failed. During the trial Earle Reynolds, a former AEC employee, his wife and their two teenage children admired the defendants' resolve to protest the tests, possibly at the expense of their own lives. After the defendants were found guilty imprisoned for two months, Reynolds and his family chose to follow their example and did so with greater success. Their small vessel, *Phoenix*, was not intercepted until it had deeply penetrated the test zone.¹⁶⁶

Laurence S. Wittner credits these incidents with significantly raising the profile of the anti-nuclear movement. Throughout the United States, citizens formed picket lines outside federal buildings and AEC facilities. One of their most memorable slogans was "Stop the tests, not the *Golden Rule*," and Reynolds became a household name as he carried that message further. While free on bail, he made eight television appearances, twenty-one radio broadcasts, and dozens of public speeches. Government officials implied that he must be a communist.¹⁶⁷ Linus Pauling had once been called before the Senate Internal Security Subcommittee to confront the same allegation, which he had denied.¹⁶⁸ Indirectly both men had joined the Soviet-championed effort to place the good of humanity before national security considerations.¹⁶⁹ So too had thousands of other men and woman affiliated with organizations such as the British Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament, in addition to over one hundred thousand Japanese university students who boycotted their classes

¹⁶⁶ See Wittner, *Rebels against War*, 246-49; *The New York Times*, 2 May 1958, 8 May 1958, 2 July 1958.

¹⁶⁷ Wittner, *Rebels against War*, 249.

¹⁶⁸ Wittner, *The Struggle against the Bomb* 2: 139. Much earlier in 1950 Senator Joe McCarthy had alleged that Pauling was a communist. John Winterle and Richard S. Cramer, *Portraits of Nobel Laureates in Peace* (London: Abelard-Schuman, 1971), 226.

¹⁶⁹ The National Security Council viewed this as part of the Soviet "peace offence" while the U.S. delegation at the United Nations insisted that nations should not be expected to compromise their security unless disarmament agreements included verification procedures. *FRUS 1955-1957*, vol. 19, *National Security Affairs* (Washington: USGPO, 1990): 27-38; *Yearbook of the United Nations* 1955: 8-9.

in protest of the U.S. tests.¹⁷⁰

Operation Hardtack yielded results which bolstered earlier predictions that a suspension would not substantially disadvantage the United States, and government scientists determined secret underground tests would be extremely difficult to conceal. These factors influenced Eisenhower's willingness to now accept a voluntary one-year suspension.¹⁷¹ Also, as he remarked to a French official, the suspension seemed helpful in counteracting the impression that the United States was a war-mongering nation.¹⁷² Robert Divine explains Eisenhower's change of position more generally in terms of his increased receptiveness to the world opinion.¹⁷³ At the time Eugene Rabinowitch wrote that the suspension would have been more useful if adopted before the United States had decided to pursue the hydrogen bomb.¹⁷⁴ No longer were there any means of denying humanity the opportunity to destroy itself or to reverse the risks attributed to radioactive fallout.¹⁷⁵

By the time the voluntary test suspension entered into force in early November, the United States had conducted well over a hundred explosions, the Soviet Union less than half that many and Britain merely twenty-one.¹⁷⁶ Ralph E. Lapp accordingly held the United States responsible for the majority of debris which had been released into the atmosphere since the end of the Second World War.¹⁷⁷ The Department of Health announced that radiation levels in Los Angeles were

¹⁷⁰ See Richard Taylor, *Against the Bomb: The British Peace Movement, 1958-1965* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1988), 26-27; *The New York Times*, 16 May 1958.

¹⁷¹ See Eugene B. Skolnikoff, *Science, Technology and American Foreign Policy* (Cambridge, Massachusetts: The MIT Press, 1967), 111-12; Gilpin, *American Scientists*, 197; Divine, *Blowing on the Wind*, 226-27; Henry A. Kissinger, "Nuclear Testing and the Problem of Peace," *Foreign Affairs* 37, 1 (1958): 1-18.

¹⁷² Wittner, *The Struggle against the Bomb* 2: 182-83.

¹⁷³ Divine, *Blowing on the Wind*, 211-12.

¹⁷⁴ Eugene Rabinowitch, "Nuclear Bomb Tests," *BAS* 14, no. 8 (1958): 282-87.

¹⁷⁵ See Ralph E. Lapp, "Fallout Hearings: Second Round," *BAS* 15, no. 7 (1959): 302-7; Boyer, *By the Bomb's Early Light*, 352-53; Weart, *Nuclear Fear*, 208-9.

¹⁷⁶ Divine, *Blowing on the Wind*, 238. For a slightly higher estimate, see Wittner, *The Struggle against the Bomb* 2: 29.

¹⁷⁷ Lapp, "Fallout Hearings."

detrimental to human safety, igniting a small-scale panic among residents in the vicinity of test sites in Nevada and New Mexico. Though some senior military officials held that the U.S. nuclear deterrent had reached an excessive level, the air force enacted plans to station inter-continental ballistic missiles throughout the nation with the immediate hope of deterring a Soviet miscalculation over the future of Berlin.¹⁷⁸ Rabinowitch wrote that the logic of competitive coexistence was likely to prevent the superpowers from engaging in direct conflict while cautioning that there was no guarantee that logic of any sort would prevail.¹⁷⁹

The three nations honored the suspension despite the non-compliance of France, which soon tested its first nuclear warhead; the downing of a U.S. spy plane over Soviet territory; menacing declarations by Soviet leaders; and perpetual discord over the future of Berlin.¹⁸⁰ Their restraint during this tumultuous period was admirable, but it was not unlimited. In April 1961 the United States attempted but failed to overthrow the Cuban government, highlighting its intolerance for communism as well as its reluctance to enforce its will in the face of adversity. This contributed to the Soviet Union's recommencement of testing later in the year and, more directly, to the full-scale crisis which erupted the following October.¹⁸¹ President John F. Kennedy implied that he would stop at nothing to reverse the Soviet Union's deployment of missiles in Cuba. While his strong leadership helped to secure that objective, he also made two major concessions: a pledge to refrain from further coup attempts and a pledge to withdraw missiles from Turkey, stationed as close to

¹⁷⁸ *The New York Times*, 31 October 1958, 31 March 1959.

¹⁷⁹ Eugene Rabinowitch, "The Berlin Crisis: Will Deterrence Work?" *BAS* 15, no. 4 (1959): 151-54.

¹⁸⁰ See Roberts, *The Nuclear Years*, 50; Bethe, *The Road to Los Alamos*, 55.

¹⁸¹ See Thomas G. Paterson and William J. Brophy, "October Missiles and November Elections: the Cuban Missile Crisis and American Politics, 1962," *Journal of American History* 73, no. 1 (1986): 87-119.

the USSR as the Soviet missiles in Cuba had been to the United States.¹⁸²

In July 1963 the superpowers and Britain reached a formal agreement barring nuclear tests in the atmosphere, underwater and outer space. The Cuban missile crisis had provided a new sense of urgency to reach some form of agreement, yet the partial test ban fell short of the most idealistic expectations. It permitted any number of underground tests so long as they did produce radioactive fallout beyond a signatory nation's own borders.¹⁸³ Kennedy still had reason to hail it as a "victory for [hu]mankind," albeit one which would not "resolve all conflicts, or cause the communists to forego their ambitions, or eliminate the dangers of war."¹⁸⁴ However, there were two communist ambitions which it had defeated: a complete ban and a prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons. It had also defeated the Anglo-American hope to establish an inspection regime. The compromise solution provided a degree of hope that the Cold War would not precipitate a global catastrophe.¹⁸⁵ In this way it had been tailored to accommodate world opinion, as Eisenhower had explained his acceptance of the voluntary test ban.¹⁸⁶

The day the treaty entered into force in October, Linus Pauling received the Nobel Peace Prize for his role as one of the world's foremost anti-nuclear activists. Pauling regretted the limited scope of test ban but acknowledged that it was a milestone in the quest which he hoped would lead to the abolition of war. *The New York Times* identified one of his most repeated observations as being that the question

¹⁸² Mandelbaum, *The Nuclear Question*, 145-47.

¹⁸³ For the text of the treaty, see *The New York Times*, 26 July 1963.

¹⁸⁴ *The New York Times*, 27 July 1958.

¹⁸⁵ See Eugene Rabinowitch, "Previews of Armageddon," *BAS* 4, 9 (1948): 258-60; Henry A. Kissinger, "Force and Diplomacy in the Nuclear Age," *Foreign Affairs* 34, no. 3 (1956): 349-66.

¹⁸⁶ See Glenn E. Schweitzer, *Techno-Diplomacy: U.S.-Soviet Confrontations in Science and Technology* (New York: Plenum Press, 1989), 51; Robin Ranger, *Arms and Politics 1958-1979: Arms Control in a Changing Political Context* (Toronto: Gage Publishing Limited, 1979), 13-14; Wittner, *The Struggle against the Bomb 2*: 173-75, 423-24; Kissinger, *Nuclear Weapons and Foreign Policy*, 365-66. In August, given Kennedy's assurance that it would in now way limit the U.S. president's power as commander-in-chief, the senate ratified the treaty by a vote of 80:19. *The New York Times*, 24-25 September 1963.

of humankind's survival trivialized issues such as capitalism and communism. He had first uttered words to that effect more than a decade earlier when called before congress to explain his affiliation with communist-sympathetic organizations.¹⁸⁷ The same sentiment had led many of the scientists affiliated with the Manhattan Project to establish the Federation of American Scientists and *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists*. With numerous other organizations and individuals, they achieved a major success in influencing how governments perceived rationality.¹⁸⁸

The Antarctic Treaty's inclusion of a nuclear test ban was less consequential than the one signed four years later, which itself only modified the arms race. Glenn E. Schweitzer observes that underground tests continued at a rapid pace.¹⁸⁹ Perhaps, as many U.S. senators feared, the 1963 test ban did slow the development of new weapons.¹⁹⁰ The Kennedy administration viewed this risk as preferable to further atmospheric tests which were subjecting the planet to a tiny sample of what would follow a nuclear exchange. The test ban helped to ensure that the "fragile truce" reached in the Antarctic, as *The New York Times* referred to it,¹⁹¹ would be upheld worldwide. The anti-nuclear movement had gained tremendous influence before the Cuban missile crisis had highlighted the need for some form of agreement. While Eisenhower acknowledged this, his successor went even further, enlisting Norman

¹⁸⁷ *The New York Times*, 11 October 1963.

¹⁸⁸ See Taylor, *Against the Bomb*, 5-9, 26-27; A.P. Vinogradov, "Prospects for the Pugwash Movement," *BAS* 15, no. 9 (1959): 376-78; P.E. Hodgson, "The British Atomic Scientists' Association, 1946-1959," *BAS* 15, no. 9 (1959): 398-94; Boyer, *By the Bomb's Early Light*, 64; Wintterle and Cramer, *Portraits of Nobel Laureates in Peace*, 228.

¹⁸⁹ Schweitzer, *Techno-Diplomacy*, 51. For another interpretation, see Philip C. Jessup and Howard J. Taubenfeld, *Controls for Outer Space and the Antarctic Analogy* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1959).

¹⁹⁰ *The New York Times*, 24-25 September 1963.

¹⁹¹ *The New York Times*, 16 June 1960.

Cousins, editor of *The Saturday Review* and member of the National Committee for a Sane Nuclear Policy, to help negotiate the agreement.¹⁹²

The world opinion which bore upon the voluntary test suspensions from 1958 to 1961 also bore upon the final days of the Antarctic Conference.¹⁹³ The nuclear test ban appeared to be gratuitous as all participants concurred on the need for demilitarization.¹⁹⁴ By the time of the conference, however, the United States had threatened not to renew the voluntary suspension as there had been little progress toward a formal agreement.¹⁹⁵ Its position might have been intended to hasten such an agreement, preferably by eroding the Soviet Union's aversion to inspection rights. Published U.S. documents reveal a variety of opinions among officials.¹⁹⁶ Neither published nor unpublished documents provide an extensive justification for the U.S. delegation's initial opposition to the test ban proposed for Antarctica.¹⁹⁷ What they do reveal is that the Southern Hemisphere nations unanimously sought to avoid any possibility of being subject to radioactive fallout.¹⁹⁸ While the cost-benefit ratio of conducting tests in the far south was questionable, the same was widely observed of the arms race.¹⁹⁹

¹⁹² Wittner, *The Struggle against the Bomb* 2: 142-43, 423-25.

¹⁹³ See Dwight D. Eisenhower, *The White House Years: Waging Peace 1956-1961* (London: Heinemann, 1965), 480-81.

¹⁹⁴ Embassy in Washington (Caccia) to Foreign Office, 22 October 1959, A 15214/260, PRO, FO 371.

¹⁹⁵ See *USWA* 1959: 169-71.

¹⁹⁶ See *FRUS* 1958-1960, 3: 557, 644-46.

¹⁹⁷ The delegation confidentially opposed the prohibition since it "had the effect of prohibiting nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes for all time in Antarctica no matter how desirable, unless and until there was general international agreement on the subject of nuclear explosions, which agreement might never be had." There is no elaboration of how the delegation intended to directly or indirectly convince the other signatories to accept that perspective. U.S. Delegation to Antarctic Conference (Phleger), Memorandum for Deputy Undersecretary of State (Merchant), 17 November 1959, NARA, RG 59, 702.022

¹⁹⁸ Department of State (Fergusson), Office Memorandum, 24 November 1959, NARA, RG 59, 399.829; Department of State, Office of Deputy Undersecretary of State (Owen), Memorandum, 9 December 1959, NARA, RG 59, 702.022. See Finn Sollie, "The Political Experiment in Antarctica," in Richard S. Lewis and Philip M. Smith, eds., *Frozen Future: A Prophetic Report from Antarctica* (New York: Quadrangle Books, 1973), 46-63.

¹⁹⁹ For example, Clifton M. Utley, "Atomic Superiority—A Wasting Asset," *BAS* 7, no. 3 (1951): 75-76; David Inglis, "National Security and the Arms Race Limited," *BAS* 12, no. 6 (1956): 196-201; Bernard Brodie, "Nuclear Weapons and Changing Strategic Outlooks," *BAS* 13, no. 2 (1957): 56-61.

From the perspective of the superpowers and Britain, one possible benefit of conducting tests in the Antarctic was that the fallout might not have reached the Northern Hemisphere. At the same time the United States and Soviet Union had proved willing to subject their own citizens—and each other's citizens—to heightened levels of radiation. Their tests in Nevada and Siberia, for example, contaminated rainfall from Japan to Midwest America while U.S. tests in the South Pacific displaced generations of islanders, and the first British test had entailed a similar risk for Australians.²⁰⁰ The early determination of the Department of State and National Security Council had not been fundamentally altered by the escalation of the arms race during the 1950s; Antarctica was still a region of minimal strategic importance.²⁰¹ The anti-nuclear sentiment which encouraged the United States to accept both test bans was prevalent among Americans. Otherwise it would have exerted much less influence even on those politicians, such as Adlai Stevenson, who advocated a test ban.²⁰²

The Department of State announced that the 1963 test ban had been phrased in a manner to prevent the Soviet Union from conducting allegedly peaceful atmospheric explosions. While this helped to persuade a majority of senators that it was in keeping with national interests,²⁰³ it also demonstrated that the superpowers would continue to presume the worst of each other in spite of formal progress. This aspect of their

²⁰⁰ See Edward A. Dougherty, "At the Crossroads in Hiroshima," *Peace Review* 10, no. 4 (1998): 625-31; William Penney, "The Monte Bello explosion," *BAS* 8, 9 (1952): 295-96; Ralph E. Lapp, "Global fallout," *BAS* 11, 9 (1955): 339-43; Weisgall, "Time to end the 40-year lie"; Guyer, "Radioactivity and right"; Lapp, "Fallout and candor"; Lapp, "Fallout hearings."

²⁰¹ Department of State, Office of European Affairs (Raynor) to Division of Northern European Affairs (Green), 27 January 1948, NARA, RG 59, 800.014; *FRUS* 1948, vol. 1, part 2, *General* (Washington: USGPO, 1976): 989-92; *FRUS* 1949, vol. 1, *National Security Affairs; Foreign Economic Policy* (Washington: USGPO, 1976): 800-3.

²⁰² See Kevles, *The Physicists*, 382-83; Divine, *Blowing on the Wind*, 115-16; Whitfield, *The Culture of the Cold War*, 59.

²⁰³ *The New York Times*, 24 September 1963. Many opponents of the 1963 treaty believed that the United States had been "lulled into complacency" by the Soviet peace offensive. See John E. Mueller, "Public Expectations during the Cold War," *American Journal of Political Science* 23, no. 2 (1979): 301-29.

relationship was not altered by the Kennedy administration's decision to adopt a doctrine of flexible rather than massive retaliation.²⁰⁴ It is understandable that the Department of State's announcement failed to recall that during the Antarctic Conference it had sought to avoid a clause barring peaceful explosions since, under certain circumstances, it believed, U.S. explosions might be described as such.²⁰⁵ The Southern Hemisphere nations had insisted on an unequivocal ban not because they had been deceived by the Soviet "peace offensive," but because they were disinclined to glorify the intentions of either superpower.

The success of the Antarctic Conference required the United States to modify its promotion of science and international cooperation, the incessantly stated objective of its policy toward the far south. The Manhattan Project had fundamentally transformed science, leading to the creation of a defense industry which diverted funds from non-applied research.²⁰⁶ In his farewell address Eisenhower warned of the military-industrial complex which his own policies had generated for the sake of national security, precipitating the arms race of which the Franck Report had warned.²⁰⁷ During the Antarctic Conference the United States yielded to a bloc of nations which shared little in common except for questioning its defense-oriented interpretation of science and its tendency to link international cooperation to the

²⁰⁴ See A.J.C. Edwards, *Nuclear Weapons: The Balance of Terror, the Quest for Peace* (Houndmills: Macmillan Press Ltd., 1986), 7; David Alan Rosenberg, "The Origins of Overkill: Nuclear Weapons and American Strategy," in Norman Graebner, ed., *The National Security: Its Theory and Practice, 1945–1960* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1986), 123–95.

²⁰⁵ See footnote 197.

²⁰⁶ Stuart W. Leslie, *The Cold War and American Science: The Military-Industrial-Academic Complex at MIT and Stanford* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1993), 31; Bruce L.R. Smith, *American Science Policy since World War II* (Washington DC: The Brookings Institution, 1990), 71; Daniel S. Greenberg, *The Politics of Pure Science* (New York: New American Library, 1971), 6–8.

²⁰⁷ See Dean Schooler Jr., *Science, Scientists and Public Policy* (New York: The Free Press, 1971), 13; William D. Hartung, "Eisenhower's Warning: The Military-Industrial Complex Forty Years Later," *World Policy Journal* 18, no. 1 (2001): 39–44; Fred J. Cook, *The Warfare State* (London: Jonathan Cape, 1962), 1–3.

maintenance or expansion of its strategic advantage.²⁰⁸ It is noteworthy that the Soviet Union refrained from maligning U.S. intentions as the Department of State maligned Soviet intentions related to the 1963 test ban. In part this might have been due to its ability to ratify either agreement—or any agreement—without engaging in a truly open debate.

Kenneth Osgood writes convincingly of the Eisenhower administration's reliance on "psychological warfare" in its negotiations with the Soviet Union.²⁰⁹ There is ample evidence of this in the realm of arms control and some pertaining to the Antarctic Conference. This is not to suggest that the trends were identical but they were analogous. As the United States did not instigate debate over the test ban, the issue can be viewed as a form of the Soviet Union's competing "psychological warfare" which greatly benefited from its advocacy of a test ban and a prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons.²¹⁰ This revealed the limitations of U.S. planning, which dwelled on the failure of the conference rather than its success.²¹¹ A declaration of U.S. rights based on exploration or other criteria would have been favorably received by many Americans, as discussed in chapter five, but perhaps less so than a test ban, which also would have generated favorable publicity abroad. U.S. Antarctic policy contained elements of success, in the form of two internationalization proposals, yet failed to maximize their propagandistic value.

²⁰⁸ In March 1958 the National Security Council contemplated accommodating the Soviet Union since the U.S. strategic advantage could no longer be taken for granted. The following August it suggested that this might include pursuing a verifiable arms control agreement. *FRUS* 1958–1960, vol. 3, *National Security Affairs; Arms Control and Disarmament* (Washington: USGPO, 1996): 51–56, 293.

²⁰⁹ Osgood, "Form before Substance."

²¹⁰ See Stephen E. Ambrose, *Rise to Globalism: American Foreign Policy since 1938* (London: The Penguin Press, 1971), 246; Dean Acheson, *Power and Diplomacy* (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1959), 9–11; Department of State, *Documents on Disarmament 1945–1959*, vol. 2, 1957–1959 (Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1960), 752–57.

²¹¹ Jason Kendall Moore, "The Constructive Limits of Antarctic History, Yankee Imperialism and Chilean–Australian Relations through 1959," *Revista de Historia* 13–14 (2003–4): 173–78.

The first proposal was tabled in 1948 at a time when the United States still held an atomic monopoly.²¹² Chapter two has addressed Truman's failure to capitalize on recommendations to use the bomb to extract Soviet concessions in Eastern Europe. Indeed that would have been a difficult objective even for his predecessor, Franklin D. Roosevelt, who was vastly more experienced and charismatic. Here the more significant issue is that Truman proved unable to use the bomb to secure the comparatively simple objective of reaching an eight-power agreement for a continent in which the Soviet Union had not been active for over a century. By the time of the second proposal a decade later, Eisenhower had found that hydrogen weapons provided no better leverage. His decision to involve the Soviet Union in Antarctic-related discussions was understandable in light of the "delicate balance of terror" which overshadowed international relations.²¹³ It also underscored that fact that technology had become a source not of power, but of impotence.²¹⁴

U.S. officials regretted that between the internationalization proposals, the Soviet Union did not hesitate to compete for regard as "the most peaceful atom user." Harold Nieburg uses that term in reference to the trend instigated by Eisenhower's Atoms-for-Peace proposal which sought to mitigate the negative publicity surrounding U.S. tests.²¹⁵ Soviet tests generated less negative publicity since they were fewer in number and conducted away from the western media. For this and other reasons, U.S. officials had not expected the USSR to open one of its nuclear reactors to inspection and then pledge to assist Eastern bloc nations in building their

²¹² By many accounts the primary objective of the Baruch Plan had was to preserve that monopoly. For example, Edward A. Shils, "Some Political Implications of the State Department Report," *BAS* 1, 9 (1946): 7-9, 19; Leo Szilard, "Shall We Face the Facts?" *BAS* 5, no. 10 (1949): 269-73.

²¹³ Albert Wohlstetter, "The Delicate Balance of Terror," *Foreign Affairs* 37, no. 2 (1959): 211-34.

²¹⁴ Mario Toscano, "Reflections on the Current International Situation," *International Affairs* 35, no. 1 (1959): 10-23.

²¹⁵ Medhurst, "Atoms for Peace and Nuclear Hegemony," 576.

own. They sought to regain the lead by pledging the same to a greater number of their own allies, aside from opening the formerly top-secret laboratory in Los Alamos to public scrutiny. Nieburg writes of these incidents as helping to establish the Olympic spirit which guided the two Geneva Conferences on the Peaceful Uses of Atomic Energy.²¹⁶

The Antarctic Conference involved less showmanship than the Geneva Conferences since it was not a public event. What the conferences shared was an “air of unreality” which had for many years characterized the sovereignty dispute, the formal exchange of protests and technical justifications for excluding the USSR.²¹⁷ Until the final days of the conference in Washington, Soviet representatives appeared to be “all milk and honey.”²¹⁸ The unexpected debate over the test ban reminded all parties that the spirit of Geneva was not unlike the spirit of the International Geophysical Year, which British officials privately mocked.²¹⁹ The failure of the U.S. delegation to anticipate the debate suggested that it had been deceived by its own rhetoric, or at least numbed to the possibility that the Soviet “peace offensive” might abruptly be carried to the far south. Its decision to compromise entailed no serious repercussions or loss of prestige. Rather it highlighted the fundamentally reactive nature of U.S. Antarctic policy.

As H. Robert Hall emphasizes, the process of getting the Antarctic-interested nations “to the table” was highly convoluted.²²⁰ Once there the risk persisted that they might fail to reach an agreement, as the three nuclear nations had failed to in

²¹⁶ Nieburg, *Nuclear Security and Foreign Policy*, 92-94.

²¹⁷ Embassy in Moscow (Kelly) to Foreign Secretary (Bevin), 17 October 1950, A 1529/36, PRO, FO 371.

²¹⁸ Embassy in Washington (Hankey) to Foreign Office (Hildyard), 21 October 1959, A 15214/257, PRO, FO 371.

²¹⁹ Foreign Office (Hankey) to Colonial Office (Rogers), 16 June 1958, AS 15214/135; Colonial Office (Rogers) to Foreign Office (Hankey), 18 June 1958, A 15214/135A, PRO, FO 371.

²²⁰ H. Robert Hall, “Casey and the Negotiation of the Antarctic Treaty,” in Julia Jabour-Green and Marcus Haward, eds., *The Antarctic: Past, Present and Future*, (Hobart, Tasmania: Cooperative Research Centre for the Antarctic and Southern Ocean, 2002), 27-33.

relation to arms control. The voluntary test suspension had been adopted only as a stop-gap measure. The same might have been true of the Chilean Escudero Plan to suspend the question of sovereignty only while other aspects of an internationalization agreement were negotiated—except that the question of sovereignty was to remain indefinitely suspended. This demonstrated that avoidance techniques could sometimes be used with success. The Atoms-for-Peace proposal offered a less notable example of this, as it failed to place any limit on military tests or the stockpiling of weapons. The world opinion to which Eisenhower attributed the voluntary test suspensions did contribute to both the Antarctic Treaty and the 1963 test ban, yet it was not fully heeded.

On some level Escudero might have empathized with why many scientists regretted having been involved with the Manhattan Project. The United States misdirected his plan much as it misdirected the atomic bomb from a certain perspective. The Antarctic Treaty, unlike the arms race, produced a result which all parties found satisfactory. Escudero warranted much credit for this even though his role as an advisor to the Chilean Foreign Affairs Ministry had been relatively passive. He might have been displeased with the Soviet Union's involvement,²²¹ but he was unlikely to have blamed himself for it as much as Albert Einstein did for having encouraged the U.S. government to develop the atomic bomb.²²² Both men had reason to feel either betrayed or neglected. What had become apparent by the Antarctic Conference was the need for peaceful coexistence, and regardless of their

²²¹ The reviewed documents contain no indication of Escudero's opinion on this issue.

²²² Einstein referred to this as the "one great mistake" of his life. Sherwin, *A World Destroyed*, 27. As early as 1947, he identified parallels between the U.S. public opinion and the xenophobic nationalism which had characterized the Third Reich. Aryeh Dvoretzky, "On Some of Einstein's Non-Scientific Opinions," in Colette M. Kinnon, ed., *The Impact of Modern Scientific Ideas on Society: In Commemoration of Einstein* (Dordrecht, Holland: D. Reidel Publishing Company, 1981), 182-88. At the height of McCarthyism he publicly urged intellectuals to refuse to testify before the House Un-American Activities Committee and Senate Internal Security Subcommittee, as he himself refused to. In his perspective, citizens had a responsibility to sacrifice their "personal welfare in the interest of the cultural welfare" of the United States. See *The New York Times*, 12 June 1953, 17 December 1953.

intentions or past mistakes, they and many others significantly furthered this objective.

This theme has been the most overarching contained herein, yet it cannot be duly evaluated in isolation from the others. The conclusion provides a synopsis of each of the selected Cold War contexts, two in relation to diplomacy, two in relation to public opinion. Thereafter it suggests projects which might be derived from this one, and suggests possible implications for the ongoing debate over the nature of history.

Conclusion

For the sake of drawing broader parallels than otherwise possible, this thesis has emphasized the contexts of U.S. Antarctic policy as much as the policy itself. Its synopsis of the McCarthy era, for example, has demonstrated the extent to which anticommunism permeated the American society.¹ The term McCarthyism remains widely used as a synonym for intolerance. Antarctic specialists are as familiar with it as any other kind of specialist, yet terms such as “Escuderoism” have yet to enter the vocabulary of either specialists or generalists. Cold War historians who mention the continent do so only in passing as it was extremely remote from human civilization. The treaty’s domestic ratification, however, hinged upon the support of politicians who generally shared McCarthy’s viewpoint despite their past condemnation of his behavior. The treaty’s inclusion of the Soviet Union diverged most poignantly from this context, yet in each of the selected contexts, U.S. Antarctic policy entailed ambivalent motivations which contributed to an impression of unreliability. While Antarctic literature does not analyze this issue at length, it happens to reinforce the traditional perspective that the treaty was a miraculous achievement.²

Thomas Postelwait suggests that history might reveal no more than the documented traces of undocumented memories.³ If so, the same might be held of Antarctic history, yet politically oriented accounts neglect the multiplicity of ways in which Cold War dynamics bore upon the treaty’s formation. The reviewed U.S. and British archives indicate that strategic perspectives extended to the South Pole, albeit

¹ See chapter six.

² See the works of Peter Beck, Sanjay Chaturvedi, Jack Child, Klaus J. Dodds, Richard S. Lewis, Julius Goebel, H. Robert Hall, Christopher C. Joyner, Phillip W. Quigg and Deborah Shapley, as cited in chapter one.

³ Thomas Postelwait, “Writing History Today,” *Theatre Survey* 41 (2000): 83-106.

with the understanding that relatively little was at stake.⁴ There is no shortage of Antarctic-related documentation from the era under consideration—an era which Cold War historians have analyzed from an endless number of non-Antarctic perspectives.⁵ This thesis has modified Postelwait's logic in analyzing the generally undocumented Antarctic traces of well-documented Cold War memories.⁶ As observed at the time, U.S. officials involved with the region did think in terms of long-range bombers and nuclear missiles,⁷ yet they chose to pursue the benefits associated with peaceful scientific cooperation.

The Antarctic Treaty's suspension of sovereignty, based on the Chilean Escudero Plan, established the *modus vivendi* for an agreement which grew overshadowed by the superpowers' conflict. Perhaps more than other aspects of the treaty, it appeared to be in keeping with the "spirit of Geneva" to resolve conflicts through negotiation rather than force. Bipolar rivalries extended to many economic and ideological realms which alone did not account for the Cold War. The rivalries focused on sovereignty and the defense thereof, leading the formation of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, the Warsaw Pact and the arms race of which many scientists had warned. By voluntarily withholding their sovereignty in the Antarctic, the United States and Soviet Union suspended traditional geopolitics, as defined in terms of projecting influence beyond internationally recognized borders. The U.S.

⁴ Chilean archives also reveal strategic thinking, yet on the global level the Foreign Affairs Ministry wielded little influence, unlike the Foreign Office and Department of State.

⁵ For example, John Earl Haynes, "The Cold War Debate Continues: A Traditionalist View of Historical Writing on Domestic Communism and anti-Communism," *Journal of Cold War Studies* 2, no. 1 (2000): 76-115.

⁶ For example, U.S. and British archives contain limited, somewhat incompatible references to the debate over the treaty's inclusion of the nuclear test ban. If exclusively relied upon, these archives would have provided an insufficient basis for chapter seven, yet when evaluated relative to the anti-nuclear movement, they have assumed far greater significance. Likewise, an account of the treaty's domestic ratification might be viewed as unrelated to McCarthyism, yet the remnants of that phenomenon, coupled with the U-2 incident, lent a degree of credibility to the charge of "appeasement," as discussed in chapter six.

⁷ *The New York Times*, 5 October 1954.

Navy's 1946–1947 expedition indicated that a formal claim was under consideration. The government withheld action primarily due to the military establishment's wariness to add to its responsibilities which already extended around the globe. Another factor was that a U.S. claim might have provoked a Soviet counter-claim.⁸

U.S.–Soviet relations influenced the multilateral negotiations surrounding Antarctica, but in themselves were highly unpredictable and subject to miscalculation. For example, the United States excluded Korea from the perimeter of nations which it vowed to defend, only then to spend three years embroiled in a conflict which appeared to have been inspired from the Soviet Union and which directly involved China. Its reluctance to assist the anticommunist uprisings in East Berlin and Hungary demonstrated further inconsistencies between the theory and practice of its ideals. Like its briefly held atomic monopoly and later doctrine of massive retaliation, its stance toward the Antarctic failed to deter its enemies or reassure its allies. There were increasing signs that the Cold War would extend to the bottom of the world, though few as to what that might entail. The stated U.S. objective to promote science and international cooperation was not entirely plausible in an era when officials reserved the right to launch a pre-emptive nuclear strike against the Soviet Union, which often boasted of its own capacity to obliterate its adversaries.⁹

The sovereignty dispute between Britain and the Southern Cone nations, Chile and Argentina, exacerbated the difficulty of reaching an internationalization agreement. It revealed that, to some extent, the “free world” nations were divided among themselves. While determining the future of Antarctica was not among the highest U.S. priorities, it held vastly greater importance for these three nations. Their threats of war nearly did reach fruition after the British Navy destroyed Chilean and

⁸ See chapters one, two and seven.

⁹ See chapter two.

Argentine outposts in the disputed archipelago. The United States helped to diffuse the controversy without providing any guarantee of the course which its own policy might take. A declaration of its rights over the unclaimed sector from 90° to 150° West would have assured Britain and the Latin American nations that a new level of complexity would not be added to their own territorial quarrel. This alternative was withheld not only due to concerns of provoking a Soviet claim, but also due to the belief that U.S. rights extended over most or all of the frozen terrain.¹⁰

The trilateral quest for an agreement faced nearly as many hurdles as the multilateral quest. Anti-U.S. sentiment rose substantially after World War Two. Though less pronounced in Britain and Chile than in Soviet-bloc or non-aligned nations, it remained significant. The two nations were united in their desire to secure U.S. financial and military assistance while preserving the sense of dignity which fuelled their quarrel over Antarctica. They also shared a sense of frustration toward the U.S. refusal to become directly involved. These issues contributed to their willingness to negotiate their own arrangement, in cooperation with Argentina, in case the twelve-power negotiations of the second U.S. internationalization proposal were to fail. Their disappointment that the United States insisted on being involved was understandable, as was their own contingency planning. Indeed the controversy surrounding the region was most noteworthy in that it divided loyalties within and between Cold War factions.¹¹

The diplomatic contexts of U.S. Antarctic policy—presented in the first four chapters—revealed elements of uncertainty. The first internationalization proposal sought to avoid Soviet or UN involvement as either way U.S. officials would have compromised their freedom of action. It was tabled at a time when they were

¹⁰ See chapters three and four.

¹¹ Ibid.

considering the announcement of rights as well as means of reducing tensions between the Southern Cone nations and Britain. They discouraged British calls for arbitration at the International Court of Justice at The Hague as they were met with calls to take the dispute before the Organization of American States, where the issue was likely to generate perceptions of Anglo–American collusion. Neither of these bodies nor any other clearly held jurisdiction over Antarctica. The second U.S. internationalization proposal sought to preserve that aspect of the status quo without fully alleviating the risk that the Soviet Union might attempt to involve the United Nations for the sake of portraying itself as the champion of the unrepresented nations. The only certainty was that the future of the region would now be largely determined by Cold War exigencies.¹²

U.S. policy enjoyed a greater degree of flexibility than British or Chilean policy, for example, as the North American public did not regard Antarctica in highly nationalistic terms. Some journalists began to echo the sentiments of Elizabeth A. Kendall, the lone citizen activist discussed in chapter five, and much of the world respected the legacy of Admiral Richard Evelyn Byrd. The prospect of announcing a formal claim based primarily on his exploration would have appealed to many North Americans, but it was not among their foremost priorities. The widely reported race to Antarctica with Germany before the Second World War emerged thereafter as a uranium race with the claimant nations, a topic which made for engaging, though not alarming headlines. Operation High Jump highlighted the navy's capacity to defend or advance national interests if that were to become necessary or preferable. Later U.S. expeditions, though less massive, remained formidable. As Americans took

¹² See chapters one through four.

abundance for granted and were confident of their nation's military strength,¹³ they lacked a sense of urgency toward the Antarctic.¹⁴

The danger related the Soviet Union's involvement was far less than the danger that its troops might overrun Western Europe or that its agents might seriously undermine U.S. internal security. President Harry S. Truman's program to rid the federal government of disloyal employees was not without basis, though it reached extreme proportions which were carried further by Senator Joe McCarthy. The phenomenon known as McCarthyism grew larger than any individual, for it addressed the nation's core values and role in world affairs. Antarctica seemed trivial by comparison, yet its ratification by the senate had not been taken for granted. The Department of State did not lobby on its behalf as the treaty could be viewed as appeasing the Soviet Union, as had been repeatedly alleged of officials throughout the Roosevelt and Truman administrations. Six years had passed since the senate rebuked McCarthy, but that had been due to his manner rather than his ideas. U.S. politics remained saturated in anticommunism.

The treaty gained the two-thirds margin needed for ratification because senators had faith that the government would not have proposed the draft upon which it was based, and then accepted amendments during the conference, unless the treaty were consistent with the nation's best interests. The senators who disagreed shared Kendall's perspective that the treaty offended the legacy of U.S. explorers, involved the Soviet Union for no valid reason, and discarded common sense to appease a few idealistically minded scientists, if not the Soviet Union itself. The Eisenhower administration had accepted that the treaty required a suspension of traditional Cold War thinking. The USSR had re-established its Antarctic presence during the

¹³ See David M. Potter, *People of Plenty: Economic Abundance and the American Character* (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1954).

¹⁴ See chapter five.

International Geophysical Year and for many years insisted on participating in any agreement. To deny it that opportunity would have been highly impractical. Moreover opponents of the treaty were unable to suggest that it would jeopardize U.S. security. The government permitted these issues to sell the treaty, and they were sufficiently obvious to have that effect.¹⁵

A more pressing issue, and indeed the most pressing issue before humanity, was the arms race.¹⁶ Rumors that the U.S. nuclear agenda might extend to Antarctica were not supported by any evidence that Operation High Jump of the later Operations Deep Freeze transported weapons of mass destruction or sought to deploy them. At the same time the rumors were not simply communist propaganda, as Eisenhower sought to dismiss them. The U.S. delegation initially objected to including a test ban in the treaty in hope that, at some point in the future, U.S. nuclear tests in the Antarctic might be viewed as consistent with the treaty's demilitarization clauses. World opinion had turned against the United States in this regard, heavily influenced by the Soviet Union's announcement of a voluntary test suspension in early 1958, which the Anglo-American nations agreed to honor and which remained in effect during the Antarctic Conference.¹⁷

The public opinion contexts of U.S. Antarctic policy—presented in the last three chapters—included a number of divergent variables. U.S. Antarctic opinion was mild though generally favorable to the declaration of a national claim. U.S. opinion toward the Soviet Union was hostile but increasingly receptive to the need for peaceful coexistence. It had also grown less favorable to nuclear tests. The anti-nuclear movement held exponentially greater significance than the pro-claimant

¹⁵ See chapters five and six.

¹⁶ Arnold Toynbee, for example, referred to the arms race as the "challenge of our generation." Quoted in H.E. Wimperis, "Atomic Energy Control: The Present Position," *International Affairs* 24, no. 4 (1948): 515-23.

¹⁷ See chapter seven.

movement embodied by, and mostly limited to, Byrd and Kendall whose best efforts failed to alter the course of U.S. policy. By declaring rights in the Antarctic, the government would have incurred allegations that it was as self-interested as the seven other nations which had done so, and more deceptive as it had long refused to recognize the validity of rights based on exploration, discovery or any other criteria. In that case it would have undermined its prestige without gaining any substantial benefit. Officials had no desire to offend the legacy of Byrd and other American explorers; rather they hoped to nurture their own reputation for seeking the pacifistic resolution of disputes.¹⁸

In both the diplomatic and public opinion contexts of U.S. Antarctic policy, officials faced difficulty gaining support for an agreement in which they themselves lacked unequivocal faith. The non-claimant policy failed to allay widespread concerns that the White House might yet declare rights over the entire continent. Officials repeatedly stated their reservation not of their own rights, or the rights of the Western Hemisphere—a notion entertained by the Roosevelt administration—but of all rights. Statements of that nature fuelled concerns about U.S. unreliability.¹⁹ As a representative of the Department of State once told reporters, U.S. Antarctic policy under constant review and was prepared to adapt to new circumstances.²⁰ This explanation revealed that the policy was less a policy than a series of fluctuating responses. While the second internationalization proposal laid the groundwork for negotiations, it borrowed the Chilean Escudero Plan and failed to anticipate, much

¹⁸ See chapters five through seven.

¹⁹ See Consuelo León Wöppke, “‘The Western Hemisphere o Hemisferico Occidental’: Construcción y Deconstrucción de un Concepto Mítico Relevante de las Relaciones Interamericanas y Antártica,” in León Wöppke, Mauricio Jara Fernandez et al., *¿Convergencia Antártica? Los Contextos de la Historia Antártica Chilena, 1939–1949* (Valparaíso, Chile: Editorial Puntangeles, 2005), 43–60.

²⁰ The representative was Caspar D. Green of Division of Northern European Affairs, who said in response to a reporter’s question about U.S. Antarctica policy that “like most foreign policy problems is under constant study and that changing circumstances could bring change in this as well as in any other policy.” Department of State, Memorandum by Division of Northern European Affairs (Green), 11 February 1948, NARA, RG 59, 800.014.

less to welcome, the need for a nuclear test ban. The United States assumed a form of leadership perhaps more accurately described as facilitation.

Keith Suter writes that signing of the treaty was remarkable in that it took place at such a tense interlude of the Cold War.²¹ The previous year the Soviet Union had issued an ultimatum over the future of Berlin which had carried an implicit threat of war. While the meeting between Eisenhower and Khrushchev at Camp David generated a sense of hope, the crisis had not been resolved.²² Suter portrays the treaty as evidence of U.S. dominance in the world and the Soviet Union's acceptance that it extended to Antarctica. The treaty, in his estimation, attested to America's "unchallenged" power.²³ Interestingly U.S. officials at the time agreed that the Soviet Union had gained the diplomatic advantage, as judged by world opinion, and this had heavily influenced their decision to follow the Soviet-sponsored voluntary suspension of nuclear testing, as well as to accept the Soviet-sponsored test ban included in the Antarctic Treaty.²⁴ If their power had been unchallenged, they might have chosen to resurrect the original eight-power proposal and forced the USSR to evacuate.

Suter's exaggeration of U.S. power is less questionable than others' reference to U.S. Antarctic policy as a tribute to the nation's enlightened self-interest. John D. Negroponte, Barbara Mitchell, and Lee Kimball, for example, provide idealistic summaries which are difficult to reconcile with the contingency plans and widespread apprehension discussed herein.²⁵ They seem to accept at face value Eisenhower's public remarks which were by nature optimistic and much less revealing than press

²¹ Keith Suter, *Antarctica: Private Property or Public Heritage?* (London: Zed Books, 1991), 20-21.

²² See chapters two and four.

²³ Suter, *Antarctica*, 10.

²⁴ See chapter seven.

²⁵ John D. Negroponte, "The Success of the Antarctic Treaty," *Department of State Bulletin* 87 (1987): 2123; Barbara Mitchell and Lee Kimball, "Conflict over the Cold Continent," *Foreign Policy* 35 (1979): 124-41.

speculation at the time, based largely on official explanations of U.S. objectives.

Declassified government papers, though essential for diplomatic historians, reveal no greater duplicity than many journalists alleged. The uncontroversial ideals espoused by U.S. policy—science and international cooperation—came to fruition only because officials accepted the need for a measure of peaceful coexistence. While they distrusted the Soviet Union’s use of that term, at the Antarctic Conference they recognized the impracticality of promoting a form of their self-interest which was not only enlightened but radioactive.²⁶

After the Second World War the United States engaged in many forms of political warfare—espionage, false propaganda, assassinations, counterfeiting and even demolition—to encourage Soviet compliance with an international system which advanced the its own strategically oriented interpretation of democracy.²⁷ Some politicians reduced this objective to a justification for proceeding “with the atomic bomb in one hand and the cross in the other.”²⁸ The reviewed documents do no suggest that the senators who opposed the Antarctic Treaty were jingoists, but rather that the most dangerous form of U.S. self-interest was prohibited at the Antarctic Conference due to the joint effort of the Soviet Union and the Southern Hemisphere nations. U.S. opposition to the nuclear test ban, though short-lived, underscored the nation’s failure to anticipate foreign policy challenges, as well as its reluctance to divorce science from military applications.²⁹

²⁶ See chapter seven.

²⁷ See *FRUS 1945–1950, Emergence of the Intelligence Establishment* (Washington: USGPO, 1996): 719-22, 730-31; Thomas H. Etzold and John Lewis Gaddis, eds. *Containment: Documents on American Policy and Strategy, 1945–1950* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1978), 64-69.

²⁸ In the words of Senator Edward Martin, as spoken in 1950. Quoted in Stephen J. Whitfield, *The Culture of the Cold War* (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1991), 87. For similar declarations, see John Lewis Gaddis, *1941–1947* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1972), 245.

²⁹ Ralph E. Lapp observed that congress never refused, and rarely hesitated to fund a major defense project, a phenomenon which he linked to “a weapons culture which has fastened an insidious grip upon the entire nation” dating back to the Manhattan Project, after which “science was never to be divorced from weaponry.” Lapp, *The Weapons Culture* (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, Inc.,

John Lewis Gaddis aptly summarizes the theme which unites the four contexts presented herein: U.S. influence during the Cold War was often more limited than it appeared and lacked a grand design. He makes this determination in light of recently declassified Soviet-era documents which, in his perspective, affirm the traditional U.S. viewpoint that the USSR was largely to blame for the antagonistic nature of superpower relations. Though others disagree with this specific interpretation,³⁰ he writes with recognized authority and moderation. It is unsurprising that he omits U.S. Antarctic policy from among the things which “we now know,” yet that policy also generated a false impression of U.S. leadership.³¹ As discussed in chapter six, *The New York Times* praised the U.S. decision to include the USSR in the treaty. Documents indicate that this decision was made only in response to British pressure, and was only feasible given the suspension of sovereignty called for by the Chilean Escudero Plan. What deserved praise was not the U.S. decision itself, but officials’ willingness to heed external influences.³²

British Foreign Secretary Ernest Bevin once said, “I think wisdom has come late” in reference to accepting the need to resolve his nation’s territorial dispute with Chile and Argentina.³³ His words were less applicable to that specific dispute—which was technically never resolved—than to the Antarctic controversy in general. There was much wisdom in the U.S. decisions to uphold the non-claimant

1968), 12-15. From a more moderate perspective, even James B. Conant conceded, “There can be no doubt that politics and science, once quite separate activities, have become intermeshed and at times the grinding of the gears produces strong and disturbing noises.” Conant, “Science and Politics in the Twentieth Century,” *Foreign Affairs* 28, no. 2 (1950): 189-202. J. Robert Oppenheimer wrote the atomic bomb severely challenged the idea of progress which had been an integral part of western civilization for centuries. Oppenheimer, “Physics in the Contemporary World,” *BAS* 4, no. 3 (1948): 65-68, 85. For similar themes more poignantly expressed, see D.J. Dooley, “Science as Cliché, Fable and Faith,” *BAS* 15, no. 9 (1959): 372-75.

³⁰ For example, Michael Cox and Caroline Kennedy-Pipe, “The Tragedy of American Diplomacy? Rethinking the Marshall Plan,” *Journal of Cold War Studies* 7, no. 1 (2005): 97-134.

³¹ John Lewis Gaddis, *We Now Know: Rethinking Cold War History* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997), 27; Melvyn P. Leffler, “The Cold War: What Do “We Know Now”?”, *American Historical Review* 104, no. 2 (1999): 501-24.

³² See chapter five.

³³ *The New York Times*, 4 November 1948.

policy, involve the USSR, and accept the nuclear test ban, yet it came very late and without enthusiasm.³⁴ Perhaps the success of U.S. Antarctic policy must be judged by the result to which it contributed rather than by how adroitly or maladroitly it was pursued,³⁵ as this would be consistent with the North American tendency to believe that truth must be derived from experience.³⁶ During the Eisenhower administration that tendency entailed a highly managerial style of government and the willingness to let policies be shaped by events.³⁷

U.S. Antarctic policy might be regarded as counterproductive given its failure either to assert rights or to exclude the USSR. While the government neglected a several innovative recommendations pertaining to the far south, it also neglected the recommendations to consult with the Soviet Union before bombing Hiroshima, which might have slowed or prevented the arms race. Later it neglected recommendations not to develop the hydrogen bomb, lest the arms race never be curtailed. Meanwhile the quest for nuclear supremacy failed to prevent it from becoming embroiled in conventional wars. The result has been described as entailing both “the high risks of

³⁴ The eighteen-month event was widely and correctly perceived as being conducive to some form of Antarctic agreement. For example, G.C.L. Bertram, “Antarctic Prospect,” *International Affairs* 33, no. 2 (1957): 143-53.

³⁵ A declaration of rights would have pleased many Americans while either mildly or greatly complicating the prospects for internationalization. Acquiring a new testing ground for nuclear weapons also might have pleased some Americans, yet the cost-benefit ratio failed to be enticing. In this way, the frozen continent was ideally suited for cooperation between the superpowers, as their strategic designs focused on the inhabited continents; what they did elsewhere was peripheral in their effort not only to win hearts and minds but also to secure valuable military outposts. See Hans W. Weigert, “U.S. Strategic Bases and Collective Security,” *Foreign Affairs* 25, no. 2 (1947): 250-62; Kenneth A. Osgood, “Hearts and Minds: The Unconventional Cold War,” *Journal of Cold War Studies* 4, no. 2 (2002): 85-107.

³⁶ John P. Diggins, “Consciousness and Ideology in American History: The Burden of Daniel J. Boorstin,” *American Historical Review* 76, no. 1 (1971): 99-118. This viewpoint, not specifically related to U.S. Antarctic policy, was acknowledged by J. Robert Oppenheimer, who wrote that the nation’s “culture favours practice over contemplation.” Oppenheimer, “An Inward Look,” *Foreign Affairs* 36, no. 2 (1958): 209-20.

³⁷ See David B. Capitanichik, *The Eisenhower Administration and American Foreign Policy* (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1969), 25-27; H.W. Brands, “The Age of Vulnerability: Eisenhower and the National Insecurity State,” *American Historical Review* 94, no. 4 (1989): 963-89; Robert Griffith, “Dwight D. Eisenhower and the Corporate Commonwealth,” *American Historical Review* 87, no. 1 (1982): 87-122; Philip Abbott, “Eisenhower, King Utopus and the Fifties Decade in America,” *Presidential Studies Quarterly* 32, 1 (2002): 7-29.

strategic warfare” and “the high costs of limited conflict.”³⁸ Compared to this scenario, U.S. Antarctic policy was not counterproductive; it merely disappointed a minority of citizens and a handful of Department of State employees who offered their best insights while dealing with many other issues which would continue to occupy them.

Research topics to be derived from this thesis might include biographical sketches of individuals such as Elizabeth A. Kendall whose diligence surprised and perhaps amused many officials and politicians. Walter Sullivan, science editor of *The New York Times*, appeared to carry her nationalistic motivations to the furthest nuclear extreme, though otherwise he did not fit the profile of a fanatic.³⁹ George C. Krouse, president of the Antarctic Colony Associates, which the governmental refused to subsidize,⁴⁰ might prove equally fascinating. So too might Julio Escudero Guzman and Mario Rodriguez, the counselor to the Chilean Embassy in Washington who revealed knowing that the United States had betrayed its pledge of confidentiality by discussing the Escudero Plan with British officials, and whose manner often verged on petulance.⁴¹ To varying degrees, all of these individuals possessed the spirit of “buccaneering playboys trying to scratch empires from ice,” as *Manchester Guardian* once referred to the Southern Cone nations with an equal measure of humor and contempt.⁴²

Other topics might pertain to U.S.–Chilean relations, a topic herein presented relative to U.S.–British relations but which maintains properties worthy of

³⁸ Brands, “The Age of Vulnerability,” 989.

³⁹ See footnote 20.

⁴⁰ Antarctic Colony Associates (Krouse) to Secretary of State (Acheson), 7 July 1950; Department of State, Division of Northern European Affairs (Hulley), to Antarctic Colony Associates (Krouse), [7 July 1950], NARA, RG 59, 702.022.

⁴¹ Jason Kendall Moore, “Frontier Mentalities and Perceptual Trends in United States–Chilean Antarctic Relations through 1959,” *Estudios Norteamericanos* 3, no. 2 (2003): 69–80.

⁴² Embassy in London (Douglas) to Department of State, 25 February 1948; Ambassador in Santiago (Bowers) to Secretary of State, NARA, RG 59, 800.014.

consideration beyond the scope of previously published studies dwelling on the Antarctic.⁴³ President Gabriel Gonzalez Videla held beliefs which appeared compatible with the “paranoid” style of anticommunism,⁴⁴ yet the Chilean reality bore evidence of a Soviet-inspired conspiracy which actually did have the potential to topple the government. As discussed in chapter four, Gonzalez Videla berated his fellow citizens who possessed an “uncontrollable” hatred of the United States,⁴⁵ yet he also demonstrated a strong aversion to U.S. economic policies. Published accounts of his meetings with the Department of State and U.S. businessmen suggest that he was not exempt from “anti-Yankee” sentiment, but rather that he was able to use it to gain concessions.

The reviewed archives of the Chilean Foreign Affairs Ministry address Antarctica rather than the copper industry, and they have been minimally cited to avoid distracting from U.S.-oriented Cold War themes. These sources remain tremendously valuable for any number of projects. One of the most human diplomatic encounters presented herein took place between Chilean Ambassador in London Manuel Bianchi and Foreign Secretary Ernest Bevin. In centuries past their heated tempers, roused by the actions and declarations of Gonzalez Videla, might have precipitated a duel to the death. Chilean archives hold evidence of many such incidents which fully attest to the “pleasure of reading diplomatic correspondence,” outlined by Gordon A. Craig.⁴⁶ A collection of Antarctic-related essays published last

⁴³ Such as Jason Kendall Moore “Frontier Mentalities and Perceptual Trends in U.S.–Chilean Antarctic relations through 1959,” *Estudios Norteamericanos* 3, no. 2 (2003): 69–80; Moore, “Maritime Rivalry, Political Intervention, and the Race to Antarctica: U.S.–Chilean Relations, 1939–1949,” *Journal of Latin American Studies* 33, no. 4 (2001): 713–38; Moore, “Thirty-Seven Degrees Frigid: U.S.–Chilean Relations and the Spectre of Polar Arrivistes, 1950–1959,” *Diplomacy & Statecraft* 14, no. 4 (2003): 69–93.

⁴⁴ See Richard Hoffstadter, *The Paranoid Style of American Politics and Other Essays* (London: Jonathan Cape, 1964).

⁴⁵ *The New York Times*, 21 November 1948.

⁴⁶ Gordon A. Craig, “On the Pleasure of Reading Diplomatic Correspondence,” *Journal of Contemporary History* 26 (1991): 369–84.

year by Universidad de Playa Ancha, Chile, attests to the richness of the material.⁴⁷ It should be hoped that more historians will present the far south in a manner which holds the attention non-specialists and broadens the perspective of the remainder.

Some of the previously published research incorporated herein, in modified form, originally assumed a more critical tenor toward U.S. Antarctic policy. While the author's perspective has not been altered by exploring the general context of U.S. foreign relations, greater effort has been made to empathize with the dilemmas faced by policymakers, some but not all of whom believed that their national objectives were truly enlightened, regardless of the extreme form of forms which they occasionally happened to assume.⁴⁸ The incompatibility of their perceptions and reality is a topic which goes far beyond the scope of this thesis, and other more creative or theoretical analytical frameworks have been neglected.⁴⁹ This thesis has subscribed to the notion that, in the words of Karl Löwith, "a single grain of [evidence] is preferable to a vast construct of illusions."⁵⁰

⁴⁷ The topics, though diplomatically oriented, extend into the realms of philosophy, journalism, geography, culture. Consuelo León Wöppke, Mauricio Jara Fernandez et al., *¿Convergencia Antártica? Los Contextos de la Historia Antártica Chilena, 1939–1949* (Valparaíso, Chile: Editorial Puntangeles, 2005).

⁴⁸ It has been observed that Americans are prone to believe that their nation's role in the world is idealistically motivated. He attributes this in part to their "brainwashing" by government propaganda and orthodox historians. George H. Quester, "Origins of the Cold War: Some Clues from Public Opinion," *Political Science Quarterly* 93, no. 4 (1978–79): 647–63.

⁴⁹ While theoretically based studies are often regarded as more creative than source-based historical accounts, some authors maintain that the use of language is inherently creative and that history is capable of being as eloquent, dramatic, and persuasive as the finest literature. Others go as far as to suggest that truth of history lies only in the mechanics of its articulation. This structure of this thesis has been inspired by such thought, as its multiple perspectives of U.S. Antarctic policy are not necessarily complementary or reflective of what actually might have transpired. See Paul Hamilton, *Historicism* (London: Routledge, 1996), 21; Hayden White, "The Historical Text as Literary Artifact," in Geoffrey Roberts, ed., *The History and Narrative Reader* (London: Routledge, 2001), 221–36; David Harris Sacks, "Imagination in History," *Shakespeare Studies* 31 (2003): 64–86.

⁵⁰ Karl Löwith, *Meaning in history* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1949), v. Löwith wrote "truth" in place of "evidence." The substitution seeks to preserve a measure of continuity with footnote 48 and themes. See also Jeffrey Andrew Barash, "The Sense of History: On the Political Implications of Karl Löwith's Concept of Secularization," *History and Theory* 37, no. 1 (1998): 69–82.

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